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Abstract  
 To combat urban sprawl and its negative effects on ecosystem services and human health, 
regional growth management and containment policies have been used with increased frequency to 
manage urban growth.  Yet, local implementation of regional growth management planning policies 
across North America has had mixed success, often resulting in a mismatch between growth management 
planning objectives and the urban development reality. This research explores the reasons for the apparent 
mismatch by examining how barriers to local implementation are expressed, reinforced and perpetuated to 
prevent transformative change.  
Using Ontario’s Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe as a case study, the dissertation 
examines the barriers to implementation through a review of local contextual information and the 
perspectives of those tasked with implementing the Plan within three case study regions of the Greater 
Golden Horseshoe: Waterloo, Simcoe and Peterborough. A relational model of barriers reported in the 
literature is developed and tested against the barriers described by local planners, developers, the media, 
planning documents, and locally relevant academic literature and used to frame comparisons across case 
studies. Variations among the case studies are interpreted in light of the model using a conceptual 
framework that conceives barriers as institutions embedded within a hierarchical culture of planning.  
Case study results reveal that barriers to local implementation vary across regions. This variation 
can be attributed to particular local contextual pressures and differences in local planning environments 
that influence how broader, societal barriers are understood, justified, managed and reinforced.  Planning 
environments in the more rural and exurban case studies regions of Simcoe and Peterborough 
demonstrated similar belief systems, values and planning goals that obstructed local efforts to manage 
growth. These same regions faced particular growth and economic pressures that reinforced existing value 
systems and reduced the range of perceived planning solutions and approaches to growth management. In 
contrast, planning environments in the more urban Waterloo case study region, as well as urban single tier 
municipalities within the rural case study regions, demonstrated planning environments that were more 
open to innovative and assertive planning approaches to manage growth.  
This research demonstrates how the interactions between local context and planning 
environments shape the interpretation and implementation of regional growth management plans. The 
research findings provide focal points for further research on growth management implementation by 
highlighting barriers and patterns of reinforcement that are less visible and rarely acknowledged in 
planning practice. As well, this research highlights the need for planning approaches that recognize the 
important role of the local planning environments in advancing growth management objectives. Failure to 
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recognize and address the underlying barriers and their interdependencies may result in the development 
of regional growth management plans that fail to achieve their objectives.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 Since the mid 20th century, North American urban development has been oriented around the 
automobile. The low density, peripheral growth that characterizes urban development in many North 
American cities is credited with causing, directly or indirectly, a suite of social, environmental and 
economic problems including increased risk of obesity (Lopez, 2004), reduced sense of place and social 
connection (Putnam, 2000), greater air pollution (Dodman, 2009), higher energy consumption (Ewing & 
Rong, 2008; Norman, MacLean, & Kennedy, 2006), loss of farmland and habitat (Radeloff, Hammer, & 
Stewart, 2005), and decreased productivity associated with traffic congestion (Hymel, 2009; Sweet, 
2011).   
 The solutions proposed to address the trend of low density urban growth emphasize improved 
planning policies and urban design through the application of growth management approaches. In North 
America, a number of state and provincial governments have adopted regional growth management plans 
and policies to encourage more compact, centralized development. Yet in spite of efforts to better manage 
growth through regional-scale planning, many cities continue to expand at the expense of their 
commercial centres and growth of low density, single use development shows little sign of abating 
(Ewing, Pendall, & Chen, 2002). The prevalence of the car-oriented urban form, despite the focus of 
decades of concerted planning efforts, has led many planners and scholars to question the reason for the 
disparity between plans and the development reality (Filion, 2010).  
 This research explores the reasons for the apparent mismatch between growth management 
planning goals and urban development. Recognizing that regional growth management strategies are 
implemented by local municipalities, variability in local implementation is the focus of this study.  Using 
Ontario’s Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe as a case study, the barriers to implementation 
are examined through a review of local contextual information and the perspectives of those tasked with 
implementing the Plan within three case study regions of the Greater Golden Horseshoe: Waterloo, 
Simcoe and Peterborough. In considering the full range of barriers operating at multiple scales and their 
interdependencies, this research aims to answer the questions:  
1) What are the key barriers to local implementation of regional growth management plans? 
2) Are barriers archetypical or are they unique to the local context? 
3) How do the barriers to implementation relate to one another, and what are the mediating 
mechanisms that define these relationships?  
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4) How do the barriers interact to reinforce the status quo? Where are there opportunities for change 
to overcome the barriers?  
 Four main data sources are drawn upon to identify barriers to implementation: 1) a 
multidisciplinary literature review to identify barriers demonstrated or theorized to impact or inhibit 
implementation of regional growth management plans; 2) interviews with actors responsible for 
implementing the Growth Plan to gain insights from their practical experiences, with emphasis on 
municipal planners, but also including provincial planners, planning consultants and developers in the 
case study municipalities; 3) municipal and provincial planning documents, correspondence, media, 
reports and academic studies that examine planning issues in the specific case study regions to identify 
local challenges, opportunities and areas of contention regarding Growth Plan implementation; and, 4) 
Statistics Canada community profile data (2011) and background municipal planning documents to obtain 
descriptive statistics and contextual information for each case study region. 
 To capture the complex interrelationships and characteristics of obstacles to growth management, 
this research applies a new institutional conceptual framework that conceives implementation barriers as 
part of a broader institutional system comprised of interrelated and contextually embedded factors. A 
second conceptual framework that interprets the barriers to implementation as a product of planning 
culture is used to categorize and synthesize barriers. Using the two frameworks as a conceptual basis, a 
relational model of barriers reported in the literature is developed and tested against the barriers described 
by local planners, developers, the media, planning documents and academic research, and used to frame 
comparisons across case studies. Variation between case studies is interpreted through key institutional 
themes that highlight how the local planning environment and contextual factors interact to reinforce and 
perpetuate barriers to growth management.  
This research builds on previous studies of plan implementation by synthesizing and testing 
barriers reported in the literature against real world conditions, and by integrating two conceptual 
frameworks – new institutionalism and planning culture – to advance our understanding of how barriers 
to implementation are influenced by local context. Results of this research contribute to the broader field 
of plan implementation by deepening our understanding of the relationship between local context, 
planning culture and plan implementation. It does this by examining how obstacles to the implementation 
of a growth management plan are perceived, justified and reinforced through local planning cultures, 
planning policies and processes. It highlights the importance of local context on the interpretation, 
management and expression of broader scale, societal barriers.  
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An understanding of the role and influence of local context and different planning cultures on 
implementation can assist regional planners in developing better, more implementable and supported 
policies, and improved methods to communicate those policies. As well, the articulation of the 
interrelationships between barriers and how they are embedded in or reinforced by local planning cultures 
can help local implementing agencies recognize and address obstacles to implementation.  
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Thesis Organization 
 This dissertation is organized into eight chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the second 
chapter explores the policy and plan implementation literature to identify known and theorized barriers to 
local implementation of growth management plans. The barriers identified in the literature are organized 
into three interrelated and hierarchical groups: 1) societal environment, 2) planning environment, and 3) 
artifacts. Interrelationships between the identified barriers and the mechanisms by which they are 
theorized or demonstrated to be reproduced or undermined are described. 
 The third chapter introduces two theoretical frameworks for understanding implementation. 
These frameworks – new institutionalism and a theory of planning culture – are combined to form a 
conceptual model of barriers to implementation based on the barriers identified from the literature cited in 
the previous chapter. The model identifies the set of expected barriers against which the barriers reported 
in the case studies are tested, with particular reference to the interdependencies and reinforcing 
mechanisms between barriers. The conceptual model highlights three clusters of barriers that form the 
broader institutional context that enables or constrains implementation. 
 Chapter 4 introduces the research questions: What are the barriers to local implementation of 
regional growth management policies? Are barriers archetypical or are they unique to the local context? 
How do the barriers to implementation relate to one another, and what are the mediating mechanisms that 
define these relationships? How do barriers interact to reinforce the status quo? Where are there 
opportunities for change? To answer these questions, an exploratory, case study methodology is used that 
draws on interviews with municipal planners and developers, media reports, planning documents and 
academic literature. Case studies were selected using a purposeful, maximum variation (heterogeneity) 
approach to capture similarities, central themes and shared patterns of policy implementation among the 
disparate regions as well as to capture distinct policy implementation challenges that are unique to each 
region.  
 Chapter 5 presents information about the formal institutional context for growth management 
planning in Ontario, including the legislative authority for land use and infrastructure planning, the 
respective roles of the Province and local municipalities, the economic context, and the detailed 
requirements of the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe. This chapter sets the context within 
which local municipalities from each case study region must plan for growth. 
 The sixth chapter presents the local social, economic and political context for each study region 
and the barriers to implementation of the Growth Plan as reported by municipal planners, developers, the 
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media, planning documents and relevant academic research. Key barriers for each case study region are 
described and compared to the predictive model of barriers. Regional barrier models are developed for 
each case study region to illustrate how local conditions varied from the model.  
 Chapter 7 interprets the variability across case study regions. Framed by new institutionalism and 
a theory of planning culture, two themes are described that dominate the discourse around implementation 
of growth management policies in the case study regions. The chapter identifies patterns of stability and 
change in the barriers identified for each municipality and contrasts the results against barriers predicted 
by the plan implementation literature. 
 The final chapter, Chapter 8, summarizes the research findings and identifies key findings. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research findings on theory and 
opportunities for further research. 
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Chapter 2. Barriers to Implementing Growth Management Strategies 
To combat urban sprawl and its negative effects on ecosystem services and human health, 
regional growth management and containment policies have been used with increased frequency to 
manage urban development (Bengston, Fletcher, & Nelson, 2004).  In recent years, the Province of 
Ontario enacted growth management planning legislation called the Places to Grow Act (2005) followed 
by the adoption of a Growth Plan (2006) to guide urban growth and development for its most populous 
and fastest growing region, the Greater Golden Horseshoe. As a regional plan, the Growth Plan aims to 
make more efficient use of land and infrastructure and to protect farmland and natural areas from 
development. To do this, the Growth Plan requires local municipalities to focus development in existing 
and emerging built up areas rather than in greenfield areas and to plan for transit-supportive, mixed use, 
and complete communities (Ontario Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal (MPIR), 2006). The Plan 
has been commended by the planning community as an innovative model of new-regionalism planning 
(American Planners Association (APA), 2007; Ontario Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure (MEI), 
2007). 
Despite accolades from the planning profession, the capacity of regional growth management 
plans like the Growth Plan to foster the development of compact, mixed use communities and to reduce 
urban sprawl is not well understood (Carruthers, 2002a; T. Moore & Nelson, 1994; Paulsen, 2013). 
Scholars have noted that despite a plethora of land use plans that set out policy guidelines for more 
compact development, low density car-oriented development continues to prevail and cities continue to 
expand at the expense of their commercial centres (Ewing, Pendall, & Chen, 2002; Filion, Bunting, 
Pavlic, & Langlois, 2010). Once established, the structural components of cities such as buildings, street 
patterns and land uses become deeply entrenched and demonstrate considerable persistence in the face of 
pressures to change (Conzen, 2004; Hommels, 2005a; Hommels, 2005b).  
Unsuccessful past attempts to plan at the regional scale in the Greater Golden Horseshoe and 
elsewhere suggest the need for a better understanding of why some plans fail to achieve their objectives 
(Ben-Zadok, 2009; Boarnet, McLaughlin, & Carruthers, 2011; White, 2007). In a review of previous 
regional plans for the Toronto-centred region, for example, White (2007, p. 49) concluded that “the 
Growth Plan itself may be worthy of praise, but this history has shown quite clearly that impressive plans 
can quite easily become unimplemented plans – in which case their impressiveness ceases to be of much 
use”. Studies of US state growth management plans have similarly received mixed reviews. A number of 
investigations of state growth management plans have failed to establish a statistically significant 
relationship between the presence of growth management policies and urban sprawl (Anthony, 2004), 
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while others have found the connection between growth management plans and metrics of urban sprawl 
across the different states to be equivocal (Carruthers, 2002b; Ingram, Carbonell, Hong, & and Flint, 
2009; T. Moore & Nelson, 1994; Pendall, 1999).  
Variability in the effectiveness of regional growth management plans or programs can be 
attributed in part to the range of policies and regulations that comprise each unique growth management 
planning framework (Ingram et al., 2009). Analyses of individual growth management programs have 
connected successful planning outcomes to efforts to fine tune growth management policies and 
supporting regulatory controls (Ben-Zadok, 2005). Comparative policy and plan evaluation have been 
useful in identifying basic components that contribute to stronger and more effective plans. Many of these 
components, including requiring municipal official plan conformity to the state or regional growth 
management planning framework, and the integration of land use and infrastructure planning, were 
deliberately incorporated into the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe (Brad Graham, personal 
communication). For these and other reasons, including the Plan’s research-based, progressive content, 
and the transferable nature of its components and methodology to other regions, the Growth Plan was 
awarded the American Planning Association’s prestigious Daniel Burnham Award to recognize its 
contribution to community welfare and the advancement of the planning profession (Ontario Ministry of 
Infrastructure (MEI), 2006). 
While differences in the policies that comprise a regional policy framework can provide some 
explanation for different planning outcomes, they fail to account for local variability in conformance to 
growth management plans. Like many state growth management plans in the US, the Growth Plan for the 
Greater Golden Horseshoe is structured to permit a significant degree of local autonomy in 
implementation, giving municipalities the flexibility to adopt those policies and programs they feel best 
fit their priorities and local conditions. Municipal autonomy has been touted as a requirement to prevent 
local resistance to regional planning mandates (Fishman, 2000); however it leaves growth management 
objectives vulnerable to derailment by local political, economic and social actors and circumstances. As a 
result, some scholars have concluded that it is primarily the local scale at which barriers to 
implementation seem to arise (Carruthers, 2002a; O'Connell, 2009). Local scale barriers to 
implementation, such as political structure, land market characteristics, municipal subsidies for sprawling 
infrastructure, demographics and geographic characteristics have all been shown to affect efficacy of 
regional growth management plans (Blais, 2010; Brody, Carrasco, & Highfield, 2006; Carruthers, 2002b; 
Lubell, Feiock, & Ramirez de la Cruz, Edgar E., 2009; Tomalty & Skaburskis, 2003). Municipalities have 
been found to define the growth management term ‘smart growth’ differently, and may implement only a 
small subset of smart growth principles (Ye, Mandpe, & Meyer, 2005), or pay only lip service to growth 
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management concepts without translating them into action (Downs, 2005; Ingram et al., 2009; Ye et al., 
2005). Planners’ perceptions and the approaches they use to implement plans may also influence a plan’s 
implementation (e.g. Berke et al., 2006). 
Local implementation can be understood as a culturally-embedded practice (Othengrafen, 2010). 
Municipal planning agencies operate within a broader social, political and economic framework that can 
constrain local growth management policy adoption and implementation efforts. National and subnational 
economic fluctuations, political ideologies and policies have been demonstrated to structure the 
environment within which local planning agencies adopt and implement policies to manage growth 
(Basmajian, 2013; Counsell, Haughton, & Allmendinger, 2014; Frenkel & Orenstein, 2012; Sager, 2011). 
Outward development pressures on cities posed by entrenched cultural tendencies, such as auto 
dependency and racial or socioeconomic discrimination, are additional forces that can conflict with 
growth management planning agendas (Wassmer, 2008).  
Understanding the challenges encountered or created by local municipalities when implementing 
a regionally-prescribed growth management plan is critical for the development and implementation of 
effective, executable plans. As one author concluded after a comparison of state growth management 
plans, "it does little good to enact policies that are too complicated, time-consuming and/or expensive to 
enforce" (Carruthers, 2002b, p. 1978). Without evaluating the factors that hinder or enhance local 
implementation, planners are at risk of falling into a pattern of "new plan syndrome", whereby plans are 
repeatedly updated without attention to whether or not the original plan was actually implemented 
(Calkins, 1979; Talen, 1996). For example, an understanding of the redistributive effects of growth 
management policies and the vested interests of social groups can help planners and elected officials 
make better plans and manage public and political opposition (Downs, 2005). Learning about the barriers 
to specific policies can help planners identify areas where plans will be difficult to execute (Berke & 
Godschalk, 2009) and where additional, mutually-supportive policies may be needed to achieve the 
desired effects (Bengston et al., 2004).  
Although the importance of evaluating how and if plans are implemented has been widely 
acknowledged for some time, the body of research on plan implementation has grown little since Calkins' 
(1979, p. 745) warning four decades ago that "the current state of the art of planmaking and supporting 
analysis is based on minimal data inputs and, what is probably more important, insufficient feedback on 
the efficacy of plans or policies during their implementation". More recently, scholars have declared that 
the study of plan implementation has been "ignored for decades" in the field of planning research (Berke 
et al., 2006, p. 581) – a deficiency that has undermined the legitimacy of planning as a profession to its 
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critics (Talen, 1996). Understanding plan implementation has been further hindered by the complexity of 
factors that influence the development process and spatial outcomes.  Studies of plan implementation 
have historically focused on either macro- or micro-level processes that obstruct implementation, with 
only limited integration or synthesis between the two scales (O'Toole, 2000). Methodologies that 
emphasize mainstream economic perspectives in which actors are viewed as rational, utility maximizers, 
have provided incomplete explanations for the complex and interconnected processes that underlie urban 
development and plan implementation (Adams & Tiesdell, 2010; Guy & Henneberry, 2000; Healey & 
Barrett, 1990). Urban policy studies that examine only formal political arrangements, such as laws and 
government structures, have been criticized for providing an “undersocialized” explanation of 
implementation in their assumption that policies and their outcomes are simply an aggregation of 
individual preferences (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013). Responding to these and other methodological and 
conceptual shortcomings, a growing body of literature recognizes that local practices are “historically and 
geographically situated” and are contingent on both formal and informal socio-political arrangements 
involving multiple scales (González & Healey, 2005, p.2056; Verma, 2007).  
This research seeks to fill the gap in our understanding of local variability in growth management 
implementation. The Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, recognized as a model of 
progressive and coordinated growth management planning with transferrable methodology, principles and 
policies, serves as a case study for the investigation of local variability in implementation (American 
Planners Association (APA), 2007). The research explores the formal and informal socio-cultural, 
political and economic institutions that frame the local contexts and create constraints on the local 
implementation of a regional growth management plan. In addition, it examines the role that actors and 
actor groups play within these framing institutions to reinforce or challenge the status quo. The research 
adopts a conceptual framework that recognizes that constraints or barriers to implementation do not 
operate in isolation – they interact in ways that can lead to further entrenchment or opportunities for 
change. By investigating the obstacles to local implementation of a high quality plan such as the Growth 
Plan, this research aims to highlight a broader range of obstacles that might otherwise be attributed to a 
poorly designed plan. 
This chapter explores the plan and policy implementation literature to identify the known and 
theorized factors that challenge or obstruct local implementation of regional growth management plans. 
The literature review focuses on barriers to implementation in recognition of the mismatch between the 
prevailing low density development outcomes and the near paradigmatic status of growth management as 
a desirable planning objective and widespread inclusion of general growth management principles within 
planning documents (Downs, 2005). The review draws on literatures across multiple disciplines that 
10 
 
examine how policies and plans are carried out at the local level, including urban planning, municipal 
finance, policy implementation, and governance. Geographical regions sharing similar political and 
planning institutions, such as North America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, were the focus 
of the literature review, but other examples from Asia, Africa and South America were also examined. 
The chapter examines reported barriers to growth management that emerge from formal governance, 
political and economic and spatial structures that shape local plan implementation, such as planning law, 
the practices of provincial and local planning agencies, citizen groups, land and property markets, and 
physical geography. As well, it examines less visible, taken-for-granted barriers that influence 
implementation, such as the distribution of power and resources, the unwritten rules and conventions of 
municipal governments and their planning departments, the motivations and practices of development 
industry actors, and local community values, identities and interests.  Recognizing that actors and the 
structural frames within which they express their preferences and interest do not operate in isolation, the 
review examines how barriers interact in “mutually constitutive and generative processes” (Healey, 
2007).  
Chapter 3 introduces two theoretical frameworks: new institutionalism and a theory of planning 
culture. The two theories are integrated to form a conceptual framework to model expected barriers to 
growth management, as identified in the literature review, and their synergistic or conflicting 
relationships. The model highlights the scale of influence at which key barriers operate and the 
mechanisms by which they are reinforced or vulnerable to change. The model is used later in the thesis to 
frame comparisons across local municipalities within the Greater Golden Horseshoe.  
Barriers to Growth Management in the Literature 
Provided that supporting social, political and economic processes and frameworks remain in 
place, the structural components of a city can be highly resistant to change long after they have been 
deemed undesirable. Cities and the practice of planning for urban growth are rife with examples, 
particularly with respect to the failure to meet growth management objectives; low density, single use 
developments continue to occur in communities guided by Official Plans that encourage compact, mixed 
use urban forms; investments in public transit fail to induce new development at transit supportive 
densities; and “edge cities” continue to grow, despite significant investments in inner city redevelopment 
(Filion & McSpurren, 2007; Filion, 2010b).  On the other hand, some regions have successfully 
challenged the post-war, car-oriented development trajectory with effective growth management 
strategies, successful transit initiatives, and reduced rates of urban expansion (Gosnell, Kline, Chrostek, & 
Duncan, 2011; P. M. Hess & Sorensen, 2015). Of interest to many scholars is the question of why some 
regions have achieved a certain degree of success with respect to managing growth while others appear to 
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be “locked in” to a particular development trajectory and unable to change (Downs, 2005; Grant, 2009; 
Searle & Filion, 2011). 
The subsequent section summarizes barriers that have been identified in the literature to obstruct 
growth management implementation. To facilitate later systematic analysis, barriers to growth 
management are organized according to the scale at which they operate using a typology developed by 
Othengrafen (2010). The typology recognizes a broad range of social, cultural and economic factors that 
affect planning practice, including those factors that are more tangible and visible as well those that are 
less visible or taken-for-granted. Used by Othengrafen (2010) and colleagues (Knieling & Othengrafen, 
2015; Othengrafen & Reimer, 2013) to explore the political, economic, and socio-cultural reasons for 
variability in planning practices across different European regions, the typology lends itself to analyses 
that examine the interactions and fit between barriers at different scales that may lead to opportunities for 
their de-stabilization and change. It categorizes factors that structure planning practice into three different 
scales of influence: micro-level (artifact), meso-level (planning environment) and macro–level (societal 
environment). The artifact scale is the smallest sphere of influence and includes structures or products of 
the planning process, such as urban form, land use plans and zoning regulations. Artifacts are the outputs 
of the broader planning environment, which is comprised of the established assumptions, philosophies 
and practices of planners, planning agencies and other implementing actors. The planning environment, in 
turn, is nested within a societal environment, which includes the underlying assumptions and perceptions 
that guide values and action.  
Artifacts 
Artifacts are the tangible and visible products, structures and processes of the planning 
environment and can include urban design and form as well as the plans, policies and regulations that 
guide decision making. In part because of their visibility, planning artifacts are the focus of most research 
on plan implementation.  Planning artifacts that have been found to serve as barriers to implementation 
include local, provincial and federal plans, policies and investments and their consistency with each other, 
as well as the physical or built environment in which plans are implemented.  
Local Municipal Planning and Policies 
Municipal governments play a significant role in the implementation of growth management 
plans through their adoption of local conforming plans and the steering of private development and public 
works to conform to those plans. The Official Plan is the primary policy tool a municipality can use to 
redistribute growth to existing built up areas. Scholars have theorized that the quality of such plans can 
affect their ability to influence land use outcomes. Strong plans are defined generally as those plans that 
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clearly articulate values and goals, have a factual basis, provide a clear relationship between analysis and 
policies, provide opportunity for public participation, and establish responsibilities for implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation. Such plans are theorized to be more likely to yield outcomes consistent with 
the plan (Baer, 1997; Berke & Godschalk, 2009). Weak plans, on the other hand, can provide too little 
guidance for land use, leaving implementation to the discretion, biases and political motivations of those 
implementing the policy (Baer, 1997; Berke & Conroy, 2000).  
Empirical studies of the relationship between plan quality and land use outcomes have been few 
and the outcomes mixed (Brody & Highfield, 2005). Brody and Highfield (2005) found that the presence 
of specific implementation approaches in local plans in Florida (e.g. sanctions for non-conformance and a 
requirement for monitoring) was significantly correlated with land use conformity. Berke et al. (2006) 
found that the quality of plans in New Zealand was positively associated with conforming land use 
outcomes, although other factors such as enforcement style, awareness building and staff capacity were 
also positively correlated. In contrast, Norton (2005b) and Steelman and Hess (2009) both found that land 
use outcomes in North Carolina were unrelated to plan quality and were instead a function of the 
stakeholders involved with the implementation of the plan and their relationships with each other.    
In some cases, municipal policies and regulatory tools can serve as barriers to developers seeking 
to build urban forms that are consistent with growth management objectives. Such plans and their 
supporting policies and programs may discourage developers from redeveloping infill sites or building 
more compact urban forms by creating financial or technical barriers. In a survey of US developers, local 
regulations were identified as the greatest obstacle to their participation in the development of more 
compact, transit-oriented urban forms (Levine & Inam, 2004). Developers in Toronto have similarly 
pointed to municipal regulations, including parking requirements, inflexible planning restrictions and 
engineering standards, as significant barriers to their efforts to build compact infill communities (Blais, 
2003). Attracting developers to infill sites as opposed to greenfield sites can also be challenging when 
there is an absence of municipal incentives to offset the costs of deteriorating or under capacity 
infrastructure, zoning that is unsupportive of new uses or densities, and environmental contamination 
(Farris, 2001).  
Certain municipal policies that frustrate growth management efforts have received in depth study. 
In the US, zoning has long been recognized as a potential regulatory obstruction to compact development 
(Talen, 2013). Although zoning can be used as a tool to support higher densities and mixed uses, its 
critics argue that it can also be used to protect or promote low density and single use development and 
prevent the development of mixed and more compact forms (Talen, 2013). In a review of the effects of 
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zoning practices on urban sprawl in the United States, Talen (2013) and Levine (2006) both argued that 
zoning has led to an inefficient patterning of development by “locking in” land uses to low densities that 
cannot easily shift to higher densities when conditions change. This inefficiency creates a condition in 
which households willing to settle for higher density, compact housing in exchange for a more desirable 
location are excluded from the market (Levine & Inam, 2004; Levine, 2006). Empirical studies support 
the assertion that restrictive low density, single use zoning can obstruct growth management efforts. In a 
study of US state growth management initiatives, Kim and colleagues (2013) found that density increases 
in counties with restrictive zoning were related to decreased vacancy rates rather than a result of higher 
density infill development. As well, zoning regulations that are intended to achieve different land use 
planning goals such as groundwater recharge (Sung, Yi, & Li, 2013) and slowing urban growth (Pendall, 
1999) have been demonstrated to restrict intensification of urban areas. 
Municipal fiscal policies have also received considerable attention for their role as a barrier to 
growth management. Blais (2010) and others (Skaburskis & Tomalty, 2000; Slack, 2002; Tomalty & 
Skaburskis, 1997) have argued that the traditional way in which Canadian municipalities are financed 
creates subsidies for low density development at the urban fringe at the expense of the inner city.  These 
scholars have demonstrated how higher costs for infill development are transferred to the developer and 
ultimately passed on to the consumer. The means by which fiscal policies subsidize developers and 
consumers of development at the urban fringe is through development charges. Development charges, 
which are levied by municipalities to cover the initial infrastructure costs of a new development, are 
typically calculated using an average cost pricing method, rather than estimating actual costs. For 
infrastructure such as roads, water and sewage, costs increase with the increase in linear footage. Average 
cost pricing creates a cross-subsidy whereby high density development is overcharged and low density 
development is undercharged (Blais, 2010; Tomalty & Skaburskis, 1997). Infrastructure maintenance 
costs, which are not included in development charges and therefore must be covered by municipal taxes, 
are higher per unit for low density development, thus exacerbating the mismatch between the real costs 
and price of low density development.  For example, developments such as low density retail and drive-
thrus, that necessarily generate more car trips than other types of development due to their use and design, 
place a higher demand on road infrastructure than other uses. Average cost pricing for development 
charges that do not take into account the type of development and its long term infrastructure usage, 
therefore creates a subsidy for those forms of development at the expense of other more efficient urban 
forms.  
Similar arguments have been applied to other municipal financial tools, such as property taxes, 
which can inadvertently subsidize property on the urban periphery and overcharge inner city properties 
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(Blais, 2010). Since property tax is calculated based on the market value of a property rather than the real 
costs associated with infrastructure provision and usage, residential and commercial properties located on 
lower cost land at the urban periphery are generally charged less in property tax than development located 
on more expensive properties at the city's core.  This relationship is exacerbated by the presence of a 
fragmented municipal government, since peripheral suburban municipalities that offer fewer services can 
charge lower property taxes than central cities (Song & Zenou, 2009). According to the Chair of the 
Canadian Brownfields Network, property taxes for brownfields, which are typically higher than taxes for 
greenfield development because of their centralized location, are a significant barrier to redevelopment 
(Prior, 2010). Harris and Lehman (2001) found that residents in downtown Hamilton tended to pay higher 
taxes than their suburban counterparts and that the method by which property tax was calculated in 
Hamilton discriminated against the owners of lower priced, more compact housing, most of which was 
concentrated in the city centre. Owners of lower priced inner city housing could be expected to pay up to 
20% more property tax than an equivalent home in the suburbs, leading Harris and Lehman (2001, p. 898) 
to declare that "multiplied many thousandfold, and given the geographical concentration of cheap 
housing, it amounts to an enormous drain on the resources that are available to property owners in central 
neighbourhoods". 
Perverse subsidies that favour suburbanization, may be easier to change if they cannot be justified 
through prevailing belief systems, they are inefficient in achieving objectives, and there is the presence of 
a credible alternative (Filion, 2010b). Gradual geographic redistribution of property tax rates and 
development charges may face less political opposition in part due to the general lack of understanding of 
how such tax rates are determined and what they support. In California, for example, Innes and Booher 
(Innes & Booher, 1999, p. 143) argue that although municipal finance contributes significantly to the 
urban form, “State and local tax and revenue structures and program responsibilities are interwoven so 
thoroughly that most people have little understanding of which tax goes where and which government is 
responsible for which service.” Compared with more entrenched policies such as zoning, a number of 
municipalities in Canada including the Cities of Ottawa and Kitchener, have already revised their 
development charge policies to help reduce the unintended consequences of average cost pricing (Blais, 
2010). 
Municipal policies such as zoning and segregation of land uses are highly entrenched in planning 
practice due to their reinforcement by supporting processes, regulations and advocacy groups. Low 
density, single use zoning is popular with home owners because it provides them with security on their 
investment and control over the aesthetics of their neighbourhood (Fischel, 2004; Levine, 2006). It does 
this by buffering homeowners from undesired land uses and inhabitants, such as apartment buildings, 
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industry, people of different races and income levels, and land use conflicts, such as increased traffic, 
noise and visual blight (Dennis, 2000; Fischel, 2004). Zone changes required to increase density or permit 
new or mixed uses can involve a lengthy public consultation process with a community of property 
owners who generally perceive the original zoning as a positive feature and have little desire for change. 
Federal and Provincial Policies 
Growth management is influenced by federal and provincial policies that shape the broader legal, 
fiscal and administrative contexts within which cities operate. Some of these policies, including federal 
housing and transportation policies, have served as transition points for the suburbanization of urban 
growth. Others, such as local revenue reliance, help to reinforce conventional municipal policies and limit 
horizontal consistency. These policy frameworks, many of which are entrenched in relatively rigid 
constitutional arrangements and law, can constrain local municipalities’ capacity to limit urban sprawl by 
establishing competing objectives for municipalities and creating disincentives for compact growth.   
Local Revenue Reliance 
Beyond transfers from upper levels of government, municipal governments in Canada and the US 
rely exclusively on local revenue such as property taxes, development charges, and user fees to fund 
municipal services. In Canada in 2008, for example, 58% of municipal services were funded by municipal 
revenues, 54% of which was generated from local property taxes (Statistics Canada, 2009). A number of 
scholars have identified the limited powers of municipal governments to generate revenues to pay for 
local services as a constraint to growth management.  A product of the statutory relationship between 
provinces or states and their subordinate municipalities, the limited capacity of municipalities to generate 
revenue places significant political and economic strain on municipal land use decision making. The 
visible, redistributive effects of property taxes make it an unpopular tool for generating revenue. Property 
taxes have been blamed for the flight of urban residents to suburban and exurban areas with lower taxes 
(Harris and Lehman, 2001), creating an incentive for municipalities to maintain low property taxes . 
Since different types of development generate different levels of tax revenue and put different 
pressures on municipal services, municipalities are incented to maximize their net revenue by seeking 
land uses that will produce the greatest amount of tax revenue while utilizing the fewest services. 
Influence of a land use's revenue potential in municipal land use planning decisions has been termed "the 
fiscalization of land use" (Wassmer, 2002) and creates a strong motivation for municipalities to encourage 
types of development that can bring in the greatest net gain in revenue. The effect is compounded when 
combined with distorted municipal taxation policies that favour low density development. Revenue 
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maximization as a primary planning goal can create competition between municipalities for development 
and can interfere with regional scale goals such as the encouragement of compact development. 
Theoretical models have demonstrated that municipal reliance on property taxes can cause a 
reduction in the intensity of land development and an associated decrease in population density, leading to 
a more sprawling city (Brueckner & Kim, 2003; Skaburskis & Tomalty, 2000; Song & Zenou, 2006). 
Land use fiscalization effects may induce municipalities to favour single family homes over higher multi-
family homes or apartments because of their higher tax revenue potential and lower draw on municipal 
services by higher income residents. The financial conditions created by property taxes can make it more 
economical for developers to delay higher density development (Skaburskis & Tomalty, 2000). As well, 
the prospect of increasing property tax revenue and employment may incent municipalities to create an 
oversupply of industrial land in suburban and older areas of the city (Skaburskis & Tomalty, 2000).  
Empirical evidence of land use fiscalization effects was first noted in California, where 
researchers found that local revenue reliance created a strong incentive for planners to discourage low tax 
revenue developments such as residential and affordable housing developments, which place a high 
demand on tax-funded community facilities. Instead planners are encouraged to support high revenue 
developments such as big box retail centres, which draw consumers away from the commercial cores of 
cities to peripheral locations, and leads to urban decline in the central cores and further residential and 
commercial dispersion (Innes & Booher, 1999). In a study of the Greater Toronto area, Skaburkis and 
Tomalty (2000) found that while municipal officials did not acknowledge the influence of fiscalization 
effects, they reported a preference for higher revenue and job creating commercial and industrial 
development projects over lower revenue residential development.  
Transportation Investments 
Historic and current federal and provincial investments in car-oriented transportation also create a 
challenge for municipalities in their efforts to manage urban growth. The relationship between car travel 
and urban form was foreseen by Lewis Mumford, who as early as 1923, predicted that car travel would 
lead to the decentralization of urban centres. In discussing highway development, Mumford lamented that 
"in such a network, no single centre will, like the metropolis of old, become the focal point of all regional 
advantages; on the contrary, the "whole region" becomes open for settlement" (2003, p. 95). As predicted, 
road and highway development, along with subsequent widening and improvements provided increased 
access to new areas for development, which in turn has contributed to a decentralized and multi-nodal 
urban form throughout North America (Cervero, 2003; Handy, 2005). Commercial and manufacturing 
industries, adapting to the availability of truck transportation, have increasingly located in suburban areas 
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and along highway corridors, with new suburban communities emerging to support these industries 
(Muller, 2004).  Empirical studies have confirmed this land use transportation relationship. In a review of 
the empirical literature, Boarnet (2011) found that peripheral employment development increased with 
Interstate highway development. Baum-Snow (2007) found that the construction of a single highway 
through a US central city district could be empirically linked to an 18% decrease in central city 
population.  
Some scholars argue that the magnitude of government spending on road construction in North 
America fueled a scale of suburban expansion that would otherwise not have been possible (Kuklick, 
1980; Newman & Kenworthy, 2000). In the US, investment in highway construction under the Federal 
Highway Act of 1916 and the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 culminated in the construction of almost 
70,000km of Interstate highways (Kuklick, 1980; Mohl & Rose, 2012). In Canada, a smaller but not 
insignificant commitment by the Federal government was made for highway construction through the 
Canada Highway Act (1919) and the TransCanada Highway Act (1949) (Turgeon & Vaillancourt, 2002). 
The Toronto Region, in particular, witnessed 216 km of new highway by the late 1960s (Filion, 2010a). 
These investments were matched in many communities by a disinvestment in infrastructure conducive to 
denser urban forms, such as public transit (Muller, 2004).  
Disproportionate investment in car transportation infrastructure continues to challenge efforts to 
manage urban growth. Proponents of public transportation systems argue that federal governments in 
countries with large areas and lower population densities such as Canada and the US, tend to invest more 
heavily on highway and road infrastructure than on public transportation (Canadian Urban Transit 
Association, 2011). Investment by Ontario’s Provincial government, for example, has emphasized road 
infrastructure despite plans since the 1970s that put a greater emphasis on public transportation (Filion, 
2000). In the Toronto area, difficult economic times in the late 1980s and early 1990s were reflected in 
significant cuts to public transit, while the construction of a new Highway 407 proceeded (Filion, 2000).  
Housing Policy 
The Canadian Federal government's involvement with mortgage lending and other fiscal policies 
of Canada's national housing agency, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), have had 
a significant influence on the context within which municipalities plan for urban development. Initially 
intended to simulate the economy and job creation, early Federal housing policies such as the Dominion 
Housing Act of 1935, the National Housing Act of 1944 and the creation of the CMHC in 1945 provided 
financial incentives to encourage homeownership (Goldberg & Mark, 1985). These incentives included 
direct lending to home buyers, mortgage insurance to reduce risk to private lenders and increase the 
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availability of private mortgages, exclusion of housing sales from a capital gains tax, the development of 
a Registered Home Ownership Savings Plans, and Canadian Home Ownership Stimulation Program 
(Hulchanski, 1986; Sewell, 1994). Because the objective was to stimulate job creation in the construction 
industry, the incentives were targeted at new housing construction on the urban periphery rather than the 
reinvestment in urban areas. 
The Veteran's Land Act (VLA) of 1942 also served to encourage home construction on the 
suburban fringe. The VLA provided homes and small land holdings for returning veterans by subsidizing 
the placement of over 100,000 households on existing agricultural lands, of which approximately 87% 
were small suburban acreages (Harris & Shulist, 2001). The Act, according to Harris and Shulist (2001, p. 
258) reflected antiurban sentiments prevalent at the time: "Repelled by the urban, industrial way of life, 
they framed legislation to encourage employed veterans to discover the virtues of rural living”. In its 
original design and intent, the Act actively discouraged any intensification of Canadian cities. 
Although the Dominion Housing Act, the National Housing Act, and the Veteran’s Land Act are 
now defunct, they served to tip the balance away from city living toward suburban homeownership 
(Ekers, Hamel, & Keil, 2012; Hulchanski, 2006). In both Canada and the US, Federal subsidies 
established a trajectory of suburban development that competes with more recent inner city reinvestment 
efforts. In an effort to quantify the impact of US Federal housing policies, Persky and Kurban (2003) 
estimate the policies to have generated a 20% increase in suburban development. 
In addition to directly subsidizing the construction of new homes on the urban periphery, the 
“property bias” of Federal housing policies helped establish a culture of housing consumption and a 
strong coalition property owners who share a protectionist view of their homes and neighbourhoods 
(Harris, 2009; Jacobs & Paulsen, 2009). Referred to as NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard), public efforts to 
constrain certain types of development represent a significant and entrenched barrier to local efforts to 
encourage urban intensification and infill development. Protection by housing consumers of the value of 
their investment has been described by some scholars as a primary factor that reinforces continuity in 
urban policy (Sorensen, 2011a). The self-perpetuating nature of property rights advocacy are described in 
more detail in the section Property Rights Advocacy and NIMBY. 
Built environment 
Existing land use patterns can constrain growth management efforts by limiting options for infill 
development. The development of high density infill requires the assembly of multiple properties, but the 
diversity and fragmentation of ownership can make this land assembly difficult and expensive (Buitelaar 
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& Segeren, 2011; Farris, 2001). Property owner "holdout', caused by owner expectations of high levels of 
compensation, or refusal to sell property because of its symbolic value, can make intensification and 
redevelopment projects financially or technically unfeasible (Buitelaar & Segeren, 2011; Cadigan, 
Schmitt, Shupp, & Swope, 2011). Redevelopment efforts can be further challenged by opposition to infill 
by property owner advocacy groups concerned about changes to their physical environment (Adams, 
Disberry, Hutchison, & Munjoma, 2002). For many infill projects, existing infrastructure such as roads, 
water, sewage, parking and underground cable, may require upgrade to meet municipal standards or 
market demand (Farris, 2001). Areas available for residential infill may lack market appeal due to the 
absence of supporting services and amenities such as access to grocery stores and commercial districts 
(Farris, 2001). 
Land use patterns also influence and are influenced by transportation choices, creating a positive 
feedback loop that favours the persistence of existing low density land uses and supporting car-oriented 
transportation infrastructure (Handy, 2005). Parking lots to support car travel require a significant amount 
of space that could otherwise be used for higher density uses. US studies have found parking lots to 
comprise from 5% of the total urban footprint to as much as 16% (Akbari, Rose, & Taha, 2003; Davis, 
Pijanowski, Robinson, & Kidwell, 2010; Davis, Pijanowski, Robinson, & Engel, 2010). Once 
constructed, highways and roads are politically challenging to repurpose for higher density uses, even if 
underutilized or in conflict with other planning objectives (Dolnick, 2012).  
Other scholars have found the physical design of the built form can limit options for their 
transformation and intensification. Bervoets and Heynen (2013) found that the purpose-built design and 
layout of post war single family homes made their adaptive reuse for multifamily dwellings difficult and 
expensive. Retrofitting single family homes to multifamily homes also can require substantial alterations 
to meet the thermal and acoustic standards (Bervoets & Heynen, 2013).  
Planning Environment 
Othengrafen (2010) conceives planning artifacts as being influenced by the underlying planning 
approaches, motivations, norms and behaviours of municipal implementing agencies. Municipal agencies 
or “administrators” face a unique set of institutional pressures compared with private sector organizations, 
in part due to the fact that they "operate in strong institutional and weak technical environments because 
they face greater demands for legitimacy, than for efficiency and efficacy" (Fernández-Alles & Llamas-
Sánchez, 2008). Within these political, administrative and social structures, municipal planners are 
thought to operate within a “bounded rationality” which can limit the scope, content, processes and 
capacity of local planning (Friedmann, 1967).  While municipalities are not uniform in their set of 
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practices and procedures, many share the political motivation to develop solutions that appease local 
interest groups and attract development.  
The planning environment frames and justifies the decisions of planners and planning agencies 
that translate into policy and action. Embedded in a societal environment, the planning environment 
includes the beliefs, traditions and political, administrative, economic and organizational structures that 
can confine decision making and influence planning outputs, or artifacts (Knieling & Othengrafen, 2015; 
Othengrafen & Reimer, 2013). In addition to planners, this frame includes other actors that are recognized 
participants in the planning and development process, such as politicians, developers, and other 
stakeholders involved with plan implementation.  The normative and cognitive beliefs of actors 
responsible for implementing policies as well as the relative value and role of various stakeholders in the 
planning process set the context within which growth management policies are developed, including its 
goals, rationale, and the methods by which it is to be implemented (P. A. Hall, 1993; Skogstad, 2008).  
Policy makers and the public at large are often unconscious of their own underlying assumptions 
and beliefs, making the modification of those beliefs difficult (Skogstad, 2008). Changes to values, 
beliefs and practices can be actively resisted by those who continue to benefit from the status quo 
(Pierson, 2000; Skogstad, 2008). The policy and planning implementation literature has identified three 
key barriers within the planning environment that may constrain or facilitate the implementation of plans. 
Characteristics of the implementing agency and “street-level bureaucrats” 
Under the planning frameworks imposed by local, provincial/state and federal agencies, 
municipalities have considerable discretion in how they adopt and implement policies to encourage 
compact growth and discourage sprawl. Literature in the field of public policy implementation has long 
associated this discretion with the outcomes of public policy (M. J. Hill & Hupe, 2009; Lipsky, 2010). In 
a review of public policy implementation studies, O’Toole (2000) noted that a common finding was the 
importance of factors that underlie the decision making and behaviours of those actors who implement 
policy. O'Toole concluded "…it seems clear that research performed in ignorance of the understanding 
that implementation actors themselves have about their circumstances is likely to miss important parts of 
the explanation for what happens" (2000, p. 269).   
Policy implementation theorists have identified a number of factors that influence the decisions 
and actions of implementing actors. These include: 1) the signals from politicians and managerial staff 
that support or undermine the policy, 2) the organizational and managerial structures and processes that 
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enhance or constrain the implementing staff’s discretion and capacity to act, and 3) the knowledge and 
beliefs of the implementing staff (M. J. Hill & Hupe, 2009; H. C. Hill, 2003; May & Winter, 2009).  
Signals from politicians and managerial staff 
Signals from politicians have been explored in the context of political will, measured as the 
adoption by municipal councils of growth management policies and adherence to these policies in 
decision making.  Political will, in turn, has been found to be related to levels of civic engagement and 
pressure and lobbying from different advocacy groups, including environmental groups, development 
industries, and property rights groups (Moroney, 2008; O'Connell, 2008; O'Connell, 2009; Ramirez de la 
Cruz, E., 2009). O’Connell (2009) found that communities with a greater number and range of growth 
management-supportive advocacy groups adopted more growth management policies, while Ramirez de 
la Cruz (2009) found that communities with stronger presence of development industry activism were less 
likely to adopt certain growth management policies such as growth boundaries, than other communities.  
Others have found the influence of public advocacy on political will is tempered by elected officials' 
beliefs and commitment to planning principles (Norton, 2005a). 
Earlier studies in policy implementation literature emphasized the importance of managerial 
oversight to reduce discretion by implementing actors. Edwards (1984) and Sabatier and Mazmanian 
(1979) for example, proposed the importance of greater hierarchical control, supervision, performance 
measures, sanctions and incentives to reduce discretion that led to non-conformance. More recently, May 
and Winter (2009) also found that strong signals from managerial staff in the form of a high degree of 
supervision and emphasis on compliance were associated with greater adherence to an employment policy 
by implementing staff.  In settings where implementation involved coordination with multiple agencies, 
O’Toole  (1986) found that managerial leadership was important as a means to establish support and trust 
and to leverage resources.  
Organizational and managerial structures and processes 
Other scholars have focused on organizational processes that can enhance participation in and 
legitimacy of policy making as a means to manage discretion. Planning processes such as collaborative 
planning, have been examined as a more “bottom up” approach to plan implementation. Collaborative 
planning approaches that account for the competing interests of stakeholders may achieve more 
successful outcomes, since mutually agreed upon goals are more likely to be implemented (Innés & 
Booher, 1999). Collaborative planning within an implementing agency has been found to increase that 
agency’s commitment to a policy. For example, in studying the relationship between planners’ 
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commitment and outcomes, Waldner (2009) found that a disconnect between the department responsible 
for creating a plan and the department charged with enforcing the plan led to failures in implementation. 
Proponents of collaborative planning argue that collaborative processes can help planning agencies 
transition from embedded practices to new approaches (Burby, 2003; Healey, 2003). Studies of the 
influence of collaborative planning on plan implementation have focused on the types and quality of 
collaboration involved in the creation and implementation of a plan (Day, Gunton, & Albert, 2003; 
Joseph, Gunton, & Day, 2008; Margerum, 2002; Oliveira & Pinho, 2010; Oliveira & Pinho, 2011). 
Outcomes of this research suggest that the collaborative process is an important, but not exclusive, 
condition for implementation success (Day et al., 2003; Joseph et al., 2008).  
Certain characteristics of the municipal administrative planning process have been shown to 
impact the outcome of local growth management efforts. In a review of US state growth management 
programs, Bengston (2004, p. 281) identified administration efficiency as a critical factor in the local 
implementation of growth management plans, citing that “poorly administered growth management 
efforts often frustrate desirable development and make a community unattractive for developers. The 
result may be development leapfrogging to distant communities at higher environmental and social costs, 
exactly the opposite of what growth management seeks to achieve”. Both Bengston (2004) and Nelson 
(1996) identified streamlined permitting for development, nondiscretionary standards for approving 
development permits, and rational review of urban expansion as important contributing factors in the 
effective implementation of growth management policies.  
Planning capacity can also play a role in implementation, by mitigating the influences of 
advocacy groups on elected officials. Hawkins (2014) found an interactive effect between divergent  
viewpoints of advocacy groups and the presence of planning staff, where communities with planning staff 
adopted a greater number of growth management policies despite negative pressures from advocacy 
groups, than those without planning staff. Berke et al. (2006) and Laurian et al. (2004a) found that 
planning capacity was but one of a number of characteristics that affect land use outcomes of local plans. 
In an examination of the development approvals process, they found that development application quality, 
planners’ use of a strong enforcement style, planning department awareness-building with developers and 
a higher staff capacity were significantly and positively related to the consistency of planners’ decisions 
with local policy. Planning capacity, defined as the community’s financial capacity to plan, on the other 
hand, was found by Burby (2005) to have limited impact on a plan’s use in decision making.  
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Knowledge and beliefs of implementing staff 
Local planning staff can act as gatekeepers for the types of policies that are incorporated into 
planning documents. Implementation challenges can arise where local planners do not support state or 
provincial growth management mandates. For example, Ali (2014) found that counties in Maryland and 
Virginia failed to incorporate into local plans policies for growth management that were not state-
mandated or were not perceived to meet local needs and priorities. Maryland cities and towns with more 
and better trained planning staff have been found to be more likely to adopt policies to manage urban 
growth (Ali, 2016). Edwards and Haines (2007) attributed lower growth management policy adoption 
rates by rural municipalities in Wisconsin to the fact that the municipal staff did not perceive the policies 
as relevant to their town’s particular economic needs or urban form. An Ontario study of how new 
urbanist developments were adopted in different cities similarly found that the concept failed in 
communities in which municipal planners and engineers did not subscribe to the underlying compact 
village concept and resisted unfamiliar design and development standards (S. Moore, 2010). Others have 
found that planners’ commitment to the certain planning objectives can lead to higher quality, more 
implementable plans (Lyles, Berke, & Smith, 2014; Norton, 2005a) 
Obstacles can also arise at the point where local planners translate locally adopted policies into 
their daily practices. Scholars have found that a planner’s commitment to a plan’s objectives can be an 
important factor that influences how rigidly they conform to policy during the development approvals 
process (Dalton & Burby, 1994; Stevens, 2010).  Conformity to policies in the development approvals 
process has also been attributed to experience and training of staff, including their familiarity with the 
development process, and their awareness of guiding policies and regulations (Stevens, 2010).   
Growth management implementation may also be impacted by the way in which a planner views 
his/her role in the market. Since development is primarily constructed and financed by the private sector, 
market forces can have a significant, often limiting, influence on the achievement of planning objectives 
(Jones, 2014). Although most planners tend to occupy a hybrid role between private and public interests 
(S. Moore, 2012), planners who see themselves as active agents in property markets may be more 
effective than those who view their role as detached from the market (Adams & Tiesdell, 2010). In a case 
study of two new urbanist communities, Moore (2012, p. 591) attributed successful implementation of a 
new urbanist community in Markham to the fact that it was “created, promoted and implemented through 
a process very much micro-managed by the public sector”. Failure in implementation of a new urbanist 
community in Orangeville was ascribed to those planners’ reactive rather than proactive response to the 
market.  
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Characteristics of the Development Industry 
The development industry plays a particularly important role in the implementation of growth 
management objectives, since cities are built as a direct result of the activities of private sector realtors, 
investors, developers and builders, who purchase and assemble land, as well as design, construct, market 
and sell buildings to consumers (Coiacetto, 2000). The development industry is typically characterized as 
groups of organizations or individuals who are motivated to maximize profit by seeking opportunities to 
generate high development revenues with low development costs (Adams, 2008). Given these 
motivations, developers are described as fundamentally concerned with the availability of an adequate 
supply of developable land, and are considered to be resistant to planning policies that place restrictions 
on the types or locations of development (Pacione, 2013). The trend of land and property markets toward 
fewer, larger firms and the growing differentiation between developer and investor or end user, are 
theorized to have increased the development industry’s motivation for short term profit-seeking and 
reduce their sense of social responsibility (Adams et al., 2008). US studies that examine developers’ 
rationale for avoiding compact urban forms reveal a perception of insufficient consumer demand and 
structural barriers that increase the complexity and cost of compact development, such as the absence of 
transit, zoning restrictions (e.g. setbacks and parking requirements), and uncertainty in the approval 
process (Feldman, Lewis, & Schiff, 2012; Noland, Weiner, DiPetrillo, & Kay, 2017). Developers in 
Southern Ontario have reported a similar set of barriers that increase the cost or marketability of compact 
development projects, including the availability or timing of transit investments, unsupportive planning 
restrictions and engineering standards (particularly with respect to parking requirements), and high 
development charges within built up areas compared with greenfield areas (Blais, 2003). 
Despite shared profit-seeking strategies, developers have been found to be highly diverse in their 
practices, preferences and motivations (Coiacetto, 2000; Rosen, 2017). Within and between regions, 
developers report different visions, levels of risk-taking, patience, and collaboration with municipalities 
and this variation is likely to create variability in the ability and willingness of developers to build 
compact urban forms within different geographies (Coiacetto, 2000; Feldman et al., 2012). A number of 
studies describe developers as embedded in their local planning and development networks, seeking 
projects that are compatible with their local knowledge and expertise and their established relationships 
and reputation with local implementing actors (Charney, 2005; Coiacetto, 2000; Henneberry & Parris, 
2013). Coiacetto (2000) found that attitudes and understandings of Australian real estate developers were 
highly localized, resulting in differences in built form across regions. In a study of patterns of office 
development in Toronto, Charney (2005) found developers to select projects in familiar locations. This 
locational embeddedness was attributed to the expertise and time required to develop local trust and 
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knowledge and which were necessary for a development’s success. Locational embeddedness may 
provide municipal governments opportunities to form specific relationships with developers to further 
local growth management agendas; however, it may also serve to limit the availability of developers for 
certain types of development projects, such as infill and brownfield redevelopment.  Rosen (2017) found 
that condo builders in Toronto who reported a greater sense of social responsibility were more likely to 
take on higher risk or lower profit projects such as brownfield redevelopments.  
Other scholars have pointed out that the economic motivations of development companies, real 
estate professions and home building companies can be compatible with growth management objectives 
under certain situations. In a review of business motivations, Leo et al (1998) argued that businesses can 
be supportive of local government efforts to reduce sprawl if they perceive compact development as 
creating a competitive advantage that will attract business and development to their community. As well, 
developers may support policies to reduce sprawl if such policies limit opportunity for public opposition 
(Leo, 1998). However, a failure to balance restrictive policies where growth can occur with policies that 
offset the lost development opportunities on the urban fringe, such as zoning for higher densities within 
the urban centre, may create opposition to growth management from the development industry (Downs, 
2005; Leo, 1998). Leo et al. (1998) contended that Portland, Oregon’s creation of both development 
constraints and opportunities that ensured there was no net loss in development potential was a critical 
factor in the acceptance of Portland’s Growth Management System by members of the development 
community.  Few empirical studies examine the presumed relationship between developers’ motivations 
and characteristics and plan outcomes. In an examination of developers and planning agencies in New 
Zealand, Laurian found no significant relationship between a developer’s capacity or commitment to meet 
planning objectives on the successful implementation of an environmental plan (Laurian et al., 2004a). 
Inter-organization Relations 
Vertical Consistency 
The extent to which a municipality conforms to the regulatory growth management planning 
framework imposed by higher levels of government (defined here as “vertical consistency”) has a 
significant impact on growth management implementation. In North America, state and provincial growth 
management plans vary considerably in the extent to which they require vertical consistency. Plans that 
do not require local official plan conformity to higher level plans offer municipalities the maximum 
amount of flexibility. Such regimes operate under the premise that municipalities require the ability to 
adopt policies and programs that are best suited to their unique social, political and economic context. 
Under more prescriptive growth management regimes, official plan conformity is a requirement, but 
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municipalities retain control over the type and number of supporting policy instruments, regulations and 
incentive programs.  
Growth management regimes that do not require local Official Plan conformance to the higher 
level state or provincial plan have been credited by some scholars with providing more context-sensitive, 
and locally supported outcomes. Early work in the field of program implementation adopted the 
perspective that prescriptive plans were doomed to failure as a result of the complexity in coordinating 
actions across multiple levels of government (Bardach, 1977; Conteh, 2011; Hupe, 2011). Much of this 
work built on the findings of a widely cited case study titled “Implementation: how great expectations in 
Washington are dashed in Oakland: or, why it's amazing that federal programs work at all, this being a 
saga of the Economic Development Administration as told by two sympathetic observers who seek to 
build morals on a foundation of ruined hopes” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). This study concluded that 
the larger the number of agencies or individuals ("clearances") between the policy maker and the 
implementing agency, the less likely that policy would be successfully implemented (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1984). Underlying the “clearance” argument was the logic that adherence to a policy at each 
successive stage along the chain of organizations would need to approximate 100% for the final, 
cumulative outcome to be in close compliance with that policy's goals (M. J. Hill & Hupe, 2009; 
Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). Others found that the type and quality of the interactions between upper 
tier government agencies and local level implementing agencies (e.g. such as coordination and level of 
engagement) had an important influence on the implementation of policy (Bardach, 1977; Conteh, 2011). 
Planning implementation literature has similarly emphasized the importance of local coordination 
and conformity to state or provincial growth management objectives as a critical variable in successful 
growth management implementation. Within this literature, however, scholars have typically viewed 
conformance as an achievable, technical exercise rather than an objective doomed to failure. Results of 
these studies have been mixed: analyses of US state growth management programs have found a lack of 
vertical consistency can obstruct efforts to contain sprawl (Bengston et al., 2004; Howell-Moroney, 
2007), while others – mostly empirical studies - have failed to find a correlation between programs that 
required vertical consistency and indicators of program success such as higher population densities (Ben-
Zadok, 2005; Carruthers, 2002b; Ingram et al., 2009).  Scholars have attributed the weak correlation 
between consistency requirements and compact development to the presence of other interdependent and 
influential social and political factors (Carruthers, 2002b; Ingram et al., 2009). Studies of Florida’s 
growth management program, for example have found that despite its vertical consistency requirements, 
Florida’s urban form had become increasingly less dense and more concentrated in rural rather than urban 
counties (Ben-Zadok, 2005; Boarnet et al., 2011). This contradictory outcome is attributed in part to the 
27 
 
lack of state funding for infrastructure, variability in the local coordination of development and 
infrastructure, and the introduction of conflicting, sprawl-promoting legislation such as Florida’s 2006 
Agricultural Economic Development Act (Ben-Zadok, 2009; Chapin, 2007). 
Horizontal consistency 
Horizontal consistency is the coordination of plans and plan implementation between local 
municipalities within a region to ensure a consistent approach to growth management. Regional 
coordination can help mitigate the effects of variability in land prices, which can draw people from the 
expensive urban areas to the less expensive rural periphery (Brody et al., 2006). Coordination of 
approaches across municipalities has been shown to be particularly important for the implementation of 
municipal containment policies such as growth boundaries and service boundaries. While effective in 
managing growth within a particular municipality, growth boundaries have been demonstrated to have 
broader scale negative consequences for urban sprawl when implemented in isolation from other regions 
and without the use of complementary policies (Carruthers, 2002a; Downs, 1992; Fischel, 2004). Growth 
boundaries surrounding cities in California for example, have been found to effectively discourage 
development at the city periphery and to concentrate it in the core, but they also were found to cause 
leapfrog development in neighbouring communities that did not have urban growth boundaries (Landis, 
2006). Carruthers (2002b, p.1975) identified fragmented planning approaches as a leading factor in the 
failure of many growth management planning efforts including California where “…the problems that 
have arisen through growth control in California are directly linked to the inconsistencies that emerge 
when communities are required to plan without co-ordinating with one another”. Similarly, Boyle and 
Mohamed (2007) found that a tendency toward small local governments and local decision making, was a 
key factor in the ineffectiveness of Michigan's smart growth inspired planning strategies. 
Woo and Guldmann (2011) found that the impacts of poor horizontal coordination can be 
mitigated by the presence of vertical consistency requirements. In their study, they found growth to be 
better contained to urban growth boundaries and urban service boundaries for municipalities located 
within states with vertical consistency requirements (Woo & Guldmann, 2011). Comparative studies have 
found local containment strategies to be more effective at containing growth in the more centralized 
planning environments of the UK than in Canada, where municipal and regional agencies operate with 
less oversight from provincial and federal agencies (Jackson, Gopinath, & Curry, 2012). In British 
Columbia, for example, the multiplicity of uncoordinated government agencies instead of a single 
governing body to oversee growth and development at the urban-rural fringe, was found to help to 
perpetuate inefficient land use patterns (Meligrana, 2003).  
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Societal Environment 
Othengrafen (2010) describes the societal environment as the underlying and unconscious beliefs, 
perceptions, thoughts and feelings that serve to structure and reinforce the planning environment. Societal 
environment barriers frame how implementing agencies perceive and respond to planning challenges 
(Knieling & Othengrafen, 2015). As taken-for-granted societal norms, the beliefs and perceptions that 
make up the societal environment are rarely explicitly acknowledged or articulated (Knieling & 
Othengrafen, 2015) and as such may be more resistant to change than those that are more visible and 
tangible (Reimer, 2013). Scholars have identified a number of societal-scale barriers that play an 
important role in the transformation of urban form, including property rights advocacy and NIMBY, auto 
dependency, and market economies.  
Property Rights Advocacy and NIMBY 
Advocacy groups are described by scholars and practitioners alike as having a significant 
influence on the implementation of planning policy (Downs, 2005). Homeowners, in particular, can be 
powerful advocates for restrictions on urban intensification, although the extent to which Canadian 
homeowners can exercise their property rights is limited (compared to their US counterparts) given the 
absence of property rights from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms under the Constitution Act, 
and the fact that such rights can be changed through legislation. Despite the absence of constitutionally 
embedded property rights, Canadian and American homeowners share similar motivations to resist 
changes that may impact their properties. Homeowners are more likely than others to raise objections to 
development and are strongly associated with NIMBY – the protectionist attitudes and oppositional 
tactics used by property owners when faced with potential land use changes (K. R. Cox & McCarthy, 
1982). Protectionist actions by homeowners to preserve low density urban forms can stem from concerns 
about personal safety, and loss of neighborhood amenities as well as from racism, elitism or distrust in 
government (G. Ellis, 2004). Since home and property ownership constitutes the primary source of 
Canadian household wealth (Chawla, 2011; Metzger, 2000), opposition to growth management policies 
can also stem from financial concerns where proposed land use change is perceived as a risk to property 
values and future returns on investment. Concern about investment is exacerbated by a phenomenon 
called the “endowment effect”, in which the property owner puts a higher value on his/her goods than 
he/she would be willing to pay for it (Levine, 2006). The inflated value of property perceived by property 
owners, coupled with the fact that property constitutes a major share of a household’s wealth can lead to 
intense opposition to new development in existing neighbourhoods (Levine, 2006).  
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Home owners tend to comprise a more affluent group than non-home owners, and consequently 
their views on issues relating to urban intensification and infill development can be disproportionately 
represented in municipal politics. Coalitions of such groups have been found to exert substantial pressure 
on local politicians on issues relating to urban development (Been, Madar, & Mcdonnell, 2014; Gilbert, 
Wekerle, & Sandberg, 2005; Jacobs, 2010). This can lead to a reinforcement of existing policies that 
protect their interests, including policies that inhibit urban intensification, mixed uses and alternative 
transportation options (Sorensen, 2010). 
Property rights advocacy and NIMBY lobbying have been credited with constraining local 
growth management efforts. In Toronto, Curic and Bunting (2006) found that NIMBY responses to 
intensification of a former hydro corridor in Toronto led to considerable delay and expense. Developers 
and planners in London, Ontario cited the lack of public support and understanding for intensification 
projects involving brownfields as a barrier to their redevelopment. At a broader scale, a strong property 
rights movement in the US successfully challenged and overturned Oregon’s 30 year old comprehensive 
land use planning program (Jacobs & Paulsen, 2009). More recently, property rights advocacy entrenched 
in the US’s “Tea Party” politics was found to pose a significant threat to the sustainability objectives of 
regional planning (Trapenberg Frick, 2013). 
Property rights advocacy is increasingly viewed by scholars as a self-reinforcing value that 
inhibits changes to urban policy (Jacobs & Paulsen, 2009; Jacobs, 2010; Sorensen, 2011b). Originating 
from early agrarian and anti-urban sentiments, property ownership is an entrenched North American value 
(de Neufville & Barton, 1987; Muller, 2004; Wunderlich, 2000). Facilitated in Canada by supportive 
Federal policies such as mortgage insurance, provincial funding for highways and water infrastructure, 
lower land prices at the urban fringe, and value of the aesthetics and restorative health benefits of 
suburban and country living, Canadians place a high value on homeownership, particularly in suburban 
and exurban locations (Harris, 2000; Harris, 2004) although housing preferences for young Canadians 
may be changing (Carrick, 2014). Homeownership is theorized to be further reinforced by a North 
American culture of possessive individualism, characterized by a belief in minimal public regulation of 
private property, and the value private over public spaces (Choko & Harris, 1990; Harris, 2004). Taken 
together, these values constitute a significant challenge for municipalities attempting to implement certain 
growth management policies.  Given the scale of homeownership and the orientation of planning toward 
participation, NIMBYism has emerged as a ubiquitous challenge facing intensification efforts to alter the 
prevailing low density urban form (Dear, 1992; Searle & Filion, 2011). 
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Auto dependency 
Auto dependency has been cited as one of the most significant barriers to the implementation of 
growth management policies, as a result of its role in perpetuating low density development patterns 
(Filion, 2003). Widespread car ownership has permitted the spatial separation of housing and employment 
and has increased access to lower land prices at the urban periphery (Handy, 2005). Access to inexpensive 
land on the urban periphery permits low density urban forms, such as single family housing and 
horizontal industrial and commercial buildings and the provision of ample and free parking for 
homeowners and workers. Growth in suburban residential and commercial development has created new 
"edge cities", which can outcompete parent cities for economic growth and development (Garreau, 1991). 
Urban regions and the edge cities within them have become increasingly polycentric and commuting 
patterns occur in all directions.  
The automobile has, more than any other mode of transportation, created the political, cultural, 
economic and structural conditions for self-reinforcement (Khayesi & Amekudzi, 2011; Urry, 2004). Low 
density development designed to accommodate car travel can create greater reliance on the car by 
inducing a higher frequency of trips and discouraging alternative forms of transportation since suburban 
development does not have the density required to support public transit (Cervero, 2003). The separation 
of land uses and configuration of roads in suburban areas makes travel by active means, such as walking 
or cycling, difficult and sometimes unpleasant. The affordability and convenience of car travel reduces 
the effect of distance on consumer choices such that there is little incentive to live in close proximity to 
employment or commercial districts (Handy, 2005).  In response, households have self-organized around 
the necessity of car ownership (Filion & McSpurren, 2007). Car-oriented travel patterns and preferences 
feed back into transportation investments through political pressure for road improvements, free parking 
and low density development patterns.  
Car usage is further reinforced through socio-cultural norms and values, including an emotional 
attachment to automobile transportation. The car's provision of increased privacy, flexibility, comfort, and 
speed over public transit has created novel "socialities" whereby new lifestyles, expectations, activities 
and cultures have been created that otherwise did not and would not exist (Urry, 2004). Additionally, the 
socio-cultural importance of cars is further reinforced by its widespread interpretation as a symbol of 
financial and social success, safety, freedom, and masculinity (Urry, 2004). The cultural attachment to car 
travel is an important factor in political and community resistance to investment in public transportation 
and high density developments, as evidenced by former Toronto Mayor, Rob Ford's pronouncement that 
investments in light rail transit represented a "war on the car" (Church & Grant, 2012). Reflecting voter 
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preferences for unencumbered car travel, Ford led a move to reverse fully-funded plans for a network of 
light rail transit lines, and instead proposed subway expansions that would result in a modest service 
improvement for transit riders. The subway expansion plan eventually failed due to a lack of broader 
political support, and while much of the original light rail transit plan has returned to the political agenda, 
the controversy resulted in significant delays and costs for the transit system. 
The primacy of car transportation in urban policies and the entrenchment of behaviours and 
preferences have made it difficult to alter development patterns that favour the car. For example, although 
research has shown that road improvements and new highway development induces more car travel 
(Cervero, 2003), the reverse proposition – that fewer roads and highways will reduce car travel – is not 
supported by the evidence (Handy, 2005).  Thus changes to urban form to accommodate other forms of 
travel such as transit or cycling, are necessary but insufficient to change the current travel modes.  
Although in many cities public transit usage has increased as a result of concerted efforts to change the 
trajectory of urban sprawl, it "still lags considerably behind inflation-adjusted increases in public transit 
subsidies" (Brown, Morris, & Taylor, 2009, p. 175).   
Growth Imperative 
The shared motivation for economic growth by the decision making elite has been theorized by 
Molotch (1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987) as well as others to structure the planning environment 
and influence the decisions and actions of implementing actors. Local governments are constrained in 
their decision making by a perceived need for economic growth in order to complete with other 
municipalities for mobile capital, and by a limited capacity to generate revenue (Harding, 1995; Logan & 
Molotch, 1987). Business interests share politicians’ pro-growth motivation since they benefit directly 
from decisions that maximize property values and attract local investment. The unified objectives and 
decision making power of elected officials and business stakeholders are theorized to create formal and 
informal networks called “growth coalitions” that exert a significant influence on municipal decision 
making. Growth coalitions can include other pro-growth stakeholders such as developers and landowners, 
as well as those who are involved in property development such as construction, real estate, finance, 
architecture, and planning industries. Other indirect beneficiaries of urban economic growth and 
development include universities, cultural organizations and small businesses.  
The presence of a growth coalition can have implications for growth management when growth 
management policies conflict with aspirations for economic development. Eidelman (2010) contends that 
municipal politicians’ desire for local investment and tax revenue from development leads them to 
support developers’ preference for prevailing low density suburban developments, thus undermining 
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growth management planning efforts.  Accounts of suburban development in the US identify growth 
coalitions as integral factor in the continued expansion of suburban areas (Jonas & Wilson, 1999; Logan 
& Crowder, 2002). The efforts of a growth coalition in Whistler, BC was found to contribute to rapid, 
uncoordinated settlement growth, incentives for recreation developments, and weak implementation of 
municipal design and density policies (Gill, 2000).  
Slow growing or economically depressed communities may be more susceptible to political and 
economic pressures for growth, making municipal councils in slow growing communities less critical of 
development proposals (Leo & Brown, 2000; Leo & Anderson, 2006). In a study of the slow growing 
City of Winnipeg, Leo (2000) found that the municipality’s orientation toward growth led to the 
development of excessive infrastructure capacity (e.g. road and bridge linkages), which exacerbated 
sprawl by encouraging outward development, inducing car travel and reducing commuting times. In a 
cross-US study, Feiock et al. (2008) found that wealthier and faster growing communities were more 
likely to adopt growth management policies than municipalities facing economic challenges (Feiock et 
al., 2008).  Similarly, Lee and Choi (2011) found that wealthy counties in Colorado were more likely to 
support the implementation of growth management policies than less well-off counties.  
New political voices and pressures, represented by increasingly influential stakeholders and 
changing political economies, have called into question the continued relevance of a growth machine 
model for urban politics (Bradford, 2010; MacLeod, 2011). Nevertheless, the growth machine theory, 
now more nuanced to account for changing power structures and interests, has been argued to continue to 
have significant explanatory power (Jonas & Wilson, 1999). The persistence of the theory may be due in 
part to the growth coalitions’ self-reinforcing characteristics. Coalitions act to minimize opposition to 
development and generate public acceptance of growth by promoting growth as a public good that 
benefits all citizens (Dilworth & Stokes, 2013). Pro-growth ideologies are established and maintained 
through boosterism, the promotion of “trickle down” benefits from growth, and the adoption of neoliberal 
policies (Dilworth & Stokes, 2013). Through the generation of support for pro-growth ideologies, growth 
coalitions are thought to moderate the level of pressure from residents and environmental advocacy 
groups seeking to reign in or manage growth. 
Market Distortions and Neoliberalism 
Market distortions that fail to account for externalities of urban sprawl constitute a challenge to 
growth management objectives (Slack, 2002).  These distortions stem from individual cost-benefit 
decision making models that support the "highest and best use" characteristic of the market, where more 
productive urban land uses are priced higher than less productive farming uses (Nechyba & Walsh, 2004). 
33 
 
Scholars have pointed to the failure of a market system based on individual cost-benefit decision making 
to account for the costs of traffic congestion, social isolation, and loss of ecosystem services provided by 
agricultural lands and natural areas as a result of car-oriented development (Brueckner, 2000; Brueckner, 
2001). Failure to internalize true costs results in an underpricing of development to the consumer. 
Inaccurate price signals encourage households and businesses to make decisions that maximize their 
private benefits and minimize private costs, while ignoring social costs and benefits.  
Municipal, provincial and federal policies, such as transportation infrastructure investments, can 
create inaccurate price signals through subsidies for low density residential and commercial development. 
As well, the absence of policies to rectify market failures can present a challenge to growth management 
efforts. Natural areas provide a wide variety of services, including groundwater recharge and filtration, 
biodiversity, temperature moderation, and carbon sequestration, all of which are not accounted for in the 
purchase price of agricultural land for urban development purposes. Slack (2002) and others (Blais, 2010; 
Brueckner, 2000; Brueckner, 2001; Carruthers & Ulfarsson, 2003; e.g. Irwin & Bockstael, 2004), for 
example, argue that the social costs of pollution, congestion, loss of open space and agricultural lands are 
not borne by the developer and consumer, but rather by the broader public. Brueckner (2000; 2001) 
identifies air pollution due to commuting, loss of natural and agricultural areas at the urban fringe, and 
long term infrastructure costs as the three main externalities that are not internalized by developers. 
Underpricing of transportation in North America has received particular attention in the literature, with 
some scholars estimating that US subsidies to the operating costs of road infrastructure amounts to five 
times the charged price (Blais, 2010; Mills, 2001).  
The emergence of neoliberal political and economic ideologies may exacerbate the challenge 
posed by market distortions that favour unrestricted low density urban development. Emerging from a 
perceived failure of Keynesian economics and urban ‘managerialism’, the neoliberal paradigm is 
characterized by a belief in the superiority of market-based solutions and the withdrawal of government 
from the management of public problems (Filion & Kramer, 2011; Sager, 2011). Neoliberal thinking 
rationalizes certain barriers to growth management such as property rights, and through its emphasis on 
privatization and deregulation can hinder government efforts to intervene in the market to correct perverse 
subsidies (Sager, 2011). In its rejection of urban planning in favour of market solutions, the neoliberal 
paradigm undermines the legitimacy of planning policy and programs intended to manage growth 
(Fasenfest, Ciancanelli, & Reese, 1997; Sager, 2011). 
Scholars examining the influence of neoliberalism on growth management efforts have found that 
neoliberal governments can reduce organizational capacity and planning resources for managing growth. 
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Filion and Kramer (2011) found that a neoliberal shift in Canadian and municipal politics contributed to 
the decentralization of Toronto’s planning authority into smaller, competing regional governments, which 
hindered the City’s capacity to coordinate planning for growth on a metropolitan wide scale. As well, 
restrictions on public sector resources and a shift in priorities toward economic development in Toronto 
thwarted planning projects designed to address social and environmental concerns (Filion & Kramer, 
2011). Walks (2014) found that former Toronto Mayor Rob Ford’s “roll back” neoliberalism helped to 
dismantle planned improvements to public transit and cycling infrastructure and further entrench a culture 
of automobility and its accompanying low density urban form.  
Conclusion and Emerging Questions 
The plan and policy implementation scholarship reveals a large number of barriers to 
implementation, ranging from local planning products and the practices and motivations of individual 
actors, to the broad scale, complex structuring forces that create the political, economic and socio-cultural 
frames that shape local planning practice. Theorized and demonstrated interactions between barriers 
suggest that barriers may form mutually reinforcing groupings, or in some cases may conflict to create 
contradictory or unstable relationships. From this literature, three general observations and related 
research questions emerge.  
First, while the literatures reviewed in this chapter identify a large number of barriers to 
implementation, they are somewhat undifferentiated in terms of their relative importance and relevance to 
specific local contexts. Policy implementation research has been found to be fragmented across a wide 
range of disciplines, with different fields exploring specific questions about implementation and limited 
integration between disciplines (Saetren, 2005). Scholarly work within the plan implementation fields, as 
reported here and elsewhere, has been found to emphasize the role of micro- and meso- scale factors on 
implementation, such as organizational characteristics, discourses and power relations (Healey, 2007; 
Koontz & Newig, 2014). In contrast, scholars within the fields of political science and urban sociology, 
tend to emphasize the importance of broad structural driving forces such as elite actor networks, 
governance regimes, and social processes influencing planning practices (Healey, 2007). With limited 
engagement between disciplines, opportunities may have been missed to identify and examine the causal 
forces that obstruct implementation and their relative importance. If one of the purposes of policy and 
plan implementation scholarship is to understand what drives local conformance and non-conformance to 
broader regional plans so as to assist in the targeting of actions to facilitate improved conformance and 
consistent outcomes, an understanding of the key underlying belief systems, identities, cultural mores and 
norms that guide action and outcomes is essential. This research seeks to fill that gap by exploring the 
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questions: What are key driving forces that obstruct local implementation of growth management plans 
and how do these driving forces operate to affect local implementation? 
The second observation relates to the role and nature of interactions between variables that affect 
implementation. Integral to an understanding of implementation in environments where behavioural 
change is required is an awareness of the interactions between actors and the organizational, social, 
political and economic structures within which they operate. These interactions are important because 
they may lead to the reinforcement of existing behaviours, and can create conflicts and opportunities for 
the introduction of new behaviours. The extant research suggests that implementation barriers do not 
operate in isolation, but rather interact in various ways and at various scales to support or contradict each 
other. This research seeks to clarify these relationships by exploring in more detail the ways in which 
legal, organizational and political frameworks, societal and professional belief systems, values and norms, 
and actor behaviours interact to reinforce existing planning practices or generate opportunities for new 
approaches. Of interest are the questions: How do the barriers to implementation relate to one another, 
and what are the mediating mechanisms that define these relationships? How do barriers interact to 
reinforce the status quo? Where are there opportunities for change? 
The third and final observation emerging from the literature review pertains to the role of local 
context in implementation studies. Studies within the broader planning field have explored the 
relationship between spatial policies and plans and the symbolic and cultural meanings and identities 
affixed to a place (Cadieux, Taylor, & Bunce, 2013; Richardson & Jensen, 2003).  Local contexts, such as 
histories, geography, economies and socio-political environments, may create different perceptions, needs 
and value systems of social and political actors, which in turn could promote specific planning practices. 
These frames are largely absent from the planning and policy implementation literature reviewed in this 
chapter – a deficiency that may result in an aspatial approach to spatial policy analysis (Richardson & 
Jensen, 2003). This research proposes to explore the role of local context as mediating factor in the 
expression of barriers by answering the questions: How do the key barriers to local implementation vary 
within different local contexts? Are some barriers more important/less important in certain local contexts 
than others?   
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Chapter 3. Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks 
The sheer number of explanatory variables proposed to impact implementation, some scholars 
have argued, threatens to hamper our understanding of the primary mechanisms influencing 
implementation (O'Toole, 2000) – a problem that has led many theorists to seek a synthesis. These 
syntheses aim to identify the key driving forces that obstruct implementation, which is a question of 
interest to this research. 
In the field of policy implementation, syntheses of factors affecting implementation have 
emphasized the importance of what has been termed “top-down” variables, or the traditional governance 
structures that frame the implementation environment (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier & 
Mazmanian, 1979). Top-down variables can be considered analogous to macro-scale, societal 
environment barriers. Pierre (1999), for example, adopts a top-down approach to describe how different 
models of urban governance influence political motivations and responsiveness to certain interest groups, 
which in turn shapes policy outcomes. Also emphasizing the importance of top down variables, Hill and 
Hupe (2009) explain implementation in terms of a hierarchy of governance, whereby institutions 
(constitutive governance) influence actors’ rule making (directional governance), which in turn influences 
implementation (operational governance).  
Others have argued that “bottom-up” variables – the actions and beliefs of implementing actors 
and agencies and their use of discretion – is key to our understanding of how policy is translated into 
action (deLeon & deLeon, 2002; Lipsky, 2010). These variables generally relate to the planning 
environment scale. A seminal work by Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) emphasizes the importance of 
bottom-up variables by describing implementation as the product of the number of interactions and actors 
required to implement a policy. They propose that the greater number of actors and interactions between 
the creation of a policy and its implementation, the less likely that policy will be implemented as it was 
intended. Others have explored how and when gaps between top-down rules and local needs and 
circumstances are bridged through the use of discretion by street-level bureaucrats, resulting in impacts 
on implementation and outcomes (Booth, 1996; Lipsky, 2010; Loh, 2011; Padeiro, 2016). Collaborative 
planning scholars have explored how the engagement of stakeholders in resolving local issues can lead to 
negotiated solutions and greater acceptance and adherence to those solutions, which is theorized to 
produce greater conformance of actions to the original intent of policies and plans (Healey, 2003; Innes, 
1992; Innes, 2004; Koontz & Newig, 2014). 
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Some substantive efforts have been made in the policy implementation field to merge or further 
simplify the polarizing top-down and bottom-up view points. Sabatier’s (1986) advocacy coalition 
framework of policy change, for example, placed the analysis of implementation into a broader and 
longer term context of policy creation and change, where actors form coalitions to negotiate for policies 
and outcomes that align with their beliefs. Matland’s (1995) ambiguity/conflict model described 
implementation as a product of two key variables - a policy’s ambiguity in purpose and its degree of 
contention.  Under this model, contentious policies that are unclear in their objectives are less likely to be 
implemented than widely supported policies that clearly demonstrate a solution to a recognized problem. 
An integrated implementation model developed by Walker (2012) similarly proposed that the root of 
implementation failures lay in the policy development process, where policies are either too ambiguous or 
are inadequate to address real policy challenges. These syntheses of policy implementation have tended to 
place the majority of the responsibility for implementation failures on policy design and the organizations 
and actors responsible for implementation.  
With some exceptions (e.g. Filion, 2010b; Healey, 2003), syntheses of implementation variables 
have placed greater emphasis on tangible, visible barriers to implementation as the primary objects of 
investigation. Underlying many studies of implementation is the assumption that plan implementation is 
the product of the regulatory environment (e.g. laws), outputs of the planning process (e.g. policies and 
plans), and actions of actors involved in implementation (e.g. planning approaches). While these factors 
are likely to play a significant role, such studies may over emphasize the technical, rational decision 
making component of land use planning and implementation, and underestimate or ignore less visible, 
cultural influences on planning practice (Booth, 2011; Friedmann, 1967; Othengrafen & Reimer, 2013). 
Causal, underlying barriers may be so tightly wound with existing worldviews and practices that they can 
be difficult to identify and describe. Underlying power structures, for example, can influence problem 
identification, the range of available policy solutions, and privilege certain interests over others (Healey, 
2003). For the implementation of spatial plans, place-based ideologies and strategic representations of a 
place in public discourses can influence public and agency support for new planning policies (Bunce, 
2004; Cadieux et al., 2013). Increased mobility, changing settlement patterns, and a growing consumption 
of natural resources for either leisure or conservation can create the underlying conditions, belief systems 
and motivations that favour certain spatial planning approaches over others (Cadieux & Hurley, 2011; 
Richardson & Jensen, 2003). Failure to specify these and other underlying assumptions and belief 
systems that lead to particular planning behaviours may risk “giving rise to unwitting distortions when 
basic preconceptions have not been made explicit” (Friedmann, 1967, p. 226).  Understanding the 
mechanisms by which underlying factors purposefully or inadvertently constrain actions can help explain 
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how policies are implemented and why they may or may not succeed in meeting their goals (Lecours, 
2005). 
Two theoretical frameworks have emerged in recent decades to explore the complex 
interrelationships between planning practice, and the top-down, bottom-up, underlying and invisible 
variables that structure the environments in which spatial planning takes place. These frameworks provide 
a theoretical lens and analytical tools to help answer the questions that emerged from the previous 
chapter, namely: 1) What are the key barriers to implementation? 2) How do the key barriers to local 
implementation vary within different local contexts? 3) How do the implementation barriers relate to one 
another? and 4) Where do opportunities exist for change? The frameworks differ from many previous 
approaches to understanding implementation in that they permit an examination of both bottom up 
variables and top down variables and the interactions between them. The approaches are particularly well 
suited to exploring not just the variables themselves, but also the mechanisms by which they interact to 
enable or constrain implementation. 
The first of these theories, called new institutionalism, seeks to understand how broad forms of 
social organization or “institutions” interact with actors to create the logics and motivations for action 
(González & Healey, 2005; Healey, 2005; Lowndes, 2009; Lowndes & Roberts, 2013; Pierre, Peters, & 
Peters, 2008; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Van Der Heijden, 2010; Verma, 2007). Within this theory, 
institutions are generally understood as the “frameworks of rules, norms and practices which structure 
action in social contexts” (Healey, 2007, p. 64). Institutions refer to a wide range of types and scales of 
social phenomena that structure interactions, preferences, and ultimately, decisions and behaviour. New 
institutionalism can assist with the analytical challenge associated with a large number and type of 
implementation variables by permitting the organization of implementation barriers into common framing 
themes of social organization. Within these themes, the framework provides a range of analytical tools to 
explore how barriers interact to support or contradict each other, and how and when place-specific, 
complex institutional networks enable or constrain action (Servillo & Van Den Broeck, 2012). Recent 
developments in new institutionalism provide improved conceptual understandings of the role and power 
of actors to invoke change within the broader structuring forces of institutions (Mahoney & Thelen, 
2009). The framework recognizes that planning practice is variable and contingent on its institutional 
setting and context, and that the dissemination and adoption of new spatial planning goals can require 
changes to the formal and informal institutions that make up the institutional environment (González & 
Healey, 2005). In this regard new institutionalism is particularly apt for examining strategic planning for 
socio-spatial transformation (Healey, 2007). 
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A second theoretical framework, referred to as a theory of planning culture, has also been used to 
understand the structuring forces that influence planning practice. Like new institutionalism, the 
framework places the structuring forces that frame action at the centre of analysis. The theory provides a 
conceptual model for understanding the hierarchy of formal and informal variables that create the 
traditions, approaches and “cultures” that characterize localized planning practice. Scholars have used the 
model to analyze similarities and differences between local cultural attitudes, norms and values to 
understand how these factors create differences in the local implementation of common spatial planning 
objectives (Knieling & Othengrafen, 2015). While less conceptually developed than new institutionalism 
in terms of providing a basis for understanding how structuring forces become entrenched or vulnerable 
to change (Z. Taylor, 2013), the model’s scalar focus permits analytical distinction between broad, 
societal scale framing variables and those that are more localized and unique to specific regions. This 
distinction is helpful to explore variation in key barriers to implementation across different local contexts. 
Recognizing the potential importance of “invisible” and contextual factors that influence 
individual and collective action, the interactive nature of these structuring factors and variability in how 
they manifest in different regions and at different scales, this research adopts a conceptual framework that 
integrates new institutionalism with the scalar focus of a model of planning culture. The theoretical basis 
for these two frameworks, and how they are integrated to provide a conceptual framework for 
understanding implementation, are described in more detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter. The 
chapter ends with a detailed model for conceptualizing barriers to growth management plans. 
New Institutionalism 
Scholars of new institutional theory generally define institutions as the range of structures, both 
formal (e.g. governments, laws and constitutions) and informal (e.g. rules, identities and beliefs), that 
together form the basis for actors’ perceptions and behavior (M. J. Hill & Hupe, 2009; Lecours, 2005; 
Lowndes, 2009). Institutions are thought to emerge as a means to help actors make sense of complex 
situations by creating a set of common expectations and understandings, and offering guidance on a range 
of socially-acceptable courses of action (Boin & Kuipers, 2008). In doing so, institutions help actors solve 
problems and create order. While institutions may first develop as a means to solve collective problems, 
they can also establish patterns of behavior and shared narratives that, in and of themselves, are viewed as 
desirable and appropriate and become taken-for-granted. At that point, institutions may persist even if 
they become ill-suited to solve new societal problems.  
Institutions have not commonly been the focus of theories to understand change and obduracy in 
urban forms (Pflieger, Kaufmann, Pattaroni, & Jemelin, 2009; Verma, 2007). Cities and the politics, 
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decision making and planning practices that shape them are, however, particularly well-suited to 
exploration using a new institutional conceptual framework since they are influenced by and embedded 
within a wide range of institutions, including shared scripts, values, norms and regulatory structures, that 
may be historically-driven, codified and enforced (Teitz, 2007). At their most basic conception, cities and 
their environs are institutional structures themselves, and their physical presence can influence and shape 
identities, policy options and planning actions. The organizational structures, interrelationships and 
cultures of municipal planning departments, city councils, the local development industry, and 
neighbourhood groups may also influence how planning challenges are interpreted and resolved. These 
institutions may be intertwined with broader social-constructions such as values and beliefs surrounding 
the economy, the environment and the respective roles of citizens and governments to solve collective 
problems.  
Recent notions of new institutionalism differ from earlier institutional theories in that they 
internalize as a main point of inquiry both the formal and informal institutions that impact action. Rather 
than representing a unified body of thought, new institutionalism is comprised of a collection of analytical 
approaches that each place a different emphasis on how institutions are defined and how they operate to 
influence action (P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996; March & Olsen, 2009; Pierre et al., 2008). Pierre and 
colleagues (2008) identify as many as seven main approaches within the field of new institutionalism that 
draw variously on economics, political science and sociology to offer explanations for the role of 
institutions in creating the logics, motivations and constraints for individual and collective action. Hall 
and Taylor (1996) describe variation within new institutional theory more broadly by proposing three 
main streams of new institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism. Within and between these theoretical streams is considerable variability in 
how institutions are thought to interact with agency to influence outcomes (P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996; 
Lowndes, 2009). Using Hall and Taylor’s (1996) broader categorizations, the differences and similarities 
between the variants of new institutionalism are expanded upon below. 
Three Variants of New Institutionalism 
The first of the approaches to new institutionalism is rational choice institutionalism. Emerging 
from the field of economics and recognizing the deficiencies of classic economics in explaining 
behaviour, institutions within the rational choice stream are conceived as the “rules of the game” that 
create stability and reduce the chaos that would occur if actors operated solely according to their own 
self-interest (Lowndes, 2009). Actors within this theoretical stream are conceived as strategic decision 
makers who make choices to maximize their preferences within the bounds of existing organizations and 
relational structures that create incentives and disincentives for certain actions. Actors’ preferences are 
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generally understood as exogenous and independent of the institutions within which they operate and are 
not influenced or constructed by their institutional environment (P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996).  In some 
forms of rational choice institutionalism, action is considered to be constrained by the desire of actors to 
minimize transaction costs (e.g. the monetary or social costs of a particular interaction, decision or 
behaviour) (Alexander, 2001). Of the three variants of new institutionalism, the rational choice stream 
tends to conceive institutions the most narrowly, emphasizing the more formal elements that structure 
society, such as organizations and governments, but also including some less formal elements such as 
relationships and rules of engagement (Lecours, 2005).  
The second variant of new institutionalism is historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalists 
look to the historical context and sequence of events to understand how past institutions have constrained 
or facilitated subsequent action (Pierre et al., 2008). Compared to rational choice scholars, historical 
institutionalists define institutions more broadly as the “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms 
and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (P. A. Hall 
& Taylor, 1996). Informal institutions such as norms and conventions tend to be considered products of 
the formal structures in which they are embedded (Lecours, 2005). Studies within the historical 
institutional literature typically organize around the principle of contingency or “path dependency” and 
look for “critical junctures” in which external events or ideas upset the assumed stability of institutions 
and help to create new institutions (P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996). Actors within this theoretical stream are 
bounded in their choices by the reduction of feasible or appropriate options due to past decisions and 
institutional arrangements.  
Sociological institutionalism represents the third variant of new institutionalism. The sociological 
stream takes a socio-cultural approach to understanding the creation of institutions and their influence on 
action. Typically more inclusive in its definition of institutions than either rational choice or historical 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism conceives institutions as “not just the formal rules, 
procedures or norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the 
‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action” (P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947). Within the sociological 
institutional framework, actors are conceived as both bounded by and embedded within their institutional 
context, in that informal institutions such as norms and moral templates become internalized by actors and 
work to shape their perceptions, motivations and cultural frames that ultimately influence their behavior 
(Lowndes, 2009). Similar to historical institutionalism, institutions under the sociological institutionalism 
stream are understood as structures that socialize actors into adopting the underlying values and 
assumptions that define the institution (Pierre et al., 2008). As opposed to strategically acting to maximize 
their attainment of goals and preferences, as theorized by rational choice institutionalists, actors are 
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thought to seek out solutions within a subset of culturally-appropriate options (March & Olsen, 2009). 
Whereas historical institutionalists have typically focused on the role of external shocks or “punctuations” 
on the equilibrium of an institution, sociological institutionalists have tended to place greater emphasis on 
the role of changes to the value systems underlying the institution (Pierre et al., 2008).  
Power and Agency 
Early works using new institutional theories came under criticism for their tendency to over 
emphasize the role of structure and under theorize the role of agency and power on political and social 
behavior (Pierre et al., 2008). One of the challenges in understanding the role of agency in institutions – 
particularly for historical and sociological institutionalists – is the fact that institutions and agency are not 
considered to be discrete entities: action is in part creator and in part product of the institutional setting 
within which is it embedded (Delbridge & Edwards, 2007). A growing body of work seeks to address this 
shortcoming in a number of ways, including expanding conceptions of political power to include more 
than the formal institutions of local government, and theorizing how and when actors and actor groups are 
capable of strategic and reflexive action outside of the confines of their institution (Mahoney & Thelen, 
2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). These works recognize that real world institutions are rarely internally 
consistent and homogeneous, that they do not always knit together neatly, and that gaps exist between the 
constraints imposed by institutions and the behaviours of actors (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013). Actors are 
recognized as not wholly constrained by the institutions in which they operate, and exercise their power 
through discretion and coalition building to “interpret, adapt or resist rules” (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013, 
pp.104-105). Actors and coalition groups may also use their discretion to act in ways that change the 
range of possibilities for other actors (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013).  
Institutions and the rules, norms, practices and conventions they embody privilege certain actors 
and actions over others, and in doing so distribute power unevenly(Lowndes, 2008). The distribution of 
power within institutions reflects the values and rules of the institution itself. Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
characterize this power distribution within institutions as an arrangement of rule makers and rule takers, 
where rule makers create and impose institutional rules and practices and rule takers implement the rules. 
Discrepancies between institutional rules and action occur where rule makers are unable to oversee or 
enforce implementation, and where rule takers adapt or disregard rules to achieve their objectives. 
Capoccia (2016) elaborates on the rule maker and rule taker model by illustrating how rule makers may 
exercise control over institutional change through strategic agenda setting, and how rule takers exert their 
power through a range of actions including “gesturing” compliance, delaying action until the salience of 
an issue is low, adopting superficial changes or doing nothing.  
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Mahoney and Thelen (2009) build on Streeck and Thelan’s (2005) work by theorizing the means 
by which rule makers and rule takers influence institutional change. Their typology and conceptual 
framework for understanding institutional change highlights actors’ capacity for action, defined as the 
interaction between political context and institutional rules, which is further distilled down to two key 
factors: veto possibilities and discretion. The capacity of actors to influence action is theorized to be 
greatest for institutions that offer a high level of discretion in the interpretation and implementation of 
rules. Since the institutional rules set by rule makers are inevitably value laden and may also be 
ambiguous, rule takers may apply the rules in a way that fits with their understandings, agendas or 
interests. Within political contexts with high veto possibilities, however, action that is not in alignment 
with institutional rules can be blocked, thus constraining the types of actions available to institutional 
actors. Together these factors work to enable or constrain actors seeking institutional change.  
Local Context 
 Within the various streams of new institutional theory, a number of different frameworks have 
been developed to explore the role of local context on institutional stability and change. Defined in this 
research as the geographically-specific economic, political, social and environmental conditions that 
define a place, local context is differentiated from institutions in that it is devoid of internal organization 
and represents the conditions to which institutions must adapt. For example, a local political culture that 
emphasizes economic development may constitute an institution, but local economic growth may be 
better understood as the local context in which that political institution operates. Studies within the 
historical institutional stream use the concepts of path dependency and critical junctures to examine the 
influence of local context by analyzing geographically-specific conditions and historical events that have 
constrained future policy choices or led to the formation of new institutions (Ghitter & Smart, 2009; 
Robertson, McIntosh, & Smyth, 2010; Sorensen & Hess, 2015; Wilson, 2014). Sociological 
institutionalists, on the other hand, have focused on the interconnections between place and identity, and 
highlight the role of cultural associations of space on the discourses, agenda setting and power-
rationalities that influence policy and planning practice (González & Healey, 2005; Richardson & Jensen, 
2003). Along these lines, Richardson and Jensen (2003) propose that spatial practices are constrained and 
enabled by a “cultural sociology of space”, whereby symbolic and cultural meanings are attached to a 
physical place. Local context, including the physical characteristics and histories of a place, can help 
determine the symbolic and cultural meanings that are ascribed to it.  
Stability and Reproduction 
All variants of new institutionalism identify stability as a possible, if not defining, characteristic 
of institutions (Lecours, 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). Some institutions, such as constitutions and 
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other formal regulatory structures, are highly stable by design, in that they are developed to perpetuate 
particular actions and relationships over the long term (Sorensen, 2011b). Other institutions are stable not 
by conscious design, but inadvertently become reinforced through complementary institutions that justify 
their existence and increase the complexity, cost or desirability of seeking alternative institutional 
arrangements. Cities in particular have been theorized to be supported by a set of deeply interconnected 
institutions, including technology, culture, norms and processes, all of which contribute to a high level of 
stability, or “obduracy” of their existing physical form (Hommels, 2005b).  Understanding processes that 
lead to institutional stability is a key area of inquiry in the new institutionalism literature because it can 
help provide insight into the processes that constrain social change. Within the planning and policy fields, 
the concept of institutional stability has been used to help explain geographic differences in policy 
adoption and implementation successes and failures (Fainstein, 2000; González & Healey, 2005). 
Identifying processes and mechanisms of institutional reproduction can highlight opportunities or areas 
where destabilization and change of undesirable institutions may be possible (Lowndes, 2009; Mahoney 
& Thelen, 2009). 
The mechanisms that drive institutional stability are increasingly recognized by new 
institutionalists as emerging from both exogenous and endogenous factors (e.g. Capoccia, 2016). Within 
sociological institutionalism and some historical institutionalism frameworks, institutions are understood 
as spawning expectations, rules, norms and practices that “create the lenses through which actors view the 
world and the very categories of structure, action and thought” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p.13). These 
endogenous processes can lead to the institutionalization of worldviews, which frame actors’ perceptions 
of new challenges and the range of possible, appropriate solutions (Fischer, 2003). Actors are thought to 
be indoctrinated into the value systems that the institution embodies through a process of socialization, 
thereby creating a network of actors who replicate existing assumptions, understandings and, ultimately, 
action (Pierre et al., 2008). Such socialization can help reinforce a tendency of actors toward confirmation 
bias, where actors and actor groups selectively seek out and interpret only information that supports pre-
existing beliefs and discounts alternatives (Mercier & Landemore, 2012). Capoccia (2016) argues that 
institutions can create a set of social identities and ideational underpinnings, called “cultural categories”, 
to which actors ascribe. Cultural categories can refer to race, ethnicity or gender, but can also extend to 
any singular facet of one’s political or social identity (e.g. an “environmentalist” or a “conservative”). The 
cultural categories created by an institution can help to maintain its stability by obstructing reformers that 
challenge the institution by obliging them to frame reforms in such a way that they resonate with the 
social values and norms associated with espoused cultural categories (Béland, 2009; Capoccia, 2016). 
Reframing existing definitions and meanings requires education and awareness building, and ultimately, 
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“the social construction of the need to reform”, which can be time consuming and resource intensive 
(Béland, 2009; R. H. Cox, 2001, p. 475). New ideas that are inconsistent with entrenched cultural 
categories are at risk of being labelled as “radical” by political opponents, which can undermine their 
value and give the impression that they are unfeasible (Capoccia, 2016).  
Actors within institutions are motivated to conform to existing regimes to maintain familiar 
relationships, routines, and practices, or to avoid sanctions, uncertainty, or cognitive inconsistency 
associated with non-conformity (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012). Actors and actor groups responsible for 
policy implementation or rule enforcement, such as bureaucrats, may be motivated by reputational 
incentives that come with decisions that conform to existing social norms, conventions or legal 
precedents, in addition to motivations to maximize other preferences such as wealth and power (Capoccia, 
2016). Advocacy coalitions that benefit from existing institutional arrangements can push for their 
protection and continuity (Filion, 2010b; Lowndes, 2009). Existing institutions gain greater political 
legitimacy when actors who adapt to existing rules of behaviour can not perceive alternatives to the status 
quo and act to further support and legitimize existing institutional arrangements (Filion, 2010b; Lecours, 
2005; Lowndes, 2009). Socialization of actors can help engender a perception that existing institutions are 
both efficient and effective, even if the original purpose for the institution has long since disappeared 
(Filion, 2010b; Ghitter & Smart, 2009; Woodlief, 1997).  
Exogenous factors can also support the persistence of an institution. An institution may be 
reinforced by other, complementary, overlapping, or mutually-supportive institutions making them more 
resistant to pressures for change. Cultural categories, for example, can become institutionalized through 
“consistent and protracted” use within a larger network of formal rules, policies, and bureaucracies, and 
the norms and value systems of political actors, government actors and the general public (Capoccia, 
2016).  External advocacy coalitions, and the level of legitimacy and familiarity they ascribe to existing 
institutions, may also play a role in the entrenchment of institutions, particularly where these coalitions 
have political influence and can block change. The political framework in which other institutions are 
embedded can create stability by structuring collective action and power relations and placing limits on 
actors and actor groups seeking change (P. A. Hall, 2009). For example, electoral rules influence the 
types of coalitions that can develop to reform or change institutions (P. A. Hall, 2009), while veto powers 
among political elites, interest groups and social movements may prevent efforts to displace or convert 
institutional rules (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). Local physical context and the identities associated with a 
place may also lead to institutional stability where such identities are consistent with the symbolic 
languages and spatial practices of an institution or where they rationalize or favour certain discourses 
around spatial policy over others (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). 
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Within the historical institutionalism stream, institutional stability is further understood through a 
process of path dependency, whereby “the adoption of one set of institutions establishes conditions that 
make the adoption of others more or less likely, thereby pushing the relevant units, whether a nation, firm 
or other organization, along some paths that gradually foreclose others” (Hall, 2007, p.213). The 
narrowing of choices by the frameworks and trajectories established by previous institutions are thought 
to be operationalized through three key features: 1) small, seemingly insignificant events have 
unanticipated long term impacts, 2) such events can result in the development of particular path that 
becomes “locked in” through various self-reinforcing mechanisms, which limit opportunities for 
alternative paths, and 3) paths that are “locked-in” are assumed to remain fairly stable until exposed to a 
shock that destabilize them (Evenhuis, 2017). Institutions that are path dependent experience a high cost 
of switching to a new path due to the "inertia of sunk costs" and the range of contemplated future options 
becomes increasingly limited (Ghitter & Smart, 2009). The limitation of perceived future options can 
cause institutions to become locked-in to processes that were originally devised to resolve a need but 
which have subsequently become suboptimal (Woodlief, 1997). In urban planning, an additional degree 
of path dependency can occur because of limits that the built form places on the affordability or feasibility 
of alternatives (Hommels, 2005). Developments that occurred under different planning paradigms can be 
costly, politically unpopular and time consuming to reverse (Farris, 2001; Hesse, 2008; Vicino, 2008). 
Innovation and Change 
Recent scholarship on new institutionalism has increasingly focused on capacity for change as an 
equally important characteristic of institutions. Rather than viewing institutions as at equilibria until 
exposed to exogenous shocks, Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 9) conceive institutions as “arenas of 
conflict” that are under constant scrutiny and contestation from actors within the institution. Without 
excluding the role of exogenous forces, Streeck and Thelan emphasize the role of actors in creating 
endogenous institutional change. Rule takers, the actors upon which formal rules are imposed, are thought 
to vary in their application of those rules, particularly where there is room for discretion, and may choose 
actions that will achieve their preferred outcomes, such as non-compliance or limited compliance, 
reinterpretation of rules, or coalition building to reshape the rules or outcomes (Capoccia, 2016; Streeck 
& Thelen, 2005). Depending on the institutional arrangement, gradual institutional change can be 
expected to occur through one of four processes: displacement of old rules with new ones, layering of 
new rules on to existing rules, drift or the neglect of old rules in the face of external changes, and 
conversion of existing rules to include new interpretations or applications (Streeck & Thelen, 2005).  
Some literature in the sociological institutionalism stream views institutional change as a process 
involving the institutionalization of new ideas. Drawing on Berger’s theories of social reality (1966) and 
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Gidden’s theories of structuration (1984), scholars have theorized that new ideas or behaviours can 
become institutionalized through processes that include habitualization, objectification and sedimentation 
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Sánchez & Maseda, 2016). Habitualization occurs when patterns of behaviour 
and beliefs become routine as a result of the psychological advantage to limiting the number of available 
options.  Objectification is the process by which behavior and beliefs take on a normative and factual 
quality as a result of their disassociation from the factors or events that created them. Institutions are 
sedimented when they are transmitted across generations.  
Still other scholars conceive of institutional change as the “flip side” of stability. An institution's 
capacity to change can be viewed as the weakening or removal of the stabilizing characteristics of self-
serving advocacy coalitions, political legitimacy, familiarity, and perceived efficiency, and the presence 
of a credible alternative (Filion, 2010b). Institutions whose legitimacy and efficiency are challenged by 
credible alternatives may lose the support of their advocates and may be more easily replaced with new 
institutional arrangements (Filion, 2010b). Credible alternatives can arise through a social learning 
process in which both policy makers and the public perceive new social problems as a result of new 
research, statistics, media stories or outcomes of previously enacted policies (Kingdon, 2003). 
Innovations and new ideas can also emerge from academics who, buffered from political and social 
pressures, reshape or discredit existing paradigms (Béland, 2005; P. A. Hall, 1993). Sánchez and Maseda 
(2016) argue that incentives and sanctions can create motivations for actors and actor groups to adopt new 
ideas or practices. Certain institutions, such as particular governance arrangements, are thought to be 
more open to new ideas and innovations (González & Healey, 2005; Moulaert, Martinelli, González, & 
Swyngedouw, 2007). Some scholars argue that institutional change is more likely for institutions that 
have a higher institutional immunity, defined as a low sensitivity to the sanctions, uncertainties and 
inconsistencies that pull individuals and organizations toward conformity (Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006). Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel (2011) propose that the institutionalization of new planning regulations 
can depend on the degree to which it is at odds with institutionalized cultures and practices of local 
implementing agencies.  
Planning Culture 
Emerging in tandem with new institutionalism, a theory of planning culture has developed to 
explore the framing influence of societal and professional beliefs, norms, and perceptions on action 
(Friedmann, 2005; Sanyal, 2005). Drawing from new institutionalism, but also from other fields of 
scholarship, including planning, political science, sociology and organizational theory, scholars of 
planning culture seek to identify and characterize the underlying reasons for differences in planning 
policy, implementation and spatial outcomes across geographic areas. Studies of planning culture identify 
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and describe geographically distinct “planning cultures”, generally defined as the local planning styles 
and approaches that result from localized histories, political and legal traditions and related cultural 
norms, values, traditions and attitudes of a place (e.g. Knieling & Othengrafen, 2015; Othengrafen & 
Reimer, 2013; Othengrafen, 2010). The concept of planning culture has found considerable purchase in 
Europe, where new supra-regional vision statements and guiding spatial policies have prompted 
significant efforts to characterize differences in local planning cultures as a means to predict how the 
various regions will respond to the new governing framework (e.g. Ernste, 2012; Getimis, 2012; Jensen & 
Richardson, 2001; Sanyal, 2005).  
Planning culture research has resulted in a number of important theoretical contributions about 
local differences in planning ideologies, traditions, and styles (Getimis, 2012). Conceptions of planning 
culture, as with new institutional theories, typically recognize that distinct practices within different 
geographies can result not just from the existence of particular formal institutions that guide behaviour, 
but also from informal structures that frame the meanings, understandings and motivations for action (Z. 
Taylor, 2013). Planners within local contexts have been found to share a collective ethos and attitude 
regarding “the appropriate role of the state, market forces and civil society in influencing social 
outcomes” (de Vries, 2015; Sanyal, 2005, p. XXI). They are thought to operate as a subculture nested 
within a broader context of actors and actor groups, such as developers, politicians, and community 
stakeholders. They are also embedded within a social, legal and organizational framework that operates to 
support or undermine the unifying features that define the local planning culture. Some scholars have 
described planning culture as a set of informal institutions that “guide, and are (re)produced through, 
decisions by government, private actors and citizens on the ends and means of planning” (Buitelaar, 
Galle, & Sorel, 2011, p. 930). While planning cultures may be shaped by broader actor networks and 
institutional forces, they can also function to redefine politics and produce new sources of power and 
legitimacy (Sandercock, 2005). Rather than being static, planning cultures are considered to be in 
constant flux, as actors adapt to changes in their socioeconomic and political context. In these ways, 
planning cultures operate like informal institutions and are subject to institutional processes such as social 
construction, reproduction and change.  
A Culturalized Model of Planning 
Studies examining planning culture pay considerable attention to the unifying features of the 
planning profession within different local contexts and broader societal frameworks. Using planning 
practice as the focus for comparisons across regions, planning culture scholars examine “the exact 
patterns of how spatial planning is practiced in different cultural, spatial, temporal and thematic contexts” 
(Reimer, 2013). Where transformative change is required to achieve planning agendas, planning culture 
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scholars, like their sociological institutionalists counterparts, seek to understand how deeply embedded, 
unconscious world views and cultural norms influence the more conscious, tangible and deliberate 
interactions, processes and products that make up planning practice (Healey, 2007; Othengrafen & 
Reimer, 2013).  
Whereas new institutionalism theorists have focused on understanding and describing the 
processes of institutional stability and change and how these traits influence or are influenced by action, 
planning culture theorists have emphasized methodological and analytical approaches to dissect and 
categorize the institutions, ideologies, values, communication styles and hierarchical patterns that 
influence action (Getimis, 2012; Othengrafen & Reimer, 2013). One such approach, described by 
Othengrafen (2010, Figure 1) as a “culturalized model of planning”, provides a framework to 
systematically examine the interactions between conscious and unconscious frames that influence 
planning practice. The model incorporates Scott’s (2014) three pillars of institutions that reference a 
continuum of conscious and unconscious frames — regulative systems, normative systems and cultural-
cognitive systems — into a planning context. The model, presented in Chapter 2 as a typology for 
categorizing barriers to implementation, uses culture as an organizing category to conceptualize planning 
practice within its broader institutional framework.  
Drawing from the organizational theories of Schein (2017), the culturalized model of planning 
proposes that underlying and unconscious assumptions and perceptions at the macro-scale (societal 
environment) can serve to rationalize or reinforce the beliefs, norms and rules of behavior of actors and 
actor groups at the meso-scale (planning environment) (Othengrafen, 2010). The values and beliefs held 
by actors at this meso-scale “serve the normative or moral function of guiding members of the group as to 
how to deal with certain key situations as well as in training new members how to behave” (Schein, 2017, 
p. 20). The shared beliefs and practices of planners, planning agencies and other implementing actors, in 
turn, structure and support the types of micro-level products and outputs of planning practice (artifacts). 
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Figure 1. Culturalized Model of Planning. Variables are distinguished by scale at which they structure 
planning practice. (Othengrafen, 2010). 
 
Within the model, the artifact scale is the smallest scale and includes those outputs of planning 
practice that are easily recognized and understood, such as the architecture and land use(s) of a place 
(Othengrafen, 2010). As well, the artifact scale includes the formal products or outcomes emerging from 
planning practice, such as government plans, policies and regulatory structures, public infrastructure and 
housing investments. Artifacts are justified and rationalized by broader espoused beliefs at the planning 
environment scale. They may also serve to support existing cognitive frames or approaches at the 
planning environment scale. Artifacts are highly visible and more easily changed to adapt to new social, 
political or economic situations compared with the other scales of planning culture. 
The planning environment scale represents a deeper, more basic set of factors that define the 
planning culture of a place. These factors include the shared assumptions, values and cognitive frames of 
planners that define how they view planning problems, and the objectives, methods and instruments they 
consider to solve those problems (Othengrafen, 2010). This level encompasses different scopes of 
Artifacts 
Planning Environment
Shared assumptions, values and 
cognitive frames of political actors, 
planners, and developers (e.g. planning 
department enforcement style, planners 
as market actors)
Societal Environment 
Underlying and unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, 
perceptions, thoughts and feelings (e.g. 
autodependency, property rights)
Visible planning 
products, structures 
and processes (e.g. 
plans, policies, 
incentives) 
 
Achieve more focus 
Achieve more context 
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planning (plan-led vs. development- or market-led), processes of decision making (hierarchical, 
cooperative, or scientific) and the political, administrative, economic and organizational structures in 
which planners operate. Together, these factors work to influence the types and characteristics of planning 
products and built forms at the artifact scale. The planning environment, although less visible than 
artifacts, includes conscious, espoused beliefs and justifications that can be learned. As such, it is open to 
strategic action by actors or actor groups motivated for change. A similar, hierarchical model of planning 
governance developed by Healey (2007) describes this intermediate layer as the scale at which actors 
deliberately mobilize their biases through strategic interactions with other actors, policy agendas and 
discourses, and day to day routines. Following Healey, the planning environment could also include the 
assumptions and values and framing perspectives of all actor groups directly involved in the land 
development process, such as investors, developers, realtors and municipal councils, as well as the 
objectives and principles, processes and procedures, formalized norms and rules, and the political, 
administrative, economic and organizational structures that these groups use to carry out their respective 
roles in the land development process. 
The societal environment consists of the deepest, least visible factors that influence the planning 
environment and artifact scales. This scale consists of unconscious, taken-for-granted societal and 
political values, beliefs and philosophies about the world, including conceptions about government, 
justice, the economy, nature, and the moral or ethical characteristics attached to them (Othengrafen, 
2010). The societal scale also includes broad, formal institutions such as regulatory and legal structures 
that, in conjunction with societal values and beliefs, help foster certain discourses, practices, interests, 
networks and coalitions at the planning environment scale. These deep cultural practices and assumptions 
are analogous to the “cultural determinants of discourses and practices” dimension of the model proposed 
by Healey (2007, p. 68). Since societal environment factors serve as the most basic level of 
understanding, they are predicted to underpin the assumptions and value systems at the planning 
environment scale and justify the planning processes and plans at the artifact scale. 
The culturized model of planning provides a useful and intuitive framework for analyzing local 
differences in planning practice and specifically plan implementation. Similar, three-tiered conceptual 
models or middle range theories have been used to understand social change in a wide range of fields 
including organizational culture (Schein, 2017), socio-technical transitions (Cohen, 2012; Geels, 2010) 
and planning (Healey, 2007). The model adopts a process-based, functional definition for scale rather 
than relying solely on geographic criteria, which is described by critical geographers as a more 
meaningful approach for the systematic understanding sociospatial practices (Brenner, 2001). By 
differentiating between broad, societal-scale institutions and more localized cultures and practices, the 
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model casts light on the causal factors that influence action that may be obscured by more visible, 
intermediary structures. The model places planning practice at the intermediate scale between societal 
environment and artifacts, suggesting that the shared assumptions, values and cognitive frames of various 
actor groups involved in the planning and land development process may play a mediating role in 
translating or shaping underlying institutionalized assumptions and value systems of the societal scale 
into supporting policies, plans and built forms at the artifact scale. By categorizing the successively less 
visible factors that influence practice, the model may help identify those cultural practices and social 
norms at the broader scales that are expected to change more slowly than factors at smaller scales because 
they are subconscious, implicit or perceived by actors to constitute “natural” behavior (Healey, 2007; 
Reimer, 2013).  
Studies exploring localized differences in planning cultures have been criticized for their 
underdeveloped theoretical basis for explaining how planning cultures become entrenched or change 
across different spatial planning practices (DiGaetano & Strom, 2003; Reimer, 2013; Z. Taylor, 2013). 
The relatively static conception of planning culture in the culturalized model of planning, for example, 
hinders its ability to provide general explanations for how and why planning practices and spatial 
outcomes in some geographic areas are more resistant to change than others (Reimer, 2013). With its 
emphasis on the structuring forces that impact planning practice and outcomes, the model also provides 
limited conceptual clarity regarding the role of agency – the individual actors, actor networks and 
coalitions, power structures – on the dynamics of planning practice. Integrating the analytic framework 
provided by the model of planning culture with the theoretical contributions around structure, agency, 
stability and change provided by new institutionalism may help address these conceptual deficiencies. 
The following chapter explores how the two approaches may be integrated to provide a theoretical basis 
for exploring local differences in how spatial plans are implemented.  
Synthesizing New Institutionalism and Planning Culture: A Conceptual 
Framework 
This research adopts a conceptual framework that merges the theoretical insights of historical and 
sociological institutionalism with the analytical framework developed by Othengrafen to explore gaps in 
our understanding of the underlying reasons for local differences in growth management plan 
implementation. Theorists studying new institutionalism have identified a number of theoretical strengths 
and weakness within each of the three new institutional streams and, despite the different theoretical 
origins of these streams, have called for a synthesis (Alexander, 2005; P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996; Hall, 
2007). Hall (2007) argues that the different streams offer important theoretical insights into the forces that 
influence action, but individually may provide only a partial account of how institutions influence human 
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action. A synthesis of the historical and sociological streams of new institutionalism, in particular, could 
allow for an improved characterization of the full range of constraints, motivations and unconscious 
beliefs that actors face and could assist in a more nuanced understanding of the pace and direction of 
institutional change (Hall, 2007).  
One topic area that would specifically benefit from an integration of historical and sociological 
institutional theory relates to the definition of institutions. In their definition of institutions as “formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the 
polity or political economy”, historical institutionalists typically characterize institutions as organizations 
and the rules and regularized practices that are embedded within those organizations (P.A. Hall & Taylor, 
1996). Institutions within this definition are fairly material, unambiguous and easily understood by 
relevant actors (P.A. Hall & Taylor, 1996; Hall, 2007; Lecours, 2005). While cultural factors such as 
ideas, norms, and value systems are sometimes considered in the historical institutionalism literature, they 
are largely considered to be a direct product of and separate from the material institutions that created 
them (Lecours, 2005). Sociological institutionalists, on the other hand, place greater emphasize on the 
cultural dimensions that influence action, such as symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates 
(P.A. Hall & Taylor, 1996) and make a clear distinction between institutions and organizations (González 
& Healey, 2005). The non-material, cultural factors of interest to sociological institutionalists are believed 
to internalize elements of the broader cultural context, and are viewed as co-constitutive and generative 
rather than separate from material institutions (González & Healey, 2005). 
The implementation of plans, particularly those that require changes to organizational, political 
and cultural rules, norms and expectations, has been demonstrated in the literature to be influenced by a 
wide range of factors and would therefore benefit from the use of a broad definition for institution. This 
research draws from both historical and sociological institutionalism by  defining institutions as the 
formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in an organizational structure 
of a polity  as well as the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the rules, 
cognitive frames, meanings, understandings and motivations for action. The combined definition of 
institution is expected to provide a more comprehensive conceptual basis for understanding 
implementation than that which could be obtained through the exclusive use of a historical or sociological 
institutionalist definition. While the historical institutionalist definition emphasizes important 
organizational structures, planning processes and tools, and professional norms, the sociological 
definition incorporates other important but less visible factors such as values and belief systems around 
the role of government, the interpretation and value of nature, and what is considered “good urban form”.  
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The different definitions of institutions influence theorists’ explanations of how institutions 
structure action. Some historical institutionalists have adopted an understanding of action used by rational 
choice institutionalists, which considers actors to behave strategically within the constraints of institutions 
to maximize their achievement of specific preferences and goals (Hall, 2007). Within this frame, 
institutions provide actors with expectations and certainty around how their actions will be received and 
interpreted by others so that they can choose the most desirable outcome. Other historical institutionalists 
consider action to be further bound by cultural and historical dimensions, such as power distributions and 
the inherited social, economic, and political forces caused by previous events, and these factors serve to 
constrain the range of possible actions (Hall, 2007). Sociological institutionalists take the structuring 
influence of culture on action one step farther by considering institutions and action to be highly 
interactive and mutually-constitutive, together structuring the lens with which actors view the world and 
placing limits on the perception and understanding of possible options (González & Healey, 2005). 
Within this interpretation, “institutions influence behavior not simply by specifying what one should do, 
but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context” (P.A. Hall & Taylor, 1996, 
p. 948). A sociological institutionalist view defines action as not only constrained by the structuring 
forces of the institutions in which they operate, but also conditioned and socialized by those institutions in 
ways that favour the sustaining of existing identities and cultural practices (Healey, 2007; Lowndes & 
Roberts, 2013).  
Recognizing that action is unlikely to be wholly rational and strategic, or entirely culturally-
determined, this research adopts a comprehensive understanding of action that merges historical and 
sociological institutionalist viewpoints. A merged understanding of action enables a broad view of action 
as a function of external factors to which actors must strategically react (historical institutionalism), and 
internalized factors that influence actors’ perceptions of the range of possible actions (sociological 
institutionalism). Theories around strategic action recognize the important contribution institutions make 
in helping to structure individual and collective action by providing actors with expectations around the 
economic, social and political costs and benefits of their actions. With its social-constructivist focus, 
sociological institutionalism moves beyond a static and unidirectional understanding of institutions by 
placing emphasis on the “cognitive processes and cultural identity, not as ‘givens’ – assets or attributes, 
but as forces and outcomes in continual social production” (Healey, 2007, p.66). The capacity of 
institutions to reconfigure and change is recognized by social institutionalists as requiring more than the 
mobilization of actors or coalitions to change the formal rules and organizational structures that bound 
planning practice, it also requires the transformation of deeper frames of reference and cultural practices 
which influence how people understand, interpret and engage with the world in which they live (Healey, 
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2007). The social-constructivist view of institutions is particularly apt for understanding taken-for-granted 
variables influencing implementation, and for distinguishing between strategic action and unconscious 
practices (Reimer, 2013). An understanding of deeper structuring frames and processes of social 
construction is important when seeking answers to the question about key driving forces that obstruct 
local implementation. Casting a broader conceptual net to capture the full range of influences on planning 
practice helps avoid the challenges associated with an overly myopic view of planning as merely the 
product of the legal, governmental and administrative frameworks (Getimis, 2012; Reimer & Blotevogel, 
2012; Z. Taylor, 2013). 
In focusing primarily on the cultural factors that impact actors’ values and belief systems, 
however, some scholars have argued that sociological institutionalists risk overemphasizing macro-scale 
processes at the expense of micro- and meso-scale factors (P.A. Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 948). Inclusion of 
a historical institutionalist approach that focuses on formal meso- and micro-scale structures, such as 
government organizations, political decision making and professional practice, would ensure a more 
balanced account of the full range of barriers to implementation. Taken together, the historical and 
sociological institutionalist definitions of institutions and their conceptions of the relationships between 
institutions and actors are well suited for understanding the complexities of planning practice and its 
transformative objectives and for understanding the driving forces that affect local implementation of 
growth management plans. A combined historical and sociological definition of institution also aligns 
well with the concept of planning as embedded within a broader planning culture comprised of artifacts, a 
planning environment and a societal environment. The historical institutionalist portion of the definition 
that encompasses formal and informal organizations, rules and procedures corresponds to the artifact 
scale and some aspects of the planning environment scale of planning culture.  The sociological 
institutionalist portion of the definition that emphasizes unconscious symbol systems, cognitive scripts, 
and moral templates correspond to the planning environment and societal environment scales of planning 
culture.  
A joint historical and sociological institutionalist perspective of institutions was also found to 
provide a suitable framework for the analysis of institutional stability and change. The combined strategic 
and social constructivist perspective provides a theoretical basis for understanding both exogenous and 
endogenous institutional change, and doesn’t limit a study of change to significant historic events — a 
critique that has been leveled at some historical institutionalist approaches that emphasize path 
dependency as the main mechanism for change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). The merged definition of 
institutions allows for an understanding of implementation as a culturally-imbued practice that involves 
expert knowledge and choice, as well as personal biases and cultural understandings. This enables an 
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understanding of institutions as both a causal variable to explain action, as well as a dependent variable 
that can be influenced by action, and as such is expected to better reflect the nature of planning as both 
professional practice and a socially-constructed enterprise. The broader definition of institution is well 
suited for exploring the complex relationships between barriers to implementation and how they relate to 
one another to reinforce the status quo or create opportunities for change. A combined strategic and 
cultural approach to understanding the motivations for action further provides the necessary theoretical 
explanations for the mechanisms for stability and change outlined later in this section (See Tables 2 and 
3). Conceptual imprecision associated with the view of institutions as both a dependent and independent 
variable (see Z. Taylor, 2013) can be offset by a clear and explicit articulation of the underlying 
mechanisms driving the creation of new institutions and the reproduction of old institutions.  
This research also merges the definitions and theoretical foundations of historical and sociological 
sociological institutionalism with the conceptual framework offered by planning culture. The purpose of 
combining the two new institutional frameworks with planning culture was to capitalize on the analytical 
strengths and complementarities of each framework (  
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Table 1). The overlap of the frameworks is considerable, particularly when institutions are 
defined broadly to include the formal, informal and cultural structures. In the opinion of de Vries (2015, 
p. 2150) “both [new institutionalism and planning culture] refer to the durable and stable conditions 
shared by a community, which structures the behavior of individuals and the actions of collective actors 
within it” (de Vries, 2015, p. 2150). The conceptual framework offered by the culturalized model of 
planning provides an additional, intuitive system for examining the full range of visible and less visible 
barriers to growth management. This framework encompasses the barriers described in Chapter 2 and 
provides information on the scale at which these barriers operate. New institutionalism helps to fill the 
theoretical gap that has been argued to plague the culture model by adding a more dynamic dimension 
that includes analytical approaches to understand the underlying interactions between the barriers and 
resulting institutional stability or change (Reimer, 2013). The new institutional framework serves as a 
reductionist approach for analyzing the many possible barriers by highlighting those barriers that play an 
important reinforcing role in maintaining existing institutions. Casting light on those barriers that are most 
important in shaping existing behaviours and actions is critical for understanding why policies may fail to 
achieve desired outcomes.  
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Table 1. Comparison of Planning Culture and New Institutional Frameworks. 
PLANNING CULTURE 
HISTORICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
SOCIOLOGICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
Defines planning as “the 
collective ethos and dominant 
attitudes of planners regarding the 
appropriate role of the state, 
market forces and civil society in 
influencing social outcomes” 
(Sanyal, 2005, p.xxi) and where 
planners “produce and share 
cognitive frames, practices, 
knowledge, beliefs, norms and 
results, values and codes” 
(Orthengrafen, 2010, p.89). 
Defines institutions as “the formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms 
and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of the polity 
or political economy” (P. A. Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 938) 
Defines institutions as “not just the 
formal rules, procedures or norms, 
but the symbol systems, cognitive 
scripts, and moral templates that 
provide the ‘frames of meaning’ 
guiding human action” (P. A. Hall 
& Taylor, 1996, p. 947) 
Provides a organizing framework 
to help identify and organize a 
wide range of variables 
Provides a theoretical framework to 
help characterize and evaluate 
mechanisms that reinforce and 
undermine relationships between 
variables, with a focus on 
mechanisms most likely to affect 
strategic action (e.g. Efficiency, 
Transaction Cost, Institutional 
complementarity, Discretion, Veto 
Power)  
Provides a theoretical framework to 
help characterize and evaluate 
mechanisms that reinforce and 
undermine relationships between 
variables, with a focus on 
mechanisms most likely to affect 
internalized, cultural influences on 
action (e.g. legitimacy, familiarity, 
availability of credible alternatives) 
Organizes variables by degree of 
visibility 
Organizes variables by relationships Organizes variables by 
relationships 
Provides scalar lens for 
examining and understanding 
variables 
Provides analytical tools for 
examining how exogenous historical, 
political, economic and social 
variables affect stability and change 
Provides analytical tools for 
examining for examining how 
endogenous and socially 
constructed variables affect stability 
and change 
 
The conceptual framework used for this research merges the hierarchical culturalized model of 
planning proposed by Othengrafen (2010) with the new institutional literature’s conceptions of 
institutional stability and change, to provide a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms and scale 
at which institutions and actors obstruct or enable local growth management implementation (Figure 2). 
The three scales of planning culture in Figure 2 are broadly defined to encompass both institutions and the 
actions and behaviours of individual actors or actor groups. These scales overlap with a merged historical 
and sociological institutionalist definition of institutions, with the sociological institutionalist definition 
aligning closely with the societal scale and some of the internalized cultural aspects of the planning 
environment scale, and the historical institutionalist definition aligning with externalized aspects of the 
planning environment scale and the artifact scale. The hierarchical model offers opportunities to examine 
plan implementation within a framework of socially-constructed hierarchies that move beyond traditional 
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understandings of geographic scale, such as local, regional, national and international (Getimis, 2012). In 
this way, the scalar model may help to highlight actor-institution networks that are more meaningful than 
the specific geographic scale at which they operate. As well, it helps ensure consideration of a full range 
of factors that influence plan implementation, and avoids what has been described by some scholars as a 
“a chronic overemphasis of the formal functional principles of planning systems, without broadening its 
scope to include the complex mechanisms inherent in planning action” (Reimer & Blotevogel, 2012, p. 
8). Finally, the model may also help to highlight discrepancies or compatibilities in the institutional ‘fit’ 
between norms, beliefs and power structures at the societal scale, and policy adoption and implementation 
at the planning scale (de Vries, 2015).  
The contextually specific meanings and conditions within different local contexts have been 
identified in both the planning culture and new institutionalism literatures as playing a role that can enable 
or limit specific planning actions (de Vries, 2015; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). This research draws 
generally from the sociological institutional literature to explore the role of local context as mediating 
factor in the expression of barriers to answer the question: How do the key barriers to local 
implementation vary within different local contexts? This literature emphasizes not only the role of 
structure, but also power, agency and local context on institutional stability and change (e.g. Capoccia, 
2016; González & Healey, 2005; Healey, 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). 
Local context is defined as the geographically-differentiated socio-cultural, political, environmental, and 
economic conditions to which planning practice must respond, such as a region’s population and 
demographics, economic base, and natural (non-built) features. Contextual factors may work to enable or 
constrain reflexive and strategic decision making and influence the adaptation of existing institutions to 
new rules. Local context, which is not encapsulated in the Othengrafen’s model, is depicted in Figure 2 as 
an exogenous variable that shapes the factors that make up the hierarchy of planning culture.  
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Figure 2. Modified Culturalized Planning Model (Adapted from: Othengrafen, 2010). R/U refers to 
reinforcing or undermining mechanisms that promote institutional stability and change, as outlined in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
Recognizing the sociological institutionalist conception of actors as both the products, creators 
and sustainers of their institutional environments, the model in Figure 2 has been revised to identify the 
possibility that factors within the three hierarchies of planning culture may work to either reinforce or 
undermine factors within the same scale or across scales. The mechanisms by which factors at the 
different scales interact, and which are identified in Tables 2 and 3, are referenced in the model as R/U 
(Reinforcing/Undermining). For the purpose of this research, mechanisms are defined as the “underlying 
entities, processes or structures which operate in particular contexts to generate outcomes of interest” 
(Astbury & Leeuw, 2010, p. 368). This definition recognizes that mechanisms are moderating variables 
61 
 
that tend to be both hidden and sensitive to context, such as belief-formation or the exercise of power and 
interest, which result in particular actions, habits and patterns of behavior (Astbury & Leeuw, 2010). 
Mechanisms are not viewed as wholly separate or exogenous from institutions, but rather relate to 
processes, structures and actions that intervene between or within institutions to create patterns of 
institutional reproduction or change. 
Drawing from the theoretical literature, with particular reference to Mahoney and Thelan (2009), 
Filion (2010b), and Taylor (2013), Table 2 summarizes the mechanisms that are theorized to cause the 
reproduction of existing institutions (Referenced as R in Figure 2). Institutions may be supported by any 
number of stabilizing mechanisms, and the mechanisms may vary in terms of their applicability and 
magnitude. Filion (2010b) notes that by definition, the mechanism of familiarity is a universal factor that 
cannot be directly compromised or undermined, and therefore must be overcome or offset through direct 
action (e.g. introduction of disincentives or sanctions) or through the destabilization of the other 
mechanisms. Strategic action through discretion and veto power can reinforce existing institutions but it 
can also provide opportunities for the establishment of new institutions. 
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Table 2. Causal Mechanisms for Institutional Stability and Reproduction (Filion, 2010b; Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2009; Z. Taylor, 2013).  
MECHANISMS FOR 
REPRODUCTION 
DESCRIPTION 
Efficiency 
Institutional arrangement provides economic benefits and/or meet performance 
expectations 
Legitimacy 
Institution is legally or morally sanctioned, comprehensible, recognizable, 
and/or culturally supported 
Familiarity 
Institution becomes routine and offers advantages of reducing complexity and 
risk in decision making 
Serves Interests of Advocacy 
Coalitions 
Institution is supported by advocacy coalitions who benefit from its 
continuation 
Transaction Cost 
High cost or complexity to change from one institutional framework to another. 
Cost may be monetary or non monetary (e.g. social or political).  
Institutional 
complementarity 
The degree to which institution is related to and mutually supported by other 
institutions 
Absence of credible or 
available alternatives 
Institution is not challenged by new research or innovation. Alternatives are not 
perceived, or not available due to a narrowing of available options (path 
dependency) 
Confirmation bias 
The tendency of actors and actor groups to seek, interpret and emphasize 
information that supports or defends initial intuitions and beliefs 
Discretion 
Extent to which actors internal to an institution (“rule takers”) can exercise 
discretion to adapt or modify rules imposed by “rule makers” 
Veto Power 
Extent to which actors external to an institution (“rule makers”) can block or 
regulate action by implementers or “rule takers” 
 
Institutions represent a particular distribution of resources and set of compromises that favour 
certain groups over others. Transformative change can arise where supporting institutions represent 
imperfect compromises and/or an unequal distribution of resources which creates openings and incentives 
for the introduction of new ideas and practices (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). Table 3 summarizes the 
factors identified in the theoretical literature that can lead to institutional change, with particular reference 
to Béland (2009) and Mahoney and Thelan (2009) (Referenced as U in Figure 2).  Ideas and changing 
conditions can be introduced through processes of social learning, in which implementing actors perceive 
new social problems as a result of new information about current conditions, policy outcomes or 
alternative approaches (Kingdon, 1995). Ideas can also be introduced in the form of policy alternatives 
proposed by academics who, buffered from political and social pressures, can help reshape or discredit 
existing worldviews and policy paradigms (Beland, 2005; Hall, 1993). Changing social, political or 
economic conditions can redistribute power and resources in ways that advantage new actor groups who 
seek to make changes in their favour. Incentives and sanctions can undermine the perception of efficiency 
and legitimacy of a particular institutional arrangement and lower the transaction costs associated with 
alternatives. The ongoing or mounting distributional effects of an institution over time can lead to 
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divisions amongst institutional elites or disadvantaged subordinate groups, leading to their mobilization 
for change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009).  
For Mahoney and Thelan (2009), the meaning and interpretation of institutional rules are the 
subject of considerable and ongoing internal debate and contestation. In their view, “compliance is 
inherently complicated by the fact that rules can never be precise enough to cover the complexities of all 
possible real-world situations” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009, p. 11). Variability in how institutional rules 
and expectations are interpreted can lead to openings for actors and coalitions that favour particular 
interpretations. Where an institution permits discretion in the application or enforcement of rules, actors 
can diverge from or adapt those rules to meet their needs, interests or preferences.  Complete divergence 
from rules can occur when the powerful actors internal or external to an institution have limited veto 
powers to block change. Subtle or modest change, on the other hand, can occur in situations where 
institutions are subject to high veto possibilities. In these cases, institutional rules can be adapted through 
the overlay or attachment of new rules to existing rules, or left to become obsolete.  
 
Table 3. Factors Promoting Institutional Change (Béland, 2009). 
FACTORS PROMOTING 
CHANGE 
DESCRIPTION 
Ideas 
New information or ideas challenge perception of legitimacy or efficiency 
of existing institutional arrangements 
Changing Conditions New problems emerge that render existing institutions ineffective 
Incentives/Sanctions 
New ideas or practices gain legitimacy as a result of incentives or 
sanctions. 
Serves Interests of Advocacy 
Coalitions 
New institutions that benefit powerful interest groups are promoted and 
adopted 
Discretion 
Extent to which actors internal to an institution (“rule takers”) can exercise 
discretion to adapt or modify rules imposed by “rule makers” 
Veto Power 
Extent to which actors external to an institution (“rule makers”) can block 
or regulate action by implementers or “rule takers” 
 
Modeling Key Barriers  
The model in Figure 2 draws on both the theoretical contributions of historical and sociological 
institutionalism, and the analytical contributions of the culturalized model of planning to provide a 
framework with which to examine the key barriers to growth management plan implementation. The 
framework depicts barriers to implementation as a set of factors that are in constant interaction with each 
other and their local context through the mechanisms described in Tables 2 and 3. When populated with 
specific barriers identified in the literature, the model establishes a set of expected barriers to growth 
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management against which field results can be tested. This section describes how the framework may be 
used as a tool to understand the key driving forces that obstruct local implementation of growth 
management plans. In addition, it presents a more detailed, relational model to depict how barriers to 
implementation may reinforce each other to obstruct growth management efforts and support low density 
urban forms.  
Using the barriers to growth management identified in the literature (Chapter 2) and the 
conceptual framework outlined in Figure 2, Table 4 summarizes the key barriers to regional growth 
management implementation across the three scales of planning culture. This basic framework reveals a 
total of 10 general classes of barriers within which 31 specific barriers were identified or theorized in the 
literature to impact the implementation of growth management plans. Figure 3 incorporates the barriers 
into the culturized planning model, with barriers at the artifact scale nested within planning scale barriers, 
which are in turn nested within broader, societal scale barriers. Reinforcing or undermining relationships 
between barriers are depicted as flowing either from the societal environment scale through the planning 
environment scale to the artifact scale, or conversely, from the artifact scale through the planning 
environment scale to the societal environment scale. Local context is depicted as influencing the 
expression of barriers at all scales. 
The potential reinforcing relationships between barriers at various scales and the institutions 
within which they are embedded are further explored through a more nuanced and detailed model in 
Figure 4. This more detailed model was necessary to capture the relationships between barriers across and 
within scales which proved to be too complex to depict using the culturalized model of planning alone. 
By breaking apart the nested categories of planning culture into their individual components, the model 
depicts with greater detail the direction and nature of the relationships between barriers within and 
between the scales of planning culture. Direct positive feedback loops can be discerned where two 
barriers are connected by multi-directional (two headed) arrows, while longer feedback loops are 
identified through circular loops that connect more than two barriers. The model serves as an inset to the 
more generalized hierarchy in Figure 3 and is therefore subject to the influence of local contextual factors. 
The model illustrates that the relationships between barriers at different scales may not always be nested, 
as depicted by the model of planning culture (Figure 3). Barriers considered to operate primarily at the 
societal scale, for example, may reinforce other barriers at the societal scale. In other cases, direct 
relationships may occur between barriers at the societal and artifact scale.  
Figure 4 also creates a focus for analysis that is absent from the culturalized planning model. It 
does this by placing low density urban form at the centre of a complex network of barriers that variously 
interact across the three scales of planning culture. The model treats low density urban form as a key 
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artifact that is heavily reinforced by barriers within the broader planning culture and also highlights the 
structuring role of low density urban form in reinforcing those barriers through a series of positive 
feedback loops.  
The model in Figure 4 further recognizes that barriers to growth management operate within 
broader institutional frameworks that do not align with the scales of planning culture identified in Figure 
3. The detailed breakdown of individual barriers identified in the literature reveals that barriers coalesce 
into three broad socio-cultural, political and economic themes, represented as the dotted lines in Figure 4. 
These themes are considered to comprise the general institutional setting within which barriers operate, 
and include: 1) Land and Property Markets, 2) Place Identity and 3) Urban Governance.  The institutions 
and their component barriers are conceived as broad social arrangements comprised of rules, norms, 
practices, beliefs and ideologies, which create the logics and motivations for action.  The institutions 
encompass, and treat equally the formal and informal institutions identified in historical institutionalism’s 
definition of institutions, and the cultural aspects of institutions from the sociological institutionalist 
definition. Land and property markets comprise a range of structuring forces and actors/actor groups that 
help define dynamics of the property development industry including land use policies, development fees 
and charges, land prices, supply and demand, and development industry practices. Place identity refers to 
interactions among structuring forces, actors/actor groups and the physical environment that help to create 
and sustain place attachment, a sense of belonging and personal identity. Last of all, urban governance 
represents the suite of agencies, organizations and stakeholder groups and their respective resources, 
political interests, and power distributions, that guide the planning, management and financing of urban 
areas. Institutions are depicted with a dotted line in recognition that the boundaries are relatively fluid and 
can encompass components of other barriers. 
The institutional themes provide added value to the model by highlighting important arenas of 
interaction between barriers that could not be demonstrated through the classification of barriers by scale. 
Whereas grouping barriers according to scale can facilitate the identification of a broad range of visible 
and invisible barrier types, the grouping of barriers according to institutional themes offers a framework 
for exploring and understanding the interconnections between barriers. In placing conceptual boundaries 
around individual barriers that share or reinforce broader institutional logics and objectives, the themes 
are anticipated to help in later analysis and sense making regarding how barriers work collectively to 
enable to constrain action. Highlighting broader institutional themes based on patterns of relationships 
between barriers is further intended to prevent an overly reductionist approach in the analysis of 
individual barriers by ensuring that they are examined within their broader institutional context.  
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Underlying the model in Figure 4 are a number of assumptions that influence how the barriers 
and their interrelationships are depicted. First, the model recognizes that low density urban form is a 
central factor for understanding implementation, as it is both a barrier to implementation and also the 
outcome of failed efforts to manage urban growth. Because of its pivotal role as a measurable outcome of 
absent or unsuccessful growth management, low density urban form serves as a centralizing feature in the 
model to which all other barriers are directly or indirectly related. This focal point recognizes and 
emphasizes the important legacy of past urban forms and the constraints these forms have on future land 
use and development patterns (Conzen, 2004; Hommels, 2005a; Hommels, 2005b).  
 Second, given the resistance to change of prevailing low density urban forms and the institutions 
that support them, as demonstrated in the literature, the model assumes that the barriers to growth 
management and their broader institutional milieu benefit from a certain degree of stability. The model is 
organized to explore the factors that lead to this stability by focusing on the reinforcing relationships that 
may contribute to the enduring presence of low density urban forms. In this way the model serves as a 
tool to explore the mechanisms that support the stability of barriers (Table 2) within their institutional 
settings, with particular emphasis on the relationships between broader, underlying factors and those that 
are more visible. Although relative stability is conceived as a defining characteristic of the institutions and 
component barriers that support low density urban forms, this characteristic is understood as being under 
constant scrutiny and/or challenge that may lead to the destabilization of these relationships, as described 
in Table 3.  In local contexts where barriers are fewer in number and/or reinforcing relationships appear 
weak, the model serves as a backdrop against which the mechanisms that promote institutional change, 
including ideas, changes to external conditions, incentives/sanctions, interests, discretion, and veto 
powers, can be explored. 
  
67 
 
 
Table 4. Barriers to Implementation of Regional Growth Management Plans. 
BARRIER TYPE BARRIER 
ARTIFACTS 
LOCAL PLANS AND 
POLICIES 
Weak or unimplementable municipal plans/policies 
Unsupportive engineering and planning standards/policies  
Inaccurate price signals that subsidize low density development 
Official Plan does not conform to Growth Plan 
FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL 
PLANS AND POLICIES  
Incompatible provincial decision making, policy and investment 
BUILT ENVIRONMENT Existing low density urban form 
High cost and complexity to retrofit built form 
PLANNING ENVIRONMENT 
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
IMPLEMENTING AGENCY 
Lack of political will 
Lack of staff commitment to growth management objectives 
Staff view high density development as incompatible to local character 
Inconsistent or weak enforcement 
Lack of communication and awareness-building with developers  
Insufficient planning capacity  
Inefficient or inconsistent administration 
Staff view their role as dependent on the market 
Municipalities seek land uses that produce the greatest tax revenue while 
utilizing the fewest services 
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
DEVELOPERS 
Development industry not committed to growth management objectives 
Insufficient experience or knowledge to build alternatives 
INTER-ORGANIZATION 
RELATIONS 
Poor coordination and level of engagement between local and upper tier 
government agencies 
Weak or absent regional coordination of local planning 
Inter-municipal competition for development 
SOCIETAL ENVIRONMENT 
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND 
RIGHTS ADVOCACY 
Presence of strong NIMBY lobbying against infill and intensification 
Belief in and advocacy for minimal public regulation of private property and 
the valuing of private over public spaces 
CONSUMER PREFERENCES Consumer preference for low density suburban form 
Auto dependency and absence of alternative travel options 
GROWTH IMPERATIVE Presence of a strong conventional growth coalition that seeks economic 
development over growth management 
Absence of dissenting voices in favour of growth management 
MARKET DISTORTIONS AND 
NEOLIBERALISM 
Societal costs of development and car transportation not reflected in market 
pricing 
Belief in the superiority of market-based solutions and constraints on 
government efforts to correct market distortions 
Privatization and deregulation vs. capacity of local government to plan for 
and regulate development 
Decentralization of planning authority vs. regional coordination 
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Figure 3. Culturalized Planning Model of Barriers to Growth Management. (Adapted from: 
Othengrafen, 2010). R/U refers to reinforcing or undermining mechanisms that promote institutional 
stability and change. 
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Figure 4. Detailed Barriers to Growth Management Implementation and Predicated Reinforcing Inter-relationships. 
Directional arrows denote positive or reinforcing relationship. Dotted line depicts general socio-cultural, political or economic institution in which barriers are embedded 
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Artifacts 
Artifacts are the tangible and debated products of the planning system that are both visible and 
easy to measure. They include urban structures, land uses, plans, processes, and organizational 
arrangements. The tangible nature of artifacts, particularly when compared with underlying social and 
behavioural norms that make up planning and societal environments, makes them the main focus of 
municipal growth management efforts and empirical studies of growth management planning. Key 
artifacts credited in the literature with obstructing growth management were found to relate primarily to 
local, provincial and federal plans and policies and the built environment. Specific barriers at the artifact 
level, as described in the literature, were: 
1. Weak or unimplementable municipal plans/policies 
2. Unsupportive engineering and planning standards/policies 
3. Inaccurate price signals that subsidize low density development 
4. Official Plan that does not conform to the Growth Plan 
5. Incompatible provincial decision making, policy and investment 
6. Existing low density urban form 
7. High cost and complexity to retrofit built form 
Figure 3 depicts artifacts as both the products of the broader planning environment, and as 
reinforcing factors that help to justify or normalize underlying planning scale barriers. Figure 4 further 
suggests that direct relationships may occur between barriers at the artifact and societal environment 
scales, as well as between barriers within the same artifact scale. The degree to which barriers at the 
artifact scale are resistant to change is expected to be a function of the nature and complexity of 
reinforcing or undermining relationships with other barriers, as defined by the mechanisms outlined in 
Tables 2 and 3. Greater stability of artifacts is expected when they are aligned with the framing logics, 
understandings, assumptions and values of the broader planning and societal environments in which they 
are embedded. Artifacts and their supporting planning and societal environment organize according to 
common socio-cultural, political or economic institutions, as depicted by the dotted lines in Figure 4.  
As both a barrier to growth management and a key outcome of unsuccessful growth management, 
low density urban form serves as a central feature of the relational model in Figure 4 to which many other 
barriers relate. Low density urban form shares direct relationships with the largest number of barriers (12) 
from all three scales of planning culture, ranking it high in terms of institutional complementarity. At the 
bottom right of Figure 4, six barriers are depicted within three circular networks around low density urban 
form. These barriers share mutually reinforcing relationships with low density urban form through a 
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system of positive returns, where increases in one barrier directly lead to increases in the other and vice 
versa (depicted with two-headed arrows). For example, the sunk costs and support by advocacy coalitions 
associated with low density urban form is predicted to increase the cost and complexity of infill 
development and limit the feasibility of alternatives and the number of developers capable or willing to 
provide alternatives, thus leading to a continued supply of low density urban forms. Provincial investment 
in highway development supports continued development of low density urban forms through the creation 
of efficient and convenient travel networks for suburban home owners and businesses. The existence of 
low density urban form in turn supports a cultural environment in which car travel becomes familiar, and 
is perceived as cost effective and efficient, thus leading to support and political pressure from advocacy 
coalitions for continued investment in highway upgrades and expansions. 
Local context is expected to influence the stability of artifacts, by directly supporting or 
challenging the feasibility or appropriateness of the artifacts themselves, or the connected barriers that 
serve to reinforce them. For example, local economic conditions could directly challenge the feasibility of 
planning artifacts that create financial incentives for intensification, such as brownfield redevelopment 
grants. Alternatively, local context may interact indirectly with barriers at the artifact scale by influencing 
the institutional logics underpinning connected barriers at broader scales. For example, a declining local 
economy may challenge the perceived efficiency, legitimacy and credibility of growth management 
objectives and increase support for growth coalitions, which in turn can reduce the level of political 
support for growth management interventions and the type and quality of local policies adopted.  
Changes to local context can also alter power dynamics as well as the distribution and availability 
of resources, giving rise to opportunities for individuals and coalition groups to challenge barriers at the 
artifact scale. Changing socio-cultural conditions, economic factors and demographics can lead to new 
advocacy coalitions that contest the legitimacy and efficiency of suburban development, and generate 
consumer pressure for more affordable, centrally located urban forms. Increased consumer acceptance of 
compact, rental and condominium dwelling units could help reduce NIMBY responses to infill 
development by increasing the familiarity of compact urban forms and reducing the concerns about the 
implications of infill and compact development on property values. 
Planning Environment 
Barriers at the planning environment scale are those that frame the understandings, assumptions 
and values of politicians, municipal planners, developers and the resulting planning or development 
practices and organizational structures in which they interact. Characteristics of the implementing agency 
and developers were identified in the literature as key planning environment factors within which specific 
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barriers operated. Operating within these broader categories, the following 14 specific barriers to growth 
management were identified: 
1. Lack of political will 
2. Lack of staff commitment to growth management objectives 
3. Staff view high density development as incompatible to local character 
4. Inconsistent or weak enforcement 
5. Lack of communication and awareness-building with developers  
6. Insufficient planning capacity  
7. Inefficient or inconsistent administration 
8. Staff who view their role as dependent on the market 
9. Municipalities seek land uses that produce the greatest tax revenue while utilizing the fewest 
services 
10. Development industry not committed to growth management objectives 
11. Insufficient experience or knowledge to build alternatives 
12. Poor coordination and level of engagement between local and upper tier government 
agencies 
13. Weak or absent regional coordination of local planning 
14. Inter-municipal competition for development 
The models in Figure 3 and 4 depict how barriers at the planning environment scale are expected 
to relate to barriers from other scales. The relationships between barriers in Figure 4 reveal that in most 
cases, planning environment factors play an intermediary role in shaping how broader societal 
environment barriers are interpreted, understood and translated into artifacts. This effect is predicted by 
Kneiling and Othengrafen (2015, p 2136), who describe planning environment factors as “the conscious 
beliefs and values that predict much of the behaviour that can be observed at the artefact level”. However, 
the model also reveals that planning environment barriers do not always play a connecting role between 
broader societal factors and artifacts. For example, as a societal scale barrier, NIMBY can influence 
political will at the planning environment scale through a variety of mechanisms such as advocacy 
coalitions and cultural sanctions that support NIMBY. However, NIMBY may also directly support low 
density urban form through cultural sanctions and by increasing transaction costs required to switch to 
alternative development forms.  
Local municipalities that operate within shared regional planning, administrative, and legal 
frameworks, such as planning subregions, provinces, states, or even multi-nation frameworks such as the 
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European Union, are expected to share more similar planning environments compared with those 
operating within divergent frameworks. However, even within shared governance and planning systems, 
scholars have noted differences in how those broader frameworks are interpreted and acted upon (de 
Vries, 2015; Levin-Keitel, 2014). Differences within regions that share similar legal and administrative 
planning frameworks have been attributed to differences in the cultures and capacities of the 
organizations responsible for implementing land use planning.  
Barriers at the planning environment scale are expected to be more responsive to local context 
where they represent imperfect solutions or negotiated interpretations of the institutional logics that 
underpin societal environment barriers. In such cases, actors and actor groups may use discretion to adapt 
organizational rules to achieve their goals, or they may be more receptive to social learning in response to 
new information, ideas and alternative approaches. As with artifacts, local context may directly support or 
challenge planning environment barriers, or any of the connected barriers that serve to reinforce them. In-
migration patterns that transform rural settlements to urban centres, for example, may challenge the 
appropriateness or feasibility of long held planning perspectives that value the preservation of local rural 
character, thereby creating opportunities for alternative ideas on appropriate urban forms or new 
discretionary interpretations of existing planning policies.  
Societal Environment 
The societal environment provides a rationale or justification for beliefs, processes and tangible 
policies and actions further up the hierarchy of planning culture. Property ownership and rights advocacy, 
consumer preferences, market distortions and neoliberalism and a growth imperative were identified in 
the literature as the key societal environment factors that may obstruct local implementation of growth 
management policies. A total of ten specific societal environment barriers to growth management were 
identified from a review of the literature:  
1. Presence of strong NIMBY lobbying against infill and intensification 
2. Belief in and advocacy for minimal public regulation of private property and the value 
private over public spaces 
3. Consumer preference for low density suburban form 
4. Auto dependency and absence of alternative travel options 
5. Societal costs of development and car transportation not reflected in market pricing 
6. Belief in the superiority of market-based solutions that constrain government efforts to 
correct market distortions 
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7. Privatization and deregulation that reduce capacity of local government to plan for and 
regulate development 
8. Decentralization of planning authority that reduces regional coordination 
9. Presence of a strong growth coalition that seeks conventional economic growth over growth 
management 
10. Absence of dissenting voices in favour of growth management 
Societal barriers comprise the taken-for-granted, underlying assumptions of a society and define 
how people interpret and react to the world around them (Knieling & Othengrafen, 2015). Figure 4 
depicts most societal barriers to be at or close to the beginning of each relationship chain, where they 
operate to justify other societal or planning environment barriers and occasionally artifacts. In a few 
cases, the conditions created by artifacts and planning environments also work directly to reinforce 
societal scale barriers. The existence of low density urban forms, for example, directly justifies auto 
dependency through the perception that car travel is superior in performance and lower cost when 
compared with other travel options. The familiarity and performance of car travel in turn helps to 
reinforce continued creation of low density urban forms. Opportunities for innovation and change at the 
societal environment scale are anticipated to share commonalities with the planning environment, in 
which transformation is a result of social learning in response to new information or perceptions about 
social problems, current conditions and alternatives. 
Studies of the cultural factors that influence planning have found societal environments, and the 
resulting planning environments and artifacts, to vary significantly between case studies (Knieling & 
Othengrafen, 2015; Othengrafen & Reimer, 2013; Othengrafen, 2010). These studies have examined 
planning cultures in Europe, a geopolitical region that spans multiple political boundaries and contains a 
diverse range of socio-political cultures. Knieling and Othengrafen (2015) identified four key societal 
factors that influence the variability in planning cultures across nations: (1) prevailing socio-economic 
worldviews, and (2) societal values such as those that emphasize individual vs. communal rights, (3) 
orientation toward time (e.g. values with respect to the relative importance of the past, present and future), 
and (4) values and conceptions of nature. Societal environments that operate within a shared federal and 
regional scale political and economic framework are expected to be more uniform than those that span 
nations or distinct geopolitical regions. Case studies within single geo-political regions may demonstrate 
variability in societal environment barriers across certain socio economic or socio-political divides, such 
as the urban and rural (Segaert, 2008). As well, societal environments within regions may demonstrate 
variability in the power and influence of certain societal worldviews. 
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The societal scale barriers identified in this research and the institutional settings in which they 
are embedded emphasize the importance of three of Knieling and Othengrafen’s (2015) four general 
societal characteristics: (1) prevailing socio-economic worldviews, (2) societal values such as those that 
emphasize individual vs. communal rights, and (3) values and conceptions of nature. To a lesser extent, 
the societal environment barriers to growth management reflect the fourth characteristic: an orientation 
toward time (e.g. values with respect to the relative importance of the past, present and future). 
Applying the Models 
Figures 3 and 4 depict the barriers to growth management planning as a complex web of 
interconnected individual and collective behaviours, beliefs, policies and practices, operating at a range of 
scales and influenced by broader local social, economic and political contexts. The model in Figure 3 
illustrates the generalized relationships between barriers at different scales within a local context, while 
Figure 4 provides a more detailed model of the interdependencies between barriers and highlights where 
barrier groupings fall into general institutional themes. With its more detailed depiction of 
interrelationships and institutional themes, Figure 4 serves as a model against which barriers reported in 
specific local contexts may be compared and tested. Stable barriers are those that are positively reinforced 
by other barriers or local context through the dynamics described in Table 2.  Less stable barriers are 
considered to be those that don’t benefit from positive reinforcement of other barriers or local contextual 
factors, leading to conflicting internal logics or compromises between specific advocacy coalitions. These 
barriers are expected to be more vulnerable to changes through the mechanisms described in Table 3. 
Together, the models comprise a set of practical tools for analyzing and comparing local 
variability in barriers to growth management. The model in Figure 3 offers a framework for 
systematically identifying the full range of barriers that may impact planning action. By identifying the 
three scales of planning culture at the outset, the framework helps override disciplinary boundaries and 
provides a sensitizing approach for identifying less visible values and assumptions that may constrain or 
enable particular planning actions (Othengrafen, 2013). For example, the framework moves beyond 
rational planning assumptions that view planning as the exclusive domain of civil servants and politicians 
by ensuring consideration of other actors, actor groups and structuring forces that fall outside of 
traditional planning organizations (Reimer, 2013). The model presented in Figure 4 extends the value of 
the planning culture framework by providing a depiction of known or theorized reinforcing relationships 
between barriers that can be examined and compared across regions. In addition to providing a systematic 
basis for defining and comparing relationships between barriers in different local contexts, the model 
identifies broader institutional themes within which interconnected barriers can be analyzed and 
interpreted. In combination with the mechanisms for change described in Tables 2 and 3, the model in 
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Figure 4 provides an analytical framework for examining local planning cultures that avoids static 
conceptions of planning and recognized the dynamic interplay of variables that help to constrain or enable 
action. By considering mechanisms for change that acknowledge both structuring forces (e.g. familiarity 
and legitimacy) and agency (e.g. discretion and veto power), the model helps avoid an overly structural 
view of institutions and recognizes the role of deliberate or strategic action in blocking or enabling 
institutional change.  
The models enable a number of predictions about local variability in growth management 
implementation. Regions demonstrating a larger and more complex network of self-reinforcing barriers to 
growth management are anticipated to be less likely to implement transformative planning approaches 
that support more compact, transit supportive development than regions demonstrating fewer barriers 
and/or smaller and weaker networks. Local social, economic and environmental conditions are anticipated 
to influence the expression and stability of key barriers within different regions. The scale at which 
barriers operate is also expected to influence their relative stability and impact. Societal scale barriers are 
anticipated to demonstrate a high level of stability compared with barriers at the planning environment 
and artifact scales because they represent less visible, unquestioned values and beliefs that are more 
vulnerable than other scales to self-reinforcing mechanisms such as confirmation bias. 
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Chapter 4. Methods 
Research Objectives 
This research explores the reasons for the apparent mismatch between growth management 
planning goals and the urban development reality by examining barriers to the implementation of a 
regional growth management plan. The objective of the research is to identify key barriers to municipal 
implementation of growth management plans and explore the relationship between those barriers and the 
local context.  Recognizing that barriers to growth management plan implementation within different 
municipalities are unlikely to operate in isolation, this research explores how local context influences the 
way barriers are expressed, reinforced and/transformed.  In meeting this objective, this research aims to 
answer the questions:  
1) What are the key barriers to local implementation of regional growth management plans? 
2) Are barriers archetypical or are they unique to the local context?  
3) How do the barriers to implementation relate to one another, and what are the mediating 
mechanisms that define these relationships?  
4) How do barriers interact to reinforce the status quo? Where are there opportunities for change?  
 
 The Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, a Provincial plan guiding planning decisions 
for a region centering on Toronto, Canada, is the focal point for this study. A mixed method, multi-step 
methodological approach was used to identify, interpret, contrast and compare the barriers to 
implementation facing three case study municipalities within the Greater Golden Horseshoe against a 
model of expected barriers to implementation derived from the literature (Chapter 3). To identify and 
characterize the barriers to implementation within each of the case study regions, the research draws on 
three main data sources:  
1) Interviews with implementers to gain insights from their practical experiences, with emphasis on 
municipal planners, but also including provincial planners, planning consultants and developers in 
the case study municipalities;  
2) Supplementary documents that examine local planning issues and practice, including municipal 
and provincial planning documents, correspondence, media reports and independent and academic 
research; and, 
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3) Statistics Canada community profile data (2011) and background municipal planning documents 
to obtain descriptive statistics and contextual information for each case study region, including 
population, employment, growth rate, urban form, and socio-political context. 
Comparative models 
A key objective of this research is to examine if and how barriers to growth management 
implementation differ within different local contexts. To compare barriers across different contexts, a 
generic representation of barriers is developed and used as a model against which case study results are 
compared. The model, presented in Figure 4, draws from both the conceptual and organizational 
contributions of the planning culture framework and the theoretical and analytical contributions of 
historical and sociological institutionalism. The rationale for integrating these frameworks was to benefit 
from their individual strengths and contributions, namely: 1) The strength of the planning culture model’s 
organizing framework which helped identify the full range of identified and possible barriers described in 
the literature (Chapter 2), 2) the reductionist approaches offered by each framework for synthesizing a 
large number of variables into meaningful groups based on scale and patterns of interaction, and 3) the 
analytical contribution of historical and sociological institutionalism, which provides a basis for analyzing 
the relationships between barriers, identifying important patterns of interaction, and understanding how 
those relationships make them resistant or vulnerable to change.  
The case study models are used to illustrate key barriers to Growth Plan implementation in each 
region and their divergence from the generic model and from each other. The models are used to highlight 
important patterns of interaction between key barriers, the scale at which key barriers operate and the 
institutional themes within which they fall for each case study region. These characteristics highlighted by 
the model form the basis of further analysis and discussion of the research questions. The models are 
expected to enable a more fulsome identification of the barriers to growth management, and to provide a 
better understanding of the complex and dynamic interrelationships between barriers within different 
local contexts.  
Case study selection 
Because of the many municipalities in the Greater Golden Horseshoe, a case study approach was 
used to gather detail rich data on a subset of the municipalities. Case studies were selected using a 
purposeful, maximum variation (heterogeneity) approach, which is a recommended approach for small 
samples where there is a large degree of variation between individual cases (Patton 2002). The rationale 
for using this sampling approach was to maximize variation so as to capture similarities, central themes 
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and shared patterns of policy implementation among the disparate regions as well as to capture distinct 
policy implementation challenges that are unique to each region.  
Case study municipalities within the Greater Golden Horseshoe were selected from among the 16 
upper tier municipalities whose boundaries fell inside the Greater Golden Horseshoe. The boundaries of 
upper tier municipalities were chosen as the geographical unit of analysis since urban planning decisions 
of lower tier or single tier municipalities within those boundaries can be greatly impacted by decision 
making and policy frameworks at the upper tier. Case study selection was further restricted to include 
only those regions located predominantly or entirely outside of a protected Greenbelt that surrounds 
Toronto to ensure all case studies operated within the same Provincial policy environment, development 
conditions and growth management opportunities. Regions were further restricted to those considered to 
be self-sustaining urban areas with at least one traditional downtown, and those that had an availability of 
greenfields for development and opportunities for intensification.  
Of the seven upper tier municipalities located predominantly or entirely outside of the Greenbelt, 
the three case studies regions – Peterborough County, Simcoe County, and the Region of Waterloo - were 
selected.  These regions were selected because they represented different social, environment and 
economic contexts that could result in different constraints on Growth Plan implementation. Thus they 
represented three considerably different regions that may have different approaches to managing urban 
growth, despite sharing the same Provincial policy planning framework. Specifically, the three regions 
varied across a number of characteristics expected to influence Growth Plan implementation, including 
degree of urbanization and dispersion, population size, and rate of urban growth (Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Characteristics of Case Study Areas. 
CASE STUDY AREA POPULATION 
NO. URBAN 
GROWTH 
CENTRES 
PERCENT 
RURAL/SMALL 
TOWN* 
POPULATION 
GROWTH RATE 
(2006-2011) 
PETERBOROUGH 171,440 1 12 1.5 
SIMCOE 436,630 1 45 5.5 
WATERLOO 507,096 3 6 6.1 
*Calculated as a proportion of Census division located outside of a Census Metropolitan Area (Source: Rural 
Ontario Institute. (2013). Overview of Ontario’s Rural Geography. URL: 
http://www.ruralOntarioinstitute.ca/file.aspx?id=1c38f15e-df4e-41a8-9c4d-7ad02cf55b0b) 
 
Within the boundaries of the upper tier municipalities, all lower tier and single tier municipalities 
were identified and grouped with their associated upper tier municipality to form case study regions 
(Table 6).  
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Table 6. Case Study Areas and Associated Lower and Single Tier Municipalities. 
CASE STUDY 
AREA 
NAME 
MUNICIPAL 
CLASSIFICATION 
MUNICIPAL STATUS 
PETERBOROUGH 
Population*: 
171,440 
Peterborough County Upper Tier Municipality 
Peterborough City Single Tier Municipality 
Asphodel-Norwood Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Cavan Monaghan Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Douro-Dummer Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Galway-Cavendish & Harvey Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Havelock-Belmont-Methuen Township Lower Tier Municipality 
North Kawartha Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Otonabee-South Monaghan Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Smith-Ennismore-Lakefield Township Lower Tier Municipality 
SIMCOE 
Population*: 
436,630 
Simcoe County Upper Tier Municipality 
Barrie City Single Tier Municipality 
Orillia City Single Tier Municipality 
Bradford West Gwillimbury Town Lower Tier Municipality 
Collingwood Town Lower Tier Municipality 
Innisfil Town Lower Tier Municipality 
Midland Town Lower Tier Municipality 
New Tecumseth Town Lower Tier Municipality 
Penetanguishene Town Lower Tier Municipality 
Wasaga Beach Town Lower Tier Municipality 
Adjala-Tosorontio Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Clearview Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Essa Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Oro-Medonte Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Ramara Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Severn Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Springwater Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Tay Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Tiny Township Lower Tier Municipality 
WATERLOO 
Population*: 
507,096 
Waterloo Regional Municipality Upper Tier Municipality 
Kitchener City Lower Tier Municipality 
Waterloo City Lower Tier Municipality 
Cambridge City Lower Tier Municipality 
North Dumfries Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Wellesley Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Wilmot Township Lower Tier Municipality 
Woolwich Township Lower Tier Municipality 
*Statistics Canada (2011)  
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Interviews 
Interviews were carried out by the author of this research and a paid research assistant who was 
funded through a SSHRC grant. The research formed a subcomponent of a larger project examining 
“Smart Growth”. Interviews focused on municipal planners to gain insights from their practical 
experiences. Consulting planners, provincial planners and developers were also interviewed to gain a 
broader range of insights and to validate or provide additional context to responses. A standard set of 
open ended interview questions were developed to maintain consistency in questioning across interviews. 
A standardized approach is recommended for evaluations that involve topics of a politically sensitive 
nature, to help avoid problems of data legitimacy and credibility and to reduce the likelihood of 
interviewer bias (Patton, 2002). Questions were designed to be open ended to ensure that the interviews 
would still be useful to collect information about unanticipated or previously unknown barriers to plan 
implementation.  
A number of additional approaches were used to ensure consistency in interview questioning and 
style. The author of this research reviewed the interview questions with the research assistant in advance 
of the interview process to ensure a common understanding of the questions and interview approach. 
Recognizing that responses could be impacted by perceptions about the interviewers’ personal views 
(Morris, 2009) on growth management in general, and the Growth Plan more specifically, the 
interviewers adopted a conciliatory and encouraging interview style, avoided portraying personal views 
about the Growth Plan and deflected questions back to the interviewee if asked about personal views. 
Interviewers only deviated from the standard questionnaire to seek clarity on a statement or to obtain 
further detail about a particular response. Interviews were recorded and transcribed in full by the 
individual researcher who carried out the interview. All transcriptions were reviewed and verified against 
the original recording by the author of this research. 
Interview candidates 
Within each selected upper tier municipality interview candidates were selected using a criterion 
sampling approach, which is a useful method for gathering information-rich cases that will reveal 
importation program limitations for the purpose of identifying areas for improvement (Patton, 2002). 
Criteria for selection were 1) a high level of professional involvement in the implementation of Growth 
Plan policies through the municipal planning/decision making process (e.g. municipal planners and 
planning consultants), 2) involvement in the planning of development projects which have been or will be 
directly affected by the Growth Plan (e.g. residential or commercial developers), or 3) involvement or 
expertise in the development of the Growth Plan and its policies (e.g. provincial planners or bureaucrats). 
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Individuals who met at least one of the three criteria were identified using municipal and provincial 
government staff directories, municipal planning documents and agendas for planning working groups, 
newspaper articles pertaining to planning issues, and the planning and development consultants sections 
of the yellow pages. Names and contact information were compiled in a password-protected spreadsheet 
and all were contacted with a request for an interview.  
A total of 38 individuals participated in the interviews, 30 of whom were municipal planners 
distributed relatively evenly across the three study regions (Table 7). An additional four interview 
participants were Provincial government employees from Ontario Municipal Affairs and Housing and the 
Ontario Growth Secretariat. A final four interviews were gathered from developers and home builders 
operating within the Greater Golden Horseshoe.  Provincial government and development industry 
interviews were used to provide context to the interpretation of interviews in each of the case study 
regions.  
Table 7. Breakdown of Interview Participants. 
INTERVIEWEE TYPE NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 
Waterloo Planners 10 
Simcoe Planners 12 
Peterborough Planners 8 
    SUBTOTAL 30 
Provincial Government Officials 4 
Development Industry Representatives 4 
    SUBTOTAL 8 
TOTAL 38 
 
Documents 
A purposeful, criterion-based sampling approach was used to obtain documents relevant to the 
conceptual framework and the research questions for each case study. This technique is useful for the 
identification and selection of relevant, credible and in-depth information about a particular phenomenon 
of interest (Creswell, 2009). Municipal websites, local and regional newspapers and other media outlets, 
and research databases were queried using an online keyword search for all documents published since 
2005 relating to the case study regions and containing the following topics or key words: Growth Plan, 
Places to Grow, growth management, smart growth, urban planning, rural planning, urban development, 
intensification, density, and urban form. Document sources were only selected for review if they 
contained locally-relevant information pertaining a barrier to growth management in one or more of the 
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case study regions. Documents that described factual information about local plan implementation but 
that did not directly or indirectly identify a barrier to implementation were used for reference purposes but 
were not included as a data source for the purpose of identifying barriers. For this reason, the number of 
documents used as a data source often represented a fairly small subset of the total number of documents 
published on the topic (e.g. media reports). Although data searches emphasized the time period following 
the adoption of the Places to Grow Act (2005), they also included, where relevant, earlier publications or 
reports relating to the keywords if they provided insight into local planning issues and growth 
management challenges.  
A wide range of document sources were reviewed to obtain a full characterization of 
implementation barriers and local policy support for Growth Plan objectives (Table 8; Appendix B). The 
purpose of including a wide range of document types was to cast as wide as possible a net for the 
identification of local barriers to implementation. It was recognized that different sources may identify 
different types of barriers based on the purpose and audience of the source, and that all of these 
perspectives would contribute to a more fulsome understanding of local barriers. Sources included 
Provincial and municipal planning documents, media reports, publications from independent research 
institutes and academic papers. Planning documents selected for review included Official Plans and 
Official Plan Amendments, municipal staff reports to council, municipal and Provincial position papers 
and correspondence relating to Places to Grow Act, the Provincial Policy Statement, and the Growth Plan 
for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, Ontario Municipal Board decisions, growth management strategies, 
intensification plans, and any other municipal documents or plans adopted to guide local decision making 
with respect to the Growth Plan. Media reports included articles published by local news media that 
related to the Growth Plan, including political reactions to the Growth Plan and articles about urban 
growth, suburban development, and intensification. Media reports also included articles published by 
non-local media, such as Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Toronto newspapers, provided that the 
topic of the article specifically pertained to a growth management issue in one of the case study regions. 
Where available, research specific to the individual case studies were also collected from academic 
journals and research institutes to inform the analysis. These research publications provided in depth 
analyses of local historical urban development, as well as particular planning issues or political pressures 
facing the case study regions. Like the other document sources, academic research papers and reports 
were only considered if they examined implementation or contextual barriers within one or more of the 
case study regions. Academic literature that examined planning and growth management issues in a 
general sense, outside of the specific local contexts of the case studies, were not used to identify local 
barriers to implementation. 
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Table 8. Number and Breakdown of Documents Reporting Barriers to Growth Plan 
Implementation. 
CASE STUDY AREA 
NUMBER OF 
DOCUMENTS 
WATERLOO 
Municipal and Provincial Planning Documents and Communications 5 
Media Reports 18 
Stakeholder and Informal Group Communications 2 
Academic Articles and Dissertations 3 
Other Documents (e.g. reports and communications from independent research 
institutes, social planning organizations, professional associations, etc.) 
4 
SUBTOTAL 31 
SIMCOE 
Municipal and Provincial Planning Documents and Communications 41 
Media Reports 21 
Stakeholder and Informal Group Communications 2 
Academic Articles and Dissertations 2 
Other Documents (e.g. reports and communications from independent research 
institutes, professional associations, etc.) 
1 
SUBTOTAL 67 
PETERBOROUGH 
Municipal and Provincial Planning Documents and Communications 9 
Media Reports 18 
Stakeholder and Informal Group Communications 0 
Academic Articles and Dissertations 2 
Other Documents (e.g. reports and communications from independent research 
institutes, professional associations, etc.) 
1 
SUBTOTAL 30 
TOTAL 128 
 
The sampling method for the collection of documents, which was purposeful and criterion-based 
rather than random, resulted in variability in the number and types of document collected for each study 
region. The variability was largely due to the availability of documents that met the sampling criteria (i.e. 
contained locally-relevant information pertaining to a growth management issue) in each case study 
region. Differences were most notable for Simcoe County, where a total of 41 municipal and Provincial 
planning documents and communications were collected, in contrast with five documents for Waterloo 
and nine documents for Peterborough. The availability of relevant government planning documents and 
communications can be attributed to the fact that Simcoe County was the subject of a Provincially-
initiated study and Intergovernmental Action Plan that resulted in a significant amount of research and 
documentation of local growth management issues. In contrast, growth management planning issues in 
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Waterloo and Peterborough case study regions have not been the subject of a significant Provincially-
initiated study or plan beyond the Growth Plan. 
While the documents varied in terms of type and quality of the information provided, they shared 
the common characteristic of describing the socio-political, economic and environmental setting in which 
spatial planning and decision making for each case study region was carried out. The breadth in document 
type was considered to provide a broader portrayal of case study conditions than that which could be 
obtained from a single document type. For example, media reports typically emphasized politically 
contentious but relatively short-term planning issues, whereas academic research provided richer and 
more nuanced insights into the complex historical, spatial, financial and political conditions that 
influenced planning decisions within each case study region. Municipal planning documents and council 
reports tended to represent a range of professional planning viewpoints about the Growth Plan and 
technical challenges associated with discrete planning issues, while correspondence between 
municipalities and the Province revealed information about relationships, agency coordination and power 
between levels of government. Despite their varied focus, the different document types were considered 
to be of equal value in the characterization of the full range of barriers to growth management planning. 
Interview and Document Analysis 
A mixed method approach was used to analyze the various information sources for each case 
study region. A quantitative, directed content analysis approach was first used to measure the frequency 
with which each case study region reported the barriers to Growth Plan implementation identified in the 
literature (Table 4). Reporting frequency was used to provide initial direction regarding barriers that may 
warrant further investigation. This approach is useful for research topics which rely on qualitative data 
and for which there is an existing theory that the data can be used to confirm or expand upon (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005). Barriers identified in the literature and described in Table 4 were assigned a unique 
numerical code. The content of all data sources, including interview transcripts, planning documents and 
media reports, were then systematically analyzed and sentences or groupings of sentences that directly or 
indirectly described an identified barrier were assigned the corresponding code. More than one 
corresponding code was assigned where statements revealed more than one barrier. Newly identified 
barriers that were not previously identified in the literature review were also noted and assigned a unique 
code as they were encountered. All coding was carried out by the author of this research.  
To identify areas of focus for further evaluation, codes for each barrier type were summed for 
each region. The resulting values provided a measure of the frequency with which each barrier was 
reported in each study region. A barrier was counted only once for each data source regardless of how 
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many times it was mentioned, and so frequency of reporting was calculated as the sum of the number of 
sources in which a particular barrier was described. This approach was used to ensure that all data sources 
were considered equally, and that barrier rankings were not impacted by variability in document type and 
focus, or communication styles. Data sources were weighted equally in recognition of the fact they 
provided different but equally useful insights and perspectives about the challenges to growth 
management.  
Variability in the number of total data sources between study regions limited useful comparisons 
of a barrier’s reported frequency between regions. Instead, reporting frequency was used to calculate the 
proportion of total sources that reported a particular barrier. Relative reporting frequency values were 
used to identify barriers that were most commonly reported in multiple documents and interview sources 
as a coarse measure of barriers that could be considered pervasive, long standing or of widespread 
concern. The relative frequency that a barrier was reported provided a basis upon which comparisons 
could be made. In calculating the relative reporting frequency, this research assumed a correlation 
between the frequency of barriers identified by different key actors, documents and media accounts, and 
the significance of these barriers on planning practice.  Potential key barriers for each study region were 
identified as those barriers that were described by at least 10% of the data sources. A 10% threshold was 
chosen because it captured a sufficient number of barriers to permit the identification of important 
themes, interrelationships and patterns in each region.  
Potential key barriers were then critically evaluated in combination with local contextual and 
historical planning information to confirm the importance of frequently reported barriers and identify 
missing or underlying barriers, with the ultimate objective of understanding, characterizing and 
comparing local planning cultures. The critical evaluation involved an examination of the Provincial 
planning context and formal institutional setting for planning in Ontario, and a historical review of urban 
growth and local growth management approaches for each region. Within this context, local planning 
discourses, as presented in the collected documents and interviews, were analyzed to understand the 
following:  
 how and if growth management was interpreted and recognized as a local problem; 
 how barriers to managing growth were identified and presented by planners, political 
actors, developers and stakeholder groups;  
 what explanations, arguments, metaphors and narratives were used to explain the 
opportunities and challenges for local growth management planning.  
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Information from the analysis was used to identify underlying issues related to power relations, 
values, ideologies, and identities that may support or contradict local growth management efforts. The 
analysis was also used to further refine or expand on key barriers identified for each case study region. 
The results of the analysis were then used to construct a model of barriers to growth management for each 
region and to identify patterns and relationships between barriers. The model and accompanying 
discourse analysis was then used as a frame to answer the research questions. 
Conceptions of Implementation 
Implementation of regional plans like the Growth Plan has been evaluated using a number of 
different approaches. An evaluation of plan conformance assesses plan implementation in terms of the 
degree to which a plan achieves its intended goals and objectives, or "the conformance degree between 
the outcomes on the ground and the plan proposals and the promotion of planning goals and objectives 
through the available implementation instruments" (Oliveira & Pinho, 2010, p. 346). In the case of growth 
management planning, a “successful” plan would therefore be one that results in land use and built form 
that directly reflect the objectives of the plan, such as the achievement of specific intensification targets or 
a reduction in the rate of loss of peripheral agricultural lands to urban development. Establishing a causal 
relationship between the planning policy and built form, however, can be challenging given the evolving 
nature of most plans, time lags in the development process, and the multiplicity of variables affecting land 
use and urban development, including population growth and demographics, housing preferences, 
economic growth, past land uses and environmental constraints (Gosnell et al., 2011). Reliance on the 
correlation between land use changes and plan adoption may result in the detection of spurious rather than 
causal relationships. As a result, scholars investigating plan conformance have focused on the 
implementation and outcome of singular planning objectives rather the implementation of broad plans 
with multiple objectives, such as growth management plans. Laurian, Berke and colleagues (2006; 
2004b), for example, evaluated development permit application approvals and their conformance to 
specific policies within municipal plans.  
Plan performance is another approach that conceives implementation as process in which plans 
are consulted as part of a decision making process rather than as a directive. Instead of seeking to 
establish a causal relationship between a plan and a landuse or built form outcome, the performance 
framework views implementation as the extent to which a plan is referred to by decision makers 
(Alexander & Faludi, 1989; Berke et al., 2006). Evaluating implementation under this conceptual 
framework acknowledges that deviations from a plan may sometimes be justified. Comprehensive plans 
like the Growth Plan, for example, may occasionally have conflicting objectives, such as protection of 
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water resources and significant natural features and intensification. Moreover, certain objectives may be 
achieved differently in different contexts. In acknowledging contextual differences, an understanding of 
plan performance may better reflect the uncertainties and variability in specific municipal planning 
practices. The performance approach is challenged by difficulties in quantifying the degree to which a 
plan is consulted and adhered to in decision making and determining what types of situations might 
justify deviations from the plan (Alexander & Faludi, 1989; Mastop & Faludi, 1997). 
This study evaluates Growth Plan implementation using the performance approach. Performance 
is deemed most suitable given the broad scope of Growth Plan objectives, the short time span since the 
Plan was adopted, and the time lag between past development approvals and actual construction. In using 
a performance approach, this research intends not to quantify land use and its conformance to the Plan, 
but rather investigate how municipal planners reference and use the Plan within their differing social, 
political and economic environments. 
Terminology 
The term regional plan is used in this research to refer to any regulatory policy or plan that 
provides a land use framework for an area comprised of multiple urban and/or rural municipalities. 
Regional plans differ from local plans in their scale of implementation, with the latter implemented 
exclusively at the scale of a single municipality.  
Regional growth management plans are regional plans that generally aim to: a) protect open 
space, natural areas, and agricultural areas; b) discourage low-density development and encourage 
compact development; and c) increase the modal share of transit and active transportation (Frenkel & 
Orenstein, 2012; Ingram et al., 2009). Regional growth management plans from different regions share a 
number of common elements including a) a regional policy framework to guide local municipal planning; 
b) the need for multi-agency coordination for the implementation of regional policies, including state or 
provincial, regional and local municipal governments; and c) a combination of regulations, policies and 
incentives to achieve growth management goals (Leo, Beavis, Carver, & Turner, 1998). In addition to the 
Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, examples of regional growth management plans include 
legislated growth management programs adopted by the states of Florida, Maryland, Oregon and New 
Jersey. 
Growth Management vs. Growth Control 
One of the challenges in interpreting the successes or failures of growth management plans is the 
frequent conflation of policy types with scale of implementation, which can obscure the relationship 
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between growth management policies and their outcomes (Carruthers, 2002b; Leo et al., 1998). Local 
plans that include growth control policies, for example, have significantly different outcomes than 
regional growth management policies since the objective of the former is to prevent rather than manage 
growth (Leo et al., 1998). Such policies can actually contribute to sprawl by displacing development to 
other regions with less stringent controls. For example, studies of local growth controls in the United 
States have demonstrated that locally-conceived and -implemented policies can result in an unevenly 
distributed set of land use restrictions across a region. The heterogeneity in restrictions leads developers 
to seek those areas most free of regulation, which in turn can push development into outlying areas of a 
region rather than concentrating it within the built up area (Carruthers, 2002a; Pendall, 1999; Shen, 1996). 
As a result of its incongruency with regional growth management, the study of local growth control 
policies, falls outside of the scope of this research. 
Descriptive Statistics and Background Data 
To assist in the interpretation of interview data, the socio-political context of each case study 
region and its lower and single tier municipalities was characterized using Statistics Canada community 
profile data (2011), municipal documents, academic literature and newspaper articles.  The focus of this 
data collection stage was on the gathering of descriptive statistics and news stories that had a particular 
relevance to urban planning, such as municipal population, employment and growth statistics and local 
decisions related to urban development, transportation and urban form. Contextual information derived 
from this stage is summarized in Chapter 6. 
Data Reliability, Validity and Study Limitations 
This research aims to contribute to an understanding of the culture of planning practice in 
Canada. There have been numerous regional planning efforts in the Toronto region since the 1940s, but 
most attempts failed to achieve their goals due to public opposition over the loss of local authority in 
planning (White, 2007). What might make the Places to Grow Act and the Growth Plan for the Greater 
Golden Horseshoe different from past failed regional planning efforts is the unprecedented amount of 
municipal consultation that was conducted in the development of the plan (Brad Graham, personal 
communication) and the more de-centralized approach to implementation (White, 2007). But while 
decentralization permits more local control over how the Growth Plan will be implemented, its opens the 
Plan to the possibility of ineffective local implementation due to influential social, political and economic 
forces that favour the prevailing urban form. To date, neither the Ontario Government nor the Ontario 
Growth Secretariat, the latter which is responsible for overseeing municipal conformance to the Growth 
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Plan, have released follow-up studies assessing the barriers facing municipalities in implementing the 
Plan (although performance indicators have been developed to guide future assessments). By examining 
municipal planners' frontline experiences, this research will help fill this gap. Data from this research will 
be useful for municipalities, who may benefit from learning about other municipalities' implementation 
successes and challenges, and for use in upcoming reviews of the Growth Plan. 
A number of methodological issues encountered in this research warrant consideration. The 
qualitative data collected is inadequate for an exploration of planning outcomes in each region. Therefore, 
in exploring the research questions, this research does not seek to establish a causal relationship between 
the barriers to Growth Plan implementation and the built forms across case study regions. Rather, the 
research explores the source and characteristics of different barriers to local growth management plan 
implementation and how implementing actors and the institutions in which they are situated variously 
reinforce or resist these barriers. In addition, this research assumes a correlation between the frequency 
with which barriers are reported by actors, planning documents and the media, and the magnitude of 
impact that these barriers have on local planning practice. While this assumption is consistent with other 
analyses in which qualitative data is examined using content analysis methods, empirical research to 
confirm and quantify the relationship between reported barriers and magnitude of impact on planning 
practice would improve our understanding of the role of barriers in inhibiting policy implementation.  
While useful for obtaining a detailed and in depth understanding of the particular barriers facing 
the study municipalities, the case study methodology used for this research may provide results of limited 
application to regions facing a different socio-political and regulatory context. For example, results may 
be less generalizable to regions under a significantly different growth management planning framework, 
or that do not share Canada’s municipal finance and governance structures. While the case studies provide 
specific, context-dependent information and are, according to Flyvberg (2006), a necessary surrogate for 
general context-independent theories that are difficult if not impossible in the social sciences, subsequent 
studies of growth management implementation in other regions would help to deepen our understanding 
of the role of different planning contexts on policy implementation.  
In identifying barriers, the research relied on challenges reported by key municipal actors 
involved in the planning process, as well as media, planning reports and academic literature. While 
interview data can generate detailed insights into local planning practice and political contexts, it is also 
influenced by the power relations embedded in the interview process and the “self-presentation and 
impression management” strategies used by interviewees to control the portrayal of themselves and their 
work (S. Moore, 2015). These relations and strategies may include an interviewer’s efforts to establish a 
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rapport with the interviewer and an interviewee’s desire to obscure personal biases and elevate how they 
are perceived by the interviewer (S. Moore, 2015). The interactions inherent in the interview process 
present challenges for the interpretation of interview data, particularly when the information provided 
may consciously or unconsciously conceal legitimate information. Moreover, since it was an objective of 
this research to highlight less visible, embedded barriers to growth management, interviewees were 
required to recognize and articulate their own underlying motivations, biases and beliefs as well as those 
of others.  
The potential pitfalls of relying on interview data, such as skewed or selective description of 
barriers, was addressed in a number of ways. First, municipal interview results were compared against 
interviews with provincial actors, local media reports, planning documents, council decisions, and 
contextual information about the case study region, to determine how well the sentiments expressed were 
supported by other sources. It was recognized that implementing actors may be more likely to identify 
barriers outside of their sphere of direct influence, such those associated with the development industry, 
the political arena and societal scale barriers. Planning capacity, communication with developers, 
enforcement and administration, for example, were rarely identified as barriers by planners and more 
likely to be identified through planning and media reports. The limited emphasis on the technical, 
educational, mediating and administrative roles of planners contrasts with empirical findings in the 
planning literature which highlights the role and influence of planners in raising awareness among 
stakeholders, mediating conflict, and negotiating policy and development outcomes. Municipalities with 
greater planning capacity, for example, have been found to be more likely to adopt growth management 
policies and mediate the negative impact of divergent interests on the adoption of those policies (Brody et 
al., 2006; Hawkins, 2011; Hawkins, 2014). 
Second, additional sources of information from the interviews, such as the vocabulary and self-
portrayals of interviewees, served as data in and of itself, and helped to reveal how implementing actors 
interpreted their role in managing growth. In the case of staff commitment to growth management, 
reported frequency relied on an interpretation of the interviewee’s comments about the Growth Plan, 
which rarely included the outright self-identification by planners of a lack of commitment. As suggested 
by Moore (2015), the vocabulary and types of information shared with the interviewer served as data and 
were used in a more rigorous examination of underlying belief systems, identities, strategies, constraints 
and rationalities. Despite efforts to critically evaluate interview data, it is possible, however, that some 
barriers were insufficiently accounted for. 
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Other barriers – particularly those related to market distortions and neoliberalism – received little 
to no recognition by interview respondents or planning documents even though they were the focus of 
considerable attention in the planning and policy implementation literature. These results can be 
interpreted in one of two ways: either market distortions and neoliberal-oriented worldviews and practices 
do not contribute to the larger societal environment within which the Growth Plan is implemented, or they 
form a cognitive frame that is imperceptible to the actors tasked with implementing the Growth Plan. 
Recognizing the large body of research that examines of the impacts of market distortions, market based 
planning and neoliberalism on planning practice and spatial outcomes (e.g. Adams & Tiesdell, 2010; 
Allmendinger & Haughton, 2010; Blais, 2010; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Filion & Kramer, 2011; 
Gerber, 2016; Gunder, 2010; Heurkens, Adams, & Hobma, 2015; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Peck, 2011; 
Sager, 2009; Sager, 2011; Slack, 2002; Tomalty & Skaburskis, 2003) this research proposes the latter 
interpretation.  
Triangulation 
This study relies on a broad range of data types, including face-to-face interviews, newspaper 
articles, Statistics Canada community profile data, municipal and provincial planning documents, and 
academic literature to ensure the accuracy and validity in the characterization of each municipality's 
specific planning context and the barriers therein. No time range limited the scope of the literature review, 
although most studies reviewed were published since 1980. The semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in 2010 – four years after the adoption of the Growth Plan. Descriptive statistics were gathered, 
where possible, for the year 2010, although older (2006) statistical information was used when more 
current data was unavailable.  Relevant planning documents and newspaper articles were gathered from 
between 2005 and 2014, although some older documents were included where relevant. Selection of the 
four case study municipalities was non-random. Municipalities were chosen to vary widely by geographic 
location, compactness, population size, and rate of growth and growth pressure, to permit an 
understanding of a broad range of barriers facing municipalities in the Greater Golden Horseshoe. 
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Chapter 5. Planning Context for Municipal Implementation of Growth 
Management 
Municipal Responsibilities 
The relationship between municipalities and the province of Ontario was established by Canada's 
Constitution Act (1867), which declared municipalities to be subservient to the provinces (Wolfe, 2002). 
The province enables municipalities to deliver services that are typically of a local nature, including 
planning and economic development, and infrastructures such water, sewer and roads. At any time, 
however, the province can intervene to change the terms under which municipalities do business, through 
amalgamations, boundary changes, additional or reduced municipal service responsibilities, and changes 
to revenue generating capabilities (Wolfe, 2002).  
The provision of municipal planning services in Ontario is governed by the Ontario Planning Act. 
A Provincial Policy Statement (PPS) issued under the Act provides municipalities with more specific 
direction over issues of provincial interest. Amendments to the PPS in 2005 required that municipalities 
be consistent with the PPS rather than the less stringent, former requirement to have regard to the 
policies. The PPS provides direction to municipalities for achieving efficient development and landuse 
patterns, efficient use of infrastructure, protection of the environment and resources and conservation of 
cultural heritage. The Act is administered by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. 
Between 2000 and 2006, the province adopted a series of additional statutes to provide further 
direction to municipalities regarding planning for development and infrastructure. These included the Oak 
Ridges Moraine Conservation Act (2001) and Greenbelt Act (2005), both administered by the Ontario 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, and the Places to Grow Act (2006) administered by the 
Ontario Ministry of Infrastructure. Although administered by two separate arms of the province, the Acts 
are intended to work together to ensure the conservation of natural and agricultural areas through more 
efficient use of land and infrastructure.  
Within this provincial legislative framework, upper and single tier municipalities are required to 
adopt an Official Plan consistent with the policies within the PPS and supporting legislation. Lower tier 
municipalities must adopt policies that adhere to the Official Plan of the upper tier municipality. The 
Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing retains the authority to approve or reject upper and 
single tier municipal Official Plans. Approval authority for lower tier Official Plans can vary depending 
on the municipality, with some under the authority of the upper tier municipality and others reporting 
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directly to the Ministry. Municipal council planning decisions may be appealed to the Ontario Municipal 
Board, which is an adjudicative tribunal whose decisions are binding on all parties. 
Municipal Finance 
Canadian municipalities have limited options for generating revenues to pay for the delivery of 
local services.  In Ontario, property taxes comprise 41% of municipal revenues followed by provincial or 
federal grants which comprise approximately 22% of revenues (Commission on the Reform of Ontario's 
Public Services, 2012). Remaining revenues sources include development charges, user fees, and licenses.  
Development charges are controlled by the Development Charges Act and may only be charged by a 
municipality to cover the direct costs of providing infrastructure and soft services to support new 
developments. Recent changes to Ontario’s Development Charges Act permit municipalities to use 
development charges to fund a broader range of off-site municipal infrastructure, such as transit and waste 
management services. Additional non-monetary exactions can be required as a condition of a planning 
application (e.g. a plan of subdivision), including the dedication of land for roads, parks, schools and 
public works, or it may be agreed that the developer provides cash in lieu of the land dedications (Slack, 
2002). Although intended as a cost-recovery instrument for new development, the infrastructure funded 
through development charges, such as the creation of new parks or improvements to transit service, can 
also indirectly benefit existing development.  
In the 1990s, a Local Services Realignment (LSR) initiative by the Conservative provincial 
government at the time resulted in the downloading of services to municipalities that were formerly 
delivered by the province, including social housing, and environmental protection. The download was 
intended to be revenue neutral through a redistribution of education tax revenues from the province to 
municipalities and a provincial grant called a Community Reinvestment Fund (CRF). Municipalities, 
however, argued that the costs to provide the new services exceeded the additional revenues and that they 
were obliged to reduce investment in longer term priorities such as infrastructure to pay for more 
immediate service delivery requirements such as social assistance (Commission on the Reform of 
Ontario's Public Services, 2012; Sancton, 2005).  Dispersed urban forms typically found in most Ontario 
municipalities served to exacerbate the growing infrastructure deficit through the creation of a small tax 
base to fund large areas of infrastructure and service (Blais, 2010; Slack, 2002). By the mid 2000s, the 
Association of Municipalities for Ontario announced that the infrastructure deficit had reached crisis 
proportions (Association of Municipalities Ontario, 2007).  
Deficits in revenues are absorbed by increasing property taxes or where increased taxes are 
politically impossible, reducing the level of service (Skaburskis & Tomalty, 2000). With property taxes 
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and development charges contributing to the majority of a municipality’s revenue, municipalities are 
incentivized to increase revenues through new growth and development (Desfor, Keil, Kipfer, & 
Wekerly, 2006; Eidelman & Taylor, 2010; Filion, 2003). 
Urban Planning and Development 
Concurrent with a rising municipal infrastructure deficit, Ontario municipalities have become 
increasingly aware of the inefficiencies of low density development and the financial burden of 
maintaining them with limited tax revenues. Intensification of urban centres has become increasingly 
viewed by municipalities as an economic development strategy to help revitalize and enhance downtown 
cores, thereby increasing competitiveness, attracting investment, improving livability and as a way to 
increase tax revenues where greenfield capacity was limited (Bunce, 2004; Desfor et al., 2006).  
Other pressures emerged from mounting public concern about urban sprawl in the 1980s and 90s.  
Public concern about urban sprawl and traffic gridlock was particularly pronounced in the suburban 
municipalities within the Greater Toronto Area where the social and environmental costs of sprawl were 
most evident (Eidelman, 2010; White, 2007). Residents of exurban and rural estate developments viewed 
urban expansion as a threat to the rural and natural amenities that they enjoyed, and voiced significant and 
sustained opposition to further urban expansion (Desfor et al., 2006). Political pressure from exurbanites 
to address the problems of sprawl was reinforced by environmental groups who opposed sprawl and 
challenged conventional urban planning in Ontario. For example, a high profile conflict over the 
protection of the Oak Ridges Moraine north of Toronto between suburban residents, activists and 
developers was a key driving force behind the Progressive Conservative government’s adoption of the 
Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act and Plan (Gilbert et al., 2005).  
Smart Growth: Growth as an Uncontested Objective 
Reflecting a new planning paradigm for ‘smart growth’ that had emerged in the United States, the 
Progressive Conservative government established a series of Smart Growth Panels to investigate the 
opportunities for alternative forms of urban growth (Brennan, 2002). The Central Ontario Smart Growth 
Panel, consisting of appointed citizens and elected officials, was mandated to find solutions to the growth-
related problems of gridlock and waste disposal. The panel produced a final report that recommended 
many of the tenets of smart growth, including compact, efficient development, the establishment of 
priority locations for public infrastructure funding, and protection of agricultural areas (Bourne, Taylor, 
Maurer, Luka, & Bunce, 2003). The report has been described as “long on visions and ideals, and short on 
realistic strategies for achieving them” (White, 2007). Nevertheless, the report helped pave the way for 
later provincial governments to adopt a regional growth management planning mandate. 
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Although responding to a range of concerns about low density development, the 2002 “Smart 
Growth” panel and report initiated by the Progressive Conservative government was couched an 
uncontested pro-growth and neoliberal discourse. The advocacy of growth as the only desirable and 
effective option for municipal economic sustainability, health and wellbeing is an entrenched planning 
and development paradigm that fails to consider the full range of implications and options (Leo & 
Anderson, 2006; Sousa & Pinho, 2015). Promoted as a solution for local economic sustainability, rapidly 
growing cities and regions benefit from a perception of being successful, desirable, and admired, while 
cities with slow or no growth are viewed as unfortunate, and at risk of being left behind (Leo & 
Anderson, 2006).  
A prevailing neoliberal discourse in Ontario accentuated the “growth fixation” by emphasizing 
the benefits of market-based solutions to resolve planning problems. The Smart Growth initiative 
examined ways in which city regions could improve their competitiveness to attract economic investment 
in the new global marketplace (Bradford, 2003), building on earlier Conservative neoliberal initiatives 
such as the Savings and Restructuring Act (1995) and the Fewer Politicians Act (1997) that saw the 
downsizing and amalgamation of municipalities.   Amalgamation of municipalities was argued to reduce 
municipal service duplication and decrease the number of paid elected officials (Kushner & Siegel, 2003). 
Newly streamlined governments were expected to yield quicker and simpler approval processes for new 
development and lower taxes as a result of economies of scale for infrastructure and service provision 
which would in turn attract investment (Bradford, 2003). 
A subsequent Liberal government elected in 2004 expanded on the previous government's 
municipal restructuring and smart growth initiatives by reforming the provincial land use planning 
framework. The Liberal government reversed few of the key changes initiated under the PC government, 
prompting some scholars to describe them as having "re‐branded and re‐packaged core neoliberal 
policies" (Fanelli & Thomas, 2011). Significant regulatory reforms were introduced to the provincial 
planning framework through amendments to the Planning Act (Bill 51 and 26; 2004) which strengthened 
provincial oversight of local land use by requiring municipalities to be “be consistent with” rather than 
merely "have regard to" Provincial Policy Statements. The Provincial Policy Statements were revised to 
emphasize the provincial interest in developing efficient, competitive city regions through intensification 
and compact growth.  
Following the Smart Growth Panel recommendations, the Liberal government also embarked on a 
series of significant initiatives to manage urban growth at a regional scale. The Places to Grow Act, 
adopted in 2005, together with Greenbelt Act adopted that same year, marked the first regional planning 
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initiatives to be adopted by the province in over 3 decades (White, 2007). The Places to Grow Act 
mandates the Ministry of Infrastructure (formerly the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure) to prepare 
regional growth plans for the purpose of reducing urban sprawl and making more efficient use of 
infrastructure by promoting more compact development. The first of these plans was the Growth Plan for 
the Greater Golden Horseshoe, released in 2006, which established a 25 year planning framework for 
growth in the region centred on Toronto (Figure 5).  
Like their Conservative predecessors, the Liberal government framed the problem of sprawl in 
economic terms, tying the Places to Grow Act and the associated Growth Plan for the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe to objectives of global competitiveness, growth, and market-based efficiency (Gilbert et al., 
2005; Pond, 2009; Wekerle, Sandberg, Gilbert, & Binstock, 2007). Sprawling development was argued to 
"threaten the province's future prosperity and ability to compete in the integrated North American 
economy" (Pond, 2009, p. 418), through loss of productivity as a result of inefficient use of land, 
infrastructure and traffic congestion problems. In addition, higher taxes would be required to support the 
creation and maintenance of inefficient infrastructure that serviced low density development and the 
health care costs associated with automobile dependency and its associated pollution. Lastly, quality of 
life arguments were framed in such a way as to emphasize the role of sprawl in reducing Ontario's ability 
to attract knowledge workers (Pond, 2009). 
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Figure 5. Municipalities within the Greater Golden Horseshoe Growth Plan Area. (Ministry of 
Infrastructure). 
Ontario’s Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe 
The Growth Plan directs the location of growth by assigning specific population and employment 
forecasts to upper and single tier municipalities within the Greater Golden Horseshoe. Upper tier 
municipalities allocate forecasted population and employment numbers to lower tier municipalities. An 
amendment released in 2012 set out clearer policy direction for the Simcoe sub-area, and allocates 
population and employment forecasts to the area’s lower tier municipalities. A second amendment was 
adopted in 2013 to update and extend population and employment forecasts to 2041 (Table 9). In 2017, a 
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revised Growth Plan was released which provided new policies around integrated planning around public 
transportation and growth targets. 
Under the 2006 Plan and now the 2017 updated Plan, municipalities are required to focus 
development in built-up areas to make efficient use of existing infrastructure and to minimize the adverse 
effects of sprawl such as gridlock and loss of natural areas and agricultural lands. The mechanism through 
which the Plan encourages intensification is the intensification target that requires municipalities to 
allocate a certain proportion of their total growth to built-up areas. In addition, the Plan requires 
municipalities to achieve density targets for greenfield areas to maximize the utility of new infrastructure 
and create communities that can be effectively serviced by public transit. These and other key policies of 
the 2006 Growth Plan are detailed below: 
1. direct 40% of new residential growth to the built-up areas by 2014; 
2. focus intensification in Urban Growth Centres to achieve density targets of:  
i. 400 residents and jobs combined per hectare for each of the urban growth centres in the City 
of Toronto; 
ii. 200 residents and jobs combined per hectare for each of the Downtown Brampton, 
Downtown Burlington, Downtown Hamilton, Downtown Milton, Markham Centre, 
Mississauga City Centre, Newmarket Centre, Midtown Oakville, Downtown Oshawa, 
Downtown Pickering, Richmond Hill/Langstaff Gateway, Vaughan Corporate Centre, 
Downtown Kitchener and Uptown Waterloo urban growth centres; 
iii. 150 residents and jobs combined per hectare for each of the Downtown Barrie, Downtown 
Brantford, Downtown Cambridge, Downtown Guelph, Downtown Peterborough and 
Downtown St. Catharines urban growth centres; 
3. direct development in designated greenfield areas to accommodate a minimum density target of 
50 residents and jobs combined per hectare; 
4. encourage the development of transit supportive and pedestrian friendly, complete communities 
(e.g. urban environments that offer a diverse mix of land uses, employment, housing types as well 
as public open space and easy access to local stores and services); 
5. provide convenient access to intra- and inter-city transit; 
6. ensure the availability of sufficient land for employment to accommodate forecasted growth 
7. plan for a balance of jobs and housing in communities across the GGH to reduce the need for 
long distance commuting and to increase the modal share for transit, walking and cycling; 
8. direct growth to settlement areas unless expansions are shown to be necessary through a 
municipal comprehensive review; 
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9. direct major growth to settlement areas that offer municipal water and wastewater systems and 
limiting growth in settlement areas that are serviced by other forms of water and wastewater 
services. 
 
Revisions to the Growth Plan in 2017 resulted in a number of new policies to support specific 
densities around transit and employment areas, higher density and intensification targets and clearer 
procedures for municipalities wish to request alternative targets or expand settlement areas. Policies for 
the Simcoe sub-area were updated and integrated into the Growth Plan. Key revisions included: 
 
1. increase of the minimum intensification target for built up areas to 60% by 2031, with 50% to be 
achieved before the next municipal comprehensive review (to be completed by 2022) is approved 
and in effect; 
2. increase of minimum density targets for designated greenfield areas to 80 residents and jobs 
combined per hectare by 2031, with an interim designated greenfield area density target of 60 
residents and jobs combined per hectare to apply, beginning in 2022; 
3. new minimum density targets for major transit station areas on priority transit corridors or subway 
lines, 
i. 200 residents and jobs combined per hectare for those that are served by subways;  
ii. 160 residents and jobs combined per hectare for those that are served by light rail transit or 
bus rapid transit; or 
iii. 150 residents and jobs combined per hectare for those that are served by the GO Transit rail 
network; 
4. a requirement for upper- and single-tier municipalities to establish minimum density targets for 
all employment areas through a municipal comprehensive review; 
5. new provisions that require upper- and single-tier municipalities to undertake a municipal 
comprehensive review in advance of any requests to the Province for alternative intensification 
and density targets; 
6. new provision to enable the Minister to establish delineated built boundaries and undelineated 
built-up areas, where appropriate. 
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Table 9. Forecasted Population and Employment for Upper- and Single-Tier Municipalities within 
the Greater Golden Horseshoe to 2041 (in 1000s) (MI, 2013; MI, 2017). 
 
MUNICIPALITY 
POPULATION EMPLOYMENT 
2031 2036 2041 2031 2036 2041 
Region of Durham 970 1,080 1,190 360 390 430 
Region of York 1,590 1,700 1,790 790 840 900 
City of Toronto 3,190 3,300 3,400 1,660 1,680 1,720 
Region of Peel 1,770 1,870 1,970 880 920 970 
Region of Halton 820 910 1,000 390 430 470 
City of Hamilton 680 730 780 310 330 350 
County of Northumberland 100 105 110 36 37 39 
County of Peterborough 70 73 76 20 21 24 
City of Peterborough 103 109 115 52 54 58 
City of Kawartha Lakes 100 101 107 29 30 32 
County of Simcoe 416 456 497 132 141 152 
City of Barrie 210 231 253 101 114 129 
City of Orillia 41 44 46 21 22 23 
County of Dufferin 80 81 85 29 31 32 
County of Wellington 122 132 140 54 57 61 
City of Guelph 177 184 191 94 97 101 
Region of Waterloo 742 789 835 366 383 404 
County of Brant 49 53 57 22 24 26 
City of Brantford 139 152 163 67 72 79 
County of Haldimand 57 60 64 22 24 25 
Region of Niagara 543 577 610 235 248 265 
TOTAL 11,950 12,740 13,480 5,650 5,930 6,270 
 
While generally offering a uniform policy direction for all municipalities in the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe, the Plan does make some distinction between “inner ring” municipalities located within the 
boundary established by the Greenbelt and “outer ring” municipalities located outside of the Greenbelt. 
Inner ring municipalities, most of which are urban, are directed to accommodate approximately 75% of 
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the region’s population and employment growth by 2041, leaving 25% for the less densely populated 
outer ring (Table 10).  
Table 10. Population and Employment Allocations for Inner and Outer Ring Regions of the 
Greater Golden Horseshoe (Ontario Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal (MPIR), 2006). 
 
 
 
 
Recognizing that more rural municipalities in the outer ring of the Golden Horseshoe may face 
unique challenges in the implementation of proposed density and intensification targets, the original 2006 
Plan permitted municipalities to request alternative targets. These exceptions pertain to General 
Intensification (s. 2.2.3.4) and Designated Greenfield Areas (s. 2.2.7.5): 
2.2.3.4 The Minister of Infrastructure may review and permit an alternative minimum 
intensification target for an upper- or single-tier municipality located within the outer ring to ensure the 
intensification target is appropriate given the size, location and capacity of built-up areas (Ontario 
Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal (MPIR), 2006). 
2.2.7.5 The Minister of Infrastructure may review and permit an alternative density target for an 
upper- or single-tier municipality that is located in the outer ring, and that does not have an urban 
growth centre, to ensure the density target is appropriate given the characteristics of the municipality and 
adjacent communities (Ontario Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal (MPIR), 2006). 
Updates through the 2017 Growth Plan established clearer requirements for requesting alternative 
intensification and density targets. These include undertaking a municipal comprehensive review that 
demonstrates that the request will meet a set of specific criteria. The process and criteria for seeking 
alternative intensification targets (Section 2.2.2.1) and interim targets (Section 2.2.2.2), for example, are 
provided in Sections 2.2.2.5 and 2.2.2.6 as follows:  
2.2.2.5 For upper- and single-tier municipalities, council may request an alternative to the target 
established in policy 2.2.2.2 through the next municipal comprehensive review where it is demonstrated 
that this target cannot be achieved and that the alternative target will: 
 
GGH REGION 
POPULATION EMPLOYMENT 
2031 2036 2041 2031 2036 2041 
Inner Ring 9,010 9,590 10,130 4,380 4,580 4,820 
Outer Ring 2,940 3,150 3,350 1,280 1,360 1,450 
TOTAL 11,950 12,740 13,480 5,650 5,930 6,270 
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a) maintain or improve on the minimum intensification target in the official plan that is 
approved and in effect; 
b) be appropriate given the size of the delineated built-up area; 
c) account for existing infrastructure, public service facilities, and capital planning; 
d) account for existing planning approvals and other related planning studies; 
e) consider the actual rate of intensification being achieved annually across the upper- or 
single-tier municipality; 
f) support diversification of the total range and mix of housing options in delineated built-up 
areas to the horizon of this Plan, while considering anticipated demand; 
g) account for lands where development is prohibited or severely restricted; and 
h) support the achievement of complete communities 
2.2.2.6 For upper- and single-tier municipalities in the outer ring, council may request an 
alternative to the target established in policy 2.2.2.1 through a municipal comprehensive review where it 
is demonstrated that target cannot be achieved and that the alternative target is appropriate given the 
criteria in policy 2.2.2.5.  
2.2.2.7 The Minister may permit an alternative to the target established in policies 2.2.2.1 and 
2.2.2.2. If council does not make a request or the Minister does not permit an alternative target, the 
targets established in policies 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2 will apply accordingly. 
Supporting Plans and Policies 
Following the adoption of the Growth Plan in 2006, the province announced a number of parallel 
initiatives to support municipalities’ implementation of the Plan. The Plan was strategically developed 
under the authority of the Ministry of Infrastructure rather than the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing to take advantage of the close ties between Growth Plan objectives and selective investment in 
municipal infrastructure. Accordingly, most parallel initiatives related to infrastructure development, 
including Building Together, a long term infrastructure plan (2011), the redistribution of provincial gas 
tax revenue to municipalities for investment in transit, the establishment of a regional transportation 
planning body called Metrolinx, and establishment of RENew Ontario which provided provincial funding 
investment for hospitals, schools, roads, bridges and water systems. 
Other provincial ministries have also adopted supportive initiatives. The Ministry of Environment 
amended its Regulation 153/04 under the Environment Protection Act in 2007 to facilitate intensification 
through redevelopment of brownfield sites. In 2008, the Ministry of the Environment adopted The Lake 
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Simcoe Protection Act (2008) and Plan (2009) to provide additional policy direction for development and 
water quality protection in one of the Greater Golden Horseshoe’s most vulnerable watersheds. A 
coordinated land use review to better integrate the Growth Plan, the Greenbelt Plan, the Oak Ridges 
Moraine Conservation Plan and the Niagara Escarpment Plan was also initiated in 2015, with new plans 
released in 2017 
Official Plan Conformity 
Municipalities implement the Growth Plan through a policy conformity exercise, whereby upper 
and single tier municipalities amend their Official Plans to bring them in line with the policies of the 
Growth Plan. In two-tiered municipalities, the upper-tier municipality distributes the provincial forecasted 
growth and intensification and density targets to the lower-tier municipalities.  Lower tier municipalities 
subsequently amend their Official Plans to conform to the upper tier Official Plans and accompanying 
growth, intensification and density requirements. 
In 2012, the Ontario Growth Secretariat (OGS), working under the Ministry of Infrastructure, 
released compliance rates for the Official Plan conformity exercise for single and upper tier 
municipalities. These rates revealed that by October 2012, all 19 municipalities with an Official Plan had 
amended their Plans to conform to the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe (MI, 2013, 
February 14). Two Counties without Official Plans, Dufferin and Northumberland, had instead completed 
growth management strategies to guide local implementation of the Growth Plan. At the time of the 
release, only seven of the 19 amended Official Plans were in effect, while the other 12 were under appeal 
either wholly or in part at the Ontario Municipal Board (MI, 2013, February 14). The Ontario Municipal 
Board (OMB) is an adjudicative tribunal that is operates independently of the provincial government. 
The Official Plan conformity exercise by lower tier municipalities has been significantly slower. 
At the time of the OGS’s 2012 compliance review, less than half of the lower tier municipalities had 
adopted an Official Plan amendment to conform to the Growth plan (MI, 2013, February 14).  
Municipal Administration 
Municipal implementation of the Growth Plan also involves actions and decisions by municipal 
planners and Council to support the policies within their amended Official Plan.  Key actions and 
decisions that influence how the Growth Plan is administered include: 
 Municipal councilors' decision-making and adherence to the Plan; 
 Municipal funding to support the Plan; 
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 Municipal planning staff's decision making and adherence to the Plan during the review of 
development applications; 
 Municipal planning staff’s development of policies, regulations and incentives that support 
the Plan; and 
 Generation and sharing of knowledge about the plan through relevant studies and 
communication with stakeholder. 
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Chapter 6. Case Study Results 
Reported obstacles to Growth Plan implementation varied widely between case study regions, 
from broad policy challenges such as a failure to align Official Plan Policies to the Growth Plan, to 
specific technical concerns such as anticipated difficulties in achieving density targets. While some 
obstacles were shared across the three regions, many reported obstacles were specific to the case study 
region’s unique administrative, political, demographic or economic context.   
This chapter describes the social-political context of each study region and the means by which 
the municipalities within each region have managed urban growth to date. Key challenges to Growth Plan 
implementation as reported by municipal planners and other interview respondents are described, as well 
as issues identified in media accounts, staff reports and municipal council meeting minutes. Obstacles to 
Growth Plan implementation and local context are compared to the model of 31 potential or expected 
barriers to implementation to demonstrate how each case study region faces a unique set of conditions and 
challenges to managing urban growth. Finally, the chapter examines specific planning examples to 
answer the question “how are the barriers across the case studies expressed, reinforced and perpetuated 
within their different planning and implementation environments?”.  
Waterloo 
The Waterloo Region is Ontario’s fourth largest urban region with an estimated 2011 population 
of 507,096 distributed across the three cities of Kitchener, Waterloo and Cambridge, and four townships 
(Table 11).  Regional government in Waterloo emerged in 1973 through a provincial municipal 
restructuring process that saw the transformation of many county systems to regional governments. 
Historically, manufacturing played a significant role in the growth and development of the Region, with 
Kitchener (formerly Berlin) known variously as the “furniture capital of Canada” and the “rubber capital 
of Canada”.  Although manufacturing continues to be a significant contributor to the local economy, the 
region has adapted to broader deindustrialization trends by emerging as a leader in the advanced 
technology sector. Growth in the ‘high tech’ sector has occurred largely as a result of a close partnership 
between the cities and the local educational institutions. The University of Waterloo, in particular, is 
credited for a good portion of the region’s economic success, as a consequence of its culture of “research 
commercialisation and academic spin-outs” which has helped to create new opportunities as 
manufacturing jobs declined (Gillmor, 2012; Leibovitz, 2003, p. 2919). As well, the University is the 
owner of a significant amount of property within the region, upon which it has developed innovation hubs 
to foster local business and start-up companies (Bramwell & Wolfe, 2008).   
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Table 11. Distribution of Population across Municipalities, Waterloo Region (Statistics Canada, 
2011). 
GEOGRAPHIC REGION 
MUNICIPAL 
TYPE 
POPULATION 
CONTRIBUTION 
TO REGION'S 
GROWTH 
2006 2011 
% 
CHANGE 
% 
Canada  31,612,897 33,476,688 5.9  
Ontario  12,160,282 12,851,821 5.7  
Waterloo Region  Region 478,121 507,096 6.1 100.0 
    Kitchener City 204,668 219,153 7.1 49.99 
    Cambridge City 120,371 126,748 5.3 22.01 
    Waterloo City 97,475 98,780 1.3 4.50 
    Woolwich Township 19,658 23,145 17.7 12.03 
    Wilmot Township 17,097 19,223 12.4 7.34 
    Wellesley Township 9,789 10,713 9.4 3.19 
    North Dumfries Township 9,063 9,334 3.0 0.94 
 
As is typical of most mid-sized Canadian communities, the cities of Kitchener, Cambridge and 
Waterloo, are decentralized and dispersed. Filion, Bunting and colleagues (Bunting & Filion, 1999; 
Bunting, Filion, Hoernig, Seasons, & Lederer, 2007; Filion, Hoernig, Bunting, & Sands, 2004) point to 
the suburbanization of manufacturing and other major employers, and a polycentric configuration as the 
main drivers of the region’s low density urban form.  Earlier decades saw the downtown cores of 
Kitchener, Waterloo and Cambridge experience significant population declines caused by the 
decentralization of residential and commercial growth (Filion et al., 2004). The loss or relocation of 
industrial employers from the downtown core helped contribute to the decay of the inner cities, 
particularly in downtown Kitchener. Additionally, the lack of a single urban core as a result of the close 
proximity of the three urban municipalities has made the region particularly susceptible to both the 
pressures of dispersion and inner city decline (Bunting & Filion, 1999; Bunting et al., 2007). Compared 
with larger metropolitan centres, mid-sized cities like Kitchener and Waterloo experienced most of their 
development during the automobile era and consequently low density development constitutes a 
significant proportion of their total urban form (Bunting et al., 2007). Finally, the construction of the 
Conestoga Parkway in the 1960s between Kitchener and Waterloo further accelerated their outward 
growth by improving access to peripheral locations.  
108 
 
Municipal fragmentation and local government policies have also been implicated with helping to 
contribute to the region’s urban sprawl. For example, The Regional Municipality of Waterloo, which sets 
policy direction for all lower tier city and township municipal governments, continues to encourage 
revitalization of the inner cities for each municipality rather focusing on a single central core (Bunting & 
Filion, 1999).  As a result, downtown revitalization efforts in Kitchener, the region’s largest urban centre, 
are challenged by competition for employment and retail in adjacent Uptown Waterloo (English, 2011; 
Millward, 2006), and nearby St. Jacobs (Millward, 2006).   
As a result of outward migration pressures, the region’s predominant urban form has been 
described as having “lower population densities, outward spreading of jobs, retailing and other activities, 
CBD decline, increased open space, a transportation system that is singularly dependent on auto use, and 
an overriding demand for residential settings deemed to be 'private' and 'rural-like'” (Bunting & Filion, 
1999, p. 268-269).  In 2011, the majority of housing stock in Waterloo Region consisted of single 
detached residences (57%), while apartments accounted for only 25% of the housing stock, followed by 
semi-detached dwellings and townhouses making up 18%  (Statistics Canada, 2012). The proportion of 
low density housing (single family homes) is greatest in the townships, where 80% of the housing stock is 
single detached residences. The polycentric configuration of the region’s urban areas has contributed to a 
strong dependency on automobile transportation, with car travel accounting for 88% of all modes of 
transportation to work. Transit ridership as a proportion of all trips is relatively low (5.4%) and dominated 
by a large student population (Statistics Canada, 2011). 
The region experienced steady population growth slightly above the provincial and national 
averages between 2006 and 2011 (Table 11). Although a majority of employers are located in the three 
cities, rate of population growth was higher in the surrounding townships. Township growth contributed 
to almost one quarter of the Region’s growth from 2006 until 2011 as households sought affordable 
housing at increasing distances from the main urban centres of Waterloo, Kitchener and Cambridge. The 
greatest proportion of growth was in Woolwich Township, which grew by 17.7% during the five year 
period. Like many municipalities in the outer ring of the Greater Golden Horseshoe, a significant 
proportion of the region’s growth is due to in-migration from the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area. 
Immigration also is a significant driver of growth for the Region – approximately one fifth of Waterloo 
Region residents are immigrants, making the Region the fifth highest in per capita immigrant population 
of all Canadian urban areas (Statistics Canada, 2006).  
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Regional Municipality of Waterloo Growth Management 
Initiatives 
The creation of Waterloo’s Regional government in 
the mid 1970s permitted the development of the first 
coordinated land use plan for the region as a whole. While 
early Regional land use planning adhered to conventional 
low density, suburban residential and commercial 
development, it also emphasized the preservation of natural 
areas through the identification and protection of 
environmentally sensitive areas. These novel efforts, initiated 
during 1970s through to the 1990s, helped to prevent 
development in environmental areas of high integrity 
(Eagles, 1981). 
The Regional Municipality was an early adopter of a 
growth management approach to guide urban planning. In 
1998, the Region incorporated a number of policies into its 
Official Plan to encourage contiguous rather than scattered 
development, including policies that designated City Urban 
Areas (CUA) and Township Urban Areas (TUA) as the 
primary locations for growth and development. In 2001, four 
years before the adoption of the Places to Grow Act, 
Regional Chair Ken Seiling, submitted a report to Regional 
Council titled "Smart Growth and the Region of Waterloo: Planning for Our Future" in which he argued 
for the need for a urban growth study. The study, to be conducted by the Planning and Works Committee, 
was to determine: 1) the existing and future development options in the Region of Waterloo, with 
particular attention to the east side lands under significant development pressures, and 2) current and 
future needs with respect to land, infrastructure, brownfield redevelopment, environmental protection and 
enhancement, and the protection of rural and agricultural lands (Seiling, 2011). The report called on the 
Region to develop a growth management strategy to improve planning for future development and 
servicing. Approval of the report by Regional Council set a new course for Regional planning that better 
accounted for the interdependencies between urban growth, protection of agriculture and natural areas and 
provision of municipal infrastructure. 
Box 1. Regional Growth 
Management Strategy 
Objectives 
 Establishment of a firm 
countryside line to limit urban 
sprawl, protect valuable  
agricultural lands, and maintain 
our rural character; 
 Intensification of the CTC, 
including the implementation of an 
LRT system, to leverage capital 
investment and support the 
revitalization of our downtown 
core areas; 
 Protection and preservation of our 
environmentally sensitive 
landscapes, including our moraine 
areas, which are vital to the 
integrity of our water resources; 
and 
 Development of new employment 
lands in the vicinity of Waterloo 
Regional Airport to help maintain 
and enhance the economic 
prosperity for which our 
community has long been 
recognized. 
(Source: Region of Waterloo, 2003) 
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One outcome of the Seiling report was Regional Council’s adoption of a Regional Growth 
Management Strategy in 2003. The Strategy reflected many of the same objectives as those included in 
the later Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, including the establishment of firm settlement 
area boundaries; encouragement of reurbanization, mixed use development and transit oriented 
development; expansion of transit and active transportation options; and protection of environmentally 
sensitive areas and agricultural lands. The Strategy also identified higher order transit as a priority for the 
achievement of growth management goals. Starting in 2004, the Region, with significant funding from the 
province, commenced a series of technical studies to explore transit options for the Waterloo Region. 
Light rail transit (LRT) was approved in 2009 by Regional Council as the preferred rapid transit 
technology, subject to funding. For most Regional planners interviewed, the LRT was considered to play 
a critical role in the Region’s plans for intensification. 
An updated Regional Official Plan that conformed to specific policies and targets of the Places to 
Grow Act and Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe was approved by Council in 2010. Council 
also approved a 2011-2014 Strategic Plan for the Region that identified environmental sustainability, 
growth management and prosperity, and sustainable transportation as three of the top five strategic 
objectives to guide the Region’s decision making.  
Regional planners interviewed for this research embraced the Regional Growth Management 
Strategy, with more than one planner noting that the Strategy served as a model for the Growth Plan for 
the Greater Golden Horseshoe. Expertise at the Regional level for the development of Growth 
Management policies was recognized by the province who seconded a Region of Waterloo senior planner 
to assist in the development of the province’s Growth Plan. A provincial planner from the Growth 
Secretariat interviewed for this research noted that “…the Region of Waterloo has really shown 
leadership in their Official Plan Conformity and all of the supporting documents. They've done a lot of 
urban density work, urban design guidelines – they're really focusing on that. And quality of place”.  
The Growth Management Strategy and the Regional Official Plan (ROP) feature a number of 
policies unique within the Greater Golden Horseshoe. First, the ROP mandates an intensification target of 
45% and a density target of 55%, making the Region of Waterloo the only upper tier municipality in the 
Greater Golden Horseshoe to set their targets higher than the minimum targets required by the Growth 
Plan1. Second, the ROP provides the policy framework for an Urban Growth Boundary called the 
“Countryside Line” to reinforce policy restrictions for the expansion of settlement boundaries set out in 
                                                     
1 In its Draft Official Plan, Region of Peel sets an initial intensification target of 40% but does plan to increase that 
target to 50% in 2026 (Allen & Campsie, 2013). 
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the Growth Plan. Developed through a Regional land budget exercise, the Countryside Line reduces 
formerly available greenfield land for suburban development by 1056 ha. Finally, the ROP clearly ties 
growth management objectives to the provision of municipal infrastructure, including water and waste 
water services and a rapid transit service to be implemented in 2017. The Plan directs the Region to 
prepare and implement a number of infrastructure master plans to support the ROP’s objectives, including 
a Wastewater Treatment Master Plan, a Long-Term Water Supply Strategy, a Water Efficiency Master 
Plan, a Transportation Master Plan, Transportation Corridor Design Implementation Guidelines, a 
Cycling Master Plan, and a Pedestrian Master Plan. 
To assist lower tier municipalities in achieving intensification targets, the Region assembled a 
“reurbanization toolbox” to provide information about the Regional policies, projects and tools to 
encourage intensification. A significant component of the toolbox is the Region-led coordination of 
intensification efforts through working groups such as the Brownfields Working Group, the Region of 
Waterloo Home Builders' Liaison Committee, the Reurbanization Community Advisory Panel, and the 
Reurbanization Working Group. These working groups, comprised of Regional staff, development 
industry representatives and community members, were considered by a number of staff to be critical in 
the successful implementation of the Growth Management Strategy. The Region has also adopted 
numerous incentive programs to encourage intensification, including a Brownfields Financial Incentive 
Program, Regional Development Charges Exemptions, and Tax Increment Grant Program. 
The Region garnered public and lower tier municipal support for the new growth management 
objectives through a number of outreach initiatives designed to appeal to communities’ environmental 
values and desire for local economic development. A growth management brochure produced by the 
Region presents the Growth Management strategy as a means to protect the environment and countryside, 
while developing attractive, vibrant downtowns that would attract investment. The Region also produced 
Community Building Strategy to model attractive, vibrant streetscapes and denser built forms within 
Urban Growth Areas under the new intensification framework.  
In 2011, the ROP in its entirety was appealed before the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) by a 
coalition of land development companies and builders, thus stalling its implementation. Under dispute 
was the method the Region of Waterloo used for the establishment of a land budget to meet the Growth 
Plan’s intensification targets (s. 2.2.3.1 and s. 2.2.7.2, respectively). The land budget formed the 
numerical basis and rationale for the dimensions of the urban growth boundary – the Countryside Line – 
which excluded a portion of the developers’ properties for new development over the duration of the Plan. 
The OMB ruled in favour of the developers’ alternative methodology for calculating the amount of land 
required to accommodate the projected population growth which used past development trends to project 
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future needs (Stefanko & Sniezek, Jan 21, 2013). As a consequence of the ruling, the urban growth 
boundary was broadened to include 1,053 hectares for additional development, up from 85 hectares as set 
out in the ROP (Pender, 2013). Of particular contention in the land budget debate was the issue of future 
housing needs for seniors and whether or not seniors could be expected to age in place, as argued by the 
developers, or to transition out of single family homes and into more compact housing, thus freeing up 
single family housing for young families, as argued by the Region. The Region requested that the OMB 
reconsider its decision and appealed the decision to Divisional Court.  In 2015, the OMB approved a 
settlement negotiated between the Region and appellants that designated 255 ha of the 1,053 ha under 
dispute for urban development, with an additional 200 hectares of land to be later designated to meet 
revised provincial growth forecasts. Also negotiated in the settlement was an agreement to support the 
Region’s land budget methodology for future greenfield calculations (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Negotiated Settlement between Region of Waterloo and Appellants Showing Lands 
Proposed for Urban Expansion (Region of Waterloo, 2015). 
  
113 
 
Kitchener, Waterloo and Cambridge Growth 
Management Initiatives 
Early planning projects carried out by Waterloo 
Region’s lower tier urban municipalities focused on 
revitalization of inner city cores. All three cities embraced 
the development of downtown suburban style malls in the 
1960s and 70s as a tool to revitalize the downtowns. 
Downtown malls were intended to compete with the draw of 
large retail malls located at the urban periphery and to entice 
people and retail activities back to the downtown core, but 
without exception, the malls failed to achieve their 
commercial and planning objectives (Bunting et al. 2007; 
English, 2011). Originally intended to reinvigorate 
downtowns, downtown malls became a physical and 
financial obstacle to downtown development (Filion & 
Hammond, 2009). 
The lower tier municipalities of Kitchener, Waterloo 
and Cambridge have adopted a number of local strategies to manage urban growth in support of the 
Region’s growth management policy framework. In 2007, Kitchener revised its subdivision development 
approvals process to include neighbourhood design guidelines that promoted development forms better 
oriented to transit and active transportation. Two years later, Kitchener adopted its own Growth 
Management Strategy to form the basis for updates to its Official Plan. A significant outcome of the 
Kitchener Growth Management Strategy was a detailed Growth Management Plan in which the staging of 
development process was revised to incorporate not just infrastructure requirements, but also broader 
growth management goals and priorities (Box 2).  
Through its Growth Management Plan, Kitchener also committed to monitoring growth 
management activities and produced an annual Growth Management Monitoring Report. The results of 
the yearly review inform changes to the Growth Management Plan which is revised on a biannual basis. A 
summary of the Plan’s implementation for 2011 indicated that the density of Kitchener’s Urban Growth 
Centre had increased from 120 residents and jobs per hectare (RJs/ha) in 2001 to 131 RJs/ha in 2008 to 
151 RJs/ha in 2010 (City of Kitchener, 2011). The monitoring plan also identifies services and planning 
instruments, such as Infrastructure capacity, and zoning bylaws that are incompatible with the goals of the 
plan and outlines actions to address the deficiencies. 
Box. 2. City of Kitchener 
Growth Management 
Strategy Goals 
Goal 1: Enhance our Valued Natural 
and Cultural Heritage Resources  
Goal 2: Create Vibrant Urban Places, 
building communities where people 
want to live, invest and be creative  
Goal 3: Ensure Greater 
Transportation Choice  
Goal 4: Strengthen Communities 
improving the social, cultural and 
recreational network  
Goal 5: Foster a Strong Economy  
Goal 6: Manage Change in an 
Effective and Coordinated Manner 
(Source: City of Kitchener, 2009) 
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In addition to a Growth Management Plan, Kitchener has also adopted a number of innovative 
approaches to encourage intensification, including a development charge system that provides a truer cost 
accounting for suburban development. Development charges for suburban residential developments in 
Kitchener are as much as 74% more than development fees for central neighbourhoods while the 
differential for non-residential suburban development is even higher at 157% (Thompson, 2013). 
Although the City of Waterloo has not conducted a comprehensive Growth Management 
Strategy, it has initiated a number of projects since the early 2000s that have contributed to an 
overarching policy direction for intensification. Constrained by a shortage of greenfield, the City carried 
out a Height and Density Policy Study (City of Waterloo, 2002) and corresponding Official Plan 
Amendment (OPA #54) to identify intensification priorities for nodes and corridors. To support 
intensification, a Core Area Infrastructure Assessment study carried out in 2011 identified potential water, 
wastewater, stormwater, and transportation servicing constraints and areas for strategic capital spending 
(Stantec Consulting Ltd., 2011). Building on these studies, the City’s updated Official Plan directs high 
and medium density development to locate around transit corridor and nodes, pedestrian-oriented design 
guidelines, and the development of complete communities including encouraging the location of key 
services and retail in neighbourhoods to minimize travel (City of Waterloo, 2012). As well, the City 
adopted a Community Improvement Plan, Official Plan amendments and design guidelines for the 
residential student community surrounding the Universities to guide the transformation of the former low 
density residential area to a higher density, mixed use student community.   
The City of Cambridge retained a consulting firm to develop its Growth Management Strategy in 
2009 (Hemson Consulting Ltd., 2009). This strategy forms a key part of the City’s new Official Plan, 
which was adopted in 2012 to conform to the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe (City of 
Cambridge, 2012). The City’s growth management activities emphasize revitalization of the core areas in 
its 3 village centres and the encouragement of high quality urban environments through a Heritage 
Masterplan, streetscaping and urban design guidelines. Facing a historically strong market for suburban 
style development and challenges associated with downtown decay, the City has focused on downtown 
revitalization as a critical first step maximizing intensification opportunities. 
Township Growth Management Initiatives 
Prior to the Growth Plan’s release in 2006, few of the Region’s four townships had undertaken 
planning initiatives to manage growth. While some townships had carried out growth studies, such as 
Woolwich Township’s Growth Strategy and Master Servicing Study for the developing villages of Elmira 
and St. Jacobs (Township of Woolwich, 1993), the primary purpose of these plans were to ensure the 
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orderly staging of development in greenfield areas rather than to plan for growth through compact, transit 
supportive and mixed use development.   
By 2014, as much as four years after the adoption of the Regional Official Plan and eight years 
after the release of the provincial Growth Plan, none of the four regional townships had completed a full 
review or amendment to bring their Official Plans into alignment with the higher level plans. In planning 
reports to their local Councils, at least two municipalities cite the flux in provincial planning and the 
Regional Official Plan appeals as the reason for the delay in carrying out the conformance exercise. 
Planning capacity, however, may be a more significant reason for the townships’ failure to adapt local 
Official Plans to the Growth Plan, with most townships employing only a single full time planning staff 
person. In the fall of 2012, the Township of Wellesley sought interim planning assistance from the 
Region of Waterloo to assist in the amendment of its Official Plan to bring it into conformance with the 
ROP and Growth Plan. A similar request for interim planning assistance was submitted by North 
Dumfries in February of 2013. A report to Council outlining the request from Wellesley noted that in the 
past the Region had frequently embarked on planning assistance for the townships.  
Barriers to Growth Management in the Waterloo Region 
 Waterloo media reports, planning documents and interview respondents identified 18 unique 
barriers to growth management implementation (Appendix C; Figure 7) - fewer than those reported for 
Simcoe (27) or Peterborough (23). Of the 18 barriers, the barrier referred to as “unsupportive OMB 
rulings” was not identified in the original model of expected barriers. The challenge associated with 
unsupportive OMB rulings pertained to the decision by the OMB to uphold development industry 
interests in an appeal of the Regional Official Plan. Unique physical conditions as they related to planning 
constraints associated with the region’s polycentric configuration, environmental features and land 
availability that challenged the achievement of density and intensification targets were also identified. 
These physical conditions were interpreted as part of the community’s local context. 
Barriers reported by at least 10% of interview and document sources in the Waterloo study region 
are presented in Table 12 and a relational model of these barriers is presented in Figure 7. A total of eight 
key barriers were identified, ranging from societal scale barriers such as consumer preferences, to artifacts 
such as local plans and policies. Lack of commitment to growth management objectives by the 
development industry was most frequently reported, followed by consumer preferences for low density 
suburban form. Unsupportive rulings by the Ontario Municipal Board was found to link directly back to 
the development industry’s lack of commitment to growth management, and served to reinforce the 
existing built form. NIMBY, auto dependency, development industry experience, and unsupportive 
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engineering and planning standards were frequently described barriers that were found to further reinforce 
the existing built form. The physical aspects of the local context were found to present a number of 
technical challenges to municipal planning efforts.  
An additional barrier – high cost and complexity to retrofit the existing built form - was identified 
as a key barrier even though it was not described in 10% of the data sources.  The barrier was identified 
through a critical evaluation of the local contextual and historical information, which revealed that it 
served as an intermediary barrier through which developers’ insufficient experience or knowledge to 
build alternatives reinforced the region’s prevailing low density built form. A critical review of the local 
development industry discourse also revealed that developers demonstrated a high level of concern and 
avoidance of infill projects that may result in NIMBY-related political action, which they felt would lead 
to increased project cost, duration and complexity. This additional barrier is included in model presented 
in Figure 7. 
Table 12. Waterloo Case Study Area: Key Barriers to Growth Plan Implementation. 
BARRIER TYPE BARRIER 
A Local Plans and Policies Unsupportive engineering and planning standards/policies 
A Built environment High cost and complexity to retrofit existing low density built form 
A 
Federal and Provincial Plans and 
Policies 
OMB rulings inconsistent with Growth Plan objectives 
P Characteristics of Developers Development industry not committed to growth management objectives 
P Characteristics of Developers Insufficient experience or knowledge to build alternatives 
S Consumer Preferences Preference for low density suburban form 
S 
Property Ownership and Rights 
Advocacy 
Presence of strong NIMBY lobbying against infill and intensification 
S Consumer Preferences Auto dependency  and absence of alternative travel options 
 Local Context Unique physical conditions (e.g. polycentricity) challenge intensification 
A: Artifact; P: Planning Environment; S: Societal Environment 
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Figure 7. Waterloo Case Study Area: Model of Key Barriers to Growth Plan Implementation. Bold text indicates key barriers identified in interviews 
and planning/media documents. Arrows denote positive or reinforcing relationship. 
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Model of Barriers to Growth Management for Waterloo 
The Waterloo model of barriers to growth management was found to emphasize a network of 
obstacles associated with the Waterloo’s land and property market institution. This network was 
characterized by disparate objectives between planning agencies, the development industry and 
consumers. Interview respondents, media accounts and planning documents described the local planning 
context as dominated by consumers with a strong preference for suburban development and a reluctance 
of developers to provide alternative urban forms. Reinforced at the societal environment, planning 
environment and artifact scales, these barriers challenge local and regional efforts to create the market 
conditions necessary to encourage desirable intensification projects and constrain growth at the urban 
peripheries. 
Characteristics of Developers/Development Industry 
Development industry characteristics comprised the most frequently reported theme obstructing 
municipal planners’ efforts to manage growth in the Waterloo study region. Key characteristics included a 
limited commitment by many developers to growth management objectives and a lack of knowledge and 
experience related to redevelopment and infill projects.  
A number of interview respondents recognized the challenges to growth management presented 
by development industry as stemming from a broader, self-reinforcing land and property market system. 
One planner described this system as fueled by a network of private firms and individuals that share in the 
economic returns of greenfield development: 
“I think that the one challenge we have, the one obstacle is just our whole system of land 
economics, the way it is now. There's a huge growth industry or development industry that is 
continuously trying to bring land on stream -- greenfield development -- and the system 
promotes greenfield development because it's cheaper to develop land in the countryside 
than to redevelop land in the City. There's no public opposition to speak of, there are no 
neighbours to complain, there's no contaminated sites, there's no 
intensification/redevelopment issues. It's just greenfield, [a] fairly simple type of 
development. You've got, in most cases, willing farmers and landowners who are willing to 
sell their land and you've got a profit for quite a bit of money, actually. You've got 
developers willing to buy it…” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
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While the imperfection of the land and property market system was a common obstacle described 
by participants from all case study regions, Waterloo planners specifically emphasized supply side 
challenges as a significant barrier to achieving transit-supportive and mixed use urban forms. Planners 
from the Cities of Kitchener and Cambridge reported that, despite significant public investment to incent 
downtown development such as infill, local developers continued to be reluctant to take on reurbanization 
projects, brownfields and even higher density developments in more suburban locations. Local developers 
were described as either unwilling or lacking the capacity to tackle significant infill projects, resulting in 
the need for planners to actively “sell” reurbanization projects to development firms from larger urban 
centres such as Toronto. This experience was echoed by a consulting planner and member of the 
Waterloo Chapter of the Ontario Homebuilders Association:  
“The Homebuilders [Association] are trying to drive home to our builder members that they 
really should be looking at [reurbanization opportunities], even trying to float opportunities 
out in front of them: "ok, you don't have a lot of inventory…you might want to look at this 
redevelopment opportunity". And I'm telling you, there is a lot of resistance. When you've 
been doing the same thing fairly successfully for 20 years, you get this extreme reticence 
about taking on anything different. It's scary to these guys and if we're not seeing uptake 
from the local industry, my only option as a proactive individual is to go to people in the 
GTA, Oakville, Burlington, Hamilton, London, developers who have successfully done 
reurbanization and start to bring opportunities to them. And frankly I think that's the way it's 
going to go. I really do” (Consulting Planner and Ontario Homebuilder Association 
member).  
Development industry representatives further reported a reluctance to undertake reurbanization or 
infill projects because they were more politically contentious and could lead to a complex public and 
political process that increased the costs and timing of a development. High cost and complexity was 
directly and positively associated with absence of supportive Official Plans and zoning bylaws, NIMBY 
political advocacy, which could delay or threaten planning approvals. One home builder association 
member summarized this perspective in his statement,  
“You know, I'd rather deal with staff on all of those niceties of urban design through a 
process that I understand and can control. Because when it's in the public realm, there's no 
control” (Consulting Planner and Ontario Homebuilder Association member). 
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Limited greenfield land supply was identified by planners as an important factor in the 
developers’ willingness to undertake reurbanization projects. Planners in the City of Waterloo, where 
designated greenfield lands were nearly exhausted, felt that their limited land supply was a catalyst for the 
City’s early adoption of strategies to promote infill and compact growth and developers’ willingness to 
initiate reurbanization projects. However, for other communities where greenfield lands were abundant 
and land prices were on average lower, municipal planners felt that developers had little incentive to build 
more efficient, compact urban forms: 
“All of the zoning provisions, approvals processes, financial incentives that municipalities 
can provide, really where it's going to be effective for the most part, is where land prices are 
high. And we're not in that position in [this city]. Land prices are still quite reasonable, 
relatively speaking.  And so, there's still interest in developing single detached, semidetached 
houses. Yes, there is more of an uptake for townhouses and different types of housing, but 
we're still not fully evolved to getting to the point where the demand is there and high land 
prices are really forcing those issues for good design and innovation” (Planner, Lower tier 
municipality). 
Some planners noted that in a number of cases, the developers of reurbanization projects lacked 
the incentive to adopt a high standard for urban design, which in turn reduced consumer demand for these 
types of projects. This was particularly a problem of builders “who want to put up the brick and the 
mortar and get out as quickly as they can” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). High quality design was 
considered critical for the success of redevelopment projects, both as a means to overcome consumer 
resistance to downtown living, and also to showcase high quality redevelopment for others in the 
development industry. Poor urban design combined with a failure of the development industry to innovate 
was identified by planners as a key reason for consumer rejection of higher density urban forms. Such 
developments, some respondents argued, may have increased the density of the downtown in the short 
term, but actually decreased livability and choice in the long term:  
“…In our area [an important obstacle confronting growth management] really was a lack of 
choice. We had apartments. I don’t know if you’re familiar with this area, but the apartments 
that were built up until about 7 years ago - they were built I guess in the 70s and 80s - and 
they really weren’t desirable tenure for more affluent people or people that have families” 
(Planner, Upper tier municipality).  
“So, I think the lesson we learned is smart growth is more than just putting bodies in urban 
areas. It has to be done right, so you have to design the buildings right and…certainly the 
121 
 
role that the City can play, the City has to play a much stronger role in terms of what we 
think is an acceptable redevelopment. Otherwise if you just build a whole series of these 
[poorly designed apartments], you add people but you don't actually make the area seem 
more desirable or any more livable, which counteracts exactly what you're trying to do with 
smart growth” (Planner, Lower tier municipality). 
The importance of careful design was echoed by a member of the Waterloo chapter of the Ontario 
Homebuilder Association, who identified a mismatch between the forms of housing being built with the 
needs and preferences of an aging population: 
“I don't believe that we as builders are necessarily building the right product to entice those 
people and give them a viable alternative to the single family home. So I think that’s the 
challenge that's before us, and we've been working with the Region pretty closely on this, 
and the question is: "are people going to age in place or are they not?" If they are not, what 
kind of housing form do they want to move to? And that I don't think has been adequately 
answered” (Consulting Planner and Ontario Homebuilder Association member). 
Local Plans and Policies 
While development industry respondents conceded that there was some resistance by builders to 
build compact forms and infill development projects stemming from a lack of organizational capacity and 
experience, they pointed to municipal policies as a challenge to achieve well designed, compact urban 
forms. Outdated or inflexible municipal policies, such as transportation and parking policies, for example, 
increased costs, delays, and sometimes prevented a project from being brought to market. Speaking 
generally about new urbanism projects in the Greater Golden Horseshoe, one developer noted: 
“Well, I'd like to think that we were probably the first developer in southern Ontario who 
employed New Urbanism, without going to Duany and all those other guys. We embraced 
true communities. And people loved it… we had rear lane garages which was a very common 
grid pattern in some of these older communities. Look at Rosedale, Leaside, the Beach, those 
communities have those kinds of things. It wasn't rocket science. What was rocket science 
was trying to tell the public works officials and all those other people that you didn't need to 
have a 20 m right of way. You could get away with a 12 m right of way, and on street 
parking” (Private developer).  
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Another developer noted that inconsistencies between municipal planning and engineering staff 
and the lack of authority of planning policies over other standards created significant challenges when 
attempting to build more compact forms: 
“So what we’re finding is that the whole machinery of land use approvals is still a bit mixed 
up. The works people don’t agree with the planners – works people want too many cars, too 
many parking spaces, roads that are too wide – just standards, standards, standards. Any 
they can’t be flexible. The planners sometimes want to go somewhere with a new idea but 
they don’t have enough authority within the municipality to make it happen. So you start 
down the road with them, and you get into the commenting, and they disappear and you’re 
left with the engineers. We’re finding a real problem there” (Private developer). 
 A number of Waterloo area planners agreed that some work remained to bring all relevant 
municipal policies and standards into conformance with growth management objectives. As one 
respondent noted: 
“It's like telling people to quit smoking but then you're still handing out free cigarettes. Our 
policies are a little bit like that. When we're developing areas, there's requirements on 
having a garage and the size of your driveway. Apartment buildings – there are very specific 
requirements on how much parking you have to provide. Shopping malls, it's the same thing. 
And I'm talking a lot about parking. There are other examples aside from that” (Planner, 
Upper tier municipality). 
Waterloo planners described a number of municipal initiatives focused on helping mitigate the 
pressures from private firms for prevailing urban forms, including regulatory measures such as zoning 
and urban design requirements. Both upper and lower tier planners also cited incentive programs as 
important tools to assist them in encouraging types of development that conform to Growth Plan policies. 
The Region of Waterloo, in particular, undertook a reorganization of the Planning Department into 
Reurbanization and Greenfield development branches to permit staff to specialize in these areas and 
develop working relationships with key market players. Moreover, the Region established various 
facilitation groups, such as the reurbanization working group and a Home Builders' Liaison Committee, 
comprising key stakeholders in the reurbanization process to foster dialog between municipal government 
and developers regarding the challenges to infill development.  
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Inter-organization Relations: Vertical Inconsistency 
The role of the OMB in reinforcing development industry interests was identified as a key barrier 
by municipal planners, elected officials and interest groups in the months following the 2013 OMB 
decision that failed to support the Region’s Official Plan growth management framework. 
The OMB ruling in favour of expanding the amount of developable land by over 1000 ha posed 
significant challenges to the Region in its efforts to establish a planning framework supportive of compact 
growth. First, with an OMB ruling that supported policy development based on past trends rather than the 
goals and targets of the Growth Plan, municipal capacity to plan for future development that differs from 
urban forms and patterns of the past was diminished. In particular, the reliance on trend data in the 
calculation of land budgets to accommodate future development presents significant challenges when the 
achievement of planning goals requires a shift in behaviour. This contradiction was noted in an open letter 
published by a consortium of urban planning academics from the University of Waterloo shortly after 
release of the OMB decision:  
“We reject the idea that our future housing (or transportation, water, or any other publically 
provided goods) needs are to be based primarily upon past trends. Trends in demand are 
shaped by the perceived choice set and the quality of alternatives for consumers. Planners 
do, and should, make choices to shape that choice set of commodities – especially housing – 
in order to achieve agreed-upon goals for how, where, and when an urban landscape should 
evolve. In fact, the very goal of Planning is to understand (through much public input) what 
the future community should be, not what it will be without any action. With this 
understanding, planners (and engineers, politicians and society as a whole) take steps to 
bring about change so the community can realize its goals” (Casello et al., 2013).  
Second, increasing the amount of developable land, as permitted by the OMB decision, would 
serve to hamper the Region’s efforts to meet the Growth Plan’s intensification targets. Restriction of land 
supply through the use of urban growth boundaries can encourage developers to take on infill 
development projects and has been shown to be correlated with increased development densities (Yin & 
Sun, 2007) and a reduction in the rate of urban expansion (Howell-Moroney, 2007; Paulsen, 2013). 
Accordingly, Regional planning staff identified the urban growth boundary as an integral component of 
their overall growth management plan. As one Regional planner stated, “unless you can stop sprawl and 
prevent that continual outward expansion into the countryside, you're never going to get the conditions 
needed for redevelopment and intensification to promote smart growth.”  
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Third, the OMB ruling challenged the Growth Plan’s key objective to effect change in Southern 
Ontario’s urban form by questioning the outputs required over the Plan’s time horizon. The ruling 
concluded that municipalities were only obligated to plan for Growth Plan density targets, but did not 
need to actually achieve these targets over the Growth Plan’s time horizon. In defence of its decision, the 
OMB cited the wording in Section 2.2.7.2 of the Growth Plan which states that density target “will be 
planned to be achieved” but for which no specific date for completion was identified. Using this 
interpretation of the Growth Plan planning horizon, the Board failed to find fault in the developers’ land 
budget methodology, which relied largely on the development of apartments to achieve required densities, 
but which would not be fully built within the planning time frame of the Growth Plan (Stefanko & 
Sniezek, Jan 21, 2013).  
Reliance on apartment buildings to achieve density requirements may ultimately result in lower 
than expected densities due to possibility that the high density developments may never be developed. 
This problem was described by one interview respondent, who noted that in the past, builders had been 
reluctant to construct the higher density portion of their approved developments:  
“You know, if you look back historically on plans of subdivision that have been approved 
over the past 20 years, you're going to see these blocks of land that are undeveloped in 
those. Those are the high density sites. As developers, we were hammered over the head 
saying "That's ok, we'll approve all these singles, but boy you put a highrise site there". We 
call them orphaned apartment sites because everything else developed except that. Why? 
Because there was no market for it” (Consulting Planner and Homebuilder Association 
member). 
Critics of the OMB’s interpretation of the Growth Plan’s planning horizon argued that not only 
did it undermine the Region’s and area municipalities’ efforts to achieve Growth Plan density targets, it 
contradicted the intent of the plan as set out in Section 1.4 that the “…Plan informs decision-making 
regarding growth management in the GGH. It contains a set of policies for managing growth and 
development to the year 2031. While certain policies have specific target dates, the goals and policies of 
this Plan are intended to be achieved within the life of this Plan” (MPIR, 2006). In support of this 
critique, the province of Ontario indicated that it would defend the Region’s position in an appeal of the 
decision to the Ontario Divisional Court (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2013; Pender, 2013).  
In an effort to avoid the uncertainty of the appeal process, the Region and the appellants reached a 
compromise on the amount of lands planned for urban expansion and the appellants agreed to accept the 
Region’s land budgeting methodology going forward. The negotiated settlement between the Region and 
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appellants may represent a growing willingness by local developers to work within a new land use 
planning framework, but it did not alter fundamental challenges presented by OMB and its interpretation 
of the Growth Plan planning horizon and land budgeting.  
More recently, the Ontario government has responded to calls for OMB reform by proposing 
legislation (Bill 139) that would see the replacement of the OMB with a new tribunal and process that 
gives greater weight to local municipal decision making. Bill 139 would limit the use of “de novo” 
hearings and restrict the tribunal’s authority to overturn the decisions of a municipal council. The tribunal 
would no longer have the authority to decide whether a municipal decision represents, in its view, the best 
planning approach, and rather would be limited to deciding whether that municipal decision is one of a 
range of approaches that are consistent with local and provincial policy. Appeals could only be made on 
basis that the municipal decision did not conform to provincial policies or local plans. Bill 139 would also 
prohibit appeals of provincial approvals of official plans and official plan updates. If enacted, the bill may 
help prevent future appeals of plans, like the Regional Official Plan, that are approved by the province. 
However, with the negotiated settlement between the Region and the appellants already in effect, the bill 
will have no impact on the rural lands now planned for urban expansion. 
Consumer Preferences and Property Ownership and Rights Advocacy 
Municipal planners and developers identified consumer behaviours and preferences as another 
important obstacle to growth management in the Waterloo study area.  Most respondents recognized the 
mutually reinforcing relationships between consumer preference for low density suburban form and 
NIMBY, auto dependency, and a lack of alternative transportation and housing options. Development 
industry respondents pointed to a prevailing preference for suburban style housing as the primary reason 
for their industry’s reluctance to adopt infill and more compact residential development projects:  
“We're very responsive to our customers so if somebody says to us "Here's what I want", 
we'll try to find a way to do it. Unfortunately today, here's what they're saying "I want a 
bungalow on a 60 ft lot… that’s where we've got the disconnect. Between policy and delivery 
of product on the ground. And I don't think that's necessarily ever going to go away. I 
understand where the bureaucrats are coming from and a lot of the salient ideas behind 
smart growth and the growth plan are good, but no one has really gotten down to the brass 
tacks of  how we educate the consumer. Because that’s what drives us.” (Consulting Planner 
and Homebuilder Association member). 
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Auto dependency was identified by many Waterloo planners as a significant factor that reinforced 
consumer preferences for low density development. Planners noted the influence of transportation on land 
and property markets and pointed to the past imbalances in federal and provincial investment that 
favoured car-oriented transportation infrastructure compared with other modes of transportation. While 
planners identified municipal efforts to reduce auto dependency, including a significant investment in 
Rapid Transit and public awareness campaigns (e.g. Central Transit Corridor Community building 
strategy), most recognized that a shift in investments and market pricing would be required to 
fundamentally shift behaviours and preferences:  
“I'm not sure how you can address that through policies but as long as people have access to 
cars and it's cheap to drive, fuel is cheap and you have a federal/provincial government that 
just recently bailed out the auto industry - as long as you have a system that continues to 
promote automobile use over other alternatives, like transit, people will always have any 
easy way to get around and as long as you have those conditions, it's really difficult to 
integrate transportation and landuse planning because it doesn't matter where you build 
things because people can just hop in the car and get there” (Planner, Upper tier 
municipality).  
“Money and convenience tend to be the most important in terms of impacting peoples' way 
of life. So until it costs them more to live a suburban life than it would an urban life, they are 
less likely to consider a smart growth kind of lifestyle... To me a critical part of smart growth 
would be looking at the highway system. We keep expanding our highway systems and 
making them bigger and bigger, which all we're doing is making it more convenient for a 
suburban lifestyle. If it was expected that in Waterloo Region that you're going to sit on the 
highways for an extended period of time, you're going to be more likely to consider other 
options” (Planner, Lower tier municipality).  
Public opposition to infill development, fuelled in part by a preference for the low density urban 
forms, was described by municipal planners across all three study regions as a significant challenge to 
implementing the Growth and specifically the Plan’s intensification targets. Waterloo planners described 
public education and awareness building as comprising an important part of their work to implement 
Growth Plan policies. Both the Region of Waterloo and the City of Cambridge, for example, developed 
visualization materials to strengthen community understanding of the implications of higher densities. 
Despite public awareness campaigns, however, Waterloo planners communicated their frustration 
regarding ongoing public opposition to urban intensification policies: 
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“…We have policies in place, we have….the City of Waterloo – they have a height and 
density study or Official Plan Amendment that was put in place, so it's gone through 
Council, it's gone through a public process, that says that 25 stories can go in certain core 
areas, and yet when an actual project comes on stream, you still have the public coming out 
and saying "we don't want 25 stories". Even though it's almost a right, now, because it's part 
of the Official Plan. So NIMBYism continues to be an issue” (Planner, Upper tier 
municipality). 
Developers also identified NIMBY as one of the largest barriers to their adoption of 
intensification projects. While acknowledging the value of municipal incentive programs, one developer 
identified the potential for public opposition as having a more significant influence on their undertaking 
of infill projects. NIMBY-based political lobbying was described as adding uncertainty expense and time 
to the development process. In this context, unsupportive local plans and policies served to reinforce 
avoidance of infill and intensification style development by providing opportunities for property owners 
to appeal to Council. Out of date zoning bylaws that failed to reinforce the direction provided in the 
Official Plan, for example, could require a developer to seek a bylaw amendment which in turn could 
open a project to an expensive and politically risky public process:  
“You know you have to start creating those environments like Waterloo did very 
successfully, I think… And that's what I've been saying to all these municipalities, I've been 
saying ‘never mind your stupid financial incentives that you stew over about giving the 
industry development charge exemptions or brownfield incentives, forget about the money , 
create a policy environment’… If they're serious about this stuff…do like Waterloo did, put 
the policy in place first so that I don't have to take the risk of going to the public on it.” 
(Consulting Planner and Ontario Homebuilder Association member).  
Local Context: Polycentricity 
 Although not described by interview respondents, a number of planning studies reported the multi-
nodal nature of the Waterloo Region as presenting a significant challenge for managing growth (Bunting 
& Filion, 1999; Bunting et al., 2007). In contrast to Simcoe and Peterborough in which most urban areas 
are physically isolated from one another, the Waterloo Region’s three urban areas form a large contiguous 
urban community. Despite the presence of a strong regional government, local planning for the 
intensification and growth of these distinct but contiguous urban communities was described as 
introducing horizontal inconsistency, which in turn created a complex and sometimes counterproductive 
development environment. Retrofitting the low density, polycentric urban region to accommodate higher 
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order transit and reduce auto dependency has required a high level of investment and intervention from 
the Region (Casello, 2015; Windsheimer, 2007).  
The presence of three independent, small to medium sized urban areas was also found to help 
perpetuate the desire of each community to retain its small town character and reinforce opposition to 
intensification and transit investment. Economic development promotional materials and pledges by 
elected officials, for example, revealed that each city self-identified as a city with a small town feel and 
big city amenities (e.g. Top 10 Reasons to Live in Waterloo Region, City of Kitchener website,  2015). 
The focus by individual communities on maintaining a “small town feel” has helped to de-emphasize 
regional scale planning issues, creating challenges for coordinated management of growth (Urban 
Strategies Inc, 2001, Pembina Institute, 2007): 
“The Region of Waterloo is torn between the desire to be a small community and the 
economic reality of the urban region. There is a need to plan for one urban area, however, 
current plans are for three cities of 100,000 population per city. In reality, the Waterloo 
Region constitutes one large city of close to 500,000 people. A major effort is required to 
educate a community that still thinks of itself as a small city with a population of 100,000 
(Urban Strategies Inc, 2001).  
While acknowledging the presence of a high level of coordination and cooperation between the 
Region and area municipalities, some Waterloo area planners noted the existence of different visions for 
growth management implementation between Regional and Area Municipal Councils. As one Regional 
planner described:  
“I would have to say that this Region has been quite accepting [of the Growth Plan].…there 
are times when, if you talk to the development industry…there are still some concerns 
because at the Area Municipal level, when they take a development application for approval 
to the Council, they're still worried that something is going to go sideways. That one of the 
residents is going to capture the ear of the politician and cause them to pause or have 
doubt” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
Summary 
The Waterloo case study demonstrated a conflicted planning environment in which planners, 
developers and the public presented different viewpoints regarding the optimal built form and how future 
growth should be managed. Unique to the region was a strong institutional logic shared by regional and 
most local planning agencies that favoured growth management objectives and the development of 
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stringent regional policies to manage growth. Despite significant efforts to create a supportive policy 
framework for growth management, the Region faced significant push back from key players in the 
development industry who were supported by an OMB decision that conflicted with the Growth Plan 
goals and objectives. Further reinforcing the local development industry’s preference for lower density, 
greenfield development was consumer demand for suburban development driven by preferences and auto 
dependency, NIMBY, higher cost and complexity to retrofit low density urban areas and a lack of 
experience by local development industry professionals to build more compact forms. The polycentric 
design of the region also played a role in creating technical challenges for planners in terms of 
coordinating and planning for intensification, although the impact of these technical barriers were 
tempered by a regional and local planning agencies’ general support for growth management principles 
and a capacity to seek creative solutions. 
Simcoe 
Located north of Toronto and the Oak Ridges Moraine, Simcoe County and the separate Cities of 
Barrie and Orillia together comprise what is described in this research as the Simcoe case study area. 
While comparable to the Waterloo region in population size (443,911 in 2011), Simcoe’s population is 
more widely dispersed with almost one third of the population located within Barrie, the region’s main 
urban centre. The remaining two thirds are distributed across the 100 small towns and villages that 
comprise the City of Orillia and 16 town and township municipalities (Table 13). Unlike regional 
governments found in Waterloo Region and other more urban regions of the province, Simcoe possesses a 
county-city governance system in which municipal affairs are administered independently by county and 
city municipalities. The Cities of Barrie and Orillia are single tier municipalities which govern their own 
affairs, while Simcoe County provides a range of municipal services for 16 lower tier town and township 
municipalities, including social services, waste management, County roads, and more recently, land use 
policy planning.  Lower tier municipalities in the County are each responsible for providing water, waste 
water and development services. 
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Table 13. Distribution of Population across Municipalities, Simcoe Case Study Area (Statistics 
Canada, 2011). 
GEOGRAPHIC REGION 
MUNICIPAL 
TYPE 
POPULATION 
CONTRIBUTION 
TO REGION'S 
GROWTH 
2006 2011 
% 
CHANGE 
% 
Canada  31,612,897 33,476,688 5.9  
Ontario  12,160,282 12,851,821 5.7  
Simcoe Case Study Area   420,737 443,911 5.5 100%  
Single Tier Municipalities      
    Barrie City 128,430 135,711 5.7 31.42 
    Orillia City 30,259 30,586 1.1 1.41 
Simcoe County      
    Bradford W. Gwillimbury Town 24,039 28,077 16.8 17.42 
    Wasaga Beach Town 15,029 17,537 16.7 10.82 
    Collingwood Town 17,290 19,241 11.3 8.42 
    New Tecumseth Town 27,701 30,234 9.1 10.93 
    Innisfil Town 31,175 33,079 6.1 8.22 
    Midland Town 16,330 16,572 1.5 1.04 
    Penetanguishene Town 9,354 9,111 -2.6 -1.05 
    Essa Township 16,901 18,505 9.5 6.92 
    Tiny Township 10,754 11,232 4.4 2.06 
    Springwater Township 17,456 18,223 4.4 3.31 
    Severn Township 12,030 12,377 2.9 1.50 
    Oro-Medonte Township 20,031 20,078 0.2 0.20 
    Tay Township 9,748 9,736 -0.1 -0.05 
    Adjala-Tosorontio Township 10,695 10,603 -0.9 -0.40 
    Ramara Township 9,427 9,275 -1.6 -0.66 
    Clearview Township 14,088 13,734 -2.5 -1.53 
 
Early development in Simcoe capitalized on the abundance of farmland and natural resources 
such as timber, as well as the region’s proximity to Georgian Bay. Although agriculture continues to play 
a significant role in the local economy, many of the region’s small rural communities now serve as 
bedroom communities for larger centres within Simcoe and beyond that offer a more diverse range of 
employment. Tourism, retail, service industries and manufacturing comprise the majority of employment 
in the region. One of the County’s largest employers is an automobile manufacturing plant located in the 
small town of Alliston. Municipalities located on the shorelines of Georgian Bay and Lake Simcoe, such 
as Wasaga Beach and Collingwood, are particularly oriented to tourism and service-related industries, 
with recreation and lifestyle developments comprising a large percentage of their local development 
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activity (Lapointe Consulting Inc., 2006). Once a bedroom community for Toronto, Barrie is increasingly 
providing employment for its residents and the surrounding area. A full 63% of Barrie residents are 
employed in Barrie, with an additional 9% of residents commuting from Barrie to elsewhere in Simcoe 
County for employment (Birnbaum, Nicolet, & Taylor, 2004). 
The region has experienced rapid population and employment growth in the last 3 decades. 
Between 2001 and 2006, Barrie was the fastest growing census metropolitan area in Canada (City of 
Barrie, 2008). Growth has been unevenly distributed, with the majority occurring in southern portion of 
the region, particularly in the City of Barrie, and more recently, in smaller municipalities such as the 
Towns of Wasaga Beach and Bradford West Gwillimbury. Northern municipalities, in contrast, have 
experienced little to no growth in recent years (Birnbaum et al., 2004; SHS Inc., 2007). Population growth 
in Simcoe, driven largely by in migration from the Greater Toronto Area, has been dominated by 
households seeking affordable housing and natural amenities (Dillon Consulting Limited, 2006a). 
Extremely high residential growth rates in Simcoe have tended to coincide with decreased housing 
affordability in the Greater Toronto area where 2006 average housing prices were estimated to be about 
$20,000 greater than average prices in Simcoe (Dillon Consulting Limited, 2006a). That gap has grown 
steadily, with average 2015 prices for single family homes now differing by over almost $770,000 (Pigg, 
June 5, 2015). Proposed expansions to Highway 400, the main highway that connects Simcoe to the 
Greater Toronto Region, have also contributed to speculation and development, particularly along the 
highway corridor (Birnbaum et al., 2004). Rapid population growth in the late 1990s and early 2000sled 
some analysts to declare the region to be Ontario’s “new growth frontier”, soon to outpace other fast 
growing suburbs of Toronto (Birnbaum et al., 2004). While Simcoe never did exceed the growth rates of 
Halton, Peel and York Regions, it was the fastest growing region in the outer ring between 2006 and 2015 
(Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2016).  
Development in Simcoe to accommodate a growing population and employment has historically 
been low density and decentralized. The location of large manufacturing plants in small communities 
such as Alliston and Bradford West Gwillimbury has been a significant contributing factor to the region’s 
dispersed growth, drawing workers from larger cities such as Barrie and Toronto to the more rural reaches 
of Simcoe County. The growth of lifestyle developments in small shoreline communities to accommodate 
amenity migrants and retirees has also been identified as a significant driver of dispersed growth, 
attracting seasonal and full time residents from larger urban centres (Dahms, 1999; Mitchell, 2008). 
Housing form in the region is dominated by single detached housing (75%) – higher than either the 
provincial average (56%) or the similar-sized Region of Waterloo (57%) (Statistics Canada, 2011). 
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A high level of dispersion coupled with low 
investments in public transit has resulted in a high degree of 
auto dependency in Simcoe. Less than half (42%) of Simcoe 
commuters live in the same municipality as they work 
(Dillon Consulting Limited, 2006a). Public transit accounts 
for 4.6% of all trips in Barrie, but outside of Barrie, transit 
usage is low at less than 1% (Planning Department, County 
of Simcoe, 2011).  
Simcoe County growth management initiatives 
Long range planning and management of growth was 
not a County responsibility until the late 1990s when Simcoe 
County initiated a restructuring process that enabled it to take 
on a larger role in development and policy planning 
(Birnbaum et al., 2004; County of Simcoe, 1998). The 
County’s restructuring plan was carried out in recognition of 
the findings of three earlier provincial task forces which had 
found that small towns and townships in the County were 
increasingly challenged in their capacity to deal effectively 
with growth pressures and provision of an increasingly 
complex range of municipal services (Spicer, 2013). Lack of 
coordination among lower and single tier municipalities, 
coupled with unequal representation on County Council had 
created the conditions for inter-municipal competition for 
assessment dollars and boundary disputes. To resolve these 
problems, the Consultation Committee for the Ministry of Municipal Affairs recommended that Counties 
and municipalities share responsibility for land use planning. 
In 1998, the County of Simcoe adopted its first Official Plan to provide a more coordinated 
approach to landuse planning and municipal servicing throughout its area of jurisdiction (County of 
Simcoe, 1998). Like the Regional municipal systems that had emerged a few decades earlier, lower tier 
municipal governments in the County system were required to draft Official Plans that would conform to 
the County’s Plan. The County Official Plan was its first policy document to provide a county wide vision 
for growth, and many of the plan’s stated objectives reflected key tenets of growth management, 
including the need to protect natural resources by directing growth and development toward settlement 
Box 3. County of Simcoe 
1998 Official Plan Objectives 
 Protect, conserve, and enhance 
the County's natural and cultural 
heritage;  
 Wise management and use of the 
County’s resources;  
 Growth management to achieve 
lifestyle quality and efficient and 
cost-effective municipal 
servicing, development and land 
use; 
 Achievement of coordinated land 
use planning among the County's 
local municipalities and with 
neighbouring counties, district, 
regions, and separated cities, and 
First Nations lands;  
 Community economic 
development which promotes 
economic sustainability in 
Simcoe County communities, 
providing employment and 
business opportunities;  
 Protect public health and safety. 
(Source: Simcoe County, 1998) 
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areas and recognition of the need for better coordination with the Cities of Barrie and Orillia in planning 
and service delivery (Box 3).  
Despite these efforts, the County’s capacity to manage Simcoe’s rapid growth effectively was 
increasingly called into question, leading to concerns about the impact of the region’s rapid growth on 
natural areas, water resources, and municipal infrastructure.  Urbanization of the County had led to an 
increase in urban run-off and effluent from sewage treatment plants and septic systems which, in 
combination with agricultural run-off, were contributing to the serious degradation of Lake Simcoe’s 
water quality (Ontario Ministry of Environment, 2010; Palmer, Winter, Young, Dillon, & Guildford, 
2011). Attempts in the 1980s to mitigate the effects of human activity on Lake Simcoe – particularly 
urban development and agriculture activities – failed to protect the lake sufficiently from high phosphorus 
loads. The wisdom of accommodating additional growth in absence of a coordinated plan for water and 
waste water servicing to prevent further degradation of Lake Simcoe was questioned by provincial 
agencies, citizen stakeholder groups and a number of municipalities within the urbanizing watershed 
(Lake Simcoe Environmental Management Strategy (LSEMS), 2003). 
The location and form of urban development planned for Simcoe was also a subject of growing 
concern, leading to accusations that Simcoe was the “wild west” for development issues (Sprawl hits 
above the belt.). These concerns, raised in a 2004 report by independent urban research organization, 
Neptis Foundation, called attention to the size and location of developments proposed for Simcoe County 
and their implications for the management of growth in the entire Greater Golden Horseshoe (Birnbaum 
et al., 2004). The report pointed to a lack of capacity of lower tier municipalities in the County to plan for 
and fund expensive municipal water and wastewater servicing that was contributing to a trend toward 
very large residential and recreational developments in South Simcoe. The report authors argued that the 
developments were proposed at such a scale as to be able to recoup the costs of providing private water 
and wastewater servicing and effectively co-opted from the public the discussion about how and where 
growth should occur in the County (Birnbaum et al., 2004). One such development proposal was a 
controversial 239 ha lifestyle development and marina proposed for shoreline and agricultural lands at 
Big Bay Point, a small cottage community outside of the Town of Innisfil’s settlement boundaries. An 
OMB hearing of the case revealed that neither the County nor the Town had planning policies in place to 
guide the location, size or form of resort developments (Seaborn & Beccarea, 2007).  
That same year the County engaged a consultant to conduct a population and employment 
forecast and a workplan for a comprehensive growth management process. Citing fragmented decision 
making between the County and separate Cities of Barrie and Orillia as a major problem for future growth 
management, the consultant concluded that: 
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 “In the absence of a co-ordinated approach to resolving the major growth management 
issues in the County of Simcoe, it is likely that solutions will be reached through other 
processes. The outcomes may not be in the best interests of the communities involved. In our 
view, this is a situation that both the County of Simcoe and local municipalities should have 
a strong interest in addressing” (Hemson Consulting Ltd., 2004, p. 12).  
The “other processes” referred to in the consultant’s report was the possibility of provincial 
intervention into Simcoe’s local municipal planning activities to resolve the mounting governance and 
growth management challenges facing the area. In 2005, with no satisfactory resolution to the growth 
challenges facing the region, the province of Ontario announced it would guide Simcoe County and the 
separate cities of Barrie and Orillia through an Intergovernmental Action Plan (IGAP) process that would 
determine the Simcoe area’s capacity to sustain additional growth and to identify opportunities for local 
governments to manage that growth. In a press release announcing the decision, then Minister of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing Minister, John Gerretsen, commented that "past governments' piecemeal 
planning has threatened both the environment and the sustainability of development in Simcoe County… 
a comprehensive study of Simcoe County's watershed capacity and infrastructure will ensure 
governments make more informed decisions on future development proposals" (Ontario Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH), March 10, 2005). The Intergovernmental Action Plan resulted 
in the commitment of 2.25 million dollars from the province to support a-four phased research program 
to: 1) study the assimilative capacity of the Lake Simcoe and Nottawasaga River watersheds to 
accommodate growth and development, 2) assess the capacity of existing infrastructure to accommodate 
approved growth and development, 3) assess future growth potential, and 4) develop an implementation 
plan. 
The IGAP studies found that Simcoe County, its lower tier municipalities and the separate cities 
of Barrie and Orillia had collectively approved development in excess of both the County’s population 
targets as set out in its Official Plan, as well as the provincial population forecasts released that year as 
part of the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe. Enough land had been approved for 
development to accommodate a surplus of 25,045 to 30,991 people when evaluated against the population 
forecasts provided by the Growth Plan (Dillon Consulting Limited, 2006b). Moreover, population targets 
approved by lower tier municipalities were often much higher than the approved targets in the County’s 
Official Plan and the Cities of Barrie and Orillia had overturned their own Official Plan targets through 
resolutions that permitted additional population (Dillon Consulting Limited, 2006b).  The studies also 
concluded that the lack of a coordinated approach to water, waste water infrastructure and urban 
development had compromised the municipalities’ ability to protect groundwater and surface water 
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resources and locate development in areas  that could be could be efficiently or economically serviced 
(Dillon Consulting Limited, 2006b; Doyle, 2009). Another consequence of Simcoe’s fragmented planning 
approach, identified by the IGAP, was the challenge facing municipalities in planning for transportation 
infrastructure, complete communities and transit oriented densities. The study identified a need for better 
coordination within and between municipalities for the siting of employment areas, improving the balance 
of employment and residential landuses, and providing county-wide transit (Dillon Consulting Limited, 
2006b). 
Informed by both the results of the IGAP process and the newly released Growth Plan for the 
Greater Golden Horseshoe, Simcoe County staff embarked on a process to update its Official Plan. 
Although the revised County Official Plan was approved by Council in 2008, the Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing did not approve the plan within the statutory time frame. The plan hinged on a 
forecast of 707,000 additional people by 2031 -- 40,000 more than forecasted for Simcoe region by the 
Growth Plan (County of Simcoe, 2008, modified 2013). Almost three quarters of that growth was 
assigned by the County to lower tier towns and townships under County jurisdiction, leaving only one-
quarter for the urban nodes of Barrie and Orillia (County of Simcoe, 2008, modified 2013). In addition, 
nearly 20% of the projected growth was planned to occur along the 400 corridor immediately south of 
Barrie. The City of Barrie and York Region, a municipality immediately to the south of Simcoe, were 
openly critical of the Plan, arguing that it failed to work within the framework recommended by the IGAP 
and the population allocations of the Growth Plan and that these failures would have negative 
consequences for surrounding municipalities and the vision of the Greater Golden Horseshoe as a whole. 
In a report to Council, York Region staff noted the Simcoe County Official Plan’s overemphasis on 
residential development and failure to plan for needed employment development. Moreover, the Plan was 
structured around intensification targets of 20% rather than 40% for many of its communities, and 
greenfield density targets of 32 rather than 50 residents and jobs per hectare (Regional Municipality of 
York, 2008). The appropriation of the majority of the forecasted growth by Simcoe County and the 
allocation of that growth to small communities within rural areas rather than to larger urban centres 
incensed Barrie’s political officials who issued the press release:  
“It has been clear for some time that there are two visions for growth in Simcoe County. The 
first is the vision of Places to Grow; of compact communities served by transit and other 
urban services with growth concentrated in and around existing urban areas. Barrie City 
Council supports this recommendation by the 2006 Inter-Governmental Action Plan and its 
vision for smart growth in our area. The second vision calls for dispersed growth in rural 
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areas spread across south Simcoe, as laid out in the County of Simcoe’s draft Official Plan, 
and reflected in the Town of Innisfil’s recent OPA’s” (City of Barrie, April 28, 2009).  
In 2010, with still no Ministerial approval for Simcoe County’s Official Plan, the provincial 
government released a report entitled Simcoe Area: A Strategic  Vision for Growth and the Lake Simcoe 
Protection Act to protect Lake Simcoe from the impacts of agricultural activities and urban development, 
including treated municipal sewage effluent. The report provided an alternative planning scenario for 
Simcoe with the rationale that “Simcoe County has submitted a new Oﬃcial Plan for provincial decision 
that, while containing many good policies, needs clearer growth management direction” (Ontario Ministry 
of Energy and Infrastructure (MEI), 2009, p. 1). Following the release of the vision document, the 
Ministry of Infrastructure then issued an amendment to the Growth Plan which provided more concrete 
direction for population and employment growth for lower tier municipalities and the separate cities of 
Barrie and Orillia (MI, 2012).  
Compromising between the Simcoe County’s original plans for growth, and the province’s desire 
to constrain growth to identified urban growth nodes, the amendment assigned a greater proportion of 
Simcoe’s forecasted population to Barrie but also allocated additional population growth to Bradford and 
Alliston and designated new employment areas along Highway 400. The amendment initially called for 
the County to work with municipalities to define new Interim Settlement Area Boundaries (ISABs) based 
on a 20 year land budget reflective of the new municipal population and employment forecasts, but this 
requirement was eventually dropped after Simcoe County and municipalities raised concerns about 
developments that were already approved for lands outside of the ISABs and potential legal challenges 
(Patterson, 2011; Watt, 2012). Moreover, the Amendment permitted Simcoe County to accommodate a 
population in excess of the provincial forecast to a maximum of 20,000 people, provided that the 
development to accommodate the additional population: 1) met intensification targets and density targets, 
2) was located on lands for urban uses as of January 19, 2012, and 3) met provincial servicing policies 
and the Lake Simcoe Protection Plan, 2009.  
While directing a greater proportion of Simcoe’s growth toward urban municipalities such as 
Barrie and Collingwood, the Amendment was anticipated to permit a good number of previously 
approved developments to proceed and was strongly criticized by environmental groups, planners and a 
past mayor of Toronto for undermining the objectives of the Growth Plan (Campaign Lake Simcoe, 2010; 
Malcolmson & Donnelly, 2012; Sewell, 2013). Senior planner for Ontario’s Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing, Victor Doyle, argued that the changes presented in the Amendment opened up new, 
unserviced lands for development in absence of a demonstrated need for new land and without the 
necessary studies to identify the capacity of Lake Simcoe and Nottawasaga River to accommodate 
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additional water and waste water servicing (Doyle, 2009). In a letter to the Ontario Growth Secretariat, 
Doyle stated:  
“Currently, Simcoe County simply does not have the legislative authority or staff capacity or 
experience to manage sewer and water systems. Even with legislative authority, it will be 
some time prior to it being able to deal effectively with the existing, let alone proposed 
expansion to new systems. There should be no further land use approvals for urban 
expansions or major urban uses requiring sewer and water (ie. the employment areas) on 
inland lakes and rivers beyond those currently in place (with the exception of Barrie and 
[sic]) until the County is provided with this authority” (Doyle, 2009).  
Simcoe County and many of its constituent municipalities begrudged the greater provincial 
direction provided for Simcoe under the Growth Plan Amendment, seeing it as an infringement on local  
autonomy and decision making (McCormick, 2011b). In discussing the proposed Amendment, Chief 
Administrative Officer of Ramara Township, Rick Bates, summarized the perspective shared by many 
Simcoe municipalities: “For those of us who have worked in planning all our lives, it has always been a 
ground-up exercise. Now it’s a top-down dictatorship, and certainly there is resentment at the municipal 
level” (McCormick, 2011a, p. 7). Simcoe County nevertheless began to modify its Official Plan to 
incorporate changes required by the Amendment and the Lake Simcoe Protection Plan. An updated 
version of the Official Plan was approved by County Council in early 2013. The County has sought a 
decision from the province on the revised Plan through the Ontario Municipal Board.  
Lower tier municipalities’ growth management initiatives 
Concurrent with the County’s growth management planning efforts, lower tier municipalities in 
Simcoe have embarked on a variety of initiatives to manage growth. While the majority of municipalities 
have embraced the notion that development should make efficient use of existing water and waste water 
infrastructure, few have adopted programs to implement other aspects of growth management such as 
encouraging a mix of land uses, intensification of built up areas in lieu of greenfield development and the 
encouragement of transit-supportive densities.  Some of these efforts, such as Clearview Township’s 
Growth Plan released in 2009, provide broad vision statements for the management of growth, but lack 
specific policy recommendations or implementation actions to achieve these goals (Clearview Township, 
2009). Others, such as the Town of Collingwood, have embarked on more ambitious strategies to manage 
growth, including the identification of areas for intensification and policy changes to permit higher 
density development (Town of Collingwood, 2012). Still other municipalities, such as the Town of 
Wasaga Beach, have commenced a process to better understand their unique growth challenges through 
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planning studies on such topics as tourism housing conversion and active transportation (Meridian 
Planning Consultants Inc., 2008; Town of Wasaga Beach, 2013).  
Many of Simcoe’s lower tier municipalities have expressed a strong preference for the local 
management of growth rather than a County-driven approach. To address financial and logistical 
challenges associated with local service delivery, lower tier municipalities have engaged in various 
partnerships and contractual arrangements with other municipalities – particularly with the separate cities 
of Barrie and Orillia (Spicer, 2013). Some of these partnerships have emerged as a result of shared 
challenges related to Growth Plan implementation, such as the growth planning working group organized 
by the urban nodes of Barrie, Orillia, Collingwood, Alliston (in New Tecumseth) and Bradford (in 
Bradford West Gwillimbury). The working group initially excluded Simcoe County from participating 
and expressly objected to the County’s involvement in future water and wastewater planning ("Innisfil 
presses urban nodes to embrace joint service agreements", 2013; "Growth communities hope to work 
together", 2009). The working group’s focus evolved and membership eventually broadened to include 
the County of Simcoe and additional urban nodes identified in Amendment 1 of the Growth Plan (Alcona 
in Innisfil, and the towns of Midland and Penetanguishene) ("Innisfil presses urban nodes to embrace 
joint service agreements", 2013). 
Lower tier municipalities’ approaches to managing growth in Simcoe have been greatly 
influenced by the development industry’s vision for the area. A number of development and planning 
proposals, including those for Big Bay Point, Midhurst, and Bond Head exemplify this developer-led 
approach, particularly for residential and resort developments. By virtue of their size, the proposed 
developments have the potential to greatly influence how and where Simcoe will grow over the long term 
(Birnbaum et al., 2004). As well, they demonstrate a conflict in priorities for growth between lower tier 
municipalities, the County and the province that has resulted in prolonged clashes over local 
development. In a 2017 review of development and planning in the outer ring municipalities, a Neptis 
study and policy gap analysis (Allan, McGillivray, & Allan, 2017; Neptis Foundation, 2017) confirmed 
that lower tier municipalities in Simcoe County were continuing to plan for low density development 
outside of built-up areas in areas called “undelineated built-up areas” (UUBAs), enabled through a policy 
gap in the Growth Plan:  
“Simcoe has planned for almost 40 percent of its growth to be in the form of intensification. 
But rather than directing intensification to locations with well-established urban 
infrastructure, institutions, and amenities – such as Collingwood, Midland, Alliston, or 
Wasaga Beach – a review of the County’s land budgets shows that about 65 percent of the 
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units that have been approved as intensification in Simcoe County are being directed to 
UBUAs; 83 percent of these units are in the form of single detached housing units.” (Neptis 
Foundation, 2017, p. 4) 
Big Bay Point Development, Town of Innisfil 
In 1999, an application was submitted to the Town of Innisfil for a large resort and marina 
development in the small, seasonal community of Big Bay Point. Dubbed the largest inland marina 
development in North America, the proposal would see the establishment of accommodation for 7,500 
resort residents and associated retail and recreation development including a golf course, in an area well 
outside of Innisfil’s urban and village settlement boundaries (Seaborn & Beccarea, 2007; Vanderlinde, 
2012). Reportedly cautious about the proposal (Birnbaum et al., 2004, p. 33), Innisfil Council 
nevertheless approved the applicant’s request for an Official Plan Amendment (OPA 16) to change the 
239 ha subject lands from an agriculture and shoreline designation to “special policy area – resort 
development”, along with a set of specific conditions for the approval of any future development. Innisfil 
Council subsequently approved a secondary plan submitted by the developer for the proposed resort and 
marina to accommodate 2861 residential units (OPA 17).  
County Council and the province initially objected to Innisfil’s Official Plan Amendments. The 
amendments ignored the recommendation by the province’s 2006 IGAP process to locate growth in a 
subdivision at the north end of the town. Innisfil’s Director of Planning and Development openly 
acknowledged the Big Bay Point Plan’s disregard for the IGAP recommendation, stating “We identified 
where we'd put [the population growth] independent of the consultant's [IGAP] work" (Sprawl hits above the 
belt.). The plan also contradicted the County’s preferred strategy for urban development, as set out in 
section 3.5.1 of the County’s Official Plan, “to utilize existing settlements where appropriate in 
accordance with the policies of this Plan, as the setting for urban uses and/or most non-resource related 
growth and development” (County of Simcoe, 2005).  Despite the developer’s intention for the resort 
mainly to serve seasonal residents, the County noted that the difference between seasonal and year round 
occupation was inconsequential: seasonal occupation would still require the transportation and 
water/waste water infrastructure of a more traditional urban development (County of Simcoe, 2005).  In a 
letter from the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing to the County, provincial staff reiterated the 
County’s concern that the Official Plan Amendment and the secondary plan failed to prevent “a 
settlement from being developed in an area that is not planned for such a use”(Ontario Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH), 2005).  In addition, the province felt that conditions imposed 
on development in the special policy area failed to provide certainty regarding adequate servicing and 
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protection of natural features and functions and that the town had failed to ensure that all required 
conditions had been met in its adoption of the secondary plan (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing (MMAH), 2005). Under threat of arbitration through to OMB by the developer, the County and 
province approved the OPA, securing assurances from the developer for the provision of adequate water 
and waste water servicing and the enforcement of seasonal usage of the residences (Seaborn & Beccarea, 
2007). Two resident groups dissatisfied with the out-of-court-settlement proceeded to bring the case 
before the OMB, but failed to convince the board of their concerns.  
Midhurst Secondary Plan, Springwater Township 
Midhurst is a low density, estate-residential community of approximately 3000 people located to 
the northwest of Barrie in the Township of Springwater.  The Midhurst Secondary Plan (OPA 38), was 
initiated by the Township as part of a process to plan for and direct growth to the small settlement areas 
identified by the Township in their Official Plan. The plan, which was approved by Springwater 
Township Council in 2008 and County Council in 2011, provided a long term blueprint for the transition 
of the small, bedroom community of Midhurst to a community of approximately 30,000 residents – a 
population size that exceeded provincial population allocations set out for the entire township by 10,000 
people (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH), 2011; Township of Springwater, 
2008). The plan emphasized growth in greenfield areas outside of the concentrated built area of Midhurst 
at an average density of 40 people and jobs per ha.  
In 2011, Simcoe County’s decision to approve the Secondary Plan was appealed to the OMB by 
the province for its failure to conform to the policies of the Growth Plan. The province contended that the 
Plan exceeded Growth Plan population forecasts, directed growth to locations outside of built up areas 
and to areas that did not offer municipal water and wastewater systems, and failed to meet intensification 
and density targets (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH), 2011). Other reasons 
cited for the appeal were the Plan’s prematurity with respect to Simcoe County’s incomplete Official Plan 
conformity exercise, its failure to conform to the PPS with regard to municipal coordination, management 
of growth and provision of infrastructure and public service facilities, and its failure to conform to the 
County of Simcoe’s Official Plan population forecasts (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing (MMAH), 2011).  
After discussions with the County, MMAH withdrew its appeal for 300 ha of the total 756 ha in 
the Midhurst Secondary Plan, claiming that the Plan guiding development of those lands conformed to the 
Simcoe Sub Area policies of the Growth Plan and the transitional requirements of Ontario Regulation 
311/06 (County of Simcoe, 2013; Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH), 2012). 
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Critics of the decision argued that approval of plans for the 300 ha could have only occurred with the 
weakening of the Growth Plan through provisions in Amendment 1, which allowed for the expansion of 
Simcoe’s forecasted population by 20,000 people (Malcolmson & Donnelly, 2012). The decision to 
approve the Secondary Plan for the remaining 456 ha is still under appeal. 
Bond Head Development, Bradford West Gwillimbury 
Plans for development for Bradford West Gwillimbury, an urban and rural municipality located 
immediately north of Toronto and the Greenbelt, have been the focus of considerable controversy. As a 
result of its proximity to Toronto and major highway infrastructure, the municipality of Bradford West 
Gwillimbury has experienced significant residential development pressure to service commuters working 
in Toronto. Responding to this pressure, the town adopted an Official Plan in 2002 and a series of Official 
Plan amendments in which settlement boundaries for the Bradford urban area would be expanded by 
approximately 1,100 hectares. In addition, the town designated land around the intersection of Highway 
400 and County Road 88 as a Special Policy Area for future employment use. The servicing and 
development of these employment lands hinged on an anticipated highway link known as the Bradford 
Bypass (de Avellar Schiller, 2009). This employment area was later enlarged under an Official Plan 
Amendment (OPA 15). 
In 2003, Bradford received a significant development proposal that would see the urban 
settlement area of Bradford connected to the small hamlet of Bond Head in one continuous urban area 
that crosses Highway 400.  The new Bradford Bond Head Planning area was projected to accommodate 
115,000 people and 55,000 jobs. 
Subsequent applications from a private developer under the name Bond Head Development 
Corporation included two Official Plan Amendment applications for the expansion of settlement 
boundaries for the 200 residence hamlet of Bond Head and the expansion of employment lands along the 
400 corridor.  The Amendments were approved by town council, but a failure of Simcoe County to 
approve amendments within the statutory time frame led the proponent to appeal the County’s lack of 
decision at the OMB. 
Critics of Amendment 15, which proposed an expansion of the employment area, argued that any 
board decision on the case was premature without the pending Simcoe Amendment to the Growth Plan 
(Ghombu, 2009). Justifications for the expansions of either the Bond Head Settlement or the Bradford 
strategic employment area were also questioned given that the County of Simcoe’s earlier land budget 
exercise had demonstrated that it had enough greenfield and employment lands already approved to 
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accommodate Growth Plan forecasts (Doyle, 2009). As well, any expansions of urban areas would lead to 
the loss of prime agricultural land (de Avellar Schiller, 2009). The Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing and the Ministry of Infrastructure originally objected to the Amendment given the “oversupply” 
of lands already designated for employment in South Simcoe and planned to present their case at the 
hearing (Gombu, 2009a). However, changes to Amendment 15 negotiated through a provincial facilitator 
resulted in the province cancelling their plans to attend the OMB hearing (de Avellar Schiller, 2009). The 
province later released Simcoe’s Amendment 1, which integrated the Bradford Strategic Employment 
plan and identified it as an additional area for growth. 
Toronto media and environmental organizations accused the province of succumbing to 
development pressures in their approval of the employment lands.  An earlier agreement between the 
province, Bradford West Gwillimbury and manufacturing company Toromont had been negotiated to 
permit the company to relocate to Bradford from its Vaughan location. The Vaughan-based company had 
stated that it would consider moving its 2500 employee operation to Manitoba if it couldn’t find sufficient 
lands to relocate. Providing the necessary water and waste water servicing would be cost prohibitive 
without additional development and the residential expansion proposed for Bondhead in OPA 16 
(Gombu, 2009b; Gombu, 2009c). 
City of Barrie Growth Management Initiatives 
In the decades prior to the Growth Plan, Barrie’s rapid population growth was accommodated 
primarily through annexation; since 1954, the City expanded its boundaries nine times (Birnbaum et al., 
2004). By 2004, the challenges associated with the City’s past emphasis on peripheral residential 
development and a lack of investment in the City’s urban core had become apparent. These challenges 
included a declining downtown, a shortage of greenfield lands suitable for employment uses and the need 
for another contentious boundary expansion.  
Initial approaches by Barrie to resolve some of its growth problems led to the adoption of a 
number of initiatives to encourage downtown redevelopment. Following the release of the Growth Plan in 
2006, and with the need for additional employment lands, Barrie adopted a more comprehensive approach 
for growth that hinged on both intensification of the existing built up area and the annexation of lands to 
the south of Barrie in the town of Innisfil. Barrie’s proposal to annex lands to the South to accommodate 
employment growth was met with strong opposition from the town of Innisfil, who rebuffed Barrie’s 
offer to share some of the costs of upgrading Innisfil’s water and waste water servicing. Simcoe County 
politicians were also vocal about their opposition to Barrie’s plan, and negotiations between the 
municipalities to resolve the problem failed. The province eventually intervened to resolve the dispute, 
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which resulted in the adoption of the Barrie-Innisfil Boundary Adjustment Act in 2009 to permit the 
expansion of Barrie’s boundary by 2335 hectares into lands that were formerly part of Innisfil. The 
boundary expansion, Barrie argued, was compatible with the province’s vision for Simcoe, which 
identified Barrie as the region’s primary urban growth node. The expansion would permit Barrie to 
“continue to function as the primary location for new population and employment growth and regional 
services” (Government of Ontario, 2009, p.10) where compact, complete communities were more likely 
to be achieved and serviced by transit.  
Barrie’s approach for managing growth evolved further when, in 2009, the City adopted a revised 
Official Plan to conform to the Growth Plan and engaged a consultant to develop a comprehensive 
Growth Management Strategy. The Growth Management Strategy, which comprehensively reviewed 
existing housing, market and infrastructure conditions and opportunities for intensification and multi-
modal transportation, marked a significant break from Barrie’s historical approach to urban planning.  
Barriers to Growth Management in Simcoe 
 Of the three case study regions, Simcoe faced the greatest total number of barriers to growth 
management, with 27 barriers reported compared with Waterloo (18) and Peterborough (23). As the focus 
of a contentious urban growth and water infrastructure debate since the early 2000s, Simcoe has been the 
subject of a large number of planning and growth management studies. As a result, almost twice as many 
media reports and planning documents were collected for this research compared with the Waterloo and 
Peterborough study areas. While the abundance of documents examining growth management in the 
region may have inflated the number of total barriers due to the greater specificity and understanding of 
the challenges facing Simcoe, it also reflects a widespread acknowledgement of the significance of 
Simcoe’s growth management challenges (Appendix C; Figure 7).  
 A total of 14 key barriers were identified for the Simcoe case study region, with 12 of those 
reported by at least 10 percent of interview and document sources (Table 14, Figure 8). The remaining 
two barriers were identified through a critical analysis that examined how the reported barriers related to 
local contextual factors, historical information and local planning discourses. The two barriers, described 
as insufficient planning capacity and inefficient or inconsistent administration, were identified as serving 
critical causal and reinforcing functions between the actions of the local implementing agency and low 
density urban form. These functions are described in more detail in the subsequent section. 
 Of the 14 key barriers, rejection by council and staff of provincial oversight, and amenity 
migration were two newly identified barriers that did not form part of the original model.  Rejection by 
council and staff of provincial oversight was frequently demonstrated in interviews and media reports 
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through statements that indicated frustration with the intervention in local planning matters by the 
province and a perception that planning in Simcoe required a “made-in-Simcoe” approach.  The barrier 
referred to as amenity migration describes the physical characteristics of the Simcoe area that have 
attracted amenity migrants, and the social and economic conditions stemming from amenity-related 
development. Amenity migration was treated in the conceptual model as a local contextual factor. 
 While Simcoe shared similar key barriers at the societal environment scale when compared with 
Waterloo and Peterborough (preferences for low density suburban forms and auto dependency), interview 
respondents and document sources emphasized a different set of barriers at the planning environment and 
artifact scales. Planning environment barriers represented the largest proportion of key barriers for 
Simcoe, with nine of the 14 barriers identified from the planning environment scale. In contrast to 
Waterloo, where characteristics of developers comprised the key planning environment barriers, Simcoe’s 
barriers were found to consist of characteristics of the implementing agency and weak or absent inter-
organization relations. These barriers were found to provide the political and administrative basis for 
barriers at the artifact scale, such as non-conformity of local Official Plans to the Growth Plan, and 
incompatible provincial policies decision making. Pressures stemming from amenity migration created 
additional constraints on the planning environment to manage growth in Simcoe.  
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Table 14. Simcoe Case Study Area: Key Barriers to Growth Plan Implementation.  
BARRIER TYPE BARRIER 
A Local Plans and Policies Official Plan does not conform to Growth Plan 
A Federal and Provincial Plans 
and Policies 
Incompatible provincial decision making, policy and investment 
P Characteristics of 
implementing agency 
Lack of political will 
P Characteristics of 
implementing agency 
Lack of staff commitment to growth management objectives 
P Characteristics of 
implementing agency 
Staff view high density development as incompatible to local character 
P Characteristics of 
implementing agency 
Insufficient planning capacity 
P Characteristics of 
implementing agency 
Inefficient or inconsistent administration 
P Characteristics of 
implementing agency 
Staff view their role as dependent on the market 
P Inter-organization Relations Poor coordination and level of engagement between local and upper tier 
government agencies 
P Inter-organization Relations Weak or absent regional coordination of local planning 
P Inter-organization Relations Inter-municipal competition for development 
P Inter-organization Relations Rejection of provincial oversight 
S Consumer Preferences Consumer preference for low density suburban form 
S Consumer Preferences Auto dependency and absence of alternative travel options 
 Local Context Amenity migration and associated physical, social and economic 
characteristics 
A: Artifact; P: Planning Environment; S: Societal Environment 
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Figure 8. Simcoe Case Study Area: Model of Key Barriers to Growth Plan Implementation. Bold text indicates key barriers identified in interviews and 
planning/media documents. Arrows denote positive or reinforcing relationship. 
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Model of Barriers to Growth Management for Simcoe 
Inter-organization Relations: Horizontal Inconsistency 
Analysis of planning documents and media reports revealed horizontal inconsistency as a key 
challenge facing growth management in Simcoe area. The challenge was reported to stem from 
administrative fragmentation inherent in Simcoe’s county-city municipal system of governance. 
Originally designed to provide only a basic level of service to rural communities, county governments 
have limited statutory responsibilities compared with regional governments (Siegel, 2009). With no 
authority over land use policy and planning decisions for the Cities of Barrie and Orillia, and policy 
planning powers to guide lower tier municipalities granted by the province as late as the 1990s, Simcoe 
County’s authority to establish a county-wide vision for growth has been limited. The absence of formal 
institutional linkages between the separated Cities of Barrie and Orillia and the County have permitted 
land use decisions for urban areas to be made without consideration for rapidly suburbanizing peripheral 
municipalities and vice versa. Informal service sharing agreements to manage issues that span multiple 
boundaries have historically focused on the provision of emergency services and not the coordination of 
development or development related infrastructure (Spicer, 2013). The uncoordinated development 
approvals process combined with inter-municipal competition for assessment dollars have been described 
in some reports as helping to create ad hoc, sprawling development, inefficient water and waste water 
servicing and increasing challenges for the Simcoe and Nottawasaga watersheds to assimilate urban 
runoff and waste water effluent (Birnbaum, Nicolet and Taylor, 2004).  
Compared with areas governed by regional governments, Simcoe’s county-city governing system 
was found to be more susceptible to city boundary expansions to accommodate growth. County townships 
that focus suburban growth adjacent to Barrie and Orillia, for example, benefit from an increase in their 
assessment revenue but are not responsible for the externalities of such growth, such as the maintenance 
of adjacent city roads and other infrastructure (Spicer, 2013). As a result, Barrie through its numerous 
annexations, has demonstrated a vested interest in controlling the types of development that occur near 
their urban boundaries and has proactively sought boundary expansions to secure planning rights to the 
area and preserve future land supply. The county-city governance system leaves the area vulnerable to 
future boundary disputes and puts additional strain on local relationships and competition for 
development. With as many as eight of the 16 lower tier municipalities in Simcoe County with sufficient 
population size (15,000 people) to apply for city status, there is a potential that land use decision making 
in the Simcoe area will become even more fractured.  
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Simcoe’s fragmented governance system and conflicting views on how best to manage city and 
rural growth has challenged Simcoe’s efforts to coordinate planning activities and allocate resources to 
Growth Plan-supportive policies and programs. Divergent views have created tensions between 
municipalities – particular between Barrie, Innisfil, and the County. Tensions between Barrie and Innisfil 
escalated during the boundary dispute that led to the abandonment of talks between the two municipalities 
despite assistance from a provincial development facilitator. Frustrated with Barrie’s lack of support for 
the County’s plans for the disputed lands, County Warden Tony Guergis was quoted as saying “Why can't 
Barrie respect the fact that 17 municipalities worked together on an area-wide plan that respect [sic] each 
(community's growth?) Why can't Barrie work with its neighbours?" (“Warden blasts MPP over border 
dispute”, 2009). The dispute reached a climax when Innisfil launched a “Fair Growth” campaign to 
encourage the province not to intervene in the dispute and both Innisfil Mayor Brian Jackson and County 
Warden Tony Guergis joined the campaign’s protest outside of the Provincial Legislature (“Innisfil Takes 
Protest to Queen’s Park”, 2009). 
Relations between cities and the County were further strained as a result of the growth planning 
working group initiated by Barrie, Orillia and the County’s growth nodes but which excluded the County 
from participating ("Innisfil presses urban nodes to embrace joint service agreements", 2013; "Growth 
communities hope to work together", 2009). The meeting angered a number of municipal mayors who felt 
the meeting without County involvement was “divisive” and even “reprehensible” (“Growth communities 
hope to work together”, 2009; “County to Barrie: let’s start fresh”, 2009). 
A governance review by independent consultants contracted by Simcoe County confirmed the 
need for better coordination of land use and infrastructure by the County. In a 61 page report, the 
consultants concluded:  
“The documents reviewed for this governance study suggest a need for better planning and 
coordination of area-wide services and infrastructure.  Simcoe County has not played an 
active leadership role in facilitating these discussions” (Berkeley Consultants, 2010).   
Further, the report found that:  
“Based on our research, information collection and analysis, Simcoe County is a relatively 
weak form of County upper tier governance. Moreover, we have concluded that Simcoe 
needs to strengthen its governance in terms of: Developing a clear vision and strategic 
priorities; Taking County positions on key area-wide issues; Providing consistent and 
focused County leadership. We do not feel that the current governance structure and form 
are sufficient to do this. Change is needed” (Berkeley Consultants, 2010). 
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Simcoe’s lack of horizontal consistency in the management of growth was found to be reinforced 
by the preference of County and area municipal officials for a decentralized governance approach. The 
governance review report’s conclusions and recommendations, for example, were not universally 
accepted by County Council (Berkeley Consulting Inc. 2010; Simcoe County Governance Committee, 
2012), and elected officials of lower tier municipalities reported a preference for a “weak” County 
structure to ensure retention of local decision making power. To date, the County’s Governance 
Committee have pursued only a subset of the report’s recommendations, mostly pertaining to the structure 
and form of County Council (County of Simcoe Governance Committee, 2012). 
Despite the large number of planning documents and media reports pointing to horizontal 
consistency as a challenge to effective growth management, few Simcoe area planners reported horizontal 
inconsistency as a barrier. Only two respondents identified the need for a shared vision for growth, and 
improved coordination of servicing and development approvals processes as necessary precursors to meet 
Growth Plan objectives. One of these respondents noted that differing local visions for growth coupled 
with the competition for the tax assessment dollars from new development presented a significant 
challenge to municipal collaboration to manage of growth:  
“I think there is also the parochial interest of surrounding local municipalities, who all want 
additional lands to sort of grow in their decentralized and sometimes partially serviced 
areas. And there is a lot of resistance. For example, not withstanding the now updated 
Official Plan that doesn’t deal with the annexed land, we’ve had three appeals from 
developers and a municipality outside of our area, and the appeals have nothing to do with 
the numbers or targets in our official plan, but they have everything to do with their 
resistance to the Simcoe Area Strategic Vision for Growth. So, that is the development 
community and the neighboring municipalities that have ambitions to grow within their 
urban areas and the province not having allocated the population numbers to them, but 
regionally located them in Barrie and, you know, other nodes.” (Planner, Single tier 
municipality). 
Another planner noted that without County level approval authority for all subdivision approvals, 
some form of partnership would need to occur between the County and its lower tier municipalities to 
ensure that the County could track development approvals and assess conformity to land budgets and 
County Official Plan policies. This planner also noted disjointed planning for servicing presented a 
significant challenge for the County: 
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“…Each of our sixteen local municipalities has full jurisdiction for sewer & water, and as 
many sort of systems that are – don’t use the word piecemeal – but, they’ve been sort of 
planned in silos of the years on their own to service their own communities, and I think there 
needs to be a broader look at the servicing aspect to link some of these smaller 
communities” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
Many interview respondents indicated a general lack of support for the province’s efforts to 
establish a region-wide plan for growth. The province’s regional growth management framework and 
assignment of population forecasts for each lower tier municipality (Amendment 1) were described by 
some respondents as helping to intensify inter-municipal competition and interfere with collaboration: 
“The legislation is not reality. It is trying to both dictate growth and employment by 
academic exercises of allocating numbers, which is crap. It really is fundamentally flawed. 
I’m sorry, it may work in theory, but in practice it doesn’t work. You are now pitting one 
region versus another, and the damage that has been done in this area of people fighting… 
“how come you have decided, the province of Ontario, that Bradford, Innisfil and Essa are 
going to be the winners and we are not”? That is fundamentally wrong. Now you’ve pitted 
township versus township in a County against each other, you’re pitting County versus 
regions and other municipalities against each other, and that is fundamentally wrong” 
(Economic Development officer, Upper tier municipality). 
Similar sentiments were echoed by a number of elected officials. Tiny Township Mayor, Peggy 
Breckenridge, for example, blamed the Growth Plan population forecasts as the catalyst for the tensions  
between Barrie and the County, stating: “It’s the province that pitted us against each other. It’s the 
province that pitted us against the City of Barrie” (Watt, 2009). Breckenridge’s view, however, failed to 
account for the fact that Barrie had already investigated expansion of its settlement boundaries through 
amalgamation with Innisfil prior to the release of the Growth Plan in 2006 (Birnbaum et al., 2004; Spicer, 
2013).  
Inter-organization Relations: Vertical Inconsistency 
Interview results and media/document analysis revealed that vertical inconsistency was another 
key theme that obstructed municipal efforts to manage growth in the Simcoe area. The lack of conformity 
of Simcoe County’s Official Plan to the Growth Plan served to delay both County scale growth 
management planning and Growth Plan conformity of many local municipal Official Plans by almost a 
decade. Moreover, some local municipalities disregarded both County and provincial planning 
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approaches and sought their own approaches to growth management, as demonstrated through 
contentious development projects such as Innisfil’s Big Bay Point.  
Underlying the absence of vertical consistency with the Growth Plan was the widespread belief 
that the Plan and proposed Amendment for Simcoe failed to account for Simcoe’s unique planning 
context and a preference for local planning solutions. County planners and those from smaller towns and 
townships felt that the planning context in Simcoe differed significantly from other, more urban regions in 
the Greater Golden Horseshoe. As one County planner stated: 
“… I don’t think it [the Growth Plan] should be applicable to Simcoe County, and some of 
the outer ring municipalities. I honestly think what they’ve tried to do is paint this area with 
the same paintbrush as Greater Toronto, and we simply are a different beast. And we don’t 
have the urban fabric here, and the concentrations, public transit, the connectivity, we don’t 
have sewer and water infrastructure in many places – it’s just not there and therefore, it is 
difficult to impose the same requirements on an area as vast and diverse as Simcoe County 
as it is to area like Hamilton, Oakville you know, York Region, whatever, it’s just not the 
same beast” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
County and local municipal planners cited many reasons why they felt the Growth Plan was not 
an appropriate planning tool for Simcoe County. These ranged from the impact of intensification and 
density targets on the character of rural communities, the lack of intensification opportunities in small 
communities and the appropriateness of density targets for resort communities. The feasibility of density 
targets was regularly questioned by interview respondents and planning documents. Clearview Township 
alluded to their objection to provincial Growth Plan targets directly in the Township’s Growth Plan, 
which stated: “A single minded focus on numbers inhibits the ability to plan for a vision of complete 
communities in which all residents benefit from advancements in standards, servicing and economic 
opportunities” (Clearview Township, 2009, p. 6). Interview respondents identified a wide range of 
objections to the Growth Plan’s intensification and density targets, including the targets’ incompatibility 
with Simcoe’s strong market preference for single detached homes and large lots, the willingness of 
workers to commute, and climate: 
“We recently put in a request to get a lower intensification target that is part of the Growth 
Plan. One of the arguments we used was simply the actual snow accumulation we get in this 
area, which is different from other geographies covered in the Growth Plan. So, simply snow 
storage can be a challenge in many of our areas on many winters if you have a thirty or 
forty-foot lot and half of it is a driveway, literally piling snow can be a challenge if you start 
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talking about some of these more denser housing forms in terms of trucking snow, and 
townhouses and quads and some of these other apartment style things – is even finding snow 
storage can be a challenge in the cost of trucking that to make for safe ingress and egress 
over snow banks is a real problem here” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
Vertical inconsistency was exacerbated by a low level of coordination and engagement between 
Simcoe municipalities and the province, a problem widely cited by interview respondents and referenced 
in correspondence.  The already strained relationship between Simcoe County and the province, in 
particular, intensified after the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing failed to approve the County’s 
Official Plan and instead released its own vision for Simcoe with apparently limited engagement with the 
local decision makers. County Councilors, who had embraced the province’s earlier efforts to coordinate 
and fund the Intergovernmental Action Plan, were both surprised and angered by the province’s actions 
and responded to the province’s Strategic Vision for Simcoe by passing a resolution “that the province of 
Ontario be asked not to make a bad political decision by imposing a solution that conflicts with the 
consensus obtained in the Area Wide Growth Plan for the entire County of Simcoe…” (Guergis, 2009). 
County Warden, Cal Patterson, later penned a letter to the Ministry of Infrastructure decrying their failure 
to make a decision on the Official Plan and the disrespect the County was feeling as a result of lack of 
communication from the province (2011). In his letter Patterson reiterated his continued belief in the 
superiority of a local solution (2011).  
Other participants expressed dissatisfaction with the way the province had worked with their 
municipality in the process of developing the Growth Plan Amendment. A number of municipal planners 
echoed concerns by local politicians (e.g. Bell, 2012) that direct communication from the province to 
front line staff was lacking and that requests to the province for input went unanswered:  
“[Places to Grow] is being implemented in a very bureaucratic fashion. The province said 
they would come out a meet with us individual municipalities to talk about Smart Growth 
and everything. We all submitted position papers to them. They’ve ignored the papers, won’t 
respond, and have refused to come out to meet with us. They had meetings with CAOs at the 
County level, but no planners were involved. So it is really a very bureaucratic, top-down, 
ivory tower approach” (Planner, Lower tier municipality). 
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Characteristics of the Implementing Agency 
Certain characteristics and worldviews entrenched in Simcoe’s planning agencies and elected 
officials were found to reinforce the preference for local over regional planning and challenge vertical and 
horizontal coordination in decision making. Many elected officials demonstrated, through written 
correspondence and public statements, a belief in the superiority of local solutions and a rejection of 
provincial intervention. Resentment of provincial involvement in local planning matters was also 
expressed by many municipal staff interviewed for this research, many of whom were frustrated about the 
shift in decision making power and perception that local views and issues had not been properly 
accounted for in the province’s planning processes: 
“What they [the province] basically are saying is that they don’t care what people want and 
that big brother in Toronto knows best... Local municipalities and Official Plans need to 
have a very clear definition of where they want their growth to take place, ensure that the 
growth happens where it doesn’t put impacts on the environment, make sure we have strong 
Official Plans to protect our farmlands for a long time, but to say that only the province of 
Ontario has the foresight and ability to do that; again, I don’t think that is right (Planner, 
Upper tier municipality). 
 “We’re doing, I would like to say, fairly sophisticated planning, and I would like to get that 
provincial person who said we are doing poor planning…I would like to get them down here 
and show them some of the things we are doing. But they are not listening” (Planner, Lower 
tier municipality). 
In contrast to Waterloo, Simcoe planners cited a relatively low level of commitment by 
politicians to the principles of the Growth Plan and growth management in general. Strong consumer 
preferences for low density development coupled with community resistance to compact urban forms – 
particularly multi-story developments – were cited by many Simcoe interview respondents as significant 
sources of political pressure. In some cases, municipal staff commitment was also acknowledged as an 
obstacle to implementing the Growth Plan: 
“I think in our case…there are two obstacles. One is a little bit of a switch in the thinking 
from a rural type council and staff to somewhat more of an urban type of thinking, in terms 
of development standards, densities etc. Because we do have urban areas. We are an 
amalgamated municipality, we have a huge rural area, but we also have rural areas that 
experience significant growth pressures. And we really need to switch the mindset a little bit 
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towards urban design, intensification, how to deal with those urban pressures as opposed to 
thinking of the old days of rural subdivisions and so on. When I got here about 10 years ago 
the biggest subdivision would be 50 lots. Right now we’re processing subdivisions that are 
1100 lots or more, so it takes a very different mindset to deal with those. And we really need 
to look more at urban design standards when dealing with subdivisions of that scale and 
impact” (Planner, Lower tier municipality). 
“The first [barrier to growth management] is acceptance by the respective municipalities 
from a political and staff point of view, and then acceptance from the social point of view of 
those people within those municipalities. Everybody may be fascinated by what is happening 
on the waterfront in Toronto, but they don’t want to see it in their communities as they come 
further north. And when you look at the characters, the spatial characters in all of our 
communities north of Toronto, there are very few high rises, save in except in specific areas; 
there are very few intensification programs, except in specific areas; or brownfields that 
have been redeveloped into townhouses or something of that nature, so it is really an uphill 
battle” (Planner, Upper tier municipality).  
Growth Plan targets, in particular, were perceived by many planners to be inappropriate for the 
region’s dispersed configuration and local market preferences. Planners frequently cited auto dependency 
as a deeply rooted characteristic of Simcoe residents that would not be readily changed through more 
compact development. Simcoe County planners were unoptimistic in their view that Growth Plan targets 
would lead to a transformation of their region from one of low density, automobile-oriented development 
to one that was more compact and transit supportive: 
“We feel that their targets in the Places to Grow are excessive for Simcoe County. We put a 
report in front of them as late as two months ago, suggesting that the target intensification of 
40% be reduced to 25% and the persons per hectare be reduced from 50 down to 32. Which 
is something more reflective of the ‘made in Simcoe County’ philosophy” (Planner, Upper 
tier municipality). 
“The problem I see with the Growth Plan is that this document applies very broadly to a 
huge geography in southern Ontario, and to read a document that applies equally to 
downtown Mississauga, and downtown Hamilton, and Markham and Richmond Hill, and 
then the same policy applies to smaller communities in our area, like we have 91 settlement 
areas and to try and suggest that these are going to be less automobile reliant and more 
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compact housing forms could ever be realized in the vast majority of them, I think is a 
shortcoming of the policy” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
Lack of support for the Growth Plan was driven in part by a competing priority to maintain the 
region’s current low density, rural character. Maintaining the small town character of Simcoe’s smaller, 
rural and suburban communities was a policy priority frequently noted in policy documents and by 
interview participants. Simcoe County planners and planners from predominantly rural municipalities 
perceived the Growth Plan’s density and intensification targets as conflicting with their communities’ 
goal to preserve their small town character.  
“It’s going to be challenging to keep our character of the town – you know, we’re a small 
town. So to keep the character and still achieve the intensification targets can be very, very 
difficult for us, I think…And [maintaining the small town character] is something that 
council feels strongly about, something the residents feel strongly about. They’ve come here 
– we have three separate urban areas Alliston, Tottenham, and Beaton. Alliston being the 
biggest one, and the one that’s sort of accommodating all the growth right now, so especially 
Beaton and Tottenham, the residents there really want to see as a little change as possible, 
you know. So that will be difficult for us” (Planner, Lower tier municipality). 
“The reality is that - you can ask anybody on the street - in Barrie they don’t feel a sense of 
community. They have no connection to their community, it is growing so fast that there is no 
identity of being somebody from Barrie. Somebody from Orillia or Midland or 
Penetanguishene or Wasaga Beach has an identity of being from that place. The legislation, 
the way it is, and if allowing the type of growth in the other areas outside Barrie, you’re 
starting to destroy the fabric of what those communities are” (Planner, Upper tier 
municipality). 
Planners in the Simcoe area frequently described the Growth Plan and its intensification and 
density targets as “planning by numbers”. One respondent described the Growth Plan as inferior to the 
broader planning ideal of Smart Growth because of its emphasis on density over community design and 
livability.  
“Smart Growth was about a lot more than numbers; it was about community design, 
preservation of agricultural lands, environmental issues and all of those things, creating 
livable and healthy communities etc. The Growth Plan was offered by people that perhaps 
were more interested in efficient infrastructure, dollars and cents, and how many people per 
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dollar we’re spending on our infrastructure, as opposed to looking at the bigger picture. Yes, 
the dollar is important. Yes, efficient use of infrastructure is important. But quality of life is 
very important as well, and I’m not sure that if you design your community into entirely 
around how efficiently you can be per person or per development unit relative to your 
servicing cost, that that equates to a [higher] quality of life…. And it is a real focus in the 
Growth Plan on packing people into those mega centers to get the biggest bang for your 
buck, in terms of the servicing infrastructure. But, how does that translate back to quality of 
life?” (Planner, Lower tier municipality). 
Still other planners expressed concern that reliance on provincial policy rather than a 
municipality’s Official Plan to guide local development would lead to opportunities for appeal and non-
conformance: 
“What is happening, though, is that the implementation at the local level, and the tailoring at 
the local level, is still being interpreted in a variety of ways. I think the province has to stand 
behind the Official Plans that have received the provincial blessing as the document of 
primacy, as opposed to the municipality tailoring the policies to their context and then 
having developers, proponents for change, cherry pick from the provincial policy as the 
document of primacy, and showing that they conform to that” (Planner, Single tier 
municipality). 
While many information sources pointed to lack of political will and staff support in the Simcoe 
area as a barrier to growth management, this obstacle was not distributed equally across all municipalities 
of the study region. Single tier municipalities in the region, for example, tended to be more supportive of 
the Growth Plan targets and principles compared with County and many lower tier municipal staff. The 
City of Barrie, for example, was found to be more supportive of Growth Plan objectives, and this was 
demonstrated through strategies to revitalize the downtown and waterfront, intensify residential areas, and 
encourage mixed use and transit supportive development in greenfields.  As early as 2004, in response to 
growing concern about land shortages, Barrie Council adopted the strategic priority to manage the type 
and rate of growth. In 2008 when the County released its draft Official Plan, Barrie politician, Mike 
Ramsay, openly criticized the “community of communities” model promoted by the Plan which 
distributed growth more equally across the lower tier municipalities at densities significantly lower than 
the provincial target:  
“A community of communities is an environmental nightmare, where you will scatter 
subdivisions on farmland, where you will see villages grow into small towns that won’t be 
157 
 
able to have public transit; will be large enough to create sprawl, but not large enough to 
support the necessary recreational facilities and create a tax base that can foster the 
development of any community” (Barrie and its neighbours at odds over future growth.). 
In a 2008 report to Council, Barrie planning staff argued for the need to shift from low density, 
ground oriented housing to more sustainable urban forms to reduce land consumption, servicing costs, 
and auto dependency (City of Barrie, 2008). One planner interviewed for this research described the City 
of Barrie’s growth management planning as evolving away from low density development:  
“We have for quite some time, because we’ve run out of land to develop, needed to look at 
ways of intensifying anyway, so I think the mindset was already being recognized within the 
municipal boundaries, as to the need to intensify and focus on the urban growth areas and 
that type of thing. I think one of the most successful tools that we’ve – or not tools, but 
documents – that we’ve relied on is the provincial leadership that they have given us” 
(Planner, Single tier municipality). 
Planning capacity was found to vary significantly across the case study area, with smaller 
municipalities employing fewer than 5 full time development planning staff, few to no full time policy 
planners and limited planning support from the County. Municipality planning capacity and resources in 
Simcoe County has been described by others as not commensurate with the pace and complexity of 
development in the region. Staff have reportedly been challenged to meet the 90-day response time 
required for development proposals, leading to appeals to the OMB for lack of decision (Birnbaum et al., 
2004). Further, the absence of sufficient planning capacity and resources has created a reactive, 
developer-led planning process regarding where and how development should occur.  
“Simcoe County has no authority over water and wastewater services. In interviews, lower-
tier municipal officials in Simcoe County said that they do not have the resources to 
undertake extensive servicing, environmental and planning studies by their own staff. 
Typically, in response to a large-scale development application, municipalities enter into 
agreements with developers such that the developer pays for outside consultants (of the 
municipality’s choosing) to review studies submitted by the developer’s consultants. Because 
it is a reactive process, this reliance on outside consultants further undermines the capacity 
of local authorities to generate their own creative solutions in concert with politicians” 
(Birnbaum et al., 2004, p. 55). 
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Federal and Provincial Plans and Policies 
Unique to the Simcoe case study region was the reported challenge associated with the Simcoe-
specific policies of the Growth Plan through Amendment 1. Media, interest groups, and planners and 
politicians outside of Simcoe County criticized the Amendment for making special provisions for Simcoe 
County that undermined the effectiveness of the Growth Plan. Social and environmental interest groups, 
such as Campaign Lake Simcoe, Environmental Defence, Save the Oak Ridges Moraine, and the Council 
for Canadians condemned the Amendment for increasing Simcoe’s population projection by 20,000 
people and allocating additional population to unserviced, commuting communities and prime agricultural 
lands. These groups, along with provincial planner Victor Doyle and former City of Toronto Mayor John 
Sewell, questioned the need for developing new employment zones along Highway 400, on agricultural 
lands outside of existing settlement areas, when employment lands to the South could meet the demand 
for projected growth (Campaign Lake Simcoe, 2010; Malcolmson & Donnelly, 2012; Sewell, 2013). In a 
letter to the Ontario Growth Secretariat, Doyle denounced the proposed employment areas, stating "The 
cumulative effect will be to open up a new linear pattern of urban sprawl along Highway 400 running 
virtually from the Holland Marsh to north of Barrie". York Regional Council and staff have echoed these 
concerns, recommending the province expand the Greenbelt northwards into south Simcoe County to 
curtail ongoing ‘leap-frog’ development into the South end of Simcoe that has occurred at the expense of 
agricultural and environmental lands (Regional Municipality of York, 2015).  
Others have raised concern that the Growth Plan Amendment has focused growth and 
intensification in areas without consideration for the carrying capacity of the watershed and infrastructure 
needs (Doyle, 2009; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2011a). Critics of the Amendment argue 
that Simcoe’s employment and settlement areas are incompatible with existing water and wastewater 
infrastructure, Simcoe County’s lack of infrastructure planning capacity and the assimilative capacity of 
Lake Simcoe and other watersheds (Doyle, 2009). In his 2014 annual report, former Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario, Gord Miller, noted that underlying the Growth Plan and Amendment was a 
failure to acknowledge and plan for the natural limits to growth, and that planning for these limits was 
“…a basic tenet of sound land use planning” (Environmental Commissioner, Managing New Challenges: 
Annual Report 2013/2014, p. 153) . 
As with Peterborough County and other municipalities in the outer ring of the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe, Simcoe County was granted alternative density and intensification targets – a move that was 
argued against by some inner ring municipalities for creating an uneven playing field for implementation 
and reducing horizontal consistency of the Growth Plan (Regional Municipality of York, 2015). A report 
by the Neptis Foundation proposed that the adoption of reduced density targets set a precedent for other 
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municipalities seeking relief from Growth Plan targets and ultimately undermined the objective of the 
Growth Plan to plan for more compact, transit supportive development (Allen & Campsie, 2013). The 
study’s findings suggested that by 2031, the overall density of urban development in the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe will vary little from the status quo. Following the release of the Neptis report, Environmental 
Commissioner Miller released a cautionary media release stating:  
“The Environmental Commissioner is troubled, however, about how the Growth Plan is 
being implemented. Despite the goal of intensification, the Ontario government has 
authorized lower density targets for 9 of the 15 municipalities in the outer-ring of the 
Greater Golden Horseshoe beyond the Greenbelt” (Environmental Commissioner of 
Ontario, 2015). 
The approved alternative greenfield density targets not only reduce the ability of the Growth plan 
to protect agricultural and environmental lands from urban expansion, the densities are also criticized for 
being below the level that the Ministry of Transportation claims is needed to support basic transit service 
(Doyle, 2009; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2011). According to Doyle, “Fifty people plus 
jobs per hectare is barely enough to get you 20 to 30 minute bus service. Anything below that and you’re 
talking about developments that can’t be served by transit” (Tomalty, 2014).  
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Table 15. Alternative Greenfield Density and Intensification Targets (Environmental 
Commissioner, 2013/2014). 
MUNICIPALITY 
ALTERNATIVE 
DESIGNATED GREENFIELD 
TARGET 
(min # residents and jobs per 
ha) 
ALTERNATIVE 
INTENSIFICATION 
TARGET 
(min % of total residential 
development that must be in 
built up areas) 
City of Kawartha Lakes 40 30% 
City of Orillia 42 - 
Brant County 35-40 by 2022* 15% 
Dufferin County 44 - 
Haldimand County 29 32% 
Northumberland County 30 - 
Peterborough County 35-40 by 2015** - 
Simcoe County 39 32% 
Wellington County 40 20% 
Original Target in Growth 
Plan 
50 40% 
*Interim target of 35 from 2012 and 40 by 2022 
**Interim target of 35 increasing to 40 at next 5-year review or 2015, whichever is sooner 
 
With only a few exceptions, planners interviewed for this research did not report the alternative 
density and intensification targets or the establishment of additional employment areas as a barrier to 
local growth management. Most Simcoe County and lower tier municipal planners expressed support for 
the alternative intensification and density targets, citing the need to recognize consumer preferences and  
a desire to conserve the rural character of Simcoe’s many smaller communities. 
Consumer Preferences 
Planners in Simcoe shared with their Waterloo counterparts the belief that market forces posed a 
significant challenge to their ability to adopt and implement local growth management policies. Like 
Waterloo respondents, Simcoe respondents emphasized both supply and demand side challenges to the 
production of compact urban forms and complete communities, including NIMBY and lack of innovation 
in the development industry. However, Simcoe respondents placed additional emphasis on the importance 
of consumer demand as a significant driver for prevailing urban forms. Planners described the strong 
consumer preference for low density urban forms as a feature of the region that set it apart from other 
areas within the Greater Golden Horseshoe: 
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“Look around - the reality of the market forces is that [high density] types of developments 
are not being asked for. Look, developers by their very nature are going to squeeze the most 
out of what they can. So if they think they can get away within an area of having a forty-foot 
wide lot and having an increased density, because they make more money per hectare, they 
are going do it. But the reality is that is not the type of developments they are developing, 
and they are realizing that their market research also shows that is not what people are 
going to come and buy – that is not why people want to move to Simcoe County” (Planner, 
Upper tier municipality). 
“For our town, like I said, the preference for the single-detached dwellings, it’s really 
hampering any sort of development opportunity for the medium and higher-density 
developments. Just because it’s high risk for developers…there’s not too many examples 
around here of that type of development” (Planner, Lower tier municipality). 
Many planners perceived the strong consumer preference for low density forms as a function of 
Simcoe’s unique abundance of amenity migrants and relatively low land prices. Amenity migrants were 
hypothesized by planners to be drawn to Simcoe’s rural and waterfront communities that featured an 
abundance of recreational opportunities and aesthetic natural landscapes, to compensate for the more 
congested housing environment to the south. These views reflect those of scholars who have studied 
amenity migration in Simcoe and elsewhere (e.g. Dahms, 1996; Dahms & McComb, 1999; Módenes & 
López-Colás, 2007). Simcoe planners demonstrated a heightened awareness of the “rural idyll” as a key 
motivation for both recreation homeownership and the purchase of lifestyle communities and the rejection 
of more “urban” style developments such as highrises and mixed use developments. 
“I think the condensing of communities in our area is rather difficult…because of the 
perception that there is also so much available open land. People coming in out of Toronto 
who may have been living in a semi-detached town house type of venue, want to own their 
piece of Canadiana, so they want a small lot with a free standing house on it ” (Planner, 
Upper tier municipality). 
“Well I guess there’s a subdivision up here, which is questionable whether it should be out 
there because it’s not connected to anything…and there was certainly some desire to 
increase some of the densities in this area that was put forward, but the residents, the 
developer, they all wanted very large lots, particular backing onto the golf course. There 
was no interest in upping the density in that case, at all. So, did it go anywhere? No, it 
didn’t. All the residents, there were already some residents in the area, they were pretty 
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adamant that the next phase of the housing to be built was going to be the same as theirs” 
(Planner, Single tier municipality). 
 Simcoe planners also noted a prevailing culture of auto dependency and acceptance of 
commuting that reinforced a continued demand for low density development. Further reinforcing local 
auto dependency was the fact that many of Simcoe County’s smaller communities lacked employment 
options. In contrast to Waterloo planners, Simcoe planners were generally less optimistic about the 
likelihood that consumer preferences would change: 
Yes, we need to increase our transportation opportunities and corridors, as well as our 
passive and active recreation opportunities, but there is going to be a disconnect between 
getting people out of the automobile for a working environment, because that is not why 
people are moving to communities in Simcoe County. They are still going to be working 
somewhere else; whether it is Barrie or Newmarket or Orillia, they could be living in 
Midland or Midhurst of wherever. That is a reality” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
Planners noted that even those high density developments that had received all of the necessary 
municipal approvals were not always constructed because of inadequate demand: 
“And I think that’s what we’ll have to wait and see in the next 5 to 10 years, if any of these 
developments in these more rural areas are actually built. One thing to propose and approve 
it – will it ever get built on the ground? And I do think we will see some of it built, but I’m 
not sure in some plans you’ll ever see all of it built. I think developers are going to put 
something on paper that they have to put on, to get an approval, and then might come back 
later to try and modify it. Because they’ve fought for ten years and nothing happened. We 
have two high-density blocks in Barrie, my client does, that he has had sitting there now for 
about 12 years, that nobody is interested in. And it’s right adjacent now to the major transit 
node – so it is an area that is going to intensify, and in 12 years not one person, not one 
person, has wanted to buy for high density and the city won’t let them change it, so how long 
will people sit before they try and get it changed, I don’t know, but…” (Consulting Planner, 
Simcoe area). 
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Local Context: Amenity Migration 
Media and planning reports recognized Simcoe’s significant growth management challenges as 
resulting from its resource rich natural environment and amenity migration.  Simcoe’s proximity to large 
population centres in Southern Ontario intensified these pressures and compounded the challenges 
associated with managing recreational development, such as seasonal residences, resorts and recreational 
areas.   
Comprising a significant proportion of Simcoe’s total development, recreational developments 
receive a special exemption from growth management objectives in the province’s Growth Plan policy 
framework: Section 2.2.2.1 (i) of the Growth Plan directs “…development to settlement areas, except 
where necessary for development related to the management or use of resources, resource based 
recreational activities, and rural land uses that cannot be located in settlement areas”. Simcoe planning 
documents, particularly those related to the controversial Big Bay Point Resort, highlighted the 
difficulties in defining and constraining recreational and seasonal developments given that the time frame 
for occupation was difficult to monitor and control. Despite the different policy guidelines for urban 
development compared with resource-based recreational development in the Growth Plan, Simcoe County 
staff recognized that the differences from a land use planning perspective were insignificant. For Big Bay 
Point, for example, the development of 1600 seasonal residences could create significant planning 
challenges if sufficient policies were not in place to address the implications of resort developments on 
regional land use, transportation and growth patterns. Moreover, the conversion of seasonal developments 
to year round occupation in the future had presented planning and infrastructure challenges for small 
communities such as Wasaga Beach. These challenges were noted by County staff in a report to Council 
regarding the Official Plan Amendments for Big Bay Point: 
“On one hand, the amendments to the County and Innisfil plans have been predicated by the 
proponent on the basis that the development is a resort, will not have permanent residents, 
and can be accommodated in the Innisfil Official Plan as a recreational district.  On the 
other hand, the proposed development is a compact and dense urban form that would have a 
mix of land uses (residential, commercial, institutional, recreation) that are not unlike a 
typical settlement designation in the County Official Plan; staff has previously indicated that 
the proposed development should be evaluated as a settlement.  It has been staff’s general 
approach, in terms of the provision of most municipal services, that the impacts are similar 
regardless of the label” (Bender, 2005). 
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With regard to the Big Bay Point development, provincial staff noted:  
“Ministry staff are of the opinion that a development of this type and size (2861 residential 
units) that requires servicing through trunk watermain and trunk sewer lines from Alcona 
should be characterized as an urban development proposal…The proposed non-permanent 
ownership status is irrelevant, given that ownership of individual units is structured to 
permit units to be occupied almost year-round. The servicing needs and environmental 
impact of the development remain the same, regardless of ownership status” (MMAH, 
2005). 
Summary 
Growth management in Simcoe was found to be shaped by rapid growth in the form of low 
density suburban and exurban development in the southern portion of the region and around amenity 
areas, and constrained by the persistence of policy direction and consumer preferences that favoured 
maintenance of a rural and/or small town character. Outside of the separate cities, the case study 
presented a relatively uniform planning environment in which planners, politicians and the public shared 
negative perceptions regarding intensification and compact growth. High consumer demand for low 
density urban forms, combined with poor regional coordination between municipalities, limited planning 
capacity and competition for growth contributed to a reactive, development-led planning approaches. 
These challenges were further exacerbated by a provincial policy framework that failed to hold the region 
to the Growth Plan’s intended intensification and density standards. 
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Peterborough 
With an estimated combined population of 133,568 (2011), Peterborough County and the separate 
City of Peterborough comprise one of more sparsely populated regions within the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe (Table 16). Located 125km east of Toronto, the City of Peterborough serves as the primary 
economic centre for the County and broader region, acting as a hub for retail, secondary education, 
government services and manufacturing activities. Both manufacturing and food processing were 
historically important industries for the City of Peterborough, as a result of readily available 
hydroelectricity and rail transportation (Bain & Marsh, 2012). Although these industries continue to be 
significant employers, the decline in competitiveness of Ontario’s manufacturing markets has required 
Peterborough to diversify into other economic sectors including education, health and government. A 
small but emerging research and development sector is the result of public/private efforts to capitalize on 
the presence of two local education institutions, Trent University and Fleming College. Economic 
activities in the surrounding County are dominated by tourism and agribusiness, with seasonal residents 
comprising 35% of all households in the County, and rural and farm residential forming the balance 
(County of Peterborough, 2013a).  
The concentration of population in a single urban centre is a feature that sets this region apart 
from the more multi-nodal urban regions of Simcoe or Waterloo.  A full 60% of the region’s residents are 
located in the City of Peterborough, with the remaining 40% situated in the eight, predominantly rural 
townships throughout the County. Like Simcoe, the Peterborough area is governed by a county-city 
system in which municipal services are administered separately by Peterborough County and the City of 
Peterborough. Delivery of some services is coordinated through joint service agreements between the 
County and City, covering matters including health and social services, waste management and 
emergency services. Other services such as the maintenance of roads and land use policy planning are 
managed individually by the City and County.  Also like Simcoe, lower tier municipalities provide water, 
waste water and development services. Additionally, while the County requires MMAH approval of its 
Official Plan, the City of Peterborough has the authority to approve its own Official Plans or Official Plan 
amendments. Only the one other single tier municipality in the Greater Golden Horseshoe – the City of 
Toronto – has the same authority. 
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Table 16. Distribution of Population across Municipalities, Peterborough Case Study Area 
(Statistics Canada, 2011). 
GEOGRAPHIC REGION 
MUNICIPAL 
TYPE 
POPULATION 
CONTRIBUTION TO 
REGION'S GROWTH 
2006 2011 
% 
CHANGE 
% 
Canada  31,612,897 33,476,688 5.9  
Ontario  12,160,282 12,851,821 5.7  
Peterborough Case Study 
Area 
  131,537 133,568 1.5 100%  
Single Tier Municipalities      
    Peterborough City 75,406 78,698 4.4 162.09 
Peterborough County      
    Smith-Ennismore- 
    Lakefield 
Township 17,027 16,846 -1.1 -8.91 
    Douro-Dummer Township 6,954 6,805 -2.1 -7.34 
    Otonabee-South 
Monaghan 
Township 6,812 6,660 -2.2 -7.48 
    North Kawartha Township 2,342 2,289 -2.3 -2.61 
    Havelock-Belmont-
Methuen 
Township 4,637 4,523 -2.5 -5.61 
    Cavan-Monaghan Township 8,828 8,601 -2.6 -11.18 
    Galway-Cavendish and 
Harvey 
Township 5,284 5,105 -3.4 -8.81 
    Asphodel-Norwood Township 4,247 4,041 -4.9 -10.14 
 
Despite its importance as a regional economic hub, the City of Peterborough has not fared as well 
economically in recent years as other regions in the Greater Golden Horseshoe, including Waterloo and 
Simcoe. Unemployment in the City has been higher than the provincial average since 2009 while 
employment earnings have been consistently lower than the provincial median over the last two census 
periods (Statistics Canada, 2007).  A greater proportion of City of Peterborough residents spend more 
than 30% of their income on rent than residents elsewhere in Canada - a function of the low incomes 
rather than high rents (City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2011; Wedley, 2013b).   
In recent years, the County’s population has declined by approximately 3.1%, while the City 
grew by 4.4%.  Notwithstanding the gains and losses in population due to the 2008 annexation of County 
lands by Peterborough, the region as a whole experienced a relatively slow net growth of 1.5% over the 
2006-2011 time period (County of Peterborough Planning Department, 2013). Previous periods have been 
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characterized by higher rates of growth, although these rates have typically been slower than the 
provincial average. Peterborough’s relatively slow growth has been attributed, in part, to the province-
wide trend for growth to concentrate in larger urban centres (County of Peterborough Planning 
Department, 2013). Peterborough, like other regions in eastern Canada, has witnessed an out-migration of 
young people who are moving west in search of work (Mehta, 2012). Rate of growth projected for the 
Peterborough area is the lowest of all regions in the Greater Golden Horseshoe, and particularly lower 
than growth rates projected for Waterloo and Simcoe (City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2009b).  
Historical economic and urban development in Peterborough, combined with slow population and 
economic growth has influenced the City’s built form. Like the Cities of Kitchener, Waterloo and 
Cambridge, development in Peterborough was originally concentrated around centralized manufacturing. 
Post-war suburban growth combined with greater mobility both contributed to an increasingly low 
density, single use urban form for urban development outside of the downtown core. From 2000 to 2011, 
single detached homes contributed to 77% of the City’s total housing starts (City of Peterborough 
Planning Division, 2011). A downtown mall, erected in the 1970s as part of the Ontario Downtown 
Renewal Programme, failed to retain its department store anchor and is increasingly challenged to 
compete with suburban shopping malls (urbanMetrics, 2008).  
Some characteristics of the region have helped to slow the pace of low density urban and exurban 
development. At 125 km from Toronto, the Peterborough area has not typically attracted Toronto 
commuters, which in turn has reduced the pressure for the development of scattered bedroom 
communities compared with communities within the Toronto commutershed, such as Simcoe (City of 
Peterborough Planning Division, 2009b; City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2011). The extent of the 
City of Peterborough’s commercial suburbanization and corresponding suburban residential development 
has been offset by the presence of a number of large government and university employers located in 
downtown Peterborough, including a central office for Ontario’s Ministry of Natural Resources, Canada 
Revenue Agency and Trent University. The City’s isolation, combined with the downtown employment 
has helped to mitigate downtown decline and has encouraged workers to live within city boundaries. 
Compared with Waterloo and Simcoe, commuting patterns of workers to areas outside of the city-county 
region are relatively low, with as much as 80% of Peterborough’s workforce living within the City (City 
of Peterborough Planning Division, 2011).  
Housing tenure, incomes and demographics in the City of Peterborough have also helped slow 
Peterborough’s peripheral development. Compared with many other communities in the Outer-ring, 
including Simcoe and Waterloo, Peterborough residents have lower incomes and higher unemployment. 
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In 2011, as many as one in five people in Peterborough was aged 65 or older, a ratio higher than any other 
municipality in Canada (Mehta, 2012). Post secondary institutions, Trent University and Fleming College 
collectively attract an additional 13,000 or more students per year. Lower incomes combined with the 
large proportion of secondary students and seniors have led to a larger than average proportion of rental 
housing in the City compared with other cities. Much of this rental housing exists in the form of medium 
density apartment buildings (City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2009b).  
Despite the region’s demographics and slow growth, almost all new development in the last 25 
years has been in the form of low density residential and commercial development. The City of 
Peterborough has tended to look outward at surrounding townships to accommodate new residential 
subdivisions and industrial lands and, since 1960, has annexed lands from surrounding townships nine 
times (City of Peterborough, Land Information Services Division, 2008; Ontario Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing (MMAH), 2013). One particular annexation, approved by the Ontario Municipal 
Board in 1962, permitted Peterborough to annex 2612 ha from the surrounding townships, resulting in a 
near doubling of the City size (OMB approves Peterborough annexation bid.). In 2008, the City annexed 
an additional 520 hectares from Smith-Ennismore-Lakefield and Otonabee-South Monaghan Townships 
as part of an earlier agreement between the City, County, Townships and province (Ontario Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH), 2013; Wedley, 2010). The most recent annexation was 
approved by the province in 2011 for the annexation of lands from Otonabee-South Monaghan Township 
which came into effect in 2013.  
City of Peterborough’s Growth Management Initiatives  
Possibly as a result of lower development pressures compared with other municipalities in closer 
proximity to Toronto, such as Barrie, Kitchener and Waterloo, the City of Peterborough has adopted few 
policies and programs to encourage compact, transit supportive urban growth. City planners have 
acknowledged that, prior to the Growth Plan, municipal management of growth was guided by “market 
demand and developer readiness” rather than through more active policy and regulatory approaches 
(Hunt, 2009, p. 9).  
The availability of large greenfield areas combined with the low cost of land has historically 
provided the City with little incentive to make optimal use of space and direct development to lands that 
can more efficiently serviced. Past annexations had provided the City with “…so much land that it’s 
going to take years for land to be taken up with singles,” according to the municipality’s Planning 
Division Manager (Hanes, 2011). In 2009, the City held 1443 hectares of designated greenfield lands 
(natural areas, hazard lands and floodplains excluded) - enough land to accommodate 72,150 residents 
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and jobs (City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2009b). 
With the Growth Plan’s growth forecast for the entire City at 
only 14,300 people and jobs between 2006 and 2031, the City 
of Peterborough’s designated greenfield areas provide an 
oversupply of land in the amount of 57,850 people and jobs, or 
approximately four times the land supply necessary for the next 
25 years. The oversupply of lands  designated as greenfield is 
significantly greater than that approved by Simcoe County 
(30,991 to 25,045 people/jobs).  Leapfrog servicing of 
greenfield areas is currently permitted should the lands meet 
other, unspecified, planning requirements (City of 
Peterborough, 1981, amended 2009).  
One exception to the City’s earlier market-driven 
approach to planning is evidenced in Peterborough’s planning 
activities for the downtown core. Like many cities throughout 
Ontario, Peterborough has invested heavily in the revitalization 
of its downtown core and waterfront to combat downtown 
decline, with an outlay of $5-6 million since 1989 
(urbanMetrics, 2008). To support these initiatives, the City 
adopted a Downtown Masterplan in 1991 and included this Plan 
as an amendment (#71) to the Official Plan (City of 
Peterborough Planning Division, 2009a; urbanMetrics, 2008). 
The Masterplan provided greater direction in support of a mix 
of housing, public amenities and adequate infrastructure to 
accommodate appropriate downtown densities and mixed land 
uses. This plan was later refined and updated as the Central 
Area Masterplan to bring it into conformity with the Growth 
plan in 2009 (City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2009a). 
The Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe 
marked a turning point for Peterborough’s traditional approach 
to urban planning in which the majority of its residential growth has been in the form of single-detached 
dwellings at the City’s periphery (Hunt, 2009). In a presentation to the Ontario Home Builders’ 
Association about housing construction under the province’s new policy framework, the City Planning 
Box 4. City of Peterborough 
Growth Plan OPA, 2009 
a) Plan to achieve a minimum 
density of 50 persons and jobs per 
hectare for Designated Greenfield 
Areas and 150 persons and jobs 
per hectare for the Urban Growth 
Centre. 
b) Encourage intensification of 
people and jobs in the Urban 
Growth Centre, within 
intensification areas, and along 
intensification corridors. 
c) Encourage new development in 
existing built up areas to have a 
compact form, and an appropriate 
mix of uses and densities that 
allow for the efficient use of land, 
infrastructures and public service 
facilities. 
d) Provide sufficient land to 
accommodate an appropriate 
range and mix of employment 
opportunities, housing and other 
land uses to meet projected needs 
for the Official Plan timeframe. 
e) Encourage the remediation and 
redevelopment of brownfield sites 
to uses that revitalize 
neighbourhoods. 
f) Encourage the reuse and/or 
conversion of greyfields and 
underutilized sites.  
(Source: City of Peterborough, 1981, 
amended 2009) 
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Division Manager, Ken Hetherington acknowledged that the City hadn’t “…seen small walk-up 
apartments or multi-storey (residential) buildings built for 25 years” (Hanes, 2011). Despite concern 
expressed by staff about the Peterborough’s ability to achieve the Growth Plan’s density and 
intensification targets (City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2009b) the City did not seek provincial 
approval for alternative targets (Allen & Campsie, 2013).  
Peterborough Council adopted a Growth Management Strategy Amendment for incorporation 
into the Official Plan in 2009 (OPA #142). The Strategy adopts Growth Plan policies almost verbatim and 
provides the necessary policy framework for the City to achieve the Growth Plan’s objectives (City of 
Peterborough, 1981, amended 2009). The amendment, which did not require Ministerial approval, elicited 
a single article in the local newspaper and was approved by Council with little fanfare or controversy 
(Wedley, 2009). The new growth management policies provide a high level framework for planning that 
conforms to the Growth Plan, and commit the City to the development of more specific implementation 
strategies. Planning for these more detailed implementation strategies is underway through the City’s 
Official Plan review process.  
County of Peterborough’s Growth Management Initiatives 
Like Simcoe County, the County of Peterborough is tasked with providing broad policy direction 
for a predominantly rural area in which cottage and recreation development contributes to a significant 
portion of the overall development. Also like Simcoe County, Peterborough County plays a reduced role 
in water and waste water infrastructure delivery and the development approvals process compared with 
Regional governments such as the Region of Waterloo. The County of Peterborough’s first Official Plan 
was approved by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs in 1994, four years prior to the Official Plan adopted 
by Simcoe County. In 2008, the Townships of Asphodel-Norwood, North Kawartha and Selwyn opted to 
include their local official plans in the County’s Official Plan (OPA #3) which the County recognized 
would lead to greater consistency and coordination for the planning and development of the townships 
(County of Peterborough, 2013b). The remaining five townships adopted separate Official Plans. 
Prior to the Growth Plan, Peterborough County initiated few policies or programs to prevent 
growth beyond settlement boundaries or to increase the density of greenfield development. County 
severance policies between 1990 and 2000 provided minimal control over the severance of agricultural 
lands for rural residential use. During that time, the County saw a ratio of 1.38 new residential lots created 
per 1000 acres of agricultural land – a ratio higher than that estimated for either Waterloo (0.23) or 
Simcoe (0.93) during the same time period (Caldwell & Weir, 2002). The 1994 County Official Plan did 
little to discourage municipal plans for dispersed growth, such as the incremental lakeshore cottage 
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construction and estate residential development in rural areas (County of Peterborough, 1994, 
consolidated 2013). Medium to large lakeside residential developments, ranging in size from 44 units to 
700 units in unserviced and non-settlement areas have contributed a significant proportion of many 
townships’ total growth (Greater Peterborough Area Economic Development Corporation, 2008).  
In more recent years, the County approved a controversial 2005 Fraserville Secondary Plan 
proposed by Cavan Monoghan Township for a large residential and commercial development in a small 
hamlet adjacent to an isolated Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation facility. With inadequate 
servicing to accommodate the proposed growth, the township initially approved a proposal to pipe water 
from a location on Oak Ridges Moraine 12 km away (Pentikainen & Brunger, 2010). Public opposition, 
economic challenges and planning concerns later caused Cavan Monoghan Council to reverse its decision 
and approve a significantly reduced plan for development that could be accommodated with existing 
servicing (Isaacson, 2011).  
Release of the Growth Plan in 2006 initially led to strong criticism by County politicians who 
were concerned about the economic impact of the province’s population forecasts, which, by the time of 
the Growth Plan’s release, had already been surpassed (Isaacson, 2009). Whereas the Region of Waterloo 
embarked on a Growth Management Strategy and the MMAH provided Simcoe with a strategy through 
its Simcoe amendment to the Growth Plan, Peterborough County initiated no comprehensive Growth 
Management Strategy as part of its conformity exercise. County Council did, however, adopt a Growth 
Plan Amendment (OPA 7), approved by the MMAH in 2010, to bring the Official Plan into conformity 
with the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe. While the Official Plan Amendment recognized 
the 40% intensification target, it also cited the County’s intention to perform an intensification analysis in 
order to seek a reduced intensification target from the province within 2 years of the Official Plan 
Amendment (County of Peterborough, 1994, consolidated 2013). To date, however, no alternative 
intensification target has been granted (Allen & Campsie, 2013). The County did, however, negotiate 
alternative density targets of 35-40 persons/jobs per ha, with the target of 35 persons/jobs per ha being 
implemented at the time of the amendment’s adoption, to increase to 40 by 2015 or during the next 5 year 
review of the OP, whichever was sooner (County of Peterborough, 1994, consolidated 2013).  
In adherence to the Growth Plan’s requirement for the majority of growth be directed to fully 
serviced urban areas, the County’s Official Plan identifies four settlement areas to be the subject of 
intensification policies – Millbrook (Township of Cavan Monoghan), Lakefield (Township of Selwyn), 
Norwood (Township of Asphodel-Norwood), and Havelock (Township of Havelock-Belmont-Methuen). 
The four remaining townships that lack fully serviced settlement areas are assigned no intensification 
target, either by the province or by the County, yet collectively, these townships have been allocated 
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almost 40% of the County’s population growth (Allen & Campsie, 2013; County of Peterborough, 1994, 
consolidated 2013; Table 17). While the County Official Plan does provide a general provision for 
residential growth in hamlets to be directed toward infill and minor expansion, permitted land uses in 
those hamlets is later limited to predominantly single detached residential “with some limited provision 
for multiple unit dwellings”  (County of Peterborough, 1994, consolidated 2013, s. 6.2.3.3). The absence 
of lower tier intensification targets contrasts with lower tier municipalities in both Waterloo Region and 
Simcoe County, all of whom have been assigned individual intensification targets either through Upper 
tier Official Plans or through the Growth Plan Amendment 1.  
Table 17. Intensification Targets of Lower Tier Municipalities, County of Peterborough (Allen & 
Campsie, 2013). 
PETERBOROUGH COUNTY 
LOWER TIER MUNICIPALITIES 
ALLOCATED PROPORTION 
OF GROWTHa (2006-2031) 
MINIMUM 
INTENSIFICATION 
TARGET 
Township of Douro-Dummer 11.3% 0% 
Township of Trent Lakes (Formerly 
Galway-Cavendish and Harvey) 
8.3% 0% 
Township of North Kawartha 3.1% 0% 
Township of Otonabee-South 
Monaghan 
11.2% 0% 
Township of Asphodel-Norwood 8.5% 40% 
Township of Cavan-Monaghan 16.6% 40% 
Township of Havelock-Belmont-
Methuen 
9.2% 40% 
Township of Selwyn (Formerly Smith-
Ennismore-Lakefield) 
31.7 40% 
a County of Peterborough Official Plan  
 
Lower tier municipal growth management initiatives 
With little policy guidance from the County, lower tier municipalities have historically pursued 
individual economic objectives with limited obligation to consider their broader spatial implications. The 
form and location of growth in the townships, prior to 2006, has been largely influenced by the absence of 
municipal water and waste water servicing and weak township and County land severance policies. 
Severance policies permitting the division of lands outside of settlement areas is credited with the location 
of residential, commercial and industrial development in agricultural areas and a corresponding gradual 
decline of the population of small towns such as Havelock (Township of Havelock-Belmont-Methuen, 
2004, p. 7). The lack of municipal servicing has required most townships to set upper limits to 
development densities to ensure proper assimilation of sewage effluent through individual septic systems, 
which in turn have helped to encourage low density, dispersed growth.  
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Growth in the townships has also been guided by an absence of policies to encourage or require 
medium or high density development in areas where municipal water services are available. Prior to the 
Growth Plan, most townships had designated little to no lands for medium to high density residential even 
in areas with suitable servicing capacity. As recently as 2002, for example, only one lot in the town of 
Havelock was designated for high density residential use, and no areas were designated for medium 
density residential use (Township of Havelock-Belmont-Methuen, 2004).  
One of the most significant developments in the townships was the 1999 approval by Cavan 
Monoghan Township Council for the location of an Ontario Lottery and Gaming (OLG) Corporation 
facility at a rural race track south of Peterborough. The facility has been credited with encouraging 
expansion of the unserviced hamlet of Fraserville in an area immediately south of the City of 
Peterborough’s southern border and contributing to inefficient land use patterns immediately south of the 
City’s border (Pentikainen & Brunger, 2010). Located near the Peterborough airport, a provincial 
highway and a prospective highway 407 expansion, the area was originally planned to be the economic 
focus for the township, which commenced a planning process to enable a large scale, commercial, 
residential and recreational development and associated municipal servicing (Pentikainen & Brunger, 
2010). This process led to the adoption of the 2005 Fraserville Secondary Plan by Cavan Monoghan 
Council and approved by the County, to permit the construction of 2,700 residential units, industrial lands 
and a large entertainment development including a golf course, and an entertainment complex. Significant 
public opposition to the controversial plan to pipe water from the Oak Ridges Moraine to service the 
development as well as public concern over its conflict with objectives of the Growth Plan to make use of 
existing infrastructure, protect agricultural lands and site development in already built up areas, may have 
contributed to the Township’s later decision to shelve the Plan (Churchyard & Caldwell, 2011; Eagle, ; 
Isaacson, 2011).  
Despite initial frustration by some township councils regarding the province’s population 
forecasts (Isaacson, 2009), by 2012 all eight of the townships had adopted some form of modified Official 
Plan to bring them into conformity with the Growth Plan. The County Official Plan amendment adopted 
in 2010 served as the conformance mechanism for those townships whose local policies were integrated 
into the County’s Official Plan. For the other four townships, amendments to their Official Plans 
incorporate general policy requirements of the Growth Plan, most notably: 1) the direction of the majority 
of growth to primary settlements and hamlets areas with existing infrastructure, 2) the restriction of 
severance activity and development in areas with limited or non-existent water and wastewater 
infrastructure, 3) encouraging intensification and redevelopment in hamlet and settlement areas, and 4) 
encouraging a mix of both residential and employment land uses in hamlet and settlement areas. The 
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Official Plan for Cavan Monoghan, for example, redirects the majority of its anticipated population 
growth from its original growth area Fraserville to the township’s only serviced settlement area, 
Millbrook (Township of Cavan Monoghan, 2015). Other policies demonstrate a more comprehensive plan 
for encouraging a mix of residential and employment development. The Official Plan of Cavan 
Monoghan, for example, established the target of one new job for every three additional residents and 
provides policies for the revitalization of Millbrook’s commercial core, the encouragement of mixed uses, 
alternative forms of transportation (Nopper, 2011; Township of Cavan Monoghan, 2015).  
While most township Official Plans state generally that they will encourage a range or mix of 
housing types, specific residential policies tend to limit rather encourage that mix. Residential land use 
policies in the Official Plan for Trent Lakes (formerly Galway Cavendish and Harvey), for example, 
favour single detached units as the primary from of dwelling type rather than encouraging a mix of 
densities to be limited only by servicing limitations (Township of Galway-Cavendish and Harvey, 2011, 
s. 5.3.4). The Township’s provisions for non single detached units such as duplexes , tri-plexes and quad-
plexes are specifically encouraged to “to include acceptable landscaping  standards, and sited so as to 
minimize their effect on adjacent uses, particularly single unit dwellings” (Township of Galway-
Cavendish and Harvey, 2011, s. 5.3.5). Other townships, such as Cavan Monoghan, institutionalize the 
single detached unit as the preferred housing type by requiring that all new development in the township 
will reflect the existing built form (Township of Cavan Monoghan, 2015, p. 4). As much as 75% of 
residential development for the town of Millbrook within Cavan Monoghan township is planned to be low 
density, with maximum density targets of 35 residential units per ha, and restrictions on building height to 
3 storeys (Township of Cavan Monoghan, 2015).   
Barriers to Growth Management in Peterborough 
A total of 23 barriers to Growth Plan implementation were identified by Peterborough media 
reports, planning documents and planners (Appendix C. Reporting Frequency 9). Like the Waterloo and 
Simcoe case studies, interviews and documents reported Peterborough’s unique context as a newly 
identified barrier. In the case of Peterborough, the barrier related to the region’s physical and economic 
context, including its slow growth, a predominantly rural and low density existing built form and a lack of 
water and wastewater infrastructure.  
Of the 23 identified barriers, 12 barriers were identified as key barriers, 10 of which were 
reported by at least 10 percent of interview and document sources (Table 18). Key artifacts identified 
included unsupportive engineering and planning standards, incompatible provincial decision making, 
policy and investment and high cost and complexity to retrofit existing low density built form. These 
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barriers were reinforced by particular planning and societal environment barriers, including a lack of 
political will, staff beliefs regarding the incompatibility of high density development with local character, 
and an absence of commitment to growth management by developer. NIMBY, consumer preference for 
suburban development and auto dependency were identified as key societal barriers. Key local contextual 
factors identified by interviews and documents included slow economic growth, amenity migration and 
rural built form.  
Two additional barriers – insufficient planning capacity and inefficient or inconsistent 
administration – were identified as important intervening barriers following a critical review of the local 
contextual and historical information. Inconsistent administration was found to serve as an intermediary 
barrier through which the lack of political will functioned to reinforce low density urban form, while 
insufficient planning capacity was considered to be an additional contributing factor that exacerbated the 
inconsistent administration of growth management policies. The relationships between barriers is 
presented in Figure 9. 
 
Table 18. Peterborough Case Study Area: Key Barriers to Growth Plan Implementation. 
BARRIER TYPE BARRIER 
A Local Plans and Policies Unsupportive engineering and planning standards/policies 
A 
Federal and Provincial Plans 
and Policies 
Incompatible provincial decision making, policy and investment 
A Built Environment High cost and complexity to retrofit existing low density built form 
P 
Characteristics of the 
Implementing Agency 
Lack of political will 
P 
Characteristics of implementing 
agency 
Staff view high density development as incompatible to local character 
P 
Characteristics of implementing 
agency 
Insufficient planning capacity 
P 
Characteristics of implementing 
agency 
Inefficient or inconsistent administration 
P 
Characteristics of implementing 
agency 
Staff view their role as dependent on the market 
P Characteristics of Developers Development industry not committed to growth management objectives 
S 
Property Ownership and Rights 
Advocacy 
Presence of strong NIMBY lobbying against infill and intensification 
S Consumer Preferences Preference for low density suburban form 
S Consumer Preferences Auto dependency and absence of travel options 
 Local Context 
Unique physical conditions (e.g. slow growth, amenity migration and rural 
built form) and demographics challenge intensification 
A: Artifact; P: Planning Environment; S: Societal Environment 
176 
 
 
Figure 9. Peterborough case study region: Model of key barriers to Growth Plan implementation. Bold text indicates key barriers identified by at least 
10% of interview respondents or planning/media documents. Arrows denote positive or reinforcing relationship. 
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Model of Barriers to Growth Management for Peterborough 
Local Context 
In contrast to the challenges associated with managing growth in a rapidly urbanizing rural area 
like Simcoe, municipal planners in Peterborough reported a different set of challenges resulting from the 
region’s slow population and economic growth. Peterborough planners questioned the appropriateness of 
a plan that placed greater expectations on developers in a region experiencing little development activity. 
Economic stimulus, not growth management, some planners felt, would be more relevant to the 
Peterborough area: 
“Eastern Ontario is a somewhat economically depressed area that would stand to benefit 
from an economic development growth plan like the Northern Ontario one, but at the same 
time there are areas of development, which would benefit from the philosophies of the 
Greater Golden Horseshoe Growth Plan” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
These sentiments echoed a position put forward by City of Peterborough planning staff in a 2009 
report to Council that argued that the City had more in common with the Northern and Eastern regions of 
Ontario outside of the Greater Golden Horseshoe than those cities within the GGH: 
“From a growth management and land use planning perspective, the dissimilarities between 
Peterborough and the rest of the GGH could mean that major planning issues affecting the 
rapidly growing urbanized portions of the GGH are less relevant in the Peterborough 
context. Consequently, implementing Growth Plan policies that are really tailored to 
addressing issues relevant to places such as Barrie, Kitchener or Guelph may affect 
Peterborough’s ability to maintain itself as a complete community as it exists today. 
Therefore, should the opportunity arise, it may be worthwhile to explore Peterborough’s 
place in the provincial Growth Plan framework. At the earliest, this could be done at such a 
time when a Growth Plan is prepared for eastern Ontario” (City of Peterborough Planning 
Division, 2009b, p.5).  
Peterborough’s small size and slow population growth, planners asserted, challenged staff’s 
ability to solicit public and political support for new planning objectives under the Growth Plan. Securing 
public and political support for compact development was difficult when the drawbacks of the status quo 
were imperceptible and the benefits of new development forms might not be reaped for many decades. 
Peterborough’s slow rate of development yielded few example success stories which in turn hindered the 
development of political support: 
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“But the one thing with us is, we don’t build out subdivisions in two years. We’re kind of like 
the tortoise in the tortoise and the hare story, like we just kind of comfortably knock off 400 
houses a year, and that’s a good year. So, a lot of times you don’t see the fruits of your 
labour until 5, 6, 7 years down the road. So you don’t get that quick, measurable success or 
failure” (Planner, Single tier municipality). 
Planners also described a general public for whom the drawbacks of traditional growth, such as 
traffic congestion and loss of natural areas, were not readily apparent. One planner noted, for example, 
that short average commuting times within the City of Peterborough made it difficult to argue in favour of 
the benefits of transit-oriented densities. Further, given the region’s slow growth, the prospect of 
developing complete communities and more efficient transit was described by many planners as unlikely 
in the short term regardless of any achievements toward intensification and density targets: 
“Again, the feasibility of [complete, transit-oriented communities] is really questionable 
because you need a certain threshold in order to have a complete community or a transit-
friendly [community], again with the slow growth area, we may have a plan of subdivision 
for ten lots, and someone’s not going to put a commercial component with that right? And 
ten lots are not going to all of a sudden add to a community being transit-friendly, again, 
this is one of those ones that are big urban and not applicable really to the County. We don’t 
really have any public transit in our four villages – there is a bus that goes from 
Peterborough to Lakefield, that’s about it. So we’re not on that scale, you know there’s a 
scale of economy, which isn’t in existence here yet and probably won’t be for quite some 
time” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
The pressure to attract development in a slow growing region, many planners acknowledged, was 
an obstacle that impacted political support for growth management initiatives. In a study of planning 
challenges associated with rural-urban fringe municipalities, Pentikainen and Brunger (2010) reported 
that the drive for new municipal revenue sources was a primary factor in Cavan Monoghan township 
Council’s approval of an Ontario Lottery and Gaming development, and subsequent plans for residential 
and entertainment development, in the unserviced hamlet of Fraserville. Planning regulations that directed 
development within settlement boundaries and required higher densities and levels of intensification were 
perceived by planners as particularly challenging for Peterborough County’s small rural, and fiscally 
constrained municipalities where such requirements could be perceived as constraining needed growth:  
“The limited growth opportunities in rural Ontario is a major issue for the Growth Plan that 
needs to be addressed by proper authorities in the future. …Because it is very hard to argue 
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against the settlements being the focus, where the infrastructure is and making the best use 
of that infrastructure. But …it is pretty tough to make it go and balance your books in rural 
communities if your development opportunities are pretty much zero…  
The obstacles I see conferring Smart Growth strategies would include politics, as the number 
one. I’m particularly referring to rural politicians and the political process. [Rural 
municipalities] are struggling for their survival. They don’t have a very large commercial or 
industrial assessment base. Whatever they can get to offset the residential tax base is 
desirable, but it may not be an approved initiative in terms of Smart Growth” (Consulting 
Planner). 
Like Simcoe County, the physical amenities of Peterborough County were also found to create 
unique development pressures that were not accounted for under the Growth Plan. Isolated recreation and 
resource-based developments in rural areas, such as the Kawartha Downs casino, golf courses, ski hills, 
and lakeshore developments attracted accessory residential developments that challenged growth 
management for the broader region. In reviewing the impacts of locating a large recreational development 
on Fraserville’s unserviced lands, the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario noted that the County had 
failed to develop a watershed plan to ensure appropriate consideration of ground water resources and lake 
carrying capacities in land use planning decisions (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2011b).  
Some planners recognized the inadequacy of Growth Plan policies to protect natural and 
agricultural areas from development:  
“[The Growth Plan] talks a lot about … green spaces related to things of a provincial 
interest. Green spaces that might have some provincial significant to them, and then you 
couple it up with the Provincial Policy Statement that deals with development in proximity to 
areas of significance that are identified in the PPS. But there are a lot of other areas of 
green that aren’t necessarily of provincial significance…So it’s still left up to the individual 
municipality to sort of make its own determination as to which green spaces, if they’re not 
provincially significant, identified explicitly in the Growth Plan or in the PPS, then each 
municipality, it’s their own call in terms of what gets protected and what doesn’t. So there’s 
more green space out there that could be protected than just provincially significant green 
space” (Planner, Single tier municipality). 
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Consumer Preferences 
Consistent with the other case study regions, Peterborough planners identified consumer 
preferences as a significant barrier to their ability to implement policies to manage growth. City of 
Peterborough planners described the new greenfield density requirements as a “sharp break in the 
traditional residential development patterns of the City” (City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2009b, 
p. 53). With an absence of market demand for higher density housing, City planners identified designated 
greenfield density target as the most challenging of all the growth Plan targets for the City of 
Peterborough to achieve 
Like the planners interviewed from Simcoe, planners in Peterborough County and the City of 
Peterborough described the region as having a strong rural or small town identity that was tightly 
associated with low density, single detached urban forms. Both planners and planning documents 
described housing preferences in the County that favoured large single detached homes on 50-100 wide 
lots, hobby farms and lakeshore cottages. The entrenched low density consumer patterns were described 
by one planner as magnifying over time:  
“For our municipality, the lifestyle is entrenched. Cavan-Monaghan does tend to have a 
better-educated, higher-income population, which leads to certain lifestyle choices with the 
larger lots. We have large – when people build homes today, I would say by far, the majority 
are bigger than 2400 square feet, you know? And in my younger days, if you lived in a 1200 
square foot house, that was kind of the norm – that is so far, not the norm these days. People 
drive everywhere, and there’s expectation of a higher level of service. So it’s that whole 
lifestyle thing” (Planner, Lower tier municipality). 
The interplay between slow growth and consumer preferences was frequently described by 
planners as a significant challenge to their ability to implement Growth Plan policies. The absence of a 
market for high density housing, although expressed by municipal planners across all three case study 
areas, was a particular concern for planners in the Peterborough area. Some planners expressed 
discomfort with any actions that would potentially restrict development in a slow growth community like 
Peterborough, citing the importance of each individual development proposal to the City’s overall growth 
and the potential impact of developer hold-outs. As well, many Peterborough planners perceived 
themselves as separate agents to property markets rather than playing a hybrid role between private and 
public interests. 
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“So I think for me, that’s the most troubling part about [growth plan targets], is that we’ve 
always tried to stay out of market-related types of issues” (Planner, Single tier municipality). 
“Realizing that growth is right now here is pretty slow, we may not see the effectiveness [of 
the Growth Plan] for quite some time - it’s all market-driven. And even though sometimes 
there’s a market, people just hang onto property because they don’t want to invest in the 
infrastructure, the development costs, and they’ll just hang onto it for a long period time and 
then sell it eventually” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
A perception by planners of their limited influence over markets, combined with a prevailing 
consumer demand for low density forms of development and limited development pressure led some 
planners to express concern that the Growth Plan targets may not be achievable: 
“I still struggle greatly, with how we’re going to achieve 50 people and jobs per hectare in 
our greenfield areas. You know, the province has kind of shown us some pretty pictures of 
what it looks like, but man, I just don’t see it happening, given our demographic makeup and 
getting back into the market kind of things. I think we’ve done really good the last few years 
in terms of medium-density but again, you can plan for all the medium-density in the world, 
but if it doesn’t get built, what are you achieving? So that’s the biggest challenge in my 
mind, for us, is that target” (Planner, Single tier municipality). 
Property Ownership and Rights Advocacy 
In addition to consumer preferences, opposition to compact development by affected 
neighbourhoods (NIMBY) was frequently cited by Peterborough area planners as a challenge for growth 
management through its impact on political decision making. Many planners pointed to the rural or 
“cottage county” identity of the region as driving this challenge for managing growth. In contrast to the 
Simcoe area, where a conflict between rural identity and growth management planning was also 
identified, most planners from the Peterborough area described the conflict as a public education 
challenge rather than a problem with the Growth Plan itself: 
 “Well the challenge is the whole public acceptance. As I said, Milbrook is currently the only 
serviced area [in Cavan Monoghan Township] so that’s, at this point, where all the 
intensification has to go and there is resistance in term of parking, noise, a change in… 
tenure. So that’s the real challenge there. People have an expectation that if you’re going to 
do alternative forms or types of housing, that that should be in a new area, you don’t mix 
that in with the existing neighbourhood…In some areas in Milbrook there are the historic 
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homes. It’s quite a mix but there’s a perception that they’ve got this history that by bringing 
in new development that might be a different style, it’s not compatible. So, that’s the 
challenge” (Planner, lower tier municipality). 
Certainly, the problem is that, the traditional way of planning is to separate. To make sure 
that nobody’s going to have anybody next door that might decrease their property values or 
you know, mix the “riff-raff” with the “hoity-toities”. You know what I mean. And, so trying 
to change that, is a challenge. It’s trying to introduce different, and really just more in the 
way of changing policies to make it more possible is part of it, but the other part is certainly 
the approach taken by those who are already there, versus those who might be coming in. 
There’s a real tendency for people to say, “I bought it because I wanted it to be this way, 
and now you’re trying to change it and I'm going to fight you tooth and nail because that’s 
not why I bought this property.” And because the planning process is geared to public 
reaction, and public reaction tends to be very, very selfish, it makes a problem for those 
communities who are trying to be more proactive” (Consulting Planner). 
Peterborough planners described a level of NIMBY that challenged even the most modest 
increases to density within the built boundary, such as a single triplex or small scale semi-detached 
residential infill development. Planners described numerous examples of higher density development 
applications being supported by both staff and Official Plan policies, but denied by Council due to 
widespread community opposition. While in some cases, the decisions to deny the applications were 
appealed and overturned by the OMB, public opposition contributed to a lengthy and expensive planning 
process:  
“One [failed rezoning application] was to convert a single-detached dwelling to a triplex. 
The property is located on a county road, which is an arterial road, it’s across the road from 
a school, it’s within walking distance to the arena, the library, the community centre, liquor 
store, the grocery store – you can walk everywhere, technically you wouldn’t need a car. The 
neighbours went… crazy. Yep, so that application did not get approved based on traffic, and 
the fact that there were kids playing in the street, which is beyond me. But in terms of 
absolute planning, [the application] makes sense, it’s permitted in the Official Plan, it met 
all the criteria in terms of what you want, in terms of location. It met the zoning by-law 
requirements for setbacks, minimum unit size, parking spaces – all of the things that we 
would look at in a more traditional planning sense, but in terms of public acceptance, it 
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wasn’t there, and so council – this is an election year… refused to approve the amendment 
and so, now we have an appeal at the board” (Planner, Lower tier municipality). 
“In Lakefield, there was a greenfield development, and they were proposing higher densities. 
They were also proposing a real mix of uses, they were having small frontage single-
detached, they were having some townhomes, they were having a retirement residence and 
they were having like a nursing or sort of like an advanced care facility. And they were also 
reserving some blocks maybe for some future apartments, even more dense, and the 
neighbours really did not want to see that. It had been within the village limits, but 
undeveloped forever. And then all of a sudden there was something that was promoting 
Smart Growth, a mix of uses, there was a little bit of commercial too – they were putting in 
some professional health-related offices in this development. So there was a commercial 
aspect to it as well. You know, the people in the general vicinity just went nuts – went crazy. 
There was an appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board, but it finally got resolved and 
development is going to be able to proceed. But again, that’s one of those examples where 
you know it just takes one person to delay a project 6 months or a year or sometimes even to 
tumble the whole project” (Planner, Upper tier municipality). 
“It’s a challenge to balance on one hand, both the people and the politicians are into the 
preservation of agriculture land, and the environment, but at the same time they’re telling 
me yes, we want more growth in Millbrook, but don’t do it on the Oak Ridges Moraine, don’t 
do it on prime agricultural land, don’t intensify because “we don’t like it”. The box is very 
small, so we don’t have any successes at this point in time” (Planner, Lower tier 
municipality). 
Characteristics of the Implementing Agency 
Lack of political will to support the policies, programs and incentives necessary for compact 
growth, as well as a lack of support for the development applications that implement those policies, was 
identified by Peterborough planners and in media reports (e.g. Isaacson, 2009) as a significant obstacle to 
Growth Plan implementation. A number of planners recognized these pressures as stemming in part from 
entrenched beliefs and opinions of elected officials, combined with receptiveness to public opposition.  
There’s a certain amount of resistance when you’re talking to the political entities, you 
know, your council members, about changing the way we’re doing things. For years and 
years and years, we’ve gone along sort of the same path of… developer comes in, what do 
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you want? Ok, does it fit? Let’s move on, get it approved. All of a sudden there’s a shift in 
philosophy, and whenever you have that shift in philosophy, you’ve got to get buy-in. And 
you got to get buy-in at the staff level and at the political level” (Planner, Upper tier 
municipality). 
Peterborough area’s economic challenges were also described as an important factor that 
influenced political support for growth management initiatives. Central and eastern Ontario face “extreme 
reliance on residential tax assessment” because of limited employment development that has resulted in 
an over dependence on residential taxpayers to pay for local services and infrastructure (Natural Capital 
Resources Inc, 2012). Insufficient tax revenue has reduced the City of Peterborough ability to provide 
basic active transportation infrastructure, such as sidewalks on both sides of the street (Wedley, 2013a; 
Wedley, 2013c), and transit service improvements such as extended days of operation (Kovach, 2015).  
With the financial imperative to fund upgrades to infrastructure through development charges, 
elected officials in the lower tier municipalities of Peterborough County faced significant pressures to 
approve growth projections and development proposals, even if they failed to meet Growth Plan 
objectives. In an update of Cavan Monaghan township’s Official Plan, for example, the township and 
County approved a population target that exceed the Growth Plan target and an expansion of the 
Millbrook’s settlement boundaries to accommodate a transfer of growth from Fraserville that was 
approved prior to the Growth Plan (K. Ellis, 2012; Township of Cavan Monoghan, 2015). In reviewing a 
subdivision application for the newly expanded area, Cavan Monaghan Council recognized that the 
growth was necessary to fund improvements to an aging wastewater treatment plan in Millbrook 
("Residents speak out on proposed Millbrook subdivision".2015). 
Some interview respondents felt that township politicians were particularly susceptible to the 
promise of economic growth in their approval of the Fraserville Secondary Plan, in spite of significant 
public opposition (Isaacson, 2011), a problem that was  exacerbated by disassociation from the true costs 
of servicing different land uses as a result of dependence on casino revenues (Churchyard & Caldwell, 
2011). Describing the Fraserville development as a leapfrog development set to become “a Las Vegas of 
the North”, one consulting planner acknowledged that the community will compete with the City of 
Peterborough by luring residents and jobs and will make it difficult for the City to meet its intensification 
and density targets. Growth machine politics were described as critical driving force behind the 
Fraserville development: 
“I think there has been a major effort by a small group of smart developers with council, to 
turn [Fraserville] in to a major growth centre. But it required full services; they got full 
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services and the development is going ahead. The planning documents aren’t reflecting the 
development at this location, but the reason it is happening is not because of the planning 
documents; the reason it is happening is because of all the other things – the good politics 
municipally with the provincial politicians” (Consulting planner). 
Peterborough planners also questioned the suitability of Growth Plan targets in light of the 
region’s unique demographics when compared to other regions in the Greater Golden Horseshoe. With 
the seniors and students comprising the majority of the region’s population growth, a City of 
Peterborough planning report described a number of technical challenges in meeting the Growth Plan’s 
intensification and density targets (City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2009b). One of these 
challenges pertained to the fact that students were not counted in density targets since they are not 
permanent residents, but still had to be accommodated – a challenge facing the Waterloo Region as well. 
A second challenge unique to Peterborough was planning for senior households, which tend to be smaller 
than average, and therefore require more units to accommodate the same size population as other 
demographic groups. Moreover, senior’s residences do not count toward Growth Plan density targets 
because they are not considered individual units. The report claimed that the density required to 
accommodate the high senior and student population combined with smaller household size associated 
with these groups will result in a denser built form than most other areas in the Greater Golden Horseshoe 
(City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2009b).  
Peterborough planners reiterated the importance of demographics in achievement of Growth Plan 
targets. Many planners felt that the targets were unrealistic for their municipality’s demographic makeup, 
with one planner dismissing the intensification and greenfield targets as a “numbers game”.  
“ …I still struggle greatly, with how we’re going to achieve 50 people and jobs per hectare 
in our greenfield areas. You know, the province has kind of shown us some pretty pictures of 
what it looks like, but man, I just don’t see it happening, given our demographic makeup and 
getting back into the market kind of things. I think we’ve done really good the last few years 
in terms of medium-density but again, you can plan for all the medium-density in the world, 
but if it doesn’t get built, what are you achieving? So that’s the biggest challenge in my 
mind, for us, is that target” (Planner, Single tier municipality). 
Planners also acknowledged their own reluctance to embrace new development patterns out of 
concern for their marketability and impacts on traffic. In spite of the fact that Peterborough has been 
found to have the smallest gap between its existing density of people and jobs/ha and the density required 
by Growth Plan compared with other outer-ring urban growth centres (Allen & Campsie, 2013), planners 
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were skeptical about their region’s ability to achieve the Growth Plan’s intensification and density targets. 
A large, new urbanist development proposal in the City of Peterborough, for example, failed to secure 
staff support in part because of its novelty and staff’s uncertainty about its potential impacts:  
“So, in part, we didn’t want them to come in with 1000 homes of rear lane product off the 
bat, but in part, it was also I think because we still had other outstanding issues that had to 
be addressed before we could entertain such a large-scale development. So, scoping it down 
to 100 lots or so was a fairly sort of safe compromise to allow us to test this sort of 
development land use pattern” (Planner, Single tier municipality). 
Like Simcoe, some Peterborough planners linked more compact growth with the demise of the 
local rural identity characterized by large lots and ample green space: 
“Anyway, that’s a problem, trying to intensify something that is really, pretty much as 
intense as it gets, without completely overhauling the whole sense of community, and the 
whole heritage of - and sense of place that people have. The other problem is that, what it 
means is that green space will be taken up, because the areas that are not developed are the 
green spaces – the area where the trees grow, and where kids can ride their bikes and collect 
frogs and do whatever, even little villages, and when you get rid of those in favour of paving 
it over for intensification, you lose a lot. You lose the feel – what people I think, need for 
their heart and soul, to be able to live as human beings as opposed to, you know, in little 
cubicles. So I find that as a real problem” (Consulting Planner). 
“One of the downsides of intensification is that it is a very nice wiggle word, and it can be 
used to justify undesirable things in existing neighborhood where the character is perhaps 
worth preserving. But this changes from municipality to municipality. The best example on 
that would be justifying small lots within an existing neighborhood that had a large lot 
character. Depends on who writes the report sometimes. But a profound effect on that could 
be character of the neighborhood” (Consulting Planner). 
Characteristics of Developers  
Planners also described developers as reluctant to fully embrace alternative forms of development 
and higher densities and who continued to rely on traditional urban forms and segregated uses. Examples 
of intensification efforts described by planners emphasized a practice by developers of reducing lot sizes 
for single detached units to achieve density requirements, but an absence of a full range of compact built 
forms and configurations, such as stacked townhouses and midrise apartments.  
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“…recently I received a plan of subdivision that came in for this area, and it, well depending 
on the assumptions it used, it does achieve sort of the densities that we’re looking for. But it 
doesn’t necessarily provide the mix of land uses necessarily that we’re looking for, or the 
mix of housing types that we’re looking for. They attempted to come in and basically put in 
as many small lot singles, you know, 27 to 30-foot singles, as they could in the area, rather 
than putting in some maybe, medium-density apartment buildings or walk-ups or what have 
you, and stuff like that. I think if there’s going to be a challenge in the greenfield area, it’s 
going to be what form does that density take? Because I think there are a number of different 
ways to achieve the compact community that we’re looking for. But it’ll boil down to a 
debate over what form it actually takes” (Planner, Single tier municipality). 
“So, it’s going to take a lot of time to change [the existing suburban] built form, and also to 
be able to move back towards using some of those older structures. For example, you know, 
fire code is a real problem, and renovation costs are a real problem in some of these old 
buildings, that there’s a huge opportunity to revitalize the downtown, but at the same time, 
the cost to do that is, can be very, very high. The developer would rather just knock the thing 
down and start again, and build a box store, you know, put a Shoppers Drug Mart on the 
main street, and one level and whatever, than they would like to renovate and revitalize the 
downtown” (Consulting Planner). 
Low land prices, increases in rental vacancy and consumer demand were identified as the reason 
for a relatively slow starts for multi-unit residential development in the Peterborough Census 
Metropolitan District (CMHC, 2014). With limited demand for more compact housing, a 50 year supply 
of designated greenfield (City of Peterborough Planning Division, 2013), and strong public opposition to 
medium density developments, developers have had limited incentive to invest in infill projects or higher 
density forms. 
Federal and Provincial Plans and Policies 
Peterborough County, like many other municipalities in the outer ring of the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe, including Simcoe County, have sought alternative density from the province. A lower 
greenfield density target of 35%, to increase to 40% in 2015, was approved by the province, permitting 
new development to continue at densities too low to support basic transit (Allen & Campsie, 2013). As 
many as four of the Peterborough County’s lower tier municipalities – Township of Douro-Dummer, 
Township of Galway-Cavendish and Harvey, Township of North Kawartha and Township of Otonabee-
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South Monaghan have also been exempted from the minimum intensification target because they had not 
delineated a built boundary. 
Findings by Allen and Campsie (2013) suggest that by 2031, the overall density of urban 
development in the Greater Golden Horseshoe will vary little from the status quo. The study identified the 
lower density and intensification targets granted to municipalities across the Greater Golden Horseshoe as 
a significant factor in the likely failure of the Growth Plan to achieve its goals. Following the release of 
the Neptis report, Environmental Commissioner released a cautionary media release stating that Ontario’s 
Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe was not on track to meet its goal of curbing urban sprawl 
in the region (Environment Commission, 2013). 
Provincial approval in April 2005 (one year before the release of the Growth Plan) of the Cavan-
Monaghan revised Official Plan containing the Fraserville Secondary Plan amendment also highlights a 
conflict between the Growth Plan’s objectives and Ontario Ministry actions that conflict with those 
objectives (Pentikainen and Brunger, 2010). Following that approval, in 2007 the province approved the 
Environmental Assessment for the proposed water and waste water servicing, and the federal and 
provincial governments earmarked close to $20 million in infrastructure funding to facilitate the project.  
Under public pressure, Cavan-Monoghan Council has since abandoned its servicing and growth plan for  
Fraserville, however the original approval of the project by municipal and provincial authorities was 
noted by one planner as inconsistent with the Growth Plan objectives: 
“On the outskirts of Peterborough, 10 minutes out of town, is an existing racetrack called 
Kawartha Downs. It is just right on edge of a little rural hamlet called Fraserville, which has 
a few homes and a gas station on private services. …Developers and the politicians saw an 
opportunity to initiate a major development at this location, but it was all predicated on the 
installation of full service and had to be approved by the province – Ministry of 
Environment. So there has been quite a land assembly by the private sector in that location, 
and you can imagine the behind the scenes actions that has happened. Anyway, what has 
happened locally, this isolated location and entertainment centre will have full services 
approved by the province on a line extended quite a distance within that rural setting. It will 
likely become a Las Vegas of the North, which is great for the region but lousy for the City of 
Peterborough. It is a leapfrog development outside and I don’t think it is smart, in terms of 
Smart Growth, but the City has approved the [water pipe] line – major politics involved” 
(Consulting Planner). 
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Local Plans and Policies 
Municipal Planners in the City of Peterborough emphasized a challenge associated with zoning 
by-laws and engineering requirements that were incompatible with the Growth Plan’s objectives to 
encourage intensification and a mix of housing at higher densities. Unsupportive local policies were cited 
as requiring planners and engineering staff to come to a common agreement about minimum standards 
and acceptable approaches to facilitate new development patterns and densities.   
“Well, I’ll go back to the subdivision example in the north-end, because that was years in the 
making. Even just trying to convince different utilities and engineers here, that you don’t 
need ‘x’ amount of metres for a right-of-way, you know. You can get this [indicating on 
map], and if you move your water main here and joint trench with these, then we can reduce 
that. Yeah, it was tough. And I think if you talk to any of them, they’re still not convinced that 
it will work. Again, snow plowing is a big one, right? Like with the rear lane way, should it 
be private, should it be public? We fought that for months. The different tours down to other 
communities where they’ve done these types of development – this is brand spanking new for 
us – there was a lot of back and forth on a lot of the technical servicing issues” (Planner, 
Single tier municipality). 
“As an example of this, we’ve had through a land use planning exercise where we were 
receiving applications now where developers are looking to implement sort of alternative 
development standards. And they are looking to implement narrower road right-of-ways, 
smaller lot sizes, that sort of thing, and part of it is in response to Places to Grow legislation. 
But through that, the concerns that engineering and utility sort of professionals are dealing 
with on these types of applications is that …they have certain minimum standards that they 
have to adhere to in terms of the placement of their underground utilities. In the past, 
everyone just sort of had their own utility in their own trench in the road, and they were 
happy that way, and now you’re forcing people to work together and to try and find their 
own space within a common utility trench. And that type of change can be difficult to 
navigate and try and make happen” (Planner, Single tier municipality). 
Opportunities to strengthen other municipal policies to support alternative modes of 
transportation and transit support densities have been identified by the public, media and Peterborough’s 
Social Planning Council. In a report prepared for Peterborough’s Social Planning Council, Throop (2010) 
(2010) recommended the City improve its planning approaches for alternative forms of transportation, 
including adopting a more ambitious target for transit’s modal share from 6% to 15% by 2021, and land 
190 
 
use planning policies to improve walkability, such as sidewalks and commercial building setbacks. 
Citizens have expressed concern regarding the City’s proposed parkway expansion, citing concerns about 
induced demand for car travel over alternatives and loss of park and trail space (S. Frank, 2013).  
Summary 
Planning in the Peterborough case study region has been largely influenced by slow growth, 
which has translated into the prioritization of economic development over planning, particularly in the 
smaller rural municipalities. Development industry and consumer preferences conflict with growth 
management objectives to create significant political pressure for traditional, low density development. 
These challenges were further exacerbated by a provincial policy framework that failed to hold the region 
to the Growth Plan’s intended intensification and density standards. 
Comparison of Models 
While the generic barrier models (Figure 3 and 4) identified a total of 31 known or potential 
barriers to growth management, the results of this research suggest that only a subset of these barriers 
function as key barriers to define local responses to growth management. Moreover, different regions 
were found to demonstrate different patterns of barriers and barrier interactions across societal, planning 
and artifact scales.  
A small subset of the 10 societal-scale barriers identified in the literature were identified in the 
case study models as playing a critical role in obstructing growth management efforts. Compared to other 
societal barriers predicted by the general model, these societal barriers interacted directly with low 
density urban form rather than through an intervening planning environment barrier or artifact. Consumer 
preferences for suburban development, NIMBY and auto dependency were identified as key societal 
environment barriers in the Waterloo and Peterborough regions, while consumer preferences and auto 
dependency were identified as key societal environment barriers for Simcoe. Similarities in key societal 
environment barriers across the different case studies was not unexpected given the regions’ shared, 
Provincial-scale regulatory and general cultural settings. Case studies were purposefully selected from an 
area within the outer ring of the Greater Golden Horseshoe and thus operated within some of the same 
formal institutional frameworks, including the same Provincial land use planning and legal dispute 
resolution frameworks, and land and property market system.  Some general cultural similarities between 
case study regions were also anticipated given the relatively close proximity of case studies and their 
location within the same geopolitical region. 
191 
 
Key societal environment barriers for all three regions highlighted the relative importance of 
place identity, and associated cultural preferences and sense of belonging, as an important institution that 
directly supported and helped to perpetuate low density urban forms. In Peterborough and Simcoe, the 
societal scale barriers were reinforced by local contextual factors such as natural amenities, which created 
the physical conditions that helped to define local identities, structured transportation choices and housing 
preferences, and motivated powerful actors/actor groups to advocate for low density urban forms. By 
contrast, the polycentric urban form of the Waterloo region played a limited role in defining or supporting 
consumer preferences for low density urban forms, and was not a significant influence on the broader 
institutional logics underlying place identity. The Waterloo region’s polycentric form did, however, 
support the societal scale barrier of auto dependency through the reinforcement of car-oriented 
transportation choices. 
In contrast to the relatively uniform societal environments across the three case studies, planning 
environments in the different regions demonstrated distinct groupings and patterns of key barriers. 
Compared with Waterloo, Simcoe and Peterborough demonstrated a greater number of key planning 
environment barriers, with eight and five barriers reported, respectively. Planning environment barriers 
formed the largest category of key variables in Simcoe and Peterborough regions, which was consistent 
with the generic model that identified more barriers at the planning environment scale than at other scales. 
These barriers were found to have limited overlap with those barriers identified for Waterloo. The 
planning environment scale was also the scale at which two newly identified barriers, beyond those 
identified in the literature, were reported in the Waterloo and Simcoe case study areas.   
In the Waterloo case study, a total of three planning environment barriers were identified, two of 
which related to the broader institutions of land and property markets, and one to urban governance. Key 
planning environment barriers for Waterloo emphasized the role of development industry practices, 
beliefs and lobbying power in maintaining low density urban forms. Development industry actions and 
beliefs contrasted with municipal politicians’ and planners’ efforts to adopt and implement plans that 
constrained low density suburban development. Local context in the form of polycentric urban form 
presented technical and political challenges for municipal planners to encourage transit oriented 
development in locations that made most efficient use of existing and planned transportation 
infrastructure. 
Despite the expectation of strong hierarchical relationships driven by underlying societal barriers, 
as depicted in the culturalized planning model (Figure 2), patterns of key barriers in Simcoe emphasized 
the relative importance of the planning environment in serving as an arena of significant influence. 
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Simcoe’s barriers clearly coalesced under the theme of urban governance, specifically around the issues 
of fragmented municipal decision making, limited planning capacity, and an absence of political and staff 
support for growth management objectives.  Amenity migration in this region was found to reinforce the 
beliefs and motivations of municipal politicians and planners about the appropriate character and scale of 
built forms and opportunities for economic growth. Coupled with inter-municipal competition and a 
fragmented and under-resourced urban governance system, amenity-related private development was 
found to dictate how and where growth would occur.  
Peterborough’s key planning environment barriers related to all three institutional themes and 
specifically highlighted low planning capacity and weak support by politicians, staff and developers for 
growth management as important challenges for the region. The region’s local economic challenges 
associated with slow growth were found to heighten the effects of the planning environment barriers by 
influencing the motivation, resources and bargaining power of implementing actors required to implement 
the types of compact urban developments envisioned by the Growth Plan. The existing rural urban form 
magnified the importance of place identity, by reinforcing development industry preferences to deliver 
familiar forms, and legitimizing staff’s perceptions that low density development supported the local 
urban/rural character.  
The case study models each depicted a total of three key artifacts, stemming from multiple 
institutional frameworks. Low density urban form served as a key artifact common to all case study 
regions, reflecting similarities between case studies in terms of their historical built form and 
development approaches. Other key artifacts were shared across regions, including the complexity of 
retrofitting low density built form which was identified as a key artifact in both Waterloo and 
Peterborough, and inconsistent Provincial decision making which was a key artifact shared by both 
Simcoe and Peterborough. The relatively small number of artifacts identified as key barriers was 
consistent with the generic model of barriers which identified artifacts as the smallest grouping of 
barriers. The small number of key artifacts may reflect the impermanent nature of this scale and the fact 
that its technical outputs – the processes, plans, policies and products of planning – can be more quickly 
and easily transformed than deeply rooted cultural beliefs and practices (Healey, 2007; Reimer, 2013).  
The generic model depicted local context as an additional set of exogenous variables that could 
affect barriers at any scale of planning culture and influence how barriers were expressed and reinforced 
or undermined in different regions. Local context shaped regional patterns of barriers by influencing the 
conditions within which implementing actors within each region interpreted, presented and implemented 
the Growth Plan.  Direct interactions between local context and low density urban form were apparent in 
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all case study regions. In Waterloo, the region’s polycentric configuration helped to reinforce low density 
urban form by supporting car-oriented development and indirectly by increasing the cost and complexity 
to retrofit the existing urban form to accommodate and support higher order transit. In Simcoe, and 
Peterborough, natural amenities such as natural and rural landscapes in combination with low density 
urban forms created the cultures, identities and sense of place that influenced physical conditions that 
helped to define local identities and values. 
The relative importance of the key societal-scale barriers in the three case studies may be, in part, 
a product of their unique relationship with low density urban form. Because of their direct relationship 
with low density urban form, the barriers do not rely on other barriers to impact low density urban form. 
The long relationship chains associated with other societal-scale barriers may provide more opportunity 
for intermediary barriers to be adapted, modified or eliminated at the planning environment scale before 
they can influence low density urban form. The theory that the length of relationship chains can influence 
outcomes has been suggested by others, including Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) who theorized that the 
more interactions or decision making points there are between a policy’s development and its 
implementation, the less likely it is that outcomes will achieve the original intentions. While Pressman 
and Wildavsky’s work focused generally on implementation rather than on barriers to implementation, the 
theory’s basic premise remains relevant to the current research; namely, that a greater number of 
interactions between two variables creates more opportunities for change agents to weaken, modify or 
adapt the relationship between the two variables.  
The reciprocal relationships between low density urban form and consumer preference, NIMBY 
and auto dependency presents another rationale for the relative importance of these societal variables 
compared with others. This relationship is characterized by self-reinforcement or increasing returns in 
which low density urban forms help to strengthen consumer demand, NIMBY and auto dependency 
through a range of stabilizing mechanisms (e.g. legitimacy, familiarity and transaction costs), which in 
turn help suppress the rise of alternatives and support the continued development of low density urban 
forms. 
The reshaping of Growth Plan requirements by the Province to satisfy local municipalities has 
been identified by critics as one of the single greatest threats to achieving any meaningful transformation 
in how municipalities plan for growth (Allen & Campsie, 2013; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 
2015; Neptis Foundation, 2017). While it makes intuitive sense that the weakening of a plan’s targets 
would reduce the likelihood for meaningful change, few studies in the implementation literature have 
examined the impact of shifting requirements on planning outcomes. A relatively weak empirical 
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correlation in the plan implementation literature between implementation and consistency with state wide 
growth management programs (e.g. Ben-Zadok, 2005; Carruthers, 2002b; Ingram et al., 2009) suggests 
that implementation success may be significantly more complex in planning environments where 
discretion may permit municipalities to circumvent regional plans or even their own plans and policies if 
there is insufficient local political support. This research similarly found that local plan quality was 
infrequently reported as a significant barrier to growth management. Few empirical studies have found a 
correlation between plan quality and implementation, despite an assumed relationship between the two 
(Padeiro, 2016; Steelman & Hess, 2009). Recent findings have determined that, regardless of quality, 
plans are more likely to be implemented when they reflect the views and interests of local communities 
(Ali, 2014; Lyles, Berke, & Smith, 2016) and are developed through a negotiated, public process 
(Steelman & Hess, 2009). Plan quality may simply be a reflection of planning agencies’ existing 
motivations and interests, and those latter characteristics may ultimately be more influential on 
implementation than the plan itself. Berke and colleagues (2013), for example, found that the strength of 
local plans to protect a common pool resource, was greater for local municipalities that benefited the least 
by exploitation of those resources.  
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Chapter 7. Institutionalized Barriers to Growth Management Planning 
Approaches in the Greater Golden Horseshoe 
Comparisons of the barrier models for each case study (in Figures 7, 8, and 9) demonstrate unique 
regional patterns of key barriers and interactions that vary from the generic model based on the literature 
(Figure 4).  Interactions between the three levels of planning culture and local social, economic and 
environmental contexts were found to create regionally-unique framing institutions that helped to explain 
this variation. The interface between local context and the planning environment, in particular, played a 
significant role in the configuration of local patterns, by defining the specific growth and development 
pressures, the types and magnitude of planning challenges facing implementing agencies, and the 
prevailing interpretations, belief systems and motivations of implementing actors. This chapter examines 
the variability in barriers across the case studies and their interrelationships that create and sustain unique 
local responses to growth management. Variation across case studies is explored within the three broad 
institutions that frame the interrelationships between barriers and local context. The findings are then 
discussed within the context of the merged historical and sociological institutional framework and 
planning culture literature, including an examination of the mechanisms by which barriers are reproduced 
or challenged to create opportunities for transformative change. These discussions are used to reveal 
answers to the questions How do barriers interact to reinforce the status quo? and Where are there 
opportunities for change? 
Key Themes across Case Study Regions 
The themes described in this chapter explore how the practice of planning is embedded within a 
locally-specific institutional framework that is full of competing values and rationalities. Drawing from 
the case study results, the themes reveal how local context interacts with the each region’s planning 
culture to define a unique institutional setting that guides local implementation of the Growth Plan. The 
themes demonstrate how each region’s unique set of socio-political, economic and environmental 
conditions operate to magnify some barriers more than others, thereby creating the framing logics, 
incentives and constraints that influence how the Growth Plan is understood, communicated and 
implemented. Recognizing that institutions are not static but rather represent a set of factors that are 
continually challenged and scrutinized by internal and external actors, and local conditions, barriers to 
implementation in each region are further examined to reveal patterns of stability and opportunities for 
change. 
196 
 
The first theme pertains to the interplay between local context, place identity and urban 
governance. The two, predominantly rural, case study regions of Simcoe and Peterborough were found to 
share similar environmental and socio-political conditions that created a different set of pressures and 
constraints than those found in the Waterloo case study region. Influenced by similar local pressures, the 
rural regions of Simcoe and Peterborough shared similar planning environments in which a particular set 
of preferences about land use planning matters permeated actors’ perceptions of and responses to 
obstacles to growth management.  
The second theme relates to the relationships between local context, land and property markets 
and urban governance. Distinct land and property market pressures across case studies, in combination 
with market ideologies and beliefs at the planning environment scale were found to justify and reinforce 
certain types of planning responses to manage growth. Under this theme, framing institutions were again 
found to split across an urban and rural/peri-urban divide.  
Planning in Rural Regions: the Role of Place Identity and Urban Governance 
As an artifact of the planning process, the predominantly rural, exurban and peri-urban built 
forms of Simcoe and Peterborough case study areas were found to be a principal barrier to growth 
management in these regions. Exurban and peri-urban areas have been defined as “the area between 
existing cities and the rural hinterland that is seeing land-use changes associated with proximity to the 
city, primarily conversion from rural to urban uses” (Sorensen, 2016, p. 134). Settlements within these 
areas have been identified as comprising areas of “very-low density, amenity-seeking, post-productivist 
residential settlement in rural areas” (L. Taylor, 2011, 324) but in the case studies examined for this 
research also included more traditional, agriculture-based rural settlements. These were sites of significant 
conflict and contradiction with respect to managing growth, particularly where culturally-supported and 
familiar low density urban forms interacted directly with societal scale barriers such as consumer 
preferences, NIMBY and auto dependency to reinforce and defend the status quo. Collectively these 
barriers created a strong institutional framework defined by the logics of place identity, that when 
combined with local contextual factors such as rapid in-migration for Simcoe, and slow economic growth 
for Peterborough, created significant pressures for small, amenity-rich communities to permit low density 
residential, and recreation-related or seasonal (second home) developments for which the Growth Plan 
offered little guidance.  
In Simcoe, consumer demand and development pressure for recreational and peri-urban 
residential development in combination with limited local planning capacity created fragmented 
development patterns and regional scale planning challenges for water and waste water servicing and 
transportation (Birnbaum et al., 2004). In Peterborough, as evidenced by the Fraserville proposal, the 
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combination of recreation-related development pressures and slow economic growth elevated the 
importance of economic development in local decision making at the expense of growth management. 
The absence of identified boundaries for small settlement areas in rural municipalities within 
Peterborough and Simcoe Counties further enabled both regions to permit low density developments in 
areas without municipal services, while still meeting Growth Plan targets (Neptis Foundation, 2017). In 
both Simcoe and Peterborough, insufficient local and Provincial policy guidance for amenity-related 
development, political growth ambitions and development pressures combined to create a reactive 
planning environment in which private interests dominated discourses about future growth (Birnbaum et 
al., 2004). 
At the planning environment scale, the anti-urban sentiments of municipal implementing agencies 
in Simcoe and Peterborough interacted with the perception of growth as an economic imperative to create 
a unique and sometimes conflicting set of planning approaches, motivations, norms and behaviours that 
favoured growth, but only in its lowest density form. Key political actors within county and rural, lower 
tier municipalities frequently self-identified with a small town built form, characterized by a 
predominance of low density residential housing, agricultural lands and natural amenities, while viewing 
restrictions on growth (through Provincial population allocations) as a threat to local prosperity and self-
determination. Political will to support and achieve Growth Plan targets and policy objectives in 
Peterborough and Simcoe was found to be influenced by strong, anti-urban beliefs, a preference for local 
decision making, and a distrust of Provincial planning agencies and mandates. 
In Simcoe, and to a lesser degree in Peterborough, these sentiments were shared by staff who 
challenged the appropriateness of the Growth Plan policies for their communities. Compared with the 
Waterloo case study region, planning staff in the rural and exurban municipalities of Simcoe and 
Peterborough were decidedly less optimistic about meeting the targets of the Growth Plan, and many 
questioned its appropriateness for their communities. County and lower tier municipal planners in Simcoe 
and Peterborough identified maintenance of a rural or small town character as a desirable planning 
objective and a high priority for local politicians. Planners often equated built forms typically associated 
with urban areas (e.g. high rise development) with a loss of identity and sense of community. 
Intensification and greenfield targets required by the Growth Plan were perceived by planners as a 
challenge to the maintenance of small town character, even for marginal increases in density.  
Frequently associated with peri-urban communities in Simcoe and Peterborough was a planning 
environment that favoured local decision making and opposed the transfer of decision making power from 
local communities to the Province. While many actors in urban municipalities such as the cities of 
Kitchener, Waterloo, Barrie and Peterborough, identified positive outcomes as a result of renewed 
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Provincial involvement in local planning matters and a stronger Provincial framework to reinforce local 
planning decisions, planners and politicians in the lower tier, rural municipalities of Simcoe and 
Peterborough expressed frustration and resentment with Provincial involvement in local land use planning 
issues. Belief in the value of local decision making was conflated with anti-urban sentiments, as revealed 
through such phrases as “Toronto-centred vision”, ‘big-city-centric”, “Toronto-focused” and “big brother 
in Toronto”, to describe the Growth Plan and the Province’s involvement in local planning issues. 
Political leaders within Simcoe and Peterborough’s rural and peri-urban regions questioned whose 
interests were being served by the Growth Plan and adopted a localist, “us-vs-them” rhetoric. Such beliefs 
helped to support the narrative that dominated the discourse in peri-urban and rural areas that the Growth 
Plan was incompatible with the culture and built form of smaller communities and that its implementation 
threatened local autonomy. Simcoe’s culture of localism, in particular, was found to reinforce the existing 
county-city governance system, hinder horizontal consistency between the 19 lower and single tier 
municipalities and the County, and stifle opportunities for improving coordination of growth management 
planning (Berkeley Consulting Group Ltd., 2010; County of Simcoe Governance Committee, 2012). In 
contrast to Simcoe and Peterborough, Waterloo municipal actors typically shared a more regional 
perspective on growth management issues and demonstrated greater coordination and horizontal and 
vertical consistency through a regional governance system. 
Rural identity in Simcoe and Peterborough interacted with local aspirations for economic growth 
to create unexpected outcomes that obstructed implementation of the Growth Plan. Political support for 
development and growth, while safeguarding small town character, helped to reinforce continued 
development of low density urban forms.  Planners and politicians within the more rural or peri-urban 
regions of this study frequently perceived growth management as a threat to local economic development 
and sought opportunities to encourage amenity development while maintaining the lower densities 
favoured by local residents. The values of preserving small town character and promoting economic 
growth, for example, were the basis upon which Simcoe planners and politicians justified requests to the 
Province for alternative greenfield density and intensification targets, the allocation of additional 
population and expanded settlement areas (e.g. employment lands along Highway 400). These same 
values influenced Cavan Monaghan’s (in Peterborough County) original support for the controversial 
Fraserville development. The competing discourses of pro-growth, and anti-urbanism were reflected in 
the planning policies of smaller municipalities, many of which sought to reduce intensification targets and 
continued to plan for predominantly single detached residential urban forms with limited provision for 
moderately higher density urban forms such as multiple unit dwellings. A preference for low density 
growth created an incentive for both Simcoe and Peterborough municipalities to take advantage of a 
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policy gap in the Growth Plan that permitted them to direct low density growth to undelineated built up 
areas without full municipal servicing (Neptis Foundation, 2017).  
Growth management in the more rural municipalities was further challenged by consumer 
demand for low density urban forms, second home and recreational development and NIMBY responses. 
The influence of these societal scale barriers was heightened by local conditions, such as relatively low 
property values (in comparison to the Greater Toronto Area) and the abundance of natural amenities. 
Existing residents were described by planners and in the media as exerting significant political pressure to 
block taller and/or denser urban forms that were perceived as incompatible with the existing built form. In 
some communities, the perception of incompatible development coincided with gaps in socio-economic 
status between existing residents of estate lot developments and newcomers seeking homes in more 
compact subdivisions. Simultaneously, demand from new, rural and natural environment amenity seekers 
(particularly in Simcoe) created additional development pressure for continued low density residential and 
recreational development. The pressures from both existing and new amenity seekers helped to further 
reinforce planning decisions that favoured continued emphasis on low density development forms as the 
predominant urban form, “compatible” low density forms for new development in close proximity to 
existing low density neighbourhoods, and the separation of existing low density from higher density 
development. In Waterloo, despite a recognition of community pressure against infill and intensification, 
municipal planners and political actors were found to be less responsive to these pressures and 
demonstrated a high level of support for growth management objectives. 
The role of rurality as an obstruction to growth management implementation has received limited 
attention in the planning literature, although studies of rural planning practice have, for some time, 
identified rural areas as contested and complex spaces in which traditional urban planning policies and 
practices tend to fail (Cloke & Hanrahan, 1984; Cloke & Little, 1987; K. I. Frank & Reiss, 2014; 
Qviström, 2012; Qviström & Cadieux, 2012). In a review of the literature on rural planning practice, for 
example, Frank and Reiss (2014, p. 393) noted that  “researchers have consistently found that, despite all 
the laws, policies, and programs for planning, rural planning in practice is adhoc, incremental, and 
disproportionately dictated by private sector decision making and higher level government policies…”.  
The authors further note that planning research has traditionally viewed rural areas as “downscaled cities” 
or “cities in waiting”, neither of which recognize, in any comprehensive way, the unique contextual and 
institutional challenges facing rural areas (K. I. Frank & Reiss, 2014, p. 386).  
Spatially differentiated patterns of urban property have been identified in the historical 
institutionalism literature as an important factor that influences governance and infrastructure systems by 
structuring demand, regulation, and investment in property, and these systems in turn help to perpetuate 
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existing patterns of land use (Sorensen, 2018). Studies of rural issues in North America and Europe have 
confirmed that rural communities receive significant economic benefit from the exploitation of natural 
and “countryside” amenities through recreation and second home development, and may rely on amenity 
migration as a primary source of economic development (Golding, 2012; C. M. Hall, 2015; Velvin, 
Kvikstad, Drag, & Krogh, 2013; Woods, 2011). In part because of their natural amenities, peri-urban and 
rural areas have been found to be sites of significant in-migration, typically in the form of scattered or low 
density development (Adamiak, 2016; Chipeniuk, 2004; Cuadrado-Ciuraneta, Durà-Guimerà, & Salvati, 
2016; Golding, 2012; C. M. Hall, 2015; Kondo, Rivera, & Rullman Jr., 2012; Murdoch & Lowe, 2003). 
Taylor (2011) found that amenity migration challenges growth management policy because it typically 
occurs outside of urban areas, in municipalities with less organized governance. In a study of two peri-
urban Ontario towns, Gilbert et al (2005) found that economic development dominated local growth 
discourses and that development occurred at the expense of conservation objectives, despite a powerful 
citizen lobby that favoured the conservation of farmland and natural areas. In slow growth regions, the 
influence of economic development in local decision making is intensified, with local planning 
environments susceptible to decision making that favours growth at any cost (Leo, 2006; Leo, 2008). 
Limited planning capacity and a shared perception that growth management policies do not address 
important rural issues in any meaningful way further challenge rural community buy-in and adoption of 
growth management policy (M. M. Edwards & Haines, 2007).  
A broader sociological institutionalist view of the physical form of rural regions suggests that 
rural land use patterns may create and help perpetuate particular cultural beliefs around appropriate urban 
forms and types of economic development. For example, the concept of rural identity and sense of place 
has received some attention in the scholarly literature, although not often in the context of growth 
management implementation. The motivations, meanings and values that key actors associate with rural 
and peri-urban places have been found by scholars of rural planning practice to contribute to planning 
challenges at the local planning level (Golding, 2012; Halfacree, 2012; Kondo et al., 2012). These studies 
have found that place identity played an important role in shaping local actions because it, served as “the 
interpretive frame through which people there measure their lives, evaluate others, take political positions, 
and just make sense’’(Gieryn, 2000, p. 467). Studies of rural and peri-urban communities suggest that 
preferences for low density urban forms may be more keenly felt and strongly promoted in rural 
municipalities than their urban counterparts. Rural and peri-urban areas have been found to be subject of a 
“preservation paradox”, in which amenity migrants seek residential opportunities in non-urban areas of 
the countryside, and, once there, take action to protect the “rural idyll” from subsequent amenity migrants 
(Cadieux, 2011; Murdoch & Lowe, 2003; Qviström & Cadieux, 2012). Such migrants will actively 
support planning policies and regulations that maintain the rural aesthetic or small town character (Kondo 
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et al., 2012), as well as protect natural areas, private property values and rights, and a socially exclusive 
landscape (Gilbert et al., 2005; Golding, 2012). Differentiated identities along urban and rural lines help 
fuel an “us-vs-them” rhetoric (Golding, 2012).  
The case studies examined in this research demonstrate that interactions between local context, 
place identity and urban governance impact how shared societal scale barriers are interpreted and acted 
upon by actors at the planning environment scale. In rural regions, the magnification of certain barriers 
within these institutional frameworks created a unique planning environment in which the competing 
values of sense of place, local autonomy and economic growth trumped growth management 
considerations. These findings are consistent with those of Frank (2017, p. 304) who summarized these 
competing interests and governance challenges of rural communities as: “…on one hand there is a 
reported need for coordinated and mutually supportive policy directions from the top, from the central 
government; and on the other hand there is a desire for flexibility, situation specific strategies, and local 
control. The latter is problematic because the limited resources and anti-urban bias of rural areas make it 
difficult to conduct any planning efforts beyond the minimums required by the central government.”  
Planners as Market Actors: Land and Property Markets and Urban Governance 
Common to all case study regions was the identification of land and property market constraints 
as a barrier to local growth management, particularly with respect to preferences by consumers and the 
development industry for low density built forms. While the identification of market constraints was 
shared across case study regions, two distinct perspectives of the market emerged that defined key actors’ 
interpretation and responses to those constraints.  
In the Waterloo case study region, a unique planning environment served to support a wide range 
of planning tools and approaches (artifacts) to respond to market constraints. Waterloo planners and 
politicians were found to play an active role in addressing market barriers including responding to market 
demand side challenges through the adoption of a higher order public transit system to encourage and 
support denser urban forms. Market supply side challenges were addressed through the establishment of 
an urban growth boundary, adopting higher density and intensification targets than required by the 
Growth Plan, awareness-building with developers, and developing financial incentives for downtown and 
brownfield redevelopment. These approaches functioned to constrain the supply of development 
opportunities at the urban periphery while stimulating development opportunities within built up areas. 
Community support for growth management policies was secured in part by appealing to the public and 
lower tier municipalities’ values of economic prosperity and cultural vibrancy, and presenting 
intensification as a necessary approach to achieve those values. Waterloo area planners described 
practices to improve the quality and appeal of higher density urban forms and expressed high expectations 
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for developers to innovate and provide alternatives to single detached residential developments. The 
historical shortage of well-designed, high density developments was not perceived by Waterloo planners 
as an inevitable market outcome, but rather the result of earlier, lax municipal approval processes and 
urban design guidelines.   
The strength of Waterloo’s efforts to regulate and stimulate the land and property market system 
in favour of intensification was moderated by contradictions in Ontario’s regulatory framework that failed 
to recognize the role of planning as a means to address market failures to achieve social and 
environmental goals. The Ontario Municipal Board’s support for a land budgeting methodology that 
relied on past market trends constrained the Region’s efforts to shape market conditions to achieve 
growth management objectives.  In its decision, the Board demonstrated an interpretation of planning as a 
tool to respond to existing markets rather than as a driving force to help shape markets. Still, despite a 
moderate expansion of the urban growth boundary as a consequence of a settlement with a consortium of 
private landowners, Waterloo Region’s planning efforts to redirect growth to already built up areas were 
largely successful in establishing an assertive and coordinated framework to meet the Growth Plan 
targets. 
By contrast, the planning environments in the rural municipalities within Simcoe and 
Peterborough Counties were found to be less supportive of interventions to address market barriers to 
growth management. County and lower tier municipal politicians in these regions regularly expressed 
concerns that Provincial Growth Plan objectives conflicted with local economic development needs and 
aspirations. Planners similarly expressed concerns that the Province’s allocation of growth to certain 
communities failed to recognize consumer demand as a key driving force in settlement patterns. Growth 
Plan population projections were viewed by many rural municipal actors as “choking off” much needed 
population growth to small, rural communities.  In the context of a slow growth local economy, planners 
in the Peterborough case study region identified strong political pressures that undermined support for any 
actions that may slow or inhibit growth. Constraining growth in smaller rural communities in this region 
was perceived as a threat to a municipality’s ability to “balance its books”. Absent from the discourse 
around growth-as-an-economic-imperative was the acknowledgement of low density development as a 
possible contributing factor in perpetuating the need for additional growth to generate property tax 
revenues that would help fund maintenance of infrastructure from previously-approved, low density 
developments.  
In addition to concerns about the impacts of regional growth management on local economic 
development, actors within the rural municipalities of Simcoe and Peterborough expressed a view of 
planning as dependent on land and property markets. Describing low density housing as a defining feature 
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of their communities, planners in these communities were decidedly pessimistic about the capacity of 
planning to shape consumer demand and effect change. Some planners expressed a sense of futility that 
planning could shape urban form in the face of strong market pressures for low density development, 
citing “that’s not why people move here”, and “developers are not going to build housing forms that 
people aren’t going to take”. Others expressed a normative view that the role of planning was not to shape 
land and property markets but rather to respond to those markets. Such views coincided with a lack of 
support for the Province’s population growth allocations that directed, rather than responded to, growth 
and development. Actions by local planning environments to shape market conditions were constrained 
by the view that planning was a market-led, rather than policy-led endeavor, as evidenced by one Simcoe 
planner’s comment: “…I don’t think the town initiates or has smart growth initiatives. I think we review 
development and try to apply smart growth principles”.  
The circumstances surrounding the development industry’s challenge to Waterloo’s policy 
framework helps demonstrate the underlying, less visible barriers that municipalities face in balancing 
public and private sector interests and the achievement of growth management goals. Scholars of 
planning practice have noted that “planners do not build cities and towns. Rather, they are built by private 
sector interests, developers in particular” (Coiacetto, 2000, p. 353). The role of planners to achieve public 
goals within this framework has been a matter of debate, with an emerging literature emphasizing the 
responsibility of planners to influence private sector interests – not just through the adoption of planning 
policy and regulation, but also through direct intervention in market conditions within which the property 
and development industry operates (Adams & Tiesdell, 2010; Coiacetto, 2000; Heurkens et al., 2015). 
Studies of the influence of land and property markets on planning have long theorized that these markets 
do not operate with perfect economic rationality and are in fact highly influenced by the institutional and 
geographic contexts in which they are embedded (Alexander, 2014; Charney, 2015; Coiacetto, 2000; Guy 
& Henneberry, 2000; Healey & Barrett, 1990). Development industry actors, constrained by land markets, 
are motivated to influence the institutional setting (e.g. regulations and consumer preferences) within 
which they operate to achieve financial interests. Planners are likewise capable of the same to achieve 
public goals, but may have differing motivations, levels of influence and power that impact their abilities 
to steer or guide the development industry toward actions that are supportive of growth management 
objectives. When disparities exist between the goals of planning agencies and developers, planners are 
more likely to achieve desired outcomes if they can manipulate existing property markets to create the 
necessary conditions that support their goals (Charney, 2015; Jones, 2014). Comparisons of different 
planning and development regimes in Europe and the US have found that planning cultures that support 
reactive, market-led development approaches tend to have less influence on the nature of that 
development and a tendency toward urban sprawl (Halleux, Marcinczak, & van der Krabben, 2012). 
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Consistent with the results of this research, rural and exurban municipalities in other regions have 
been found to support market-led planning approaches (Aarsaether & Ringholm, 2011; K. I. Frank & 
Reiss, 2014; Heurkens et al., 2015).  Historical institutionalists have identified historical differences 
between the political and economic aspirations of urban and rural municipalities as playing a defining role 
in the management of urban growth (Ghitter and Smart, 2009). Rural and exurban areas have been 
characterized by scholars as focused on economic development as a primary objective, driven by a 
“scarcity mentality”, challenges associated with declining traditional economies, rural poverty and a lack 
of services (K. I. Frank & Reiss, 2014). Municipal actors in rural and exurban communities face strong 
incentives to enable amenity-related development where amenity migration forms a significant 
component of that community’s population and economic growth. Amenity migration has been described 
as the gentrification of rural landscapes, bringing with it wealth and economic diversification to rural 
communities while increasing local support for traditional built forms (Bourne et al., 2003). Within these 
contexts, planning often plays a subordinate role in guiding or informing economic development, and is 
often viewed as not relevant to local needs and aspirations. 
The ability of municipalities to manage competing interests, including economic interests, to 
achieve broader planning goals has been found in other studies to be moderated by its planning capacity 
(Göçmen & LaGro, 2016; Hawkins, 2014). With planning capacity commensurate with population size, 
and a tax base that is insufficient to fund municipal water and wastewater services, small municipalities in 
the case studies examined for this research were in a compromised position to balance municipal 
economic growth objectives and developers’ economic interests with broader public interests. Combined 
with a view of planning as detached from the market and the absence of political support for growth 
management principles, planning staff in smaller communities lacked the resources and political support 
to circumvent the status quo. Rural planning capacity challenges have similarly been found by Frank and 
Hibbard (2017) to hinder rural municipalities’ ability to conduct proactive, long term planning that to go 
beyond minimum policy requirements. 
Studies within other contexts outside of North America have also demonstrated that interactions 
between urban governance and land and property markets play a critical role the creation and 
maintenance of low density, uncoordinated peri-urban development, although the institutional 
characteristics may not be the same as those typical of the North American experience (de Vries, 2015; 
Othengrafen, 2010; Sorensen, 2016). For example, in a study of Japan’s peri-urban spaces, Sorensen 
(2016) found that the existing scattered, uncoordinated development forms characteristic of these areas 
was closely tied to an institutional system characterized by highly fragmented landownership, powerful, 
small-scale landowners who relied on land subdivision as a source of income, and a weak local 
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governments with limited severance and development control. These factors reinforced the long standing 
concentration of wealth and power in the hands of farm families whose selling of small parcels of land 
went unchallenged by weak municipal governments with limited resources and legal planning authority.  
Patterns of Stability and Change 
Scholars have described institutions as stable by design or through the implementation of 
informal and often unconscious mechanisms that encourage their reproduction. An institution can change 
if the formal and informal stabilizing mechanisms are undermined, removed or replaced with a credible 
alternative. While the characteristics of institutions can play a significant role in determining the 
institutional stability, strategic or reflexive action of actor groups and individuals is also theorized to play 
a role (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). The internal consistency of institutions can be 
challenged by external conditions or by actors operating within the institution framework (Lowndes & 
Roberts, 2013). This section explores patterns of institutional stability and change in the three case study 
regions by examining the visible and invisible mechanisms supporting and undermining barriers to the 
Growth Plan. Using the analytical tools and mechanisms theorized in the historical and sociological 
institutionalism literature and planning culture to promote reproduction and change (Chapter 3, Tables 2 
and 3), local context and regional planning cultures are examined to identify relationships that help 
subvert or conform to existing institutional expectations, conventions and logics.  
At the Tipping Point: Growth Management in Waterloo 
As theorized by the historical institutionalism literature, the institutions enabling and constraining 
local implementation in each of the three case studies demonstrated a range of internal inconsistencies 
and mismatches with external conditions that both reinforced conventional approaches to planning and 
presented opportunities for change. In the Waterloo region, institutional inconsistencies resulted in 
patterns of both stability and change through a variety of competing mechanisms (Table 19). Mechanisms 
promoting entrenchment of the status quo within the land and property market institution included a 
planning environment in which the local development industry actively resisted Regional planning efforts 
to establish an Urban Growth Boundary by challenging the basis upon which the boundary was 
developed.  
The Urban Growth Boundary presented challenges to local developers’ efforts to avoid the risks 
and complexity associated with a less familiar infill development process, and reduced or delayed 
potential economic benefits for owners of greenfield properties outside of the boundary. Developers, as 
reluctant ‘rule takers’ contested the Region’s growth management objectives by initiating a quasi-judicial 
review of the Regional plan. These actions demonstrated that development industry actors were not 
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wholly constrained by the new rules of practice established by the urban governance institution within 
which they operated. Since OMB appeals must be based on legitimate planning grounds, the appellants 
framed their appeal of the Region’s Official Plan by drawing on established conventions and rules of the 
land and property market institutions to legitimize traditional land budgeting approaches and rationalize 
the need for an expansion of the urban boundary. The development industry’s expert-based framing of the 
issue presented the Region’s land budgeting methodology as a threat to housing choice and quality of life 
and called into question the credibility of the Region’s proposed alternative. These arguments were 
successful in securing the support of the OMB adjudicator, who questioned the legitimacy and credibility 
of the Region’s land budgeting methodology that placed a higher value on achieving Growth Plan’s 
objectives than on consumer choice. The conflict demonstrated conflicting objectives for planning 
between local planning agencies and the development industry, and ultimately a gap in planning 
ideologies and methods between the urban governance institution compared and the land and property 
market. As well, it highlighted internal inconsistencies in the Provincial regulatory framework that 
enabled powerful actor groups to defend the status quo by reaffirming the legitimacy of the market-led 
planning practices. 
For those developers who did seek infill development opportunities, their efforts were challenged 
in some municipalities by outdated municipal engineering and planning standards (e.g. low density 
zoning in areas marked for intensification, and restrictive parking standards) that continued to be 
perceived by municipal authorities as efficient and meeting performance expectations. In these cases, the 
ability of developers to create viable infill developments was hindered by some municipalities’ delayed 
adoption of intensification-supportive regulations. While likely a temporary challenge to implementation 
caused by the slow adoption of new rules to support broader Official Plan policies, this delay created an 
obstacle to conformance at a time when the feasibility and credibility of compact and infill development 
were being tested. 
Consistent with the other study areas, consumer preferences for car-oriented, low density 
development in Waterloo was found to have widespread cultural support and enjoyed the benefits of 
familiarity and advocacy for its protection. The relatively low density and uniquely multimodal nature of 
the study area narrowed options for transit-oriented development, and presented ‘sunk’ costs that required 
significant investment to alter. Planning efforts to adopt policies that re-envisioned the existing urban 
form conflicted with past conventions and expectations that defined what was considered appropriate 
development. 
Despite stabilizing mechanisms that supported the existing land and property market and place 
identity institutions, Waterloo also demonstrated an evolving governance institution that helped place 
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destabilizing pressures on those same institutions. Many of Waterloo’s municipal and Regional planners 
and politicians actively challenged the efficiency, legitimacy and credibility of institutionalized societal 
barriers to growth management such as consumer preferences, auto dependency and NIMBY. Through 
the adoption of assertive growth management policies in the Regional Official Plan, Regional planners 
and politicians created formal sanctions to legitimize alternative development patterns. Moreover, through 
awareness building and legitimizing new planning approaches, local planners changed the discourse 
around growth management as one of economic opportunity and environmental responsibility. Regional 
and municipal planners transmitted new ideas that questioned the efficiency and legitimacy of 
conventional low density development, and worked to improve awareness and credibility of alternatives 
through education and dialog with developers, adoption of policies to support compact growth, and 
investment in public transit. Regional planners attempted to address cultural barriers by fostering 
legitimacy and credibility of the transit system and higher density, transit-oriented development by 
framing the changes as a necessary means to attract economic development. This framing of growth 
management resonated with local economic objectives and environmental values and helped build an 
argument for the need for reform. An important factor unique to the Waterloo case study was the 
concentration of broad policy and planning powers in the hands of a regional planning authority, which 
established region-wide rules for a coordinated approach to managing growth. The Region used its veto 
power to establish a progressive growth management policy framework and transit infrastructure that 
imposed new planning rules on lower tier municipalities, developers and other stakeholders and improved 
the viability of compact development.  
Table 19. Growth Management Barriers in Waterloo - Patterns of Institutional Reproduction and 
Change. 
BARRIER 
MECHANISMS FOR 
REPRODUCTION 
MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE 
Development industry not 
committed to growth 
management objectives 
Efficiency: Perception that low density 
development provides greater economic 
return 
Familiarity: Status quo understandable 
lower risk 
Self Interests: Industry benefits from 
and advocates for reduced regulation 
Incentives/Sanctions: Region and 
local municipalities adopt strong 
policy framework that implements 
growth management planning 
objectives using provincial law as a 
foundation 
Preference for low density 
suburban form 
Legitimacy: Low density forms 
culturally supported 
Familiarity: Low density forms are 
recognizable and understandable 
Self Interests: advocacy for status quo 
by development industry and property 
owners 
Ideas: Municipal actors recognize and 
promote new markets that favour 
higher density, centralized housing 
and encourage development of 
credible alternatives through higher 
quality design  
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BARRIER 
MECHANISMS FOR 
REPRODUCTION 
MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE 
OMB rulings inconsistent with 
Growth Plan objectives 
Legitimacy: market-led planning over 
growth management planning legally 
supported 
Absence of credible alternatives: 
Alternative land budgeting methodology 
discredited 
Institutional complementarity: OMB 
reinforces conventional, market-led  
planning approaches preferred by 
development industry 
Veto power: OMB overrules land 
budgeting approach that directs rather 
than responds to market conditions 
 
Presence of strong NIMBY 
lobbying against infill and 
intensification 
Legitimacy: high density forms 
considered incompatible/inappropriate  
Familiarity: Low density forms 
recognizable and understandable 
Self Interests: advocacy against infill by 
property owners 
Discretion – Municipal actors use 
discretion to uphold growth 
management objectives in the face of 
public opposition 
Auto dependency and absence 
of alternative travel options 
Legitimacy: car travel culturally 
supported 
Familiarity: car travel routine, taken-for-
granted 
Self Interests: advocacy by public for 
continued investment in car 
infrastructure 
Transaction costs: Sunk costs associated 
car-oriented transportation infrastructure 
Ideas: transmission of new ideas by 
Region and advocacy coalitions  
Credible alternatives: Significant 
Regional investment in and education 
for public transit 
Insufficient experience or 
knowledge to build alternatives 
Familiarity: Greenfield development 
routine and low risk to developers 
Ideas: Municipal actors play an active 
role in addressing market barriers and 
awareness-building with developers. 
Unique physical conditions 
challenge intensification 
Transaction costs: Sunk costs associated 
with low density, multimodal urban 
form 
Veto power: Significant Regional 
investment, despite public 
controversy, in supportive 
infrastructure (e.g. public transit) 
Unsupportive engineering and 
planning standards/policies 
Efficiency: Perception by some that 
existing engineering and planning 
constraints meet performance standards 
Ideas: Municipal actors challenge 
efficiency of status quo, credible 
alternatives emerge from advocacy 
groups  
 
Market-led Planning in Simcoe 
Barriers to growth management in the Simcoe case study region exhibited a high level of 
institutional reproduction within all three institutions, and little evidence of change as a result of a number 
of stabilizing mechanisms stemming mainly from the planning environment (Table 20). The Simcoe case 
study revealed a significant gap between the ideologies, rules and approaches of formal planning 
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institutions at the Provincial scale, and those of the local urban governance and market institutions. Rules 
and approaches for managing urban growth within the Provincial Growth Plan were inconsistent with 
Simcoe planners’ views of planning as a market-led endeavour, the reduced planning capacities of smaller 
Simcoe municipalities and an economy dependent on low density, amenity growth. This absence of fit 
between the broader planning regulations and the local urban governance and market institutions 
stemmed in part from what has been described as a conflict between political vs. bureaucratic rationalities 
to planning, where political rationality refers to a belief in the supremacy of local political preferences 
and economic interests of planning, and bureaucratic rationality refers to planning approaches that support 
a “long-term perspective, ample room for expertise, the use of plans and reports and steering through 
regulations” (de Vries, 2015, p.2161). 
The gap between Province’s growth management planning mandate and the local urban 
governance institution was further reinforced by entrenched beliefs in local decision making by County 
and municipal planners and politicians and a county/city governance system. In this way, formal 
governance organizations and informal planning practices, rules and norms where supported by cultural 
understandings about the appropriate scale of decision making. These served to undermine the legitimacy 
of the Province’s new planning framework and efforts to promote greater regional coordination of urban 
growth and planning. A perception that local decision making was the most efficient means to serve 
municipalities’ economic interests also undermined any action in favour of coordinated planning 
approaches. Insufficient planning capacity and the absence of regional coordination reinforced municipal 
planners’ and politicians’ support for familiar and low short term risk planning approaches that favoured 
low density development patterns.  
Widespread cultural support for rural and low density built forms shared by consumers, planners 
and politicians helped to legitimize municipal actions to plan for and protect Simcoe’s low density built 
forms. Traditional planning approaches for low density, car-oriented built forms served the interests of 
key stakeholders, including the economic interests of developers and the preferences of new consumers 
and existing residents who exerted significant pressures on local governments to permit growth outside of 
built boundaries (in the case of development industry) and to favour low density urban forms (in the case 
of new consumers and existing residents).  
Where discrepancies exist between or within institutions, actors are theorized to play a key role in 
enabling or blocking change (Mahoney & Thelan, 2009). Simcoe actors used their power and discretion 
to block local change by bringing the rules governing local planning more in line with local cultural 
norms, conventions and expectations. Advocacy by municipal politicians for Growth Plan policies that 
reflected local interests resulted in an amendment to the Growth Plan that compromised the Plan’s 
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objectives, including an increase in the number of areas identified for growth, and a reduction in Simcoe’s 
intensification and density targets. In situations where local political actors and municipal planners were 
not wholly constrained by the new planning legislation or where policy gaps existed, they exercised their 
power and discretion to re-interpret and resist imposed density and intensification targets by approving 
development applications in areas within undelineated built boundaries. Provincial veto powers, while 
exercised through Official Plan approvals and the development of a specific Growth Plan for the Simcoe 
region, have proven to be ineffective for dealing with small scale, incremental transgressions from 
Growth Plan objectives.  
Simcoe actors’ and actor groups’ attachment to place and rural identities were found to comprise 
an important “cultural category” – or group with shared identity and ideologies (Cappoccia 2016). For 
such groups, new rules and ideational frameworks require reframing in such a way as to resonate with its 
members. In absence of any reframing of existing understandings and meanings around natural and rural 
amenities and urban growth, Simcoe municipalities were unable to rationalize or justify the need for 
changes to existing planning practices. Combined with strong cultural support for low density urban 
forms, and amenity based growth within the governance, place identity and market institutional 
frameworks, actors and actors groups (e.g. planners and politicians) were largely unable to perceive 
threats to local amenities caused by unrestricted, low density urban growth, or opportunities to achieve 
dual objectives of economic growth and compact development. 
With a few exceptions, such as a burgeoning culture of growth management planning in Barrie, 
new ideas, incentives and sanctions to undermine or challenge existing institutionalized barriers to growth 
management were largely absent in the Simcoe case study region. In contrast to Waterloo, where new 
ideas and credible alternatives were promoted by key municipal planners, politicians and advocacy 
coalitions, Simcoe’s planning environment demonstrated a relatively unified culture that favoured 
existing institutions. Mechanisms for change were found to emerge exclusively from outside of the local 
planning environment. These included the Province’s non-decision regarding the County’s Official Plan, 
and its adoption of an Amendment to the Growth Plan, which mandated specific growth management 
objectives in the Simcoe area. The strength of the Amendment to achieve growth management objectives 
was diminished as a result of successful advocacy by the development industry and local municipalities.  
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Table 20. Growth Management Barriers in Simcoe - Patterns of Institutional Reproduction and 
Change. 
BARRIER 
MECHANISMS FOR 
REPRODUCTION 
MECHANISMS FOR 
CHANGE 
Official Plan does not conform to 
Growth Plan 
Legitimacy: “made in Simcoe” plan 
perceived as more appropriate 
Veto Power: Province does not 
approve OP  
Incompatible provincial decision 
making, policy and investment 
Legitimacy: Growth Plan’s 
Amendment 1 sanctions some 
development outside of built up 
areas and lower density growth for 
Simcoe 
 
Lack of political will Efficiency: local planning perceived 
as meeting performance 
expectations 
Legitimacy: high density forms 
considered incompatible/ 
inappropriate  
Self Interests: advocacy against 
infill by property owners 
Discretion: politicians use discretion 
to support developments that don’t 
adhere to growth management 
principles 
 
Lack of staff commitment to growth 
management objectives 
Efficiency: market-led planning 
perceived to meet economic needs 
and performance expectations 
Legitimacy: compact forms 
considered inappropriate for rural 
areas 
Familiarity: Low density forms 
recognizable and understandable 
 
Staff view high density 
development as incompatible to 
local character 
Legitimacy: compact forms 
considered inappropriate for rural 
areas 
Familiarity: Low density forms 
recognizable and understandable 
 
Insufficient planning capacity Absence of credible or available 
alternatives: Municipal revenues 
insufficient to support enhanced 
planning capacity 
 
Inefficient or inconsistent 
administration 
Discretion: Staff adapt Growth Plan 
objectives to suit local context 
 
Poor coordination and level of 
engagement between local and 
upper tier government agencies 
Efficiency: local planning perceived 
as meeting performance 
expectations 
Legitimacy: localism culturally and 
morally supported as more 
democratic means of decision 
making  
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BARRIER 
MECHANISMS FOR 
REPRODUCTION 
MECHANISMS FOR 
CHANGE 
Weak or absent regional 
coordination of local planning 
Efficiency: local planning perceived 
as meeting performance 
expectations 
Legitimacy: localism culturally and 
morally supported as more 
democratic means of decision 
making  
Discretion and Veto Power: County 
has limited control over local 
decision making 
 
Inter-municipal competition for 
development 
Legitimacy: competition for 
development supports perception 
that growing cities are successful 
cities 
Efficiency: Competition for 
development provides local 
economic benefits (e.g. new 
property tax revenues, development 
charges and services) 
 
Rejection of Provincial oversight Legitimacy: localism culturally and 
morally supported as more 
democratic means of decision 
making 
Incentive/Sanctions: Amendment 1 
adopted to regulate local planning 
Preference for low density suburban 
form 
Legitimacy: Low density forms 
culturally supported 
Familiarity: Low density forms 
recognizable and understandable 
Self Interests: advocacy for status 
quo by development industry and 
property owners  
 
Auto dependency  and absence of 
alternative travel options 
Legitimacy: car travel culturally 
supported 
Familiarity: car travel routine, 
taken-for-granted 
Self Interests: advocacy by public 
for continued investment in car 
infrastructure 
Transaction costs: Sunk costs 
associated car-oriented 
transportation infrastructure 
 
Amenity migration and associated 
physical, social and economic 
characteristics 
Efficiency: Amenity based 
development has local economic 
benefits 
Transaction costs: Sunk costs 
associated with low density urban 
form 
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Managing No-growth in Peterborough 
Barriers to growth management in the Peterborough case study demonstrated a high level of 
stability and few mechanisms for change (Table 21). Like Simcoe, case study results for Peterborough 
revealed a gap between the province’s growth management mandate and local urban governance 
institutions defined by a rural or non-urban cultural identity and aspirations for economic growth. 
Planners and politicians of Peterborough County’s rural municipalities revealed a cultural category 
defined in part by a preference for local decision making as the most efficient and legitimate means to 
serve their municipalities’ immediate economic interests. A political preoccupation with economic growth 
further reinforced a political rationality to planning and limited restrictions on growth as the most 
efficient means to promote development and meet market demands. In the absence of efforts by 
Provincial, County or municipal actors to reframe intensification as an economic opportunity rather than 
an obstacle, the gap in planning ideologies and approaches between the Province and local municipalities 
created irreconcilable differences that encouraged local actors to block, circumvent or feign support for 
change. 
Political advocacy for Growth Plan policies to reflect preferred built forms resulted in a reduction 
of intensification targets for Peterborough that provided a regulatory sanction for lower density urban 
forms. Low density urban forms and recreation and resource based development in many of Peterborough 
County’s townships was further legitimized by the Growth Plan’s failure to provide a sufficient 
regulatory framework to guide development in these areas, such as lower tier municipal intensification 
targets, density and intensification policies for undelineated built up areas, and resource based 
development policies. An absence of sufficient municipal revenues contributed to under-resourced 
planning departments leading municipalities to carry out reactive, market-led planning. 
Like Simcoe, Peterborough’s planning environment demonstrated a relatively unified culture that 
generally supported the institutionalized barriers to growth management. Peterborough planners described 
a sense of futility with respect to the introduction of growth management planning approaches given the 
political support for existing institutions that undermined the adoption and dissemination of new ideas, 
incentives or regulatory frameworks. Discretion in development review processes enabled staff and 
politicians to ensure new development proposals were adapted to conventional planning standards and 
cultural expectations. In contrast to Waterloo, where mechanisms for change emerged from the planners 
and politicians, and Simcoe where requirements for change emerged from the Province, Peterborough’s 
community advocates were found to be the primary source of new ideas to challenge to conventional 
planning approaches. These ideas revolved around opposition to single developments and have had 
limited impact on the identification of credible alternatives to the region’s broader planning approaches.  
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As with Simcoe, municipal actors in Peterborough demonstrated strong cultural support for rural 
and low density built forms. Cultural support for and familiarity with low density urban and rural built 
forms reinforced political support for municipal planning approaches that helped to perpetuate these 
ideals, while consumer advocacy for familiar urban forms challenged the legitimacy of alternative 
approaches such as rural infill and intensification efforts, which were viewed by planners as physically 
incompatible and politically unfeasible. Low density urban forms served the economic interests and 
preferences of developers who sought to build familiar and culturally-preferred urban forms and 
benefitted from a less restrictive planning framework. The absence of detectable impacts of low density, 
car-oriented development, such as traffic congestion, and the sunk costs associated with existing built 
forms and transportation infrastructure undermined the credibility of municipal efforts to adopt alternative 
planning approaches that favoured transit-oriented densities and complete communities.  
Table 21. Growth Management Barriers in Peterborough - Patterns of Institutional Reproduction 
and Change. 
BARRIER 
MECHANISMS FOR 
REPRODUCTION 
MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE 
Unsupportive engineering and 
planning standards/policies 
Efficiency: Perception by some that 
existing engineering and planning 
constraints meet performance standards 
Discretion and veto power: Local 
planning agencies hesitant to support 
new planning standards  
 
Incompatible provincial decision 
making, policy and investment 
Legitimacy: Province sanctions reduced 
Growth Plan intensification targets for 
Peterborough 
 
High cost and complexity to 
retrofit existing low density built 
form 
Transaction costs: Sunk costs associated 
with low density urban form 
 
Lack of political will 
Efficiency: Minimal restrictions on 
development considered necessary for 
local economic growth; local planning 
perceived as meeting performance 
expectations 
Legitimacy: high density forms 
considered incompatible/ inappropriate  
Self Interests: advocacy against infill by 
property owners 
Discretion and veto power: politicians 
use discretion in applying growth 
management principles to decisions 
Ideas: advocacy coalition 
challenges legitimacy of proposed 
Fraserville development 
Staff view high density 
development as incompatible to 
local character 
Legitimacy: compact forms considered 
inappropriate for rural areas 
Familiarity: Low density forms 
recognizable and understandable 
 
Insufficient planning capacity 
Absence of credible or available 
alternatives: Municipal revenues 
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BARRIER 
MECHANISMS FOR 
REPRODUCTION 
MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE 
insufficient to support enhanced 
planning capacity 
Inefficient or inconsistent 
administration 
Discretion: Staff adapt Growth Plan 
objectives to suit local context  
Development industry not 
committed to growth management 
objectives 
Efficiency: Perception that low density 
development provides greater economic 
return 
Familiarity: Status quo understandable 
lower risk 
Self Interests: Industry benefits from 
reduced regulation 
 
Presence of strong NIMBY 
lobbying against infill and 
intensification 
Legitimacy: high density forms 
considered incompatible/inappropriate  
Familiarity: Low density forms 
recognizable and understandable 
Self Interests: advocacy against infill by 
property owners 
 
Preference for low density 
suburban form 
Legitimacy: Low density forms 
culturally supported 
Familiarity: Low density forms 
recognizable and understandable 
Self Interests: advocacy for status quo by 
development industry and property 
owners 
 
Auto dependency and absence of 
travel options 
Legitimacy: car travel culturally 
supported, meet performance 
expectations, politically sanctioned 
Familiarity: car travel routine, taken-for-
granted 
Transaction costs: Sunk costs associated 
car-oriented transportation infrastructure 
Ideas: advocacy coalition 
challenges legitimacy of proposed 
parkway expansion 
Unique physical conditions (e.g. 
slow growth and rural urban 
form) challenge intensification 
Efficiency: Perception that any growth 
form of is necessary to provide 
economic benefits 
 
 
Local Context and Plan Implementation 
At the outset, this research identified key barriers to growth management described in the plan 
and policy implementation literature and questioned whether these barriers would vary with local context. 
Case studies were examined within their different local contexts to evaluate if and how local factors 
influenced barriers to Growth Plan implementation at the artifact, planning and societal scales. Study 
results revealed that while different regions shared many similar barriers (particularly at the societal 
scale), the magnitude and expression of those barriers differed from region to region as a result of unique 
socio-political, economic and environmental conditions that characterized each place. These contextual 
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factors helped form distinct place identity, governance, and market institutional environments that created 
specific development pressures and influenced the beliefs, motivations and actions of local actors. 
The presence of natural amenities in the rural and peri-urban areas of Simcoe and Peterborough 
regions combined with the regions’ proximity to the Greater Toronto Area were found in this study to 
create significant seasonal and recreational development pressures. Small, less urban municipalities 
tended to share similar capacity challenges, amenity-related development pressures, a strong place 
identity, and a market-led approach to planning. In contrast, municipalities situated in large urban centres 
generally demonstrated a different set of barriers to growth management planning than municipalities in 
smaller, rural or exurban regions. In the Waterloo Region, a fairly strong local economy, a more 
urbanized built form and a long standing infusion of new ideas and resources from local post-secondary 
institutions helped structure a planning environment that was more receptive to Provincial growth 
management objectives. Waterloo’s significant barriers were mostly found outside of the municipal 
government agencies, including an unsupportive development industry and inconsistent regulatory 
framework that upended regional efforts to contain low density, peripheral development. 
This research found that interactions between local context and the planning environment scale 
was particularly important in determining how the Growth Plan was interpreted and implemented. Actors 
within the different planning environments, including planners, politicians, community stakeholders and 
developers, were found to possess particular institutional frames, unique to their specific social, political 
and economic conditions, which created the logics and rationale underlying many of the key barriers to 
growth management in each region. The frames provided the lens through which actors differentially 
interpreted societal values, assumptions and norms and negotiated locally-specific solutions through the 
planning process. In small, rural and peri-urban communities, the interactions between local context and 
the planning environment helped perpetuate a broader governance, land and property market and place 
identity institutional framework that supported conventional planning approaches and challenged a 
transition to new growth management approaches. 
Development industry commitment to growth management objectives also appeared to vary with 
geography, and lack of industry support was reported with high frequency in the Waterloo case study as a 
barrier to growth management. While the literature has recently emphasized the spatial differences and 
non-uniformity within the property development industry (Adams & Tiesdell, 2010; Coiacetto, 2000; 
Henneberry & Parris, 2013), the geographic differences found in this research may be directly tied to 
differences in local policy and regulatory environments. Opposition to growth management policies by 
key development industry actors in Waterloo may have been a direct response to Waterloo Region’s 
adoption of a new policy framework that significantly restricted suburban development opportunities and 
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associated economic returns for greenfield developers over the short term. A number of the appellants in 
the OMB hearing that challenged the Region of Waterloo’s Urban Growth Boundary were development 
firms with projects throughout the Greater Golden Horseshoe Area, including the Simcoe and 
Peterborough areas. Had Simcoe or Peterborough Counties implemented similar assertive growth 
management policies, it is reasonable to assume that development industry opposition to growth 
management policies would have been more apparent in those regions.  
The impact of geography was less apparent with respect to societal scale barriers such as 
consumer preferences, NIMBY and auto dependency on Growth Plan implementation. Planners in all 
case study regions, whether comprised of larger urban centres or peri-urban or rural municipalities, 
reported consumer demand for suburban, low density residential development as a driving force behind 
existing development patterns and the continued supply of low density urban forms. While consumer 
preference for single detached residential housing is widely understood to constitute a barrier to growth 
management (Ewing, Hamidi, & Nasar, 2015; Howley, 2009; Senior, Webster, & Blank, 2004), some 
scholars have found local variability in consumer housing preferences depending on city size (Dunse, 
Thanos, & Bramley, 2013) and social and economic conditions (Charney, 2015; Guy & Henneberry, 
2000; Lewis & Baldassare, 2010).  
Public opposition to infill and intensification was described by planners and media reports across 
all case studies as a significant barrier to growth management. These echo findings of others who have 
found NIMBY to be a ubiquitous challenge for urban intensification efforts (Downs, 2005; Searle & 
Filion, 2011). While all case study regions described NIMBY as a challenge to the creation of infill and 
higher density development, its influence on planning processes appeared to have greater purchase in 
Simcoe and Peterborough, where municipal politicians and staff were more receptive to NIMBY 
concerns. Other studies have revealed that NIMBY can both challenge and support growth management 
efforts, depending on the particular context. Feldman and colleagues (2012), for example, found that local 
politicians may use the public process strategically to advance or refute a development, depending on 
their own motivations (e.g. level of support for a project, desire for economic growth). Searle and Filion 
(2011) and Gilbert et al. (2005), on the other hand, found that public opposition to growth within 
peripheral peri-urban areas could generate greater support for intensification efforts.  
The presence of growth coalitions – the formal or informal networks established between key 
decision makers to exert influence on municipal decision making in favour of growth – was consistently 
reported with low frequency in each of the case study regions. While some news reports questioned the 
motivations behind the Province’s decision to expand to settlement and employment areas within Simcoe 
(e.g. Gombu, 2009b), few municipal actors interviewed for this research identified coalition building 
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between decision makers and the development industry as a barrier to Growth Plan implementation. 
Challenging the growth coalition theory, a number of US and Canadian scholars have found that public 
stakeholders, particularly homeowners, play a more significant role in municipal politics and decision 
making than was previously attributed to them through urban regime theories, which emphasized the role 
of the political and business elite in decision making (Arku, Kemp, & Gilliland, 2011; Been et al., 2014; 
McGregor & Spicer, 2016). In a study of redevelopment politics in London, Ontario, Cobban (2003) 
proposed that the configuration of and controls within Canada’s political and economic institutions did 
not favour the emergence of growth coalitions and that the theory had limited applicability to Canada. 
Others, however, have found coalitions to develop in a variety Canadian contexts, both for and against 
particular growth and development regimes (Leo, 1995; Leo, 2008; Marquis, 2009; Sutcliffe, 2011). 
While this research provides some insight into the motivations and interests of key actors, a more targeted 
assessment of network-building activity between key actors would be necessary to determine the role of 
possible coalitions in the implementation of growth management policy. Further discussion about areas 
for future study are presented in Chapter 8. 
Summary  
This chapter presented a synthesis of the institutions and the interactions between their 
component barriers that constrain or enable implementation of the Growth Plan within the three case 
study regions. Barriers to growth management implementation were reviewed using the categories offered 
by the culturalized model of planning to help reveal the scales at which barriers were concentrated and 
interacted. A review of the main institutional themes that were found to influence local implementation 
revealed that institutional rules, identities and belief systems at the planning environment scale served as 
the scale of primary influence affecting transgressions between local action and Provincial objectives. The 
institutional themes and component barriers were then explored using key theoretical concepts offered by 
historical and sociological institutionalism, including mechanisms supporting institutional stability and 
change, and the role of power and agency. The review demonstrated how the barriers interacted to 
reinforce the status quo in Simcoe and Peterborough, and where there was movement toward change in 
Waterloo. It further highlighted the importance of local context as a mediating factor in the expression 
and magnitude of barriers which in turn helped to structure to local implementation.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
Regional growth management plans across North America have had mixed success, often 
resulting in a discrepancy between growth management planning objectives and the urban development 
reality. The uneven success of regional plans is in part a function of the variability in their implementation 
at the local level – particularly where local municipalities have discretion in how to carry out regional 
objectives (Brody & Highfield, 2005; Carruthers, 2002a; O'Connell, 2009; Padeiro, 2016). History has 
demonstrated that even the most well-designed plans are of little value if they are not translated into 
effective action at the local level. 
Ontario’s Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe is not immune to the challenges of local 
implementation. Implementation of the Plan has been described as “plagued with problems,” which have 
allowed many municipalities to avoid the fundamental shift required to ensure compact and orderly 
growth (Neptis Foundation, 2016). While the Province has responded to these and other criticisms 
(MMAH & MNRF, 2015) with the release of a revised Growth Plan that sets stricter targets and clearer 
land budgeting methodologies, these technical and policy adjustments may have limited impact on land 
use outcomes because they fail to address the perceptions and motivations that underpin local municipal 
conformance. Understanding the underlying factors that influence local implementation is critical in 
developing effective plans and planning systems. 
This research explores the reasons for variable implementation by examining local barriers to the 
implementation of the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe.  In an examination of three 
Ontario case study regions subject to the Growth Plan, the research tests the relative importance of known 
and theorized barriers to growth management implementation, and explores the relationships between 
those barriers and the local context.  By conceiving implementation barriers as a system of interdependent 
variables operating at different planning scales and within particular institutional and local contexts, the 
research explores the underlying factors and relationships that can lead to regionally unique responses to 
the challenges of managing urban growth. The research further examines the mechanisms by which 
barriers to implementation interact with local context to become institutionalized through processes of 
self-reinforcement, or undermined to create opportunities for change. In exploring patterns of barriers and 
their interrelationships in each of the three regions, this research attempts to answer the questions: 1) 
What are the key barriers to local implementation of regional growth management plans? 2) Are barriers 
archetypical or are they unique to the local context? 3) How do the barriers to implementation relate to 
one another, and what are the mediating mechanisms that define these relationships? and 4) How do 
barriers interact to reinforce the status quo? Where are there opportunities for change? 
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The section that follows summarizes key findings of the research, including the identification of 
entrenched patterns of barriers and opportunities for innovation and change. It concludes with a 
discussion about the theoretical contribution of the barrier models and questions for further research. 
Key findings 
The importance of Local Context 
Drawing on a wide range of literatures, this research identified 31 barriers to growth management 
operating across a spectrum of scales ranging from the unconscious, taken-for-granted societal barriers, to 
the more visible artifacts of planning practice. Recognizing that these barriers represented potential 
challenges whose influence may vary in different contexts, the research sought to determine if and how 
key barriers to growth management varied across three case study regions. In exploring this question, this 
research confirmed the existence of regionally unique patterns of key barriers that impacted how the 
Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe was interpreted and implemented at the local level. By 
comparing case study results to a generic model of barriers to growth management, the research revealed 
that certain barriers played a more important role than others within different regions.   
The influence of local context on the different regional patterns of barriers was another topic that 
this research sought to explore. In examining the scale at which barriers operated in each case study, it 
became apparent that the concept of scale offered only a partial explanation for the different patterns of 
barriers found across regions. The existence of shared societal scale barriers highlighted key differences 
in barrier patterns at the planning and artifact scales but offered an incomplete explanation for the reasons 
for those differences. The examination of the reinforcing and undermining relationships between barriers 
and between barriers and local context helped further illuminate the reasons for regionally distinct 
patterns of key barriers. Differences in local socio-political, economic, and environmental conditions 
across the three case study regions were found to interact with barriers at all planning scales, and 
particularly at the planning scale, to create specific governance and planning constraints, market 
pressures, and belief systems, meanings and norms that framed local implementation of regional growth 
management objectives. These interactions influenced how the Growth Plan was perceived and 
communicated by local actors and how growth management objectives were incorporated into policies, 
plans and decision making processes.  
Comparison across regions revealed that the physical condition of being rural, exurban or peri-
urban, and the myriad of related physical, economic and socio-cultural factors, provided significant 
explanatory power with respect to the different patterns of barriers across regions.  With some exceptions, 
(e.g. Hommels, 2005a; Hommels, 2005b; Richardson & Jensen, 2003; Sorensen, 2016), scholarly works 
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have treated built form as an object to which planning policy is directed, but rarely has it been explicitly 
identified as a barrier to the implementation of that policy. In this research, low density urban form was 
found to play a central role in growth management implementation across all case studies, both as an 
indicator of unsuccessful implementation and a barrier in itself. The additional physical condition of 
being rural, exurban or peri-urban was found to heighten the obstructing influence of urban form. Rural 
and exurban municipalities in Simcoe and Peterborough were found to share particular belief systems that 
placed a high value on the preservation of small town or rural character, local decision making, and 
market-led planning, and they faced significant organizational and governance constraints, such as lower 
planning capacity and fragmented, local decision making that collectively inhibited planning responses to 
achieve growth management objectives. These factors, combined with significant external growth 
pressures and internal aspirations for amenity-related development, helped strengthen political opposition 
to growth management and preferences for local, market-led planning approaches.  
In contrast, the urban region of Waterloo demonstrated market constraints and regulatory 
inconsistencies as key barriers to growth management. In this region, development industry objectives 
conflicted with local efforts to adopt regional policies to constrain growth, and were supported by a land 
use tribunal system that favoured conventional, market-led planning approaches. These barriers, however, 
demonstrated a tenuous impact on local implementation, in part because they failed to align with the local 
context, which was characterized by an increasingly urban identity, and economic growth contingent on 
the presence of post-secondary institutions, rather than natural amenities. The impact of market and 
regulatory barriers to growth management was further undermined by an urban governance institution 
characterized by a high planning capacity, strong regional coordination, and staff and council support for 
dense urban forms. Collectively, these factors served to challenge place identity and market barriers by 
creating openings or “soft spots” for the insertion of actions for change, including new ideas and credible 
alternatives. These ideas and alternatives included a view of intensification as a means to achieve 
economic goals, and use of planning tools to shape property markets. As a result, the urban municipalities 
in this research were found to be more likely to support actions that challenged or undermined existing 
barriers to growth management.  
The relationships between barriers and the mechanisms that led to their reinforcement or change, 
examined in Chapter 7, provide some answers to the questions posed for this research: How do barriers 
interact to reinforce the status quo? and Where are there opportunities for change? In the case of the rural 
and exurban communities of Simcoe and Peterborough, the mechanisms supporting entrenchment of 
current institutions appeared to prevail over opportunities for change. Key actors in these regions were 
found to share motivations, meanings and values that favoured low density development both as a source 
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of identity and differentiation as well as a primary source of economic development. Although some of 
these and other supporting barriers were challenged by the emergence of new ideas (Peterborough) and 
Provincial sanctions and veto decisions (Simcoe), the mechanisms for change were insufficient to subvert 
the stabilizing mechanisms that supported existing place identity, urban governance and property market 
institutions. Moreover, destabilizing actions failed to resonate with actor groups responsible for local 
planning and development, leading to strategic and political action to negotiate or subvert Provincial 
planning policy. These results are consistent with the findings of others (Golding, 2012; C. M. Hall, 2015; 
Kondo et al., 2012; Woods, 2011) and suggest that regional plans that view rural areas as if they were 
“downscaled cities” fail to directly address local conditions and do little to challenge entrenched 
institutions (K. I. Frank & Reiss, 2014, p. 386). A more fruitful treatment of rural regions may be to view 
them as physical places undergoing locally contingent processes of peri-urbanization, accompanied by a 
range of supporting social, political and economic institutions (Sorensen, 2016). New planning policy 
should recognize and address the supporting institutions that are aiding the transition of rural regions to 
peri-urban regions as well as capitalize on their inherent contradictions (e.g. the changing physical urban 
form and place identity caused by suburban growth) if it is to become locally institutionalized. 
Opportunities for change were more apparent in Waterloo Region. While identified barriers 
enjoyed support through a wide range of stabilizing mechanisms, areas of opportunity emerged within the 
institutions of urban governance and land and property markets. These opportunities included strong 
regional leadership and coordination of growth management objectives, and investment in public 
transportation, all of which provided a consistent policy framework for local municipalities and 
developers, and helped reframe intensification as an efficient and credible alternative to achieve economic 
goals. These actions combined with new ideas emerging from municipal actors and local advocacy groups 
helped undermine or challenge traditional approaches to managing growth and public support and 
preferences for car-oriented, low density urban forms. Overall, barriers to growth management in 
Waterloo faced significant destabilizing mechanisms that created openings for the institutionalization of 
the Growth Plan. 
The Role of Place Identity, Land and Property Markets and Urban Governance 
A key finding of this research was the emergence of place identity, land and property markets and 
urban governance as overarching institutions that served to obstruct or facilitate growth management 
objectives. The emergence of these institutional themes, depicted in Figure 4, served as more useful 
synthesis for the grouping of individual barriers and provided greater conceptual clarity than grouping 
barriers according to the scales of planning culture, as depicted in Figure 3 (This point is discussed in 
more detail in the next section, Implications for Theory).  
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This research found that place identity, comprising the physical characteristic of a place, and the 
motivations, meanings and values that key actors associated with that place, played a significant role in 
the obstruction of growth management efforts. Place identity barriers were found to play a particularly 
important role in the rural, exurban and peri-urban communities examined for this research, where they 
served as an important interpretive frame through which politicians, planners and other stakeholders 
viewed, evaluated and resisted planning for built forms that were considered incompatible with local 
character. These findings are consistent with those of others who have described small, amenity-based 
communities and rural areas as sites where newcomers seek built forms that offer privacy and escape, and 
existing residents oppose higher density developments (Cadieux & Hurley, 2011; Gilbert et al., 2005; 
Golding, 2012; Kondo et al., 2012). Recognition of place identity as an important influence on the 
cultural, economic and political drivers that favour unrestricted, low density urban growth is critical in the 
identification of practical solutions. 
The structuring influence of land and property markets was also identified as an important 
institution in all case studies, and economic interests were found to significantly influence planning action 
and decision making by key actors. Comprising private economic interests, municipal economic growth 
objectives and planners’ viewpoints about the role of markets in planning practice, the prevailing land and 
property market institutions not only created supply and demand challenges for compact urban forms, but 
also influenced planners’ interpretations and responses to those challenges. While the planning literature 
has long recognized the connections between land and property markets and planning (e.g. Fainstein, 
1986; Fainstein, 1991; Weiss, 1987), planning practice rarely explicitly identifies the role that land and 
property markets play in the planning process (Adams & Tiesdell, 2010). In recognizing the role of 
markets on political interests, developers’ preferences, and planners’ efforts to shape, regulate and 
stimulate real estate markets, Adams and Tiesdell (2013, p. 286) have issued a call “not for planners to 
become market actors, but rather for them to realise they already are market actors, intricately involved in 
market construction and reconstruction”. The impact of planners’ capacity to fully engage in their role as 
market actors, through education and by challenging the value systems that separate planning from 
markets was found in this research to be an important factor that influenced municipalities’ ability to 
overcome barriers to growth management. By providing planners with both the tools and capacity 
required to shape places, municipalities may be better equipped to confront difficult planning issues and 
adapt to new regional policy. 
Urban governance served as the third key institution that influenced growth management efforts. 
Consisting largely of the organizational structures and processes, regulatory requirements and municipal 
actors’ belief systems that guide planning practice and decision making, urban governance encompassed 
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much of the operational side of planning practice. Barriers within the urban governance institutions were 
found to be locally contingent, with rural case study regions demonstrating a more fragmented 
governance structure, intense inter-municipal competition for development, and lower planning capacity 
in terms of staff and resources than the urban case study region. These urban governance barriers reduced 
rural and exurban municipalities’ capacity for long term strategic planning and their ability to balance 
economic development with growth management planning objectives (Birnbaum et al., 2004). Urban 
governance challenges in rural areas were heightened by amenity migration pressures, which appealed to 
local economic development objectives, but which placed pressures on local municipalities’ capacity to 
plan for compact, continuous urban forms, and adequate water, waste water infrastructure. Governance 
structures in general have been described by others as “much better geared to the stationary and the 
immobile than they are to the movement of people (and capital) between jurisdictions” (C. M. Hall, 2015, 
p. 4). Amenity migration is not easily managed by local governments, and requires planning and 
coordination at multiple scales and across disciplines. Small, amenity-rich communities that rely on the 
permanent and/or temporary movement of people as a significant source of economic growth often lack 
the capacity to plan around the broader issues associated with amenity migration, such as loss of habitat 
and natural areas, the transition of vacation homes to permanent ones, and infrastructure to support 
newcomers. The absence of policies in the Growth Plan that address recreation-related development only 
served to exacerbate the regulatory challenges in governing growth in amenity regions. 
Local Planning to address Regional Objectives 
The results of this research confirm that planning at the local scale is often ill-equipped for 
dealing with planning challenges that have broader regional or global implications, particularly when 
those broader objectives conflict with local needs and preferences (Pissourios, 2014).  If new planning 
legislation is to be adopted at the local level, there needs to be a consideration of the myriad of other less 
visible and locally-contingent, institutionalized barriers that can obstruct implementation, (Buitelaar et al., 
2011; Sánchez & Maseda, 2016). Efforts to institutionalize a new regulatory framework require the 
recognition that the practice of planning is embedded in a broader planning culture, rather than a purely 
technical, rational activity (Booth, 2011; Friedmann, 1967; Othengrafen & Reimer, 2013). As this 
research demonstrated, land use planning is a negotiated and complex process rooted in local conditions, 
motivations, and belief systems (Servillo & Van Den Broeck, 2012). As a socially constructed process, 
planning is guided by underlying, and often taken-for-granted, assumptions and belief systems that lead to 
particular planning actions that can inhibit or facilitate transformative change. Understanding and 
challenging these underlying assumptions is critical for reflexive and effective planning practice 
(Friedmann, 1967). 
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In recognition of the failed application of certain planning approaches at the local level, some 
scholars have argued for a more multi-faceted and nuanced view of planning that recognizes the unique 
needs, pressures and values of the communities responsible for implementation. Solutions to planning 
challenges in rural and exurban regions have focused on collaborative planning and co-management 
planning approaches, which are argued to better recognize and address unique local conditions, empower 
local actors, and achieve more democratic outcomes (K. I. Frank & Reiss, 2014). These approaches are 
theorized to provide a forum for more open and objective communication in which actors are encouraged 
to be self-reflective and seek consensus on solutions that achieve the common good (Fischler, 2000; 
Healey, 1992; Innes, 1995).  Provincial-local processes for social learning may help to highlight and 
explore contradictions in rural planning objectives (e.g. natural amenities as focal points for both growth 
and protection), and market-led planning practices. Collective recognition of barriers to growth 
management, particularly at the planning environment scale, may also help identify solutions that 
destabilize patterns of reinforcement and legitimize alternatives. 
Collaborative planning as a solution for regional problems such as low density urban growth, 
however, is challenged by many real world conditions that compromise its usefulness as a planning tool. 
To avoid a single group from co-opting the process, collaborative planning efforts are required to adhere 
to a communicative rationality, in which power is shared equally across participants, and participants 
work to identify mutually beneficial compromises to achieve a common good (Phelps & Tewdwr-Jones, 
2000; Roy, 2015). The emphasis on democratic process rather than outcome, can lead to planning failures 
when the process fails to produce the desired outcome (e.g. growth management) (Young, 2011). Scholars 
have questioned the value of decision making processes that give greater weight to local interests in the 
development of solutions to manage extra-local problems, such as urban sprawl (Morrison, Lane, & 
Hibbard, 2015). Local interests such as preferences for unrestricted amenity-based growth and the 
maintenance of existing, low density urban forms, for example, can hinder achievement of broader 
regional growth management objectives. Collaborative planning also risks overemphasizing the value of 
local knowledge at the expense of technical knowledge (Morrison et al., 2015). This may be a particular 
concern for regions in which there is a demonstrated absence of local planning capacity.  
Decision making that focuses on the achievement of particular planning outcomes at the expense 
of a more democratic decision making process, on the other hand, has been criticized as being overly 
authoritarian (Young, 2011). Tensions can arise when policy makers circumvent or manipulate 
democratic processes to achieve desired planning outcomes (Young, 2011). These challenges may help 
explain why the Growth Plan, which according to the former Deputy Minister of MMAH, Brad Graham, 
was developed in conjunction with an unprecedented amount of municipal consultation, still failed to 
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garner the support of key municipal stakeholders in rural regions. The findings of this research call 
attention to the areas in which consultation and action may be further required to undermine or challenge 
entrenched institutional arrangements that constrain implementation. A more strategic, multifaceted 
approach, including the reframing of issues and problems, and the weakening of institutional logics may 
be necessary to overturn local resistant to regional policy change. 
Implications for Theory 
This research partially answers a call from Hall and Taylor (1996) and Hall (2007) for a better 
interchange among the schools of new institutionalism. It does this by merging theoretical insights offered 
by historical and sociological institutionalism to provide an improved understanding institutions, their 
influence on action and their likelihood to change. In doing so, the research attempts to “reveal different 
and genuine dimensions of human behavior and of the effects institutions can have on behaviour” that 
could be overlooked with the application of a single new institutional approach (P. A. Hall & Taylor, 
1996, p. 955). By merging the historical and sociological institutionalism definitions of institution and 
conceptions of how institutions influence action, this research demonstrates a number of areas of 
complementarity and compatibility. In particular, the results of this research demonstrate that institutions 
structuring plan implementation do indeed include not just formal and informal organizations, rules and 
practices, but also “the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of 
meaning’ guiding human action” (P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947)”. The two dimensions would not 
have been fully captured without a merged historical and sociological institutionalist definition of 
institution. The results of this research also confirm Hall and Taylor’s (1996) proposition that action is 
best understood as a combination of both strategic decision making, and cultural influences, whereby the 
range of options perceived by a strategic actor may be limited to a subset of culturally-appropriate 
options.  
This research also combines the theoretical frameworks of historical and sociological 
institutionalism with the organizing framework of planning culture to advance our understanding of how 
barriers to implementation are influenced by local context. Both frameworks have been used individually 
to examine the role of structuring forces on planning action (e.g. González & Healey, 2005; Healey, 2005; 
Healey, 2007; Othengrafen & Reimer, 2013; Othengrafen, 2010). Their conceptual strength lies, in part, 
in their comprehensive interpretation of the forces that influence action, including not just formal, 
regulatory structures, such as laws, planning policy and organizations but also informal, less visible and 
taken-for-granted beliefs, values and norms. The broad definition helps avoid myopic perspectives of 
local planning as a solely rational, technical response to local needs and broader policy frameworks, 
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rather than one that is socially-embedded and value-laden. An outcome of this expanded view of barriers 
was the identification of low density urban form as an important structuring influence on planning 
practice, and the articulation of specific beliefs and value systems that played a key role in influencing 
planners’ and politicians’ actions. Results from this research confirmed that, regardless of geography, key 
barriers to growth management implementation included both formal structures (e.g. low density urban 
form, county-city governance systems, and the Ontario Municipal Board) and informal structures (e.g. the 
values and belief systems of planning staff, politicians and developers and the preferences of consumers).  
The model of planning culture introduced additional analytical value for understanding barriers to 
implementation by providing an organizing framework to identify and categorize the scale at which 
barriers operated. The model provided a useful lens for ensuring the identification of less visible barriers, 
such as underlying belief systems and values, which played an important but indirect role in the 
maintenance of low density urban forms. In absence of a sensitizing framework, invisible, underlying 
barriers may have been missed in the identification of possible or anticipated barriers that made up the 
model. The model also helped in the differentiation between barriers at the artifact scale (the outputs of 
the planning process) and planning environment scale (the rules conventions, beliefs, and value systems 
inherent in the practice of planning), which helped in the identification of causal practices or beliefs that 
were connected to particular outcomes. This may have prevented an over emphasis on the tangible 
barriers in the analysis. As well, the scalar component of the model helped serve as a form of synthesis, 
allowing for general conclusions regarding the relative importance of each scale on implementation. In 
the case of this research, the categorization of barriers by scale helped highlight the fact that while 
societal barriers were fairly consistent across case study regions, the planning environment scale 
functioned as a critical interception point or filter through which societal barriers were translated into 
artifacts. The identification of the planning environment as a key scale of interaction was reinforced by 
findings of the relational models in which urban governance emerged as a key institution. The focus on 
the planning environment and its emphasis on the shared assumptions, values and cognitive frames of 
political actors, planners, and developers called attention to the important role of implementing agents and 
their discretion and socialization as part of the implementation process. The identification of planning 
environment as an important scale of analysis has been identified by others, such as Lowndes (2009), who 
identified this institutional scale as “locally specific cultures and conventions (‘how things are done 
around here’)”.  Suitner (2014) similarly described this scale as comprising the traditions and attitudes 
around the practice of planning. The focus on planning environments by Suitner (2014), Othengrafen 
(2010) and others (Hamedinger, 2014; Haselsberger & Hamedinger, 2014; Knieling & Othengrafen, 
2015) is part of a growing body of work examining the factors affecting the transferability of centralized 
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planning policies to different countries or regions. These scholars argue for the need for increased 
sensitivity to local cultures, including local planning environments, when applying planning policies to 
new areas. Given the important influence of distinct planning environments on policy outcomes, parallels 
may exist between studies of policy transferability and the application of Provincial policy to urban and 
rural areas.  
By including a third scale of operation, the model of planning culture permitted an expansion on 
binary conceptions of implementation (e.g. top-down and bottom up variables). The categorization of 
barriers into three scales of analysis helped to move the examination of implementation beyond the 
actions of rule makers and rule takers, to include a wider range of formal and informal influencing 
structures, from societal influences to more visible plans and processes.  Scholars from a range of new 
institutional theoretical streams have recognized that institutional change is contingent on the scale at 
which change is imposed and the interconnections between scales (Lowndes, 2009; Scott, 2014). The 
model of planning culture helped to inform the new institutional framework by embedding the scale at 
which a barrier can be perceived directly into the analytical model.  The recognition of scale also 
provided some clarity and structure for new institutional thinking by helping to tease apart implementing 
agents from the products of the planning process and broader societal influences. Given that institutional 
stability and change are a function of influencing processes and the effects of those processes (Delbridge 
& Edwards, 2007; Lowndes, 2009), the inclusion of the artifact scale in the analytical framework helped 
ensure that the spatial and policy effects were not overlooked. Moreover, the scales of planning culture 
helped to ensure that the beliefs, values and conventions of actors at the planning environment scale were 
not conflated with the outcomes of their actions by defining those outcomes as artifacts in a separate, but 
connected scale of analysis.  
This research also revealed a number of shortcomings in the planning culture model. In its 
identification of the three scales of influence, the model suggested a nested relationship between scales, 
where artifacts were nested within the planning environment, and the planning environment was nested 
within the societal environment. The model’s hierarchical depiction of scales did not account for possible 
direct interactions between artifacts and societal scale factors and provided limited insight on whether 
interactions occurred within scales. The nested nature of the three scales was not well suited for 
recognizing what social institutionalists consider to be a key characteristic of the social structures that 
comprise institutions: that social structures can be both a mediating variable and also an outcome of 
action, and that actors are both bounded by them and embedded within them (Delbridge & Edwards, 
2007; Healey, 2007). Under this premise, barriers at a particular scale could be expected to demonstrate a 
more complex set of interrelationships. The results of this research, including the generic model of 
229 
 
barriers to growth management developed in Figure 4, did in fact demonstrate a much more complex 
picture of interrelationships that included interactions between barriers across and between scales, 
sometime resulting in direct interactions between societal scale and the artifact scale and frequently 
demonstrating interactions within any given scale. The recognition of these interconnections was critical 
in the understanding of how existing barriers that influenced planning practice were challenged or 
perpetuated. 
In its depiction of potential and known relationships between barriers, the model in Figure 4 
provided a better understanding of the complex and dynamic interrelationships between barriers within 
different local contexts. The model revealed that barriers generally coalesced around the three broad 
institutional themes of place identity, land and property markets and urban governance. The identification 
of these institutional themes complements scholarly works that have sought to synthesize the factors that 
influence institutional change. Such works have focused on the characteristics of the institutions, but have 
not identified the relevant institutions themselves (Delbridge & Edwards, 2007; Mahoney & Thelen, 
2009; March & Olsen, 2009). The identification of key framing institutions and their interactions 
complements these literatures by defining particular institutional structures that influence action in a local 
planning setting. The categorization of barriers within the three framing institutions also responds to 
challenges in the implementation literature identified by O’Toole (2000), regarding the vast number of 
implementation variables that challenge efforts at a synthesis. The institutional themes provide a form of 
synthesis by grouping barriers according to meaningful interrelationships. The themes further offer a 
conceptual frame for analyzing and understanding the broader institutional logic and conventions 
underlying the barrier groupings. Without this conceptual framing provided by the model, the analysis of 
how barriers interacted may have been more disjointed and abstract. The model further helps refocus our 
understanding of plan implementation from one that emphasizes implementation as a technical challenge 
preoccupied with issues such as plan quality and administrative efficiency, to one that recognizes its 
social, cultural and political roots. In doing so, it provides a possible explanation for why empirical 
studies have found weak relationships between the existence of growth management policies and actual 
changes to the built form (Anthony, 2004; Boyle & Mohamed, 2007).   
Scholars have identified that the temporal scale is also an important factor in the change and 
entrenchment of institutions (Lowndes, 2009; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Scott, 2014) and historical 
institutionalists have used time and sequencing of events as a focal point for examining institutional 
change. Examinations of institutional change that do not adopt a historical institutionalist approach may 
benefit from the use of the model in this research because of its integration of mechanisms leading to 
institutional stability and change over time (Tables 2 and 3). Some of these mechanisms (e.g. legitimacy, 
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familiarity, new ideas) by definition, incorporate the notion of time and its solidifying effect on beliefs 
and practices, or conversely, its introduction of novelty. These time sensitive mechanisms were found to 
play an important role on the relatively stability of barriers to growth management. 
The mechanisms examined for this research also confirmed the importance of both structure (e.g. 
cultural support and legitimacy) and agency (e.g. discretion and veto power) in reinforcing existing 
barriers to growth management. The dual role of structure and agency has been recognized in the recent 
theoretical literatures as important for providing a more fulsome explanation of incremental institutional 
change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). Of particular importance to smaller rural communities in 
Peterborough and Simcoe was the role that legitimacy and familiarity played to reinforce place identity, 
land and property market barriers, and a governance system whose actors advocated for reduced Growth 
Plan targets and used discretion to interpret and adapt the Growth Plan in a manner that would limit 
transformative change to the status quo. While Waterloo shared many of the same societal scale 
stabilizing forces that supported existing land and property markets and place identity, these forces were 
partially undermined by an evolving governance institution that adopted destabilizing incentives, 
sanctions, new ideas, and credible alternatives. Waterloo municipal and political actors further used 
discretion and veto power as a means to challenge barriers that enjoyed cultural support and legitimacy. 
Results of this research build on the extant growth management implementation literature by 
deepening our understanding of the relationship between local context, institutions and action. It does this 
by examining how obstacles to the implementation of a growth management plan are perceived, justified 
and reinforced through local planning cultures, planning policies and processes. It highlights the 
importance of local context on the interpretation, management and expression of broader scale, societal 
barriers. Explanations of the locally contingent responses to the Province’s Growth Plan help highlight 
crucial contextual factors that may impact how regional growth management policy will be interpreted 
and adopted and implemented in other regions that share similar contexts. 
Areas for Further Research 
While a central strength of this research was the interdisciplinary examination of implementation, 
and the integration of concepts of planning culture with new institutional theory, the approach also raised 
a number of challenges and questions. The purpose of merging the culturalized model of planning 
proposed by Othengrafen (2010) with the new institutional literature’s conceptions of institutions into one 
conceptual framework was to provide a more nuanced understanding of the scale at which barriers 
obstructed or enabled local growth management implementation. Attention to the three scales of planning 
helped in the identification of barriers, ensuring that barriers represented a continuum of visibility, from 
231 
 
regulative systems, normative systems and cultural-cognitive systems (Scott, 2014); however, the scalar 
categories provided little predictive power for interactions that occurred within or across scales. As a 
result, the inclusion of the three scales into the combined conceptual framework (Figure 4) provided 
limited insight into the relationships, patterns and clustering of barriers. The arrangement of barriers 
according to the strength of their reinforcing relationships rather than the scale at which they operated 
provided a more useful depiction of barriers as a complex system that coalesced around institutional 
themes. And yet, according to Lowndes (2009), scale and the relationships between scales are a critical 
factor in the study of institutions, and relationships between scales can determine how change at one scale 
is incorporated or rejected at another scale. A possible reason for challenges associated Othengrafen’s 
(2010) model was that in the adaptation of three cognitive scales proposed by Schein (2017) to a system 
of three organization-based planning scales, the model may have conflated two distinct areas of inquiry, 
namely the cognitive scale at which barriers originate, and the operational scale at which they are 
expressed. Further explorations of independent influence of cognitive scale and the operational scales of 
planning would assist in the understanding of the relative importance of scale on institutional stability and 
change. 
A second area that would benefit from further inquiry is the relationship between barriers to 
implementation and conformance with growth management policy. A methodological challenge of this 
research was its reliance on qualitative data in the form of documents, media reports and interviews, to 
measure barriers to growth management implementation. The use of qualitative data helped illustrate the 
planning cultures of different case study areas and their responses to the Growth Plan, but with the 
exception of some secondary sources that examined the Growth Plan implementation (e.g. Allen & 
Campsie, 2013; Neptis Foundation, 2017) the study did not relate barriers to growth management to local 
conformance to Growth Plan objectives. An empirical study that measures implementation of key 
objectives of the Growth Plan, including achievement of density and intensification targets, and the rate 
and form of urban growth before and after the Plan, would help complement this study and comparisons 
could further illuminate the role that barriers and local context play in Growth Plan conformance. 
A third area of inquiry that would expand on the findings of this research is the exploration of 
how planning policy might be adapted to different geographic regions. This research highlighted 
important challenges associated with the application of a regional growth management plan to rural, 
exurban and per-urban regions. Findings of this research suggest that some regions may be unsupportive 
of new planning policies or unable to implement them for a wide range of reasons, many of which are 
cultural and unconscious. And yet regional scale policies have been identified as one of the most effective 
way to deal with the negative externalities of growth, which are not easily perceived or managed at the 
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local level (Chapin, 2012; Wassmer, 2008). This dichotomy raises the question: how can regional-scale 
challenges, such as low density urban growth, be addressed in a way that works for those who are tasked 
with implementing the solution? Recognizing that barriers to growth management reported in this 
research point to distinct place identity, land and property markets, and urban governance institutions 
within rural, exurban and peri-urban regions that obstruct local implementation, a more specific question 
warrants further exploration: What approaches will address the specific barriers to implementation facing 
rural, peri-urban and exurban regions? 
To answer these questions, this research highlights possible areas of further inquiry. Since the 
institutionalization of a new regulatory framework requires the replacement or modification of old 
institutions with new institutions, which occurs within the “soft spaces” that exist between regulatory 
frameworks and actors’ interpretations and implementation of those frameworks (Mahoney & Thelen, 
2009), identification of the institutional soft spaces in rural communities would assist in targeting areas 
for intervention. This research highlights some areas where possible soft spaces exist, including: 1) the 
conflicting rationalities that underpin local objectives for amenity-related economic growth and the 
conservation of natural and rural amenities to support that growth and local place identities and 2) 
reduced governance, planning and resource capacity in regions that experience intense pressures for 
amenity related growth. A deeper exploration of the regulatory, economic and cognitive frames that that 
guide and enable amenity related development, and the role of evolving urban forms on the institutional 
logics place identity could help identify opportunities to undermine the stability of existing institutions 
and identify specific opportunities for change.  
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Appendix A. Standardized Interview Questions 
Interview Questions 
Smart Growth and the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe 
These interview questions are about the challenges and opportunities in implementing Smart 
Growth strategies in Ontario, with specific attention to the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe 
(the Growth Plan). We define Smart Growth as the policies and practices that promote compact forms of 
development which reduce automobile dependence through higher density, mixing of land uses and 
greater public and active modes of transportation than present development. Interviewees will be involved 
in different aspects of urban development and design and growth management.  Therefore some questions 
may be relevant to some individuals but not to others. You may choose not to answer a question if it does 
not correspond to your involvement and experience. Please remember that your answers will be kept 
confidential. 
The interview is organized into two sections. The first deals with Smart Growth in general, and 
more specifically with the conditions that are favourable to its implementation and the obstacles that 
confront Smart Growth policies. The second examines the approaches local and regional administrations 
will take relative to the policy directives present in the provincial Growth Plan.  
Section 1: Smart Growth 
1) What are in your opinion the most important ways of advancing Smart Growth strategies (for 
example, attempts to achieve life style changes, shifts in land use and transportation policies, 
different planning and development processes)? 
2) Can you identify a successful Smart Growth initiative promoted by your organization, or which 
took place within your locality or region? If so, can you describe it and focus on the conditions 
that led to its success? 
3) What are in your opinion the most important obstacles confronting Smart Growth strategies (for 
example, prevailing life styles, consumer preferences, insufficient public sector funding)? 
4) Can you identify a Smart Growth initiative contemplated or taken by your organization, or within 
your locality or region, which failed to be implemented or to achieve desired outcomes due to 
obstacles such as those mentioned in your previous answer? 
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5) Do you feel that Smart Growth strategies could eventually profoundly alter urban development? 
a. If the answer is yes: What circumstances would be needed for this to happen? 
b. If the answer is no: Why is Smart Growth likely to be ineffective in this regard? What 
else could be done to alter urban development? 
Section 2: Growth Plan 
1) In your opinion are the elements that are necessary for successful Smart Growth strategies present 
in the Growth Plan? Which are present and which are not? 
2) Do you feel that the Growth Plan prescribed under the Places to Grow Act is an effective policy 
instrument to achieve Smart Growth?  
a. Is the Growth Plan an effective tool to plan for active transportation, complete 
communities and reducing automobile dependency?  
b. Which aspects of Smart Growth does it most promote, and to which aspects does it pay 
less attention? 
3) Do you feel that the Growth Plan is an effective tool for preventing urban encroachment into green 
spaces and agricultural areas? Why or why not? 
4) Can you mention examples of Smart Growth interventions within your locality or region, which 
were implemented as a result of provincial policy requirements through the Growth Plan? 
5) What opportunities and challenges have you faced, or are you anticipating facing, when 
implementing the following four requirements of the Growth Plan? 
a. achieving intensification and density targets for your municipality’s or region's built up 
area and within intensification areas, that is, corridors and urban growth centre(s) 
b. planning for compact, transit-friendly, complete communities in designated greenfield 
areas 
c. planning for mixed uses (residential, commercial, office, institutional and employment), 
and establishing/maintaining employment areas 
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d. reducing automobile dependency, creating walkable and cyclable communities and 
increasing the proportion of people using alternative modes of transportation to get 
around (transit, walking and cycling). 
6) Are there instances where you were unable to implement Smart Growth interventions called for by 
the Growth Plan? If so what was the nature of the obstacles? 
7) Do you feel that your region's implementation of Growth Plan policies will profoundly alter urban 
development? 
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Appendix C. Reporting Frequency  
 
 
Waterloo Case Study Area: Number of Sources Reporting Barriers to Growth Management. 
0 5 10 15 20
Presence of a strong growth coalition that seeks economic…
Absence of dissenting voices in favour of growth management
Weak or unimplementable municipal plans/policies
Inaccurate price signals that subsidize low density development
Achievement of Growth Plan targets dependent on market
High cost and complexity to retrofit existing low density built…
Societal costs of development and car transportation not…
Lack of political will
Intermunicipal competition for development
Incompatible Provincial decision making, policy and investment
Unsupportive engineering and planning standards/policies
Unique physical conditions challenge intensification
Insufficient experience or knowledge to build alternatives
Presence of strong NIMBY lobbying against infill and…
Autodependency  and absence of alternative travel options
OMB rulings inconsistent with Growth Plan objectives
Preference for low density suburban form
Development industry not committed to growth management…
Media/Planning Documents
Interviews
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Simcoe Case Study Area: Number of Sources Reporting Barriers to Growth Management. 
0 5 10 15 20 25
Municipalities seek land uses that produce greatest tax revenue while…
Growth caps prevent planning for transit/complete communities
Lack of communication and awareness-building with developers
Insufficient experience or knowledge to build alternatives
Presence of strong growth coalition
Societal costs of development and car transportation not reflected in…
Weak or unimplementable municipal plans/policies
OMB rulings inconsistent with Growth Plan objectives
Growth Plan does not account for seasonal/recreational development
Development industry not committed to growth management objectives
Insufficient planning capacity
Unsupportive engineering and planning standards/policies
High cost and complexity to retrofit existing low density built form
Staff view role as dependent on market
Presence of strong NIMBY lobbying against infill and intensification
Rejection of Provincial oversight
Lack of political will
Staff view high density as incompatible with local character
Intermunicipal competition for development
Autodependency and absence of alternative travel options
Unique physical conditions challenge intensification
Incompatible Provincial decision making, policy and investment
Lack of staff commitment to growth management objectives
Preference for low density suburban form
Poor coordination and level of engagement between local and upper tier…
Official Plan does not conform to Growth Plan
Weak or absent regional coordination of local planning
Media/Planning Documents
Interviews
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Peterborough Case Study Area: Number of Sources Reporting Barriers to Growth Management. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Weak or absent regional coordination of local planning
Amenity migration and recreational development pressures
Slow growth prevent planning for transit/complete communities
Growth Plan population restrictions in small towns impedes efforts to…
Growth Plan provides insufficient guidance for rural areas and agricultural…
Insufficient experience or knowledge to build alternatives
Absence of dissenting voices in favour of growth management
Privatization and deregulation reduce capacity of local government to plan…
Intermunicipal competition for development
Municipalities seek land uses that produce the greatest tax revenue while…
Lack of staff commitment to growth management objectives
Rejection of Provincial oversight
Presence of a strong growth coalition that seeks economic growth over…
Autodependency  and absence of alternative travel options
Staff view high density as incompatible with local character
Unsupportive engineering and planning standards/policies
Development industry not committed to growth management objectives
Incompatible Provincial decision making, policy and investment
Local Context (rural urban form, amenity migration, slow growth and…
High cost and complexity to retrofit existing low density built form
Presence of strong NIMBY lobbying against infill and intensification
Preference for low density suburban form
Lack of political will
Media/Planning Documents
Interviews
